SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1389

Citation: SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1389
Parties: SZUWX v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number(s): NSD 1035 of 2015
Judge(s): GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 4 December 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (‘FCCA’) – where FCCA refused to extend time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to enable judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal concerning the applicant’s protection visa application – where FCCA found that proposed grounds of judicial review were arguable – whether the FCCA failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether it was in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time – whether legally unreasonable not to extend time
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476, 477, 477(1), 477(2)

Cases cited:

AAV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 700

AEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 702

Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292

Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 72 FLR 291

Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1983] FCA 96; (1983) 72 FLR 291

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 713; (1987) 14 ALD 291

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; (2009) 239 CLR 531

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Pozniak v Minister for Health [1986] FCA 66

Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 12; (1994) 48 FCR 83

SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 139 ALD 252

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719

SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2151

Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 59; (2008) 101 ALD 211

Date of hearing: 3 December 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr I Coleman SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Russell C Byrnes Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz, Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1035…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1389
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought a judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) that had refused to extend the time limit for the applicant to challenge a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal concerning their protection visa application. The applicant contended that the FCCA had failed to take into account relevant considerations when it refused to extend the time limit, and that it was in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension. The legal issues before the court were whether the FCCA had erred in its decision to not extend time and whether it was legally unreasonable for the FCCA not to extend time.

The court noted that the FCCA had found that the proposed grounds of judicial review were arguable, but had still refused to extend time because the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The court considered the principles of appellate review of the exercise of a judicial discretion, as established in House v The King, and noted that the FCCA's discretion to extend time was not entirely at large. The court held that the FCCA had not erred in its decision to refuse to extend time, as the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay and had only advanced weakly arguable grounds of judicial review. The court also held that it was not legally unreasonable for the FCCA not to extend time in those circumstances.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The court's decision underscores the importance of providing a satisfactory explanation for any delay in seeking judicial review and the need for the applicant to advance strong grounds of review in order to succeed in their application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the applicant to rely upon the amended application for relief dated 19 November 2015.

2. The amended application for review dated 19 November 2015 be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thirdly, despite some similarity in the description in House of the type of errors which justify appellate intervention and the types of matters which may give rise to jurisdictional error, it may be wrong to assume that the content of those grounds of review is the same. For example, although a mistake in fact-finding in the course of exercising a judicial discretion might attract appellate intervention in accordance with the House principles, generally speaking such an error is only likely to give rise to a jurisdictional error in the context of judicial review of administrative action if the fact in question is a jurisdictional fact. The High Court’s decision in Craig Craig is an important decision in the circumstances of this case. In particular, Craig serves to underline the critical need to distinguish between judicial review for jurisdictional error of a decision of an inferior court as opposed to an administrative tribunal or decision-maker, a distinction which was reaffirmed by the High Court in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; (2009) 239 CLR 531 (Kirk) at [67]-[68] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. Because of its importance, it is convenient to analyse Craig in some detail. Craig involved judicial review of the exercise of a discretion by the District Court of South Australia. The primary judge stayed criminal proceedings on the basis that the accused was without legal representation through no fault of his own and could not receive a fair trial unless he was represented by counsel, having regard to Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292 (Dietrich). The Crown applied to the Supreme Court of South Australia for an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the primary judge’s stay order (there was no statutory right of appeal). The Full Court of the Supreme Court held that the primary judge had committed a jurisdictional error because he had misunderstood the majority’s reasons in Dietrich. That decision was reversed on appeal by a unanimous decision of the High Court (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). The Court described the critical issue at [7] as whether “if, as the Full Court has held, the trial judge’s decision to grant the stay was affected by error, that error was of a kind which would have warranted the issue of the prerogative writ of certiorari…”. Putting to one side the issue of the availability for certiorari for error of law on the face of the record, the significance of the High Court’s analysis of the availability of that remedy for jurisdictional error may be summarised as follows. First, emphasis was given to the fact that a necessary distinction had to be drawn between inferior courts and other tribunals exercising governmental powers which are also amenable to the writ. The Court emphasised that inferior courts are constituted by persons with either formal legal qualifications or practical legal training and are part of the administration of justice, whereas administrative tribunals are commonly constituted by persons without formal legal qualifications or training and do not form part of the “ordinary hierarchical judicial structure” (at [10]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to ground 3, the Minister emphasised the primary judge’s finding that the applicant had not offered a satisfactory explanation for his delay. Moreover, the decision not to extend time in circumstances where there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay and the applicant advanced only weakly arguable grounds of judicial review fell far short of lacking an evident and intelligible justification, so submitted the Minister. Consideration Given its significance in the proceeding, it is desirable to set out s 477 of the Act, which specifies the time within which a proceeding under s 476 of the Act must be instituted in the FCCA and confers a discretion on the FCCA to extend that period:477 Time limits on applications to the Federal Circuit Court(1)An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.(2)The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:(a)an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and(b)the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. Self-evidently, the discretion to extend time is expressed in broad terms by reference to the Court extending the 35 day period as it “considers appropriate”. Although the legislation does not provide a list of considerations which may be relevant to that question, the discretion is not entirely at large. That is because:(a)it is a precondition to the exercise of the discretion that the applicant apply in writing for time to be extended and to indicate in writing why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and(b)another precondition is that the Court itself must be satisfied that “it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order”. It is important to recall that the jurisdiction being exercised by the Court in reviewing the primary judge’s exercise of discretion is a jurisdiction which concerns judicial review, as opposed to appellate review, of the exercise of a discretionary power by another Court. The principles which govern appellate review of the exercise of a judicial discretion were authoritatively described by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 (House) at 504-505. It is convenient to set out that well-known passage:But the judgment complained of, namely, sentence to a term of imprisonment, depends upon the exercise of a judicial discretion by the court imposing it. The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. Unlike courts of criminal appeal, this court has not been given a special or particular power to review sentences imposed upon convicted persons. Its authority to do so belongs to it only in virtue of its general appellate power. But even with respect to the particular jurisdiction conferred on courts of criminal appeal, limitations upon the manner in which it will be exercised have been formulated. Lord Alverstone L.C.J. said that it must appear that the judge imposing the sentence had proceeded upon wrong principles or given undue weight to some of the facts (R. v. Sidlow). Lord Reading L.C.J. said the court will not interfere because its members would have given a less sentence, but only if the sentence appealed from is manifestly wrong (R. v. Wolff). Lord Hewart L.C.J. has said that the court only interferes on matters of principle and on the ground of substantial miscarriage of justice (R. v. Dunbar). See, further, Skinner v. The King and Whittaker v. The King.