FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BSZ22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1494
ORDERS
SYG 2039 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BSZ22
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CLEARY
DATE OF ORDER:
15 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed as incompetent.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $6,100.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04(h) of the Rules.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CLEARY
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an application for an order…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1494
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the second application for judicial review, given the applicant's failure to disclose the earlier proceedings in the first application. Under s 486D(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), a person must disclose any judicial review proceedings already brought in relation to the decision in question. The Court found that the first application for judicial review constituted a judicial review proceeding in relation to the second non-appearance decision, as the confirmation decision was part of the same AAT decision to dismiss the application. The Court also determined that the second application for judicial review was an attempt to re-litigate the AAT's decisions, which had already been challenged in the first application, and thus the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the second application. Consequently, the Court dismissed the second application as incompetent, with costs.
The Court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory requirement for disclosure under s 486D(2) of the Act, the interpretation of the AAT's decisions as part of a single decision-making process, and the legislative intent behind s 486D to prevent re-litigation of already reviewed decisions. The Court held that the applicant's failure to disclose the earlier proceedings resulted in a lack of jurisdiction, and therefore the second application was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is no reason why I should not follow these decisions, and I propose to do so in the circumstances of this case.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the first issue before the Court is whether it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the second application for review. For the reasons that follow, I have determined that the Court does not have jurisdiction. Reasons why the Court has no jurisdiction in this matter Under s 486D(2) a person must not commence proceedings in this Court “unless the person, when commencing the proceeding, discloses to the court any judicial review proceeding already brought by the person in that or any other court in relation to that decision”. The issue under this provision as it applies to the present case is whether the first application for judicial review in proceedings number MLG1094/2022 filed by the applicant, which challenged the confirmation decision, constituted a judicial review proceeding in relation to the second non-appearance decision which is sought to be reviewed in these proceedings. If it did then the Court has no jurisdiction. There is no issue the applicant failed to disclose the existence of proceedings number MLG1094/2022 in these proceedings, as the applicant made no reference to it in his application or supporting affidavit filed in these proceedings on 14 December 2023. I consider there are three reasons why the first application for judicial review in proceedings number MLG1094/2022, which challenged the confirmation decision, constituted a judicial review proceeding in relation to the second non-appearance decision. They are as follows: First, the earlier challenge to the confirmation decision was in essence a challenge to the second non-appearance decision (it confirmed that decision). The confirmation decision was in substance part of the same Tribunal decision made to dismiss the applicant’s application to the Tribunal for non-appearance. As Perram J held in AYT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 252 (AYT16), under s 426A(1E), if an applicant does not apply within 14 days of receiving the non-appearance decision, the Tribunal was legally bound to make the confirmation decision, confirming the (earlier) non-appearance decision made under s 426A(1A)(b). In the present case, the applicant did not seek re-instatement of his application within 14 days of receiving the second non-appearance decision, therefore the confirmation decision was a decision the Tribunal was legally required to make as a consequence of its non-appearance decision. Second, and allied to the first reason, the Federal Court has held that merely seeking judicial review of a confirmation decision cannot succeed without putting in issue the initial non-appearance decision: see AYT16 at [12] per Perram J, affirming AYT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2733 at [12] per Judge Driver. Third, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 (Cth) which inserted s 486D into the Act provides: The provision is designed to assist the courts to identify applications which have already been the subject of proceedings for judicial review of tribunal decisions and discourage applicants from attempting to re‑litigate these matters, including as a means to delay their removal from Australia.The second application for review in this Court was merely an attempt by the applicant to re-litigate the Tribunal’s decisions which had already been challenged in proceedings number MLG1094/2022. I consider s 468D was inserted to prevent this from happening.