MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

Citation: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
Parties: MZABP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL and FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
File number: VID 443 of 2015
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 9 December 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application to extend time in which to bring judicial review proceedings under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether extension of time necessary in interests of the administration of justice

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review of decision of Federal Circuit Court refusing to extend time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Federal Circuit Court misconstrued nature of s 477(2) power – whether Federal Circuit Court’s reasoning was illogical, irrational or legally unreasonable – application dismissed

Legislation: Constitution s 75(v), Ch III
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 91X, 424A, 476, 476A(3)(a), 477(1), 477(2), 477A(2)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2009 (Cth)
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth)
Cases cited: BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz [2004] HCA 61; 221 CLR 400
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14; 228 CLR 651
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; 147 CLR 246
Chapman v Reilly (unreported, Neaves J, 9 December 1983)
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2003] HCA 28; 214 CLR 318
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; 3 FCR 344
Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; 195 CLR 516
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531
Lucic v Nolan [1982] FCA 217; 45 ALR 411
Marsden v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 229
Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
Mladenovv Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 12
MZZIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203
NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority [2004] HCA 48; 219 CLR 90
Seafish Tasmania Pelagic Pty Ltd v Burke, Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities [2013] FCA 782
Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 878; 48 FCR 83
Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] FCAFC 59
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; 139 ALD 252
SZTDC…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1391
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of São Tomé and Príncipe, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which had affirmed the refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa application. The applicant applied for judicial review under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and sought an extension of time under section 477(2) of the same Act. The Federal Circuit Court refused the extension of time and the applicant sought judicial review of that decision. The central legal issues were whether the Federal Circuit Court misconstrued the nature of its power to extend time under section 477(2) and whether the Court's reasoning was illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable.

The court examined the Federal Circuit Court's reasons and found that while the applicant's submissions had some force, the Federal Circuit Court's reasons did not explicitly set out the statutory test for extending time. The court noted that the Federal Circuit Court did not make the jurisdictional findings required by section 477(2) of the Act. Additionally, the phrase used by the Federal Circuit Court in its reasons did not accurately reflect the statutory test and had no clear source. Despite these issues, the court found that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was not so flawed as to be illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable. The court concluded that the applicant had no avenue of appeal and no broader corrective jurisdiction available to him.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review of the Federal Circuit Court's decision. The application was dismissed with no orders for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which appear below, I have concluded the application must be dismissed.BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of São Tomé and Príncipe who arrived in Australia on a student visa on 17 September 2011. São Tomé and Príncipe is an island nation located near the equator to the west of Central Africa. In March 2012, the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa which was refused by a delegate of the first respondent in May 2012. On 30 November 2012, the Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed that refusal. It was not until 6 March 2014, some 15 months later, that the applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). He also therefore needed to, and did, seek an extension of time under s 477(2) in which to review the Tribunal’s decision. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Given the small population of São Tomé and Príncipe, and the likelihood that a recitation of the applicant’s claims before the Tribunal may enable him to be identified, thus frustrating the apparent purpose of s 91X of the Migration Act, I do not propose to set out his claims in detail. Although it might be said the terms of the Federal Circuit Court’s decision pay insufficient regard to the likelihood of identifying the applicant, I do not propose to compound any risks which may arise for the applicant because the details of his claims are publicly available. The applicant gave details of his employment and activities in São Tomé and Príncipe. He explained that since he had been studying in Australia, there had been a change of circumstances in São Tomé and Príncipe and he had been warned by friends not to return there. The applicant’s migration agent submitted to the Tribunal that there had been no claims for protection in respect of São Tomé and Príncipe which had come before the Tribunal, and there is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons which appear to doubt that proposition. Before the Tribunal the applicant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of his political opinion, his religion and his membership of a particular social group of whistle-blowers. His claim was based on events occurring in São Tomé and Príncipe in 2011, and early 2012. He claimed his immediate family had also fled the country in early 2012 and were seeking asylum elsewhere. It suffices to say that the Tribunal did not accept his claims, finding he had fabricated them. The finding of fabrication, which was made principally in relation to the applicant’s claim based on political opinion, was then used by the Tribunal as a reason for it not needing to consider in detail the applicant’s claims to fear persecution by reason of being a member of a social group, namely whistle-blowers. The way the Tribunal dealt with the whistle-blower claim would come to form a substantial part of the applicant’s grounds for judicial review.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDING The applicant filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court on 6 March 2014, seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision under s 476 of the Migration Act as well as an extension of time in which to seek review under s 477(2). The 35 days in which he had a right to seek review of the Tribunal’s decision (see s 477(1) of the Act) expired on 4 January 2013. The application was made approximately fourteen months out of time. At the time of filing his application, the applicant was self-represented. He subsequently obtained legal representation and filed an amended application. At the Federal Circuit Court hearing, the applicant’s lawyer sought to rely on further amended grounds as well as a ground not previously identified. With the leave of the Court, the applicant filed after the hearing a further amended application dealing with all the grounds he sought to raise, and the Minister was given an opportunity to file supplementary written submissions. The Minister did not oppose these amendments. As amended the grounds covered a failure to consider his case as put (ie, as two separate claims to fear persecution by reason of political opinion and membership of a social group), a failure properly to consider the whistle-blower claim at all, a failure to afford procedural fairness both in terms of a failure to provide, pursuant to s 424A of the Act, information on which the Tribunal ultimately relied, and a failure to review the whole of the delegate’s decision because of the way the Tribunal dealt with the social group claim. The grounds also alleged breach of an asserted “duty to inquire”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was not until 6 March 2014, some 15 months later, that the applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). He also therefore needed to, and did, seek an extension of time under s 477(2) in which to review the Tribunal’s decision. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Given the small population of São Tomé and Príncipe, and the likelihood that a recitation of the applicant’s claims before the Tribunal may enable him to be identified, thus frustrating the apparent purpose of s 91X of the Migration Act, I do not propose to set out his claims in detail. Although it might be said the terms of the Federal Circuit Court’s decision pay insufficient regard to the likelihood of identifying the applicant, I do not propose to compound any risks which may arise for the applicant because the details of his claims are publicly available. The applicant gave details of his employment and activities in São Tomé and Príncipe. He explained that since he had been studying in Australia, there had been a change of circumstances in São Tomé and Príncipe and he had been warned by friends not to return there. The applicant’s migration agent submitted to the Tribunal that there had been no claims for protection in respect of São Tomé and Príncipe which had come before the Tribunal, and there is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons which appear to doubt that proposition. Before the Tribunal the applicant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of his political opinion, his religion and his membership of a particular social group of whistle-blowers. His claim was based on events occurring in São Tomé and Príncipe in 2011, and early 2012. He claimed his immediate family had also fled the country in early 2012 and were seeking asylum elsewhere. It suffices to say that the Tribunal did not accept his claims, finding he had fabricated them. The finding of fabrication, which was made principally in relation to the applicant’s claim based on political opinion, was then used by the Tribunal as a reason for it not needing to consider in detail the applicant’s claims to fear persecution by reason of being a member of a social group, namely whistle-blowers. The way the Tribunal dealt with the whistle-blower claim would come to form a substantial part of the applicant’s grounds for judicial review.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDING The applicant filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court on 6 March 2014, seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision under s 476 of the Migration Act as well as an extension of time in which to seek review under s 477(2). The 35 days in which he had a right to seek review of the Tribunal’s decision (see s 477(1) of the Act) expired on 4 January 2013. The application was made approximately fourteen months out of time. At the time of filing his application, the applicant was self-represented. He subsequently obtained legal representation and filed an amended application. At the Federal Circuit Court hearing, the applicant’s lawyer sought to rely on further amended grounds as well as a ground not previously identified. With the leave of the Court, the applicant filed after the hearing a further amended application dealing with all the grounds he sought to raise, and the Minister was given an opportunity to file supplementary written submissions. The Minister did not oppose these amendments. As amended the grounds covered a failure to consider his case as put (ie, as two separate claims to fear persecution by reason of political opinion and membership of a social group), a failure properly to consider the whistle-blower claim at all, a failure to afford procedural fairness both in terms of a failure to provide, pursuant to s 424A of the Act, information on which the Tribunal ultimately relied, and a failure to review the whole of the delegate’s decision because of the way the Tribunal dealt with the social group claim. The grounds also alleged breach of an asserted “duty to inquire”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Unlike the circumstances to which some members of the Court in Kirk referred, where correction of legal error may be available through both an appellate process and supervisory review, so that the confinement of the latter to errors which are jurisdictional in nature can highlight the distinction between judicial review and appeal, litigants in the circumstances of the applicant have no avenue of appeal, and access to a broader corrective jurisdiction is absent.CONSIDERATION As developed in submissions, the applicant’s judicial review application relied on two alternative submissions: first, that the Federal Circuit Court misconstrued the nature of its power to extend time under s 477(2); and second, that the Court’s reasoning was illogical, irrational or legally unreasonable, or (it appeared) a combination of all three. In relation to both alternatives, the applicant submitted the errors were jurisdictional in nature. On the first contention, the applicant relied on the example given in Craig and to which I have referred at [30] above, submitting that the Federal Circuit Court misconstrued or did not understand the source of its jurisdiction to extend time and the approach required by s 477(2)(b) of the Migration Act. As to the second contention, the applicant relied on the dicta of several judges in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332. Did the Federal Circuit Court misconstrue the nature of its s 477(2) power? The applicant relied on four indicators that the Federal Circuit Court misapprehended the nature of its power to extend time. These were: (1)the manner in which the Court expressed and applied the test for extension of time. The applicant submitted that paragraph [11] of the Federal Circuit Court reasons is taken from paragraph [29] of Minister’s submissions before the Federal Circuit Court, where reference is made to Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; 3 FCR 344, the leading case on the discretion to extend time under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth). (2)the absence of any reference to s 477(2) in the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons. The fact that there is a reference to the time limit and to s 477(1) does not, the applicant submits, provide sufficient basis to infer the Federal Circuit Court understood what it needed to apply was the statutory test in s 477(2).(3)the absence of any express findings of the two jurisdictional facts for which s 477(2) provides in paras (a) and (b). Had the Federal Circuit Court been adhering to the statute which conferred its power, the applicant submits it would have made the findings the statute required.(4)in the only paragraph of the Federal Circuit Court reasons which could be said in any way to set out the test the Court had applied (at [55] of the Court’s reasons), the use of a confused and inaccurate rendition of the test in s 477(2)(b). There is some force in the applicant’s submissions. The reasons of the Federal Circuit Court fail to set out the terms of s 477(2), being the power the Court was called on to exercise, and fail to set out with any accuracy or particularity the key statutory consideration in dispute and of which it had to be satisfied: namely, whether it was in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time. Even if, as the Minister submits, it is appropriate to substitute the word “serve” for the word “save” in [55] of the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons, so that the sentence is not nonsensical, the phrase upon which the Federal Circuit Court fastens is not the statutory phrase. Nor does it have a source in authorities such as Hunter Valley Developments. Where the Federal Circuit Court has drawn the phrase from is unknown.