SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 43 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158

Citation: SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158
Appeal from: SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719
Parties: SZTES v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL and FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
File number: NSD 967 of 2015
Judges: LOGAN, ROBERTSON AND KERR JJ
Date of judgment: 5 November 2015
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from decision of a judge of the Court refusing an application for judicial review of decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse to extend time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether decision of the Federal Circuit Court involved jurisdictional error – whether appellant was denied procedural fairness in the Federal Circuit Court – relevance of absence of right of appeal – whether the primary judge or the Federal Circuit Court misunderstood the test under s 477(2)(b) – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend – amendment proposed to reverse effect of deliberate forensic choice made before the primary judge – application refused

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 477
Cases cited:

AAV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 700; 230 FCR 454
Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1
Craig v The State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Dagli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 298; 133 FCR 541
Hamod v State of New South Wales and Anor [2011] NSWCA 375
Metwally v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; 59 ALJR 481
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parteLam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; 204 CLR 82
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission [1986] HCA 54; 161 CLR 141
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 146; 216 FCR 445
SZWBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 88

Date of hearing: 5 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 92
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr SEJ Prince with Mr PW Bodisco
Solicitor for the Appellant: SBA Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms AM Mitchelmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent submitted save as to costs
Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 967 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTES
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Afghanistan, sought to appeal the decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court, who had refused his application for judicial review of the Federal Circuit Court's decision to not extend the time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Circuit Court's decision involved a jurisdictional error or if the appellant was denied procedural fairness in that court. The court also considered whether the primary judge or the Federal Circuit Court misunderstood the test under s 477(2)(b) of the Act.

The court found that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness in the Federal Circuit Court. The judge of the Federal Circuit Court had correctly exercised his discretion by taking into account the appellant's representation by counsel and the absence of a marked delay or unsatisfactory explanation for the late filing. The court held that the appellant's contention that it was an error to consider his representation by counsel was incorrect. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the primary judge misunderstood the test under s 477(2)(b) of the Act, finding that the primary judge's reasoning was sound.

The court also dismissed the appellant's application to amend his notice of appeal, noting that the proposed amendment sought to reverse a deliberate forensic choice made before the primary judge. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In conclusion, the court found no jurisdictional error in the Federal Circuit Court's decision and rejected the appellant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and the interpretation of s 477(2)(b) of the Migration Act. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's application to amend his notice of appeal was refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent be amended to: “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The appellant’s application to amend his notice of appeal be refused.

3. The appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In what follows, I shall refer to the visa applicant as the appellant. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The judge of the Federal Circuit Court noted the facts as summarised by the Tribunal as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan who arrived at Christmas Island by boat on 18 July 2012. On 15 January 2013 he lodged an application for a protection visa with what is now the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, alleging that he feared persecution in Afghanistan. On 11 March 2013 the appellant’s application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. The appellant then applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a review of that departmental decision and was unsuccessful in that review. On 19 August 2013 the appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. That application was filed outside the limitation period prescribed by s 477 of the Migration Act and the appellant applied for an extension of that limitation period. The appellant relevantly made the following claims in a statement attached to his protection visa application:(a)his parents had rented a house in a complex in Kabul which was owned by a Pashtun man. In April 2012, upon returning from work, he was told by his neighbours not to go to his home as Afghan authorities had raided his housing complex and found bombs for use in suicide attacks. His neighbours did not know where his family was so he fled to the house of his father’s friend who then helped him to flee Afghanistan;(b)he would be detained and mistreated by the Afghan authorities because they believed that either he or his family were involved in plotting suicide attacks or he would be harmed by his Pashtun landlord and his affiliates as he (the landlord) believed that either he or his family reported the location of the bombs to the Afghan authorities; and(c)he did not know if his Pashtun landlord had connections to the Taliban but the fact that he had been planning suicide attacks suggested that he had some connection to Afghan insurgent groups. After discussing the claims made by the appellant and the evidence before it, the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the appellant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 or pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal’s decision was based on the following findings and reasons:a)while the Tribunal accepted that the [appellant] was a Hazara Shi’a who had spent most of his life in Kabul, Afghanistan, it did not accept that he was a member of the group “unaccompanied Afghan minors” as it found that he was eighteen years old at the time of its hearing and would not be unaccompanied were he to return to Afghanistan because it did not accept that his parents had disappeared or fled from Afghanistan;b)the Tribunal found that the [appellant] was not truthful as to the reasons which led him to flee Afghanistan and that his testimony was internally inconsistent, implausible and amounted to a fabrication which in turn undermined his credibility. While it accepted that the [appellant]’s family had rented from a Pashtun landlord, it did not accept that the [appellant] had faced the difficulties he claimed to have faced, such as the existence of explosives in his home, that he had fled to a family friend’s house and then from Afghanistan because of the discovery of those explosives, or that his family had also fled because of those explosives. …c)the Tribunal did not accept the [appellant]’s claims that he had not understood the Hazaragi interpreter who had assisted him at his interview with the delegate and that the interpreter had not understood him and only interpreted half of what he had said. In this regard, the Tribunal accepted that there had been some discussion at the interview that the interpreter was not accredited but referred to the [appellant]’s agreement at the start of that interview that he could understand the interpreter, to his representative’s statement at the interview that the [appellant] had indicated to her that he could understand the interpreter and had been able to communicate effectively and to his lack of objection to the interpretation throughout the interview;d)in making its adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal considered the submission of the [appellant]’s representative at the end of its hearing that the [appellant]’s mental state was “not flash” but, having listened to the delegate’s interview and having read the [appellant]’s statutory declaration, it was not satisfied that the [appellant]’s mental state impacted his ability to give evidence to the Department or to it;e)it did not accept that the [appellant] would face harm as a member of the particular social group “children and young people of Afghanistan” were he to return to Afghanistan. In particular, it did not accept the [appellant]’s claim at the hearing that he would be forced to work day and night and become a dancing boy, implying that he would be sexually exploited despite his age;f)the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was any real chance in the reasonably foreseeable future that the [appellant] would be killed, physically harmed or persecuted in Afghanistan by the Taliban or any other group or person by reason of his race, religion, imputed political opinion or for any other reason. In this connection:i)whilst the Tribunal accepted that Kabul was not entirely insulated from violence and accepted that there had been some attacks in Kabul, it referred to country information which pointed to a “situation of safety” for Hazaras in the city. It considered that no truthful evidence had been submitted by the [appellant] that he or his family had in any way been targeted in such attacks during his time living in Kabul;ii)it accepted that there had been some violence against Shi’a Muslims in Afghanistan but found that Shi’as were generally free to perform their traditional religious practices in Kabul without incident; andiii)the Tribunal noted the [appellant]’s claims at its hearing that all policemen were robbers and thieves, that Hazaras were degraded and that the Taliban could do what they please if they caught a Hazara. It also noted his claim that if he was caught by the government his only option would be to do what the police wanted. However, the Tribunal considered that the country information indicated that Kabul was a relatively secure place, that there were large numbers of trained army personnel and that Shi’a Hazaras were relatively safe from persecution.g)referring to country information, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the [appellant] would face a real chance of persecution by the Taliban or by anyone else for being a failed asylum seeker returning to Afghanistan from a western country, by reason of being perceived as a spy or by reason of an imputed political opinion;h)it did not accept that the [appellant] would be uniquely vulnerable because of his youth, his lack of personal and social connections in Afghanistan or at risk as a perceived opponent as it considered that he did have social connections through his family and it did not accept that a bomb had been found at his home;i)while the Tribunal accepted that, despite certain improvements, Hazaras continued to face some discrimination in the areas of accommodation and employment, the Tribunal did not accept that this had been the situation for the [appellant] and his family or would be the case in the future. It found that the [appellant] would be able to work and did not accept that he would be denied an education. It also thought the chance remote that the [appellant] would, for any Convention reason, be denied access or accommodation or that as a Shi’a Hazara in Kabul he would suffer significant economic hardship threatening his capacity to subsist. It further found that poor though the standard of health care services were in Afghanistan, that did not itself amount to persecution and, in any event, the [appellant] would not be denied access to basic services such as to amount to persecution; andj)the Tribunal referred to the [appellant]’s claim in his statement that he had been subjected to verbal abuse because of his Hazara ethnicity and that when he worked in a car repair shop he had been denied opportunities for career advancement. While the Tribunal was willing to accept that the [appellant] may have suffered some harassment and insults from people of other ethnicities, it was not satisfied, on the [appellant]’s evidence, that he had suffered treatment such as to constitute serious harm or persecution. It also accepted that the [appellant] might face some harassment or insults in the future but was not satisfied that this treatment would amount to serious harm.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As earlier noted, ground 7 as originally framed, was not pressed by the appellant.Consideration It is to be recalled that no appeal lay from the decision of the judge of the Federal Circuit Court and the appellant before the primary judge had to establish jurisdictional error on the part of the judge of the Federal Circuit Court. Denial of procedural fairness could constitute a jurisdictional error but it was necessary for the present appellant to establish that there had been a denial of procedural fairness in the Federal Circuit Court. It is to be accepted that the present appellant was entitled to a fair decision-making process in the Federal Circuit Court. Relevant to that issue is the nature of the power being exercised by the judge of the Federal Circuit Court. A precondition of the discretion to extend the 35 day period was that the Federal Circuit Court was satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. That a party consents to an extension of time does not remove the discretion and does not remove the need for the judge of the Federal Circuit Court to be so satisfied. Reliance was placed by the appellant on what was said in the course of the hearing, at page 5 of the transcript of 30 July 2014, when the judge of the Federal Circuit Court said he did not need to hear the present appellant on the extension of time issue as far as a satisfactory explanation was concerned and said “ … let’s move to the merits”. A fuller version of the exchange is as follows:COUNSEL FOR THE MINISTER: No, your Honour. Your Honour will have seen from our written submissions that we don’t oppose the extension of time.HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand that. Thank you. Yes.COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: And I do thank my friend for that.HIS HONOUR: Well, I will take the affidavit of Mr Feraz as read.COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: Yes. And I formally then make the application.HIS HONOUR: So what would you like to say to me in that regard?COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: I rely on my written submissions on that point, that it wasn’t a gross or marked delay, that there is an explanation that is unchallenged that is on the court file. HIS HONOUR: That’s all right. I don’t need to hear you on the extension of time issue as far as a satisfactory explanation is concerned. COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: Sure.HIS HONOUR: So just – let’s move to the merits. In context, I do not see how the statements could reasonably have led counsel to think that the second precondition to the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 477(2) was no longer an issue. In this respect I differ from what the primary judge was prepared to assume at [53]-[54] and [59] of his reasons. I reject the appellant’s contention that it was somehow an error to take into account that the present appellant was then represented by counsel. While an unrepresented litigant may have reasonably misunderstood what the judge of the Federal Circuit Court had said, in my view, objectively assessed, counsel could not.