CCH19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1304
•15 August 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CCH19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1304
File number(s): MLG 1627 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE JOHNS Date of judgment: 15 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time – judicial review – protection visa refusal – 315 days late – inadequate explanation – no arguable case of jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 476, 476(2)(a) 477 Cases cited: ADF17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 453
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
SZLIH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 108 at [33]
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437; [1994] FCA 1253
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 at [12], [18]
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 89 Date of hearing: 8 August 2025 Place: Melbourne Applicant: Appeared on his own behalf Solicitor for the First Respondent: Gianluca Rossi, Mills Oakley Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 1627 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CCH19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE JOHNS
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE JOHNS
INTRODUCTION
Before this Court is an extension of time application filed by the pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The Applicant seeks this extension of time so that he may subsequently apply to have a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) judicially reviewed.
In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (as the Minister was then called) (Delegate), to refuse to grant the Applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Protection Visa).
Section 476 of the Act confers upon this Court, in relation to migration decisions, the “same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution”. That is, the Court may undertake judicial review, in respect of matters “where a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.”[1]
[1] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].
The Applicant filed his application for judicial review 315 days outside the 35-day time limit prescribed by the Act. In these circumstances, the Applicant must satisfy the Court that it is necessary, in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending the prescribed time for the filing of their judicial review application.[2]
[2] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477(2).
Having not been satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the Applicant an extension of time, the application is dismissed for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
The background to this matter is derived from the submissions of the parties and, unless otherwise indicated, does not appear to be in dispute.
Issue in dispute
The primary issue is whether there are grounds for granting an extension of time.
The Application for a Visa
The Applicant is a citizen of Malaysia[3] who arrived in Australia on 6 March 2014[4] as the holder of a visitor visa.[5]
[3] Court Book (CB) 12.
[4] CB 19.
[5] CB 21.
On 15 August 2015, the Applicant lodged an application for a Protection Visa.[6]
[6] CB 1-35.
The Applicant’s protection claims in the application can be summarised as follows:[7]
(1)he left Malaysia as he couldn’t pay the debts he owed to loan sharks. He was blackmailed and threatened by the loan sharks and was scared to leave his home;
(2)when the Applicant failed to pay, the violence escalated, resulting in the Applicant being beaten and hurt badly. The loan sharks also tried to chop off the Applicant’s hand;
(3)he couldn’t live peacefully and was living in fear in Malaysia and therefore came to Australia;
(4)the Applicant sought help from his local community, but they did not want to get involved with his loan shark problems. He also sought assistance from the local police who couldn’t assist him;
(5)the loan sharks continued to look for the Applicant (e.g. visited his previous workplaces with guns and knives) even after he had arrived in Australia;
(6)if he returned to Malaysia the loan sharks would find him, and he would be subjected to violence so that he would return the money; and he could not relocate within Malaysia as he was warned that if he did so, he would be found and killed by the loan sharks associates, which he were told were present in every Malaysian state.
[7] CB 30-2.
Decision by the Delegate
On 8 July 2016, the Delegate refused to grant the Applicant a Protection Visa.[8] The Delegate’s findings can be summarised as follows: [9]
[8] CB 65-82.
[9] CB 79-81.
(1)that the Applicant made vague claims that lacked detail and provided little or no supporting evidence to substantiate them; this caused the Delegate to question the authenticity of his claims. For instance:
(a)he claimed he reported the incident to police but had no evidence of this;
(b)he claimed he was beaten but was unable ot provide a medical report as proof; did not provide a medical report;
(c)he claimed the loan sharks attempted to locate him at multiple workplaces, but only listed one;
(2)the genuineness of his stated fear of persecution in Malaysia was doubtful given the Applicant’s significant delay in applying for the Protection Visa;
(3)country information indicated that the Malaysian authorities – including the police and judiciary – are reasonably effective in combating illegal money lending;
(4)that there are effective protection measures available to the Applicant, and thus, that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution;
(5)that the Applicant could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the Applicant would suffer significant harm.
The Delegate was therefore not satisfied that the Applicant had a real chance of being persecuted for a refugee convention reason under s 36(2)(a) of the Act, nor that there was a real risk of significant harm for the purposes of complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). The application for a Protection Visa was accordingly refused.
By operation of s 476(2)(a) of the Act, this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.
Application to the Tribunal
On 20 July 2016, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision.[10]
[10] CB 839.
On 22 July 2016, the Tribunal acknowledged the application and invited the Applicant to provide material or written arguments.[11] No such materials or arguments were filed.
[11] CB 91-5.
On 1 May 2017, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing on 2 June 2017. The Tribunal requested that the Applicant complete and return the Response to Hearing Invitation – MR Division form.[12]
[12] CB 97-102.
On 27 May 2017, the Applicant returned the completed form and confirmed his attendance.[13] The Applicant requested that his brother and father give evidence at the hearing.
[13] CB 103-6.
On 2 June 2017 the Applicant attended the scheduled hearing in person with the assistance of a Malay interpreter.[14] At the hearing, the Applicant was given until 12 June 2017 to provide post-hearing evidence and submissions.
[14] CB 107-9.
On 8 June 2017, the Applicant provided the Tribunal with the following documents:[15]
(1)a statutory declaration made by his father; and
(2)a copy of the Applicant’s marriage certificate.
[15] CB 110-2.
The statutory declaration detailed the Applicant father’s experience with the loan sharks the Applicant feared harm from. On 26 May 2017, the Applicant’s father was approached by a Chinese man, asking for the Applicant. His father was warned that the loan sharks would not let the Applicant go, until his debts were settled. The father did not make a police report as he was not harmed.[16]
[16] CB 111.
On 29 September 2017, lawyers for the Applicant, wrote to the Department, with an application that work rights be granted on the Applicant’s bridging visa.[17]
[17] CB 114-5.
On 8 June 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision not to grant the Applicant the Protection Visa.[18]
[18] CB 121-31.
TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The Tribunal’s decision is 14 pages long and spans 70 paragraphs.
At paragraphs 12 to 23 of their outline of submissions filed on 20 June 2025, the Minister’s representative summarised the Tribunal’s reasons. The Court as presently constituted has carefully read the Tribunal’s reasons and accepts the summary as comprehensive, fair and properly referenced. The Court adopts it for the purposes of this judgment (citations omitted):
12. The Tribunal identified a number of inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence that in its view suggested that his claims “were not credible or genuine”.
13. The Tribunal found the evidence given by the applicant’s brother that he was paying the applicant’s debt by instalments using money sent to him by the applicant was inconsistent with the applicant’s claim that he was unable to repay the debt, and it rejected the applicant’s explanation that he was unaware the remittances were being used to repay the debt as “implausible, in the sense of being fanciful”.
14. The Tribunal also found the applicant’s failure to mention at the hearing a claim until he was prompted to do so by the Tribunal indicated that the claim had been fabricated. The particular claim was included in the applicant’s Protection visa application that his friend had seen loan sharks armed with a knife and a gun visiting his previous workplace looking for the applicant.
15. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant claimed at the Tribunal hearing that he did not go to hospital after he was beaten with a baseball bat in 2013 for “financial reasons” and then after it was put to him that there were public hospitals in Malaysia, he changed his evidence and said that he did not require hospitalisation because his injuries only hurt for a few days. The Tribunal found this claim was far-fetched and undermined by the applicant’s inconsistent testimony.
16. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant’s brother had been subjected to death threats by the loan sharks. It found the claim that his brother did not seek police protection after receiving a death threat was “unconvincing given he did not personally owe the debt and the seriousness of the threat conveyed”. It also noted the written statement from the applicant’s father claimed that the threats were “conveyed to him and not to his brother” and concluded that the applicant’s oral evidence and his father’s written evidence were “mutually unsupportive”.
17. In addition, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that he attempted to evade the loan sharks by relocating to Pahang and but was recognised there by a Chinese man as “far-fetched and contrived for the purpose of augmenting the applicant’s otherwise weak claims for protection”.
18. The Tribunal identified that it was entitled take into account the applicant’s delay in applying for protection as a relevant factor when assessing the genuineness or depth of his claimed fear of persecution and credibility.1 It found that despite his claim that he had travelled to Australia for the purpose of seeking protection, the applicant delayed making his Protection applicant’s explanation that he delayed making his application until a friend told him about it and because his English was weak because the applicant had indicated he was able to speak and read English and had access to information about protection visas on the internet. It found that if he had a genuine fear of harm, he would have sought protection earlier and the delay indicated his claims were “not genuine” .
19. On the basis of what it identified as “the applicant’s substantial delay in applying for protection, his limited and vague written claims and his generally vague, inconsistent and far-fetched oral testimony”, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had: accrued debts to a loan shark; been threatened with harm by loan sharks, beaten or forced to relocate for this reason.
20. The Tribunal also did not accept that the applicant’s brother or his father had been threatened by loan sharks because of the inconsistencies it identified between the oral evidence of the applicant and his brother at the Tribunal hearing and because it found that the written claims made by the applicant’s father were not reliable or consistent with the applicant’s oral evidence.
21. With “particular emphasis on the applicant’s substantial delay in applying for a protection visa”, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s claims were “contrived” and that he: was not a reliable or credible witness; did not have any genuine personally held fears of persecution; and did not face a real chance of serious harm for the reasons claimed. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not a refugee as defined in section 5H and he therefore did not meet paragraph 36(2)(a) of the Act.
22. In undertaking its complementary protection assessment, the Tribunal had regard to its anterior factual findings in relation to its assessment of the applicant’s claims against the refugee criterion, particularly its “extensive adverse credibility findings in relation to critical or dispositive aspects of the applicant’s claims”, and also found the applicant did not face a real risk of significant harm.
23. The Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the applicant’s a protection visa.
Based on the findings made by the Tribunal it was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations and did not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision to refuse the Applicant the Protection visa.
PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT
The application
On 24 May 2019, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review (Originating Application). The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. The Applicant sought a writ of mandamus directed at the Tribunal, requiring them determine the application according to law.
The Originating Application was filed outside the 35-day time limit specified in s 477(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the Applicant requires an extension of time within which to pursue the substantive matter in court.
Case management
On 20 June 2019, the First Respondent (Minister) filed its response and opposed the application for an extension of time.
On 18 September 2019, the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book).
On 19 September 2024 a Registrar of this Court issued an order (Registrar’s Order) directing the:
(1)Applicant to file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence by 1 November 2024; and
(2)Minister to file any written submissions and further evidence in reply by 15 November 2024.
On 23 May 2025, the Court as presently constituted extended the Applicant’s time to file and serve materials until 22 May 2025. The Minister was directed to file and serve materials by 5 June 2025.
The Applicant did not file an amended application nor did he provide further particulars of the grounds for judicial review, despite being invited and granted additional time, to do so.
On 5 June 2025, the Minister complied with the Registrar’s Order by filing written submissions.
Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:
(1)the application for judicial review filed 24 May 2019;
(2)a Court Book numbering 134 pages filed 18 September 2019, (marked as Exhibit R1);
(3)an outline of written submissions filed by the Minister on 5 June 2025; and
(4)an Affidavit of Service of Anthony Robert Gardner affirmed 11 June 2025
This matter was:
(1)allocated to, and listed for hearing by, the Court as presently constituted on 24 April 2025; and
(2)heard on 8 August 2025 in person at the Court’s Melbourne Registry.
The extension of time hearing
At the hearing, the Applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation. He was assisted by a Malay translator. The Minister was represented by Gianluca Rossi, solicitor at Mills Oakley.
The Court confirmed with the Applicant that they had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister’s written submissions.
Noting that the Applicant was not legally represented, the Court also explained to him that the statutory timeframe within which an applicant can seek judicial review in this Court is 35 days from the date of the relevant decisions.
The Court informed the Applicant that his application was filed outside the prescribed period. The Court explained that, despite the late filing of the application, the Applicant can ask the Court for an extension of time within which to file his application.
The Court invited the Applicant to address the factors relevant to the grant of extension of time (discussed below). The Applicant’s responses are discussed in the consideration that follows.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
s 477 of the Act provides time limits which applies to proceedings for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decisions in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction and the basis upon which it may be extended. At the date of the Tribunal’s decision, it read as follows:
477 Time limits on applications to the Federal Circuit Court
(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35-day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:
(a)an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and
(b)the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order
CONSIDERATION
Because the Tribunal’s decision was dated 8 June 2018, the Applicant had until 13 July 2018 to seek judicial review. Because the application was not filed until 24 May 2019 it was 315 days out of time.
Consequently, the Court must consider the two limbs of s 477(2) of the Act to determine whether it is appropriate to grant the Applicant an extension of time.
s 477(2)(a) – Application in writing specifying reasons
The first limb contained in s 477(2)(a) of the Act is whether the application has been made to the Court in writing giving reasons as to why the extension of time should be granted.
In the originating application, the Applicant sought leave of the Court to grant him an extension of time. The Applicant stated (reproduced without alteration):
1.The reason I need to extend the given timeframe, is due to financial, language issues and lack of familiarity regarding judicial review application process.
2.The language barrier made it harder for me to find a job and that is part of reason in relation of my financial issues. Financial issues make me submit the application out of timeframe due it take a time make a saving for this application.
3.In addition, the language barrier made it hard for e to collect the accurate information for the application process. Most information is gained through from friends, in which some information is not accurate and it tooks time for me to collect the accurate information and for me to make the best decision on what I should do to get the reappealing of my application, Hence, that is part of the reason on why I’m not submitting the form in given time frame.
4.In relation, lack of familiarity regarding judicial review application process make difficult to do this application because some people told me that I need to hire a lawyer for application. Until one day I’ve met my friends to assisted me with the application. He also told me that I can reappeal my application to FCC by myself instead of hiring a lawyer. Thus, that what made me to drag my application until the given timeframe.
5.Due the obstacles that I’m facing I would like reappeal my application to FCC for reconsideration and for the extension of my application timeframe.
Here, the Applicant requested an extension of time in writing and provided “grounds” explaining why he believed the extension should be granted. s 477(2)(a) of the Act is thus satisfied.
s 477(2)(b) – Necessary in the interests of justice
In relation to the second limb in s 477(2)(b) of the Act, the Court must consider whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time.
The factors which the court may consider under this limb are not limited. However, as per the reasoning in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen[19] (confirmed in Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs),[20] the most common factors considered by the Court in matters of this sort include:
(a)the length of the delay;
(b)the explanation for the delay;
(c)whether the respondent (or any third parties) would suffer any prejudice due to the delay;
(d)the impact on the applicant; and
(e)whether the proposed substantive application for judicial review has “merit”.
[19] [1984] FCA 176.
[20] [2022] HCA 28, [12].
When determining if a proposed application has “merit”, the Court will do so at a “reasonably impressionistic level”.[21] Importantly, an Applicant need therefore only identify an “arguable case” (which may not yet be fully developed) that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. In this regard, the Court will itself remain astute and alert to the possibility of a reasonably arguable error which may warrant an extension being granted.[22]
[21] MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392.
[22] MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 (‘MZAIB’).
The discretionary power to extend time is broad and there will be circumstances where it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. In Tu’uta Katoa[23] , the High Court provided the following examples of such circumstances (references omitted):
[I]f the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that the case is strong or even “exceptional”. In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is “reasonably arguable” or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless, but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion.
[23] [2022] HCA 28, [18].
It is now necessary to consider each of these factors to decide whether it is, in all the circumstances, appropriate to grant the Applicant an extension of time.
Length of delay
As outlined above, the delay in the matter is 315 days.
In the Court’s view, the delay in this matter is substantial.
This factor weighs against granting the Applicant an extension of time.
Explanation for the delay
At the hearing, the Applicant explained that he filed the application late because he lacked information and did not know who to refer the matter to. Further, he explained he had issues completing the application due to his lack of English and because he had no legal assistance.
The Court as presently constituted took the Applicant to the Court Book (in particular pages 117-119). There appears correspondence from the Tribunal to the Applicant. The Court confirmed that the Applicant’s email address appears on the letter and that he received it. The Court notes that the correspondence clearly told the Applicant he could make an application to this Court and that he had 35 days in which to make the application.
In any case, a lack of familiarity of time limits and language barriers are not generally regarded as satisfactory explanations for a delay.[24] Most recently in ADF17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[25] Wigney J held:
It is an applicant's responsibility to make proper inquiries to determine the time by which an appeal must be lodged: see SZLIH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 108 at [33]. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the applicant made any inquiries or took any appropriate steps to determine the appeal period in her case.
[24] SZLIH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 108, [33].
[25] (2025) FCA 453, [16].
The Court acknowledges that the Applicant is unrepresented. However, the Applicant’s explanation remains unsatisfactory. Given the Applicant’s desire to engage with the judicial review process, the onus remained on him to ensure that he filed his application within the set timeframe. If he was unsure about the process, he could have sought professional advice. However, there is no evidence that the Applicant made inquiries with the Court or any legal service to confirm the applicable time limits or to obtain competent legal advice.
For the reasons outlined above, the Court does not consider the explanations provided by the Applicant to be satisfactory. This factor weighs against granting the Applicant an extension of time.
Prejudice
The Minister accepts that there is no substantial prejudice that could not be remedied by a costs order. However, the absence of prejudice is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to grant the Applicant an extension of time.
This factor is a neutral consideration in deciding whether to grant the Applicant an extension of time.
Impact on the applicant
In this matter the impact on the Applicant of not granting the extension is significant. The Minister concedes the same.
This factor weighs in favour of granting the Applicant an extension of time.
Merits
The final and most significant factor in determining whether to grant the Applicant an extension of time to file the application for judicial review is the merits of the proposed application.
At the hearing, the Court took the Applicant to the grounds of review contained within the Originating Application.
To the extent that the Applicant made submissions in relation to the specific grounds, they are summarised below in the context of considering each of the grounds. To the extent that the Applicant made more general submissions, those submissions largely invited the Court to engage in impermissible merits review of the Tribunal’s decision. As this Court explained to the Applicant at the hearing, the Court cannot consider for itself whether the Applicant meets the criteria for a Protection Visa. To the extent that the Applicant’s submissions invite the Court to engage in merits review, they do not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.
The Minister submitted that the proposed substantive application for judicial review lacks merit as it fails to identify even an arguable case of jurisdictional error
The Court incorporates (without repetition) are paragraphs 33 to 40 of the Minister’s outline of submissions.
The grounds of review asserted by the Applicant in his Originating Application will now be addressed in turn.
Substantive grounds of Application
Ground one
1.the decision made by AAT on 8 June 2018 is refused to grant a protection visa. Hence, I would like to reappeal to FCC to reopen case.
Ground one is a statement of desire about what the Applicant hopes the Court will do. It is not a proper ground of review. No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises by reason of Ground One.
Ground two
2.I decided to move Australia due to having a danger threats towards my life. Back in Malaysia, I will facing genuine risk of my life if I staying in Malaysia because a lot of people look for myself due I can’t get done all my debt previously I loan. Some of them had threaten to do something bad to me and I received threats by them everyday.
Ground three
3.After the serious consideration ‘ve made the decision to fly to Australia for self safety and feels so secure here. I’m pretty sure myself, wife and my daughter will be exposed to the dangerous and risk if we return to Malaysia due I’m unable to paid the loan until now. AAT member aware our safety are not secure and safe if we return to or country but AAT member make a wrong decision while make a decision not to grant a protection visa.
Grounds Two and Three are claims about factual matters. They do nothing more than assert a disagreement with the findings of the Tribunal. They do not detail how, in coming to those findings, the Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error. No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises by reason of Grounds Two and Three.
Ground four
4.AAT has not threatened the family when refused to accept my application and AAT was fully aware of the facts that I’ve lodged my application for protection visa as for having genuine risk of my life if I’m going back to Malaysia due to the information. As stated on statement of decision and reasons record.
At the hearing, the Applicant was asked what he meant by this ground. The Applicant explained that his claims made to the Tribunal were truthful and the Tribunal did not review the Delegate’s decision fairly.
The Court confirmed with the Applicant that he:
(1)was invited to a hearing on 1 May 2017;
(2)attended the hearing on 2 June 2017, where oral evidence from himself and his brother was furnished; and
(3)was invited to make post-hearing submissions.
The process undertaken by the Tribunal, provided the Applicant every opportunity to put his case to the Tribunal. The contention that the Tribunal did not afford him procedural fairness must be rejected.
In so far that this ground relates to the Tribunal being unreasonable because it did not accept the Applicant’s claims the contention must be rejected. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had serious credibility concerns and found his claims “vague, inconsistent and far-fetched”.[26] The adverse credibility findings were open to the Tribunal to make.
[26] CB 129 [53].
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises by reason of Ground Four.
Ground five
5.AAT fully aware my safety can’t be granted if I’m back in Malaysia because legal justice can’t protect me at all time but AAT still not accept my application even explanation given to them during the hearing. AAT member has not used his discretion as this is clearly unfair decision to myself.
Ground Five appears to be further disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings, rather than an arguable case of jurisdictional error. The Court accepts the Minister’s submissions that the Tribunal has no obligation to uncritically accept all claims before it.[27] The adverse credibility findings of the Tribunal were open to it.
[27] Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253, 451.
To the extent this ground contends the Tribunal’s process lacked procedural fairness, the Court relies on its consideration in Ground Four.
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises by reason of Ground Five.
Ground six
6.Since my last application is got refused by the AAT, I would like to reappeal my application to get the change of decision by the FCC due to the facts my life is having danger threats if I’m back to Malysia. This are the facts that they did not take in consideration,
Ground Six is a statement of desire like Ground One, it is not a proper ground of review.
To the extent that the ground contends that the Tribunal did not consider the Applicant’s claims, this must be rejected. The Tribunal comprehensively considered the claims from paragraphs 9 to 36 of the Tribunal’s decision, then went on to make adverse credibility findings which were open to it.
No arguable case of jurisdictional error arises by reason of Ground Six.
Other Matters
Mindful of the Court’s obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAIB at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal’s decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has also read the applicant’s grounds as broadly as possible and remain alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal’s part. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal’s part and, for the following reasons, the Court is not persuaded that a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error arises out of the substantive application.
On 22 May 2025 the Applicant sent correspondence to the representatives of the First Respondent. He wrote,
I would like to inform you that last year on 7/5/2024 I still received threats from the LOAN SHARK. Among the evidence I obtained from my younger sister is as follows: they also distributed pictures of the identity cards of all family members to the public and sent voice messages to my younger sister’s Whatsapp.
The First Respondent forwarded the correspondence to the Court. As a Model Litigant the Court in indebted to the First Respondent for doing so. However, the events written about post-date the decision of the Tribunal and cannot be considered by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Because the Originating Application in this case was filed with this Court 315 days outside the statutory timeframe, the Court may only grant an extension of time within which the application was to be made if it is satisfied such extension is in the interests of the administration of justice.
Taking into account all of the considerations above, particularly the significant length of the delay, the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the application and the lack of any reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, the Court is not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that time be extended in this matter.
Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
The Court will hear the parties on costs.
I certify that the preceding eighty-nine (89) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns. Associate:
Dated: 15 August 2025
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