WZAVO v Minister for Immigration
[2019] FCCA 2271
•20 August 2019 (by telephone by Judge Kendall pursuant to s.75 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth))
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WZAVO & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2271 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time to file judicial review application – whether application in writing – whether application competent – consideration of factors in relation to an extension of time – whether adequate explanation for delay – whether application for judicial review arguable or has reasonable prospect of success. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.75 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.1.06, 44.05 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 430, 474, 476, 477 |
| ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 810 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZJSS & Ors [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164; (2010) 85 ALJR 306; (2010) 273 ALR 122; (2010) 119 ALD 446 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf& Anor [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 MZZIV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203 Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks[2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470; (2000) 177 ALR 491 SZQRU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234 WZASC v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1452 |
| First Applicant: | WZAVO |
| Second Applicant: | WZAVP |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 3 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Antoni Lucev |
| Hearing date: | 28 August 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 28 August 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 20 August 2019 (by telephone by Judge Kendall pursuant to s.75 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth)) |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicant: | First applicant in person, and by leave for the second applicant |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr PR Macliver |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
| For the Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance, save as to costs |
ORDERS
That the name of the first respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs”.
That the name of the second respondent be changed to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
That the first and second applicants’ application for an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for the making of an application under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 3 of 2015
| WZAVO |
First Applicant
WZAVP
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicants have filed an application seeking review (“ Proposed Judicial Review Application”) under s.476 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively). The Tribunal Decision, made on 3 December 2014, is at Court Book (“CB”) 329-346. The Tribunal Decision affirmed a decision made by a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, now the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (“Minister”), to refuse the applicants’ Protection (Class XA) visas (“Protection Visa”) application.
The Proposed Judicial Review Application was filed out of time, and, at hearing, the applicants sought an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act (“Extension of Time Application”).
The Court acknowledges that these Reasons for Judgment have been significantly delayed. The essential reasons for that are the case load in the Perth Registry of this Court over several years, which, as recently as November 2017, was described by the Federal Court as “extreme”, and the judicial resourcing of the Perth Registry of this Court which was described by the Federal Court as “under resourced”: WZASX v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 1415 at [32] per McKerracher J, with all of the case management, and other, consequences and effects both obvious and not obvious that flow therefrom. In relation to this case it is pertinent to note that the Court has had access to and read all of the relevant papers including the transcript of the hearing from 28 August 2015 (“Transcript”) and the materials relied upon including:
a)the CB of relevant materials, which includes the Tribunal Decision at CB 329-346;
b)the affidavits filed on behalf of the applicants by the first-named applicant (“Applicant”) on:
i)9 January 2015 (“Applicant’s January 2015 Affidavit”); and
ii)30 March 2015 (“Applicant’s March 2015 Affidavit”) and
iii)17 July 2015 (“Applicant’s July 2015 Affidavit”); and
c)the various Court documents (other than the CB and affidavits), including:
i)the Proposed Judicial Review Application filed on 9 January 2015;
ii)the orders of a Registrar of this Court made on 1 April 2015 (“Registrar’s Orders”); and
iii)the Minister’s outline of submissions filed on 20 August 2015.
It is also relevant to note that there was no witness evidence or examination at the hearing of the matter before this Court.
In the above circumstances, the delay, which the Court regrets, has had no effect upon the Court’s reasoning in these Reasons for Judgment.
The applicants have forwarded to the Court various documents after the hearing of the Proposed Judicial Review Application. There was no leave to file any of those documents, and consequently the Court has had no regard to them.
General background to the Proposed Judicial Review Application
The general background to the making of the Judicial Review Application is as follows:
a)the Applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (“China”), and was born on 5 December 1965: CB 3 and 15-16;
b)the second named applicant is the Applicant’s son (“Son”), and is also a citizen of China, and was born on 14 November 2003: CB 3, 15-16 and 31-32;
c)the Applicant first arrived in Australia on 20 November 2011 as the holder of a Subclass 456 Business (Short Stay) visa. The Applicant subsequently departed and arrived in Australia on a further four occasions, his last arrival being on 27 January 2013: CB 272-273;
d)on 15 April 2013, the Applicant lodged a Protection Visa application on behalf of himself and the Son: CB 1-37;
e)in May 2013 the Applicant provided the then Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“Department”), with a written statement in support of the Protection Visa application, together with supporting documents: CB 38-44 and 45-96 (“Applicant’s May 2013 Statement”);
f)the Applicant was invited to, and did, attend at an interview with the Delegate on 30 May 2013 to discuss the Protection Visa application and his claims for protection: CB 141-142 and 198;
g)the Applicant provided further information to the Department in support of the Protection Visa application in August 2013 and January 2014: CB 160-162 and 164-182;
h)on 1 July 2014 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant the applicants a Protection Visa as the Delegate was not satisfied that Australia had protection obligations to the Applicant under s.36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act: CB 194-210;
i)on 15 July 2014 the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s Decision: CB 211-216;
j)on 26 July 2014 the Applicant provided documents to the Tribunal to assist in explaining the applicants’ case: CB 230-260;
k)on 9 September 2014 the Tribunal invited the Applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in his case at a Tribunal hearing on 29 October 2014 (“Tribunal Hearing”): CB 265-266;
l)on 26 October 2014 the Applicant provided further material to the Tribunal: CB 294-322;
m)the Applicant appeared at the Tribunal Hearing (assisted by a Mandarin interpreter) on 29 October 2014: CB 323-325;
n)on 3 December 2014 the Tribunal Decision was to affirm the Delegate’s Decision to refuse to grant the applicants a Protection Visa: CB 329;
o)the applicants were advised of the Tribunal Decision by letter dated 4 December 2014 which was sent by email: CB 328. Also emailed was a fact sheet which advised the applicants that they could apply to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision, and that if they wished to apply for judicial review they must do so within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal Decision, and that if they required an extension of time they must ask for it when applying for judicial review and explain why an extension of time was sought: CB 345 (“Tribunal Fact Sheet”);
p)on 9 January 2015:
i)the applicants filed the Proposed Judicial Review Application two days outside of the 35 day time limit imposed under by s.477(1) of the Migration Act, but did not seek an extension of time to make the Proposed Judicial Review Application under s.477(2) of the Migration Act; and
ii)the Applicant filed the Applicant’s January 2015 Affidavit, which repeated the grounds of the Proposed Judicial Review Application, and which attached the Tribunal Decision;
q)on 30 March 2015 the Applicant filed what purported to be an affidavit, the Applicant’s March 2015 Affidavit, but which attached various extracts from the Tribunal Decision, and commented upon them by reference to various contentions including that the Tribunal had disregarded relevant considerations, misapprehended the evidence and disregarded relevant considerations, that the Tribunal Decision was contradictory in parts and lacked basic and reliable evidence. These contentions can only be treated as submissions and contentions and particulars of the “grounds” of the Proposed Judicial Review Application;
r)on 1 April 2015 the Registrar’s Orders provided that, amongst other things, that the applicants file and serve on or before 27 May 2015 an amended Proposed Judicial Review Application giving particulars of the grounds of review, and any further affidavits upon which they intended to rely at the hearing, including any affidavits in support of an application for an extension of time;
s)the applicants did not file an amended Proposed Judicial Review Application, and did not formally apply for an extension of time, however, in Annexure E-1 to the Applicant’s July 2015 Affidavit the Applicant states that he tried many times to lodge the Proposed Judicial Review Application before finally succeeding in doing so with the assistance of Registry staff; and
t)otherwise, the Applicant’s July 2015 Affidavit contains commentary on various movies and documentaries made by the Applicant (as well as three DVDs of the movies or documentaries) and some additional comment on the Tribunal Decision. Annexure E-1 to the of the Applicant’s June 2015 Affidavit provides further additional statements about the Tribunal Decision. The material at pages 3 and 4 of Annexure E-1, the three DVD movies and Annexure E-2 of the Applicant’s July 2015 Affidavit are all inadmissible as they were not before the Tribunal.
Tribunal Decision
Criteria
In the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal sets out the criteria with respect to the grant of a Protection Visa, both under the Refugees Convention and under the complementary protection criteria: CB 330 at [3]-[8].
Claims
The Tribunal set out the claims of the applicants as set out in the Protection Visa application and the Applicant’s May 2013 Statement as follows:
• The applicant claims that he left China due to having published articles and written and directed movies criticising inhuman behaviour in China.
• He says that in l989 he was in grade four at Tianjin Foreign Studies University and was involved in the student movement. He says he coordinated the safe return of students to Tianjin after the military crackdown. He was made to study socialism and communist theory and forced to work digging holes near the Tianjin Police Bureau.
• The applicant claims he published a book entitled 'Enter Joint Venture Companies’ in 1993. It was his first book and in it he analysed the role of Chinese managers in Sino Western joint ventures. He wrote in the book that:
“the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in June 1989 serves as a recent reminder of the volatility of the political system in the country"
• The applicant states that this reference to June 1989 was overlooked by official censors and was published by mistake. He says as a consequence he encountered a series of interviews, monitoring and threats.
• The applicant claims that in 1994 after a visit to the United States he was detained at Customs and asked questions about publishing.
• In August 1995 he was held at the Tianjin Heping Police Station for half a day. He said his backbone was seriously injured at this time.
• Between 1996 and 2011, the applicant wrote a series of scripts and articles. The applicant lists these works:
o Deep Sleep No More
o Flying Volunteers
o The Years return
o Love You Forever (part)
o The Encounter
• Between 2003 and 2006 the applicant studied at Nankai University as a postgraduate in the Philosophy Department. He and several other students established the ‘New Literature Association’ writing articles reflecting ‘real society’. The security department of the University warned and threatened him, telling him he would be put in prison when the time was suitable.
• The applicant claims he then started to join ‘family meetings' (Christian meetings) in Beijing and Hebei. The meetings were disturbed by the police.
• In 2009, the applicant made complaints to the authorities regarding the acquisition of his grandparents' house. He says he received threats and calls from strangers in response.
• The applicant claims that in 2012 he began filming 'The Years Return'. He claims that he was monitored by two guys for 24 hours during the filming and taken to the police station for half a day and threatened. He claims that he feared being arrested or secretly punished, and so decided to leave China. He says he took a taxi to Beijing Airport and flew that day to Perth via Hong Kong.
• Deep Sleep No More was screened in Western Australia at Cinifest Oz.
• The applicant points to examples of the treatment received by dissident Chinese writers and artists, such as Liu Xiao Bo.
CB 331-332 at [9].
The Tribunal went on to note that:
a)the Applicant did not consider that anything that he was currently writing or filming would violate Chinese central government policy, but he was worried he may have offended Chinese local government or private groups: CB 332 at [10];
b)when preparing to film The Years Return in China he had arranged for a Screen Australia delegation to meet a local Mayor, and that he was threatened at this time and monitored closely, and would not return to film The Years Return in China now as that would “be a disaster”: CB 332 at [11]; and
c)expressly, that it had taken into account written submissions provided by the Applicant which “draw attention to the treatment of Chinese dissident artists and lawyers and restate aspects of … [the applicant’s] claims”: CB 332 at [12].
The Tribunal also dealt with what occurred at the Tribunal Hearing at some length, referring to:
a)questioning the Applicant concerning the situation in China in view of a written submission that he planned to return to complete filming The Years Return, but that a number of factors persuaded him that that was not realistic, and that he thought that he would be arrested because the political situation was serious as a consequence of recent protests in Hong Kong: CB 332 at [13];
b)the Applicant’s fears arising from the Enter Joint Venture Companies publication, and its reference to the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the Applicant’s claims to have subsequently been subject to monitoring and interrogation, and that he had been taken into detention and injured in 1994 and 1995: CB 332-333 at [14]-[16];
c)the Applicant’s claims concerning the “New Literature Association” at Nankai University (“University”), which came under scrutiny, and which was eventually forced to close by the University: CB 333 at [20];
d)the Applicant’s claims concerning his Christian religion, which the Applicant agreed had not been substantiated before the Delegate, and which the Applicant ultimately appeared to indicate was not a real problem and would not result in persecution if he returned to China, although he did have a concern that it may increase his profile if he was thought of as being involved in anti-government movements: CB 333-334 at [21]-[24];
e)events in 2009 and the proposed acquisition (which did not proceed) of the Applicant’s grandparents’ house, and which did not proceed because of his grandfather’s military background: CB 334 at [25]-[26];
f)whether or not the Applicant’s planned film making and book writing activities might be of concern to Chinese authorities, and in particular The Years Return, which the Applicant said had resulted in him being warned not to shoot that movie anymore because it involved themes of a person’s house being taken by force and a fight with the people who took the house away, which was a topic about which the Chinese government was very concerned: CB 334-335 at [28]-[32], and in relation to which the Tribunal adverted to a well-known Chinese film with a plot line involving themes of official corruption, and the current central Chinese government’s crackdown, and lack of tolerance for, official corruption, and why in that context The Years Return would be “sensitive”: CB 335 at [32];
g)the screening of some of the Applicant’s works at events supported by the Chinese Embassy in Australia, in relation to which the Applicant said that the Chinese Embassy would not have had a say in the organisation of the screening, and in relation to which he emphasised that the Chinese Embassy would have had a lack of involvement: CB 335-336 at [33];
h)the Applicant’s alleged fear of harm from both the central and local Chinese governments: CB 336 at [34];
i)the fact that “nothing appeared to have happened to … [the Applicant] in China for nearly 2 decades”, other than a warning from the University security department “that had essentially amounted to little”, and why the Applicant felt he was now at risk of harm, and why the Applicant was able to leave China if the Chinese government were monitoring him (including previous travel to the United States): CB 336 at [36]-[37], in relation to which the Applicant indicated that it might be because he was “not a real activist”, but that returning to China might be more problematic now given recent developments in Hong Kong: CB 336 at [37]; and
j)the Applicant identifying his book Enter Joint Venture Companies and his film concerning the acquisition of land The Years Return as works which might be of interest to the Chinese government, and which might be perceived adversely to him, but which when asked to reflect upon them the Applicant said it was hard to say what might cause problems, “but obviously official corruption and the difficult life of the people affected by it was sensitive”, and that if a movie was shown and became popular then it might constitute a threat to the Chinese government: CB 336 at [40].
Tribunal’s consideration of claims
In considering the Applicant’s claims the Tribunal dealt with those claims under both the Refugees Convention criterion: CB 337-343 at [41]-[74] and under the complementary protection criterion: CB 343 at [75]-[79].
In relation to the Refugees Convention criterion the Tribunal correctly noted that the fear of persecution must be a well-founded fear, which required that there, objectively, be a real chance of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason: CB 337 at [41].
Generally, the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was a credible witness as to his personal background, experiences and the subjective genuineness of his fears, but was not satisfied as to the fears expressed being objectively well-founded: CB 337 at [42].
The Tribunal dealt with the substantive claims raised by the Applicant.
The Tribunal dealt with the Applicant’s experiences in relation to the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989, noting that the Applicant was subject to a form of re-education through labour for a short period, but further observing that “there appears to have been no subsequent direct consequence for the applicant’s involvement” thereafter: CB 337 at [44], and that the Applicant was able to leave China for the United States in 1994, and that he had a long career in the Chinese university system: CB 337 at [43]-[44]. The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant’s involvement in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre which had not provoked ongoing adverse consequences for him for over 20 years meant that there would be a real chance that he would encounter harm for that reason in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returned to China: CB 337 at [44].
For similar reasons the Tribunal did not accept that a brief reference to the Tiananmen Square protests in the Applicant’s book Enter Joint Venture Companies which was overlooked by official censors and published, but which caused some difficulty for the Applicant in the form of interrogation, short-term deprivation of liberty and an assault by an official in the years 1994-1995, was such that the Tribunal was satisfied there was a real chance that it would result in the Applicant experiencing harm in the reasonably foreseeable future when it had not done so in the period between 1995 and the making of the Protection Visa application, notwithstanding any sensitivity surrounding the Tiananmen Square anniversary each year and recent protests in Hong Kong: CB 337-338 at [46]-[49].
The Tribunal also examined the Applicant’s involvement with the New Literature Association during his time at the University and noted that although the Applicant was subject to some harassment from the University’s security department, that was not sufficient to cause the closure of the New Literature Association at that time, and that it was not until the University hierarchy became involved that closure was ordered. The applicant had nevertheless given no evidence consistent with facing harm at that time, and therefore the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the Applicant would face harm if he were to return to China on account of his involvement in the New Literature Association: CB 338 at [50]-[51].
The Tribunal then turned to consider a body of work identified by the Applicant, and noted that the Applicant had identified nothing in those works, other than The Years Return and the book Enter Joint Venture Companies, which might be sensitive to the Chinese authorities, and that there was nothing in those works which touched on any “taboo” subjects referred to in country information: CB 338 at [52]. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that those works would not expose the Applicant to a real chance of harm if he returned to China: CB 339 at [53].
The Tribunal then specifically turned to The Years Return. The Tribunal set out a synopsis of the plot of The Years Return, as follows:
In The Years Return, Uncle Liu is a well-known Red Army member who enjoys the scenic views of the mountains from his home, given to him by the government in recognition of his service to the country. The Minister for the Real Estate Bureau and the Deputy Secretary for the County discover hidden treasures were placed under the house during the Chinese Republic, and deceitfully inform Uncle Liu's family that they must move as the government plans to use the land. The family resists the move using improvised weapons and guerrilla warfare. When Uncle Liu's grand-daughter tries to report events to higher authorities, she is taken hostage. When an Australian reporter and his sister (classmates of the granddaughter) find out, they make the truth known about the corruption of the Minister and the Deputy.
CB 339 at [55].
The Tribunal took into account the synopsis of the plot of The Years Return provided to the Tribunal by the Applicant, and bore in mind that the Applicant claimed that it was this work which had resulted in him receiving threats and monitoring that prompted his departure from China: CB 339 at [54].
The Tribunal:
a)referred to its discussion with the Applicant at the Tribunal Hearing that it was not inclined to accept that a work dealing in themes of official corruption, including corrupt acquisition of land, would be viewed adversely by the Chinese government, and noted that the Chinese central government had undertaken steps to stamp out local corruption which was a high profile and well-ventilated issue in China: CB 339 at [56], and referred to another relatively famous Chinese film dealing with official corruption which indicated that that topic was not, on its face, “off limits” in China: CB 339 at [56];
b)had regard to country information describing the nature of local corruption, the nature and manner of the exposure of local corruption (including on social media) and the level of toleration of such exposure by the Chinese government: CB 339 at [57];
c)did not consider that the plot and themes of The Years Return would be of adverse interest to either the Chinese central or local governments: CB 339-340 at [58]; and
d)considered that the circumstances in which the Applicant left China reinforced the view that The Years Return was not a work that would attract the adverse attention of Chinese authorities, especially in circumstances where the Applicant suspected that the details of the plot were known to the authorities prior to his departure from China, which led the Tribunal to conclude that if that were so, and that if the details were politically sensitive then “more specific action would have been taken than that recounted” by the Applicant: CB 340 at [59].
The Tribunal also adverted to specific evidence that the Applicant had shown works at events supported by the Chinese Embassy in Australia, and that in a particular publication the Applicant had written a foreword specifically drawing attention to the support provided by the Chinese Embassy, which the Tribunal considered to be inconsistent with the Applicant’s expressed fears about his works attracting adverse interest from the central or local Chinese governments, and which reinforced the Tribunal’s view that the Applicant was not of adverse interest to those governments: CB 340 at [60].
The Tribunal considered the Applicant’s experiences and works as a cumulative body, and whether that was sufficient to attain the profile of a person holding a political opinion that may attract harm from the Chinese authorities, and in that regard considered carefully country information prepared by the United Kingdom Border Agency about writers, journalists, bloggers and activists who had faced harm from China as a result of their activities, but concluded that the Applicant’s experiences as put to the Tribunal did not give the Applicant the profile of a dissident: CB 340 at [61]-[62]. In this regard, the Tribunal noted and accepted a statement by the Applicant that he did not have a profile like writers who were in prison in China, but did not accept a submission by the Applicant that this meant that he was at greater risk because his welfare would not be monitored by the international community as was the case with dissidents in Chinese prisons: CB 340 at [63].
The Tribunal also considered that the Applicant would not produce works openly critical of the Chinese state, or develop themes that would expose him to the adverse interest of the Chinese authorities, and in this regard noted statements by the Applicant that he had no intention or interest to struggle with the government system in China, and had not engaged in criticism of the Chinese political system generally in the past: CB 340-341 at [64]-[65]. Likewise, the Applicant’s anonymous criticism of the Chinese central government’s handling of recent protests in Hong Kong was not such as to indicate that he would be subject to harm from the Chinese authorities: CB 341 at [66].
Having regard to the Applicant’s body of work, and the views expressed by the Tribunal in relation to the book Enter Joint Venture Companies and the film The Years Return, the Tribunal concluded that the Applicant would not be forced to suppress political opinions out of a fear of harm or to modify his conduct in order to avoid harm should he return to China, because it was not satisfied that the Applicant in fact held views politically sensitive to the Chinese authorities: CB 341 at [67]. The Tribunal also did not accept that there was any link between the Applicant’s circumstances and recent protests in Hong Kong, and observed that there was no evidence that Chinese authorities attitudes towards writers and film makers had materially changed such that there was a real chance that the Applicant would be at risk of harm if he returned to China: CB 341 at [68].
The Tribunal dealt with the Applicant’s claims regarding his religion, including the issue of whether it was a problem in conjunction with any perception that he was involved in anti-government activities, and concluded that the practise of the Applicant’s religion in China would not cause him any trouble, or that the Applicant had the profile of a person involved in anti-government activities which would be viewed as a problem in conjunction with his religious activities: CB 342 at [69]-[71]. In this regard, the Tribunal considered the evidence concerning the Applicant’s involvement in the struggle to keep his grandparents’ home, and the effect of this in terms of his writing The Years Return, but noted that the matter had been resolved in his grandparent’s favour, and that the Applicant had not identified any incidents arising from the issue with his grandparents’ home which, in the Tribunal’s view, might mean that there was a real chance that the Applicant would suffer harm in the reasonably foreseeable future as a result of the events concerning his grandparents’ home in 2009: CB 342 at [72].
The Tribunal observed that whilst it had accepted the Applicant’s evidence concerning the majority of past experiences, which had involved instances of coming to the adverse attention of Chinese authorities, it also observed that the Applicant worked in a creative field where colleagues with higher profiles and a politically focused body of work had suffered harm at the hands of Chinese authorities, and that the Applicant subjectively held the fears that he described, but that “on careful analysis of the applicant’s particular experiences and work”: CB 342 at [73], the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant’s fears were objectively well-founded, and he did not therefore have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason: CB 342-343 at [73]-[74].
The Tribunal also considered whether or not the Applicant might be eligible for protection under the complementary protection criterion, but determined, having regard to the Applicant’s claims, that none of those claims, either individually or cumulatively, provided substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia to China that there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm: CB 343 at [75]-[79].
Consideration – Extension of Time Application
Legislation
Section 477(1) and (2) of the Migration Act provides as follows:
(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:
(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and
(b) the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.
Rule 44.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) FCC Rules provides as follows:
(1) An application for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under section 476 of the Migration Act in relation to a migration decision must be made in accordance with the approved form.
(2) An application must be supported by an affidavit including:
(a) a copy of the decision in relation to which the remedy is sought and any statement of reasons for the decision; and
(b) any document or other evidence the applicant seeks to rely on; and
(c) if an extension of time is sought--the evidence explaining the delay and showing why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension.
Whether an application to extend time must be made in writing and supported by an affidavit
The Minister submitted that the Proposed Judicial Review Application was incompetent because no application for an extension of time had been made in writing as required by s.477(2) of the Migration Act.
Section 477(2) of the Migration Act provides that any application for an extension of time has to be made “in writing” and has to specify why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice that the Court make an order extending time. The legislative requirement for the applicants’ Extension of Time Application to be “in writing” is not a requirement that the Court can dispense with, it being prescribed in the Migration Act, there being no dispensation power in relation to this legislative requirement. In WZASQ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1726 at [10]-[11] per Judge Lucev this Court observed as follows:
10 Section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 requires that before the Court can make an order extending time:
a) there has to be an application for an order to extend time;
b) the application for an order to extend time must be in writing; and
c) the application must specify why it is that the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make that order. In context, this last requirement makes it clear that the application must be one made by the applicant, for it is for the applicant to specify why it is that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time.
11 … It is not open to the Court, whether by a Registrar or a Judge, even by consent, to make an order either waiving or avoiding the requirements of s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958. There are no provisions of the Migration Act which allow a Registrar or Judge to do so. As the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia observed in SZRBN & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor: … [[2012] FMCA 384 (“SZRBN”)]
“[28] In my view the language of s 477(2) is plain. The relationship between its constituent parts, s 477(2)(a) and s 477(2)(b), is one of dependence for its engagement and operation of the latter on the former. I do not see that there is discretion for the court to consider the matter in s 477(2)(b) without an application pursuant to s 477(2)(a). This is not a matter as elsewhere in the Act where the court may act on its own motion (see for example s 486F(3)(a)).
[29] The application to the court is out of time. Notwithstanding that this is only by a matter of a mere three days, the only discretion available to the court to extend time is contained in s 477(2)(b) of the Act. The engagement of that consideration is dependent, or contingent, on the matter set out in s 477(2)(a). The applicants, despite ample opportunity, have not acted to comply with s 477(2)(a) of the Act.
[30] The application is not competent and the applicants have not taken the necessary and mandatory step to open the door to the only possible avenue to enable the application, as amended, to be made competent. Accordingly I will make an order dismissing the application as not competent. … [SZRBN at [28]-[30] per Nicholls FM] ”
12 In the absence of an application meeting the requirements of s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 an application for an extension of time under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 is incompetent.
(An application for leave to appeal against SZRBN was dismissed by the Federal Court: SZRBN v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 984).
The primary effect of the above conclusions is that there is no competent application for an extension of time, and the Court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to hear the Proposed Judicial Review Application. In those circumstances, the appropriate order is that the Extension of Time Application be dismissed, and an order to that effect will be made.
The requirements of r.44.05(2) of the FCC Rules are ordinarily mandatory because of the use of the word “must”: Broad Spectrum Training Pty Ltd & Ors v Bidding Buzz Ltd & Ors [2010] FMCA 932; (2010) 244 FLR 335 (“Broad Spectrum”) at [35]-[40] per Lucev FM, and cases there cited, applied in WZASC v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1452 at [9] per Judge Lucev, unless compliance with the rule is dispensed with in the interests of justice under r.1.06(1) of the FCC Rules which provides that:
The Court may in the interests of justice dispense with compliance, or full compliance, with any of these Rules, at any time.
Therefore, absent such dispensation, the FCC Rules prescribe that there must be an explanation provided in an affidavit supporting the Judicial Review Application as to the delay and as to why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time.
The Court notes that the applicants were afforded the opportunity by way of the Registrar’s Orders to file an amended Proposed Judicial Review Application and supporting affidavit: see [7(r)] above, but did not do so.
In the above circumstances, where the Court is of the view that the Extension of Time Application must be dismissed, the additional failure by the applicants to comply with r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules is immaterial and need not be further addressed.
Factors for consideration in extending time
Lest the conclusion reached by the Court as to the incompetency of the application be wrong (although the Court does not consider it be so), the Court will, in any event consider whether or not the Extension of Time Application would have been granted.
The non-exhaustive list of factors the Court will generally take into account in determining whether to grant an extension of time include:
a)the length or extent of delay;
b)the explanation for the delay;
c)any prejudice to the opposing party; and
d)the merits of the proposed application:
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; (1984) 58 ALR 305; (1984) 7 ALD 315, FCR at 348-349 per Wilcox J.
Extent of and explanation for delay
In the present case, the delay in seeking judicial review of the Tribunal Decision is a short delay of two days.
The law with respect to limitation periods affecting an application which seeks prerogative relief is set out in the judgments of the High Court in Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks[2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470; (2000) 177 ALR 491 (“Marks”) and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 70 ALJR 866; (1996) 139 ALR 1 (“Brisbane South Regional Health Authority”). The relevant passages in those judgments of the High Court can, for present purposes, be summarised as follows:
a)a limitation period is the general rule, and an extension provision is the exception to it: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J;
b)the limitation period represents Parliament’s judgment as to how the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within a limitation period: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh ;
c)where a significant period of time has elapsed, in all but very exceptional cases, the limitation period should be “rigidly applied”: Marks at [16] per McHugh J; and
d)the effect of the limitation period is such that it “may often result in a good cause of action being defeated”: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority at 553 per McHugh J.
The failure to provide any adequate explanation for the delay may, of itself, provide sufficient reason to refuse the extension of time sought: SZMWH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 879 at [7] per Stone J.
Albeit that there is no right to legal representation in migration proceedings in this Court: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1265; (2000) 101 FCR 20; (2000) 31 AAR 448 at [24] per Sackville, Marshall and Lehane JJ; SZQRU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234 at [24] per Katzmann J; MZZZL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1309 at [11] per Judge Lucev, it is nevertheless the case that the fact that an applicant does not have a lawyer is a factor which might be taken into account when exercising a discretion to waive a requirement or extend a relevant time limitation: MZZIV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203 (“MZZIV”) at [5] per Mortimer J; ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 810 (“ADN15”) at [29] per Charlesworth J, but more particularly where, as here, there is only a short delay, which is “not significant”: MZZIV at [1] and [5] per Mortimer J, or “not substantial”: ADN15 at [30] per Charlesworth J.
The Court has taken into account the fact that the Applicant is self-represented (and was granted leave to appear for the Son, who is a minor), and has already noted the observations of the Federal Court in MZZIV at [5] per Mortimer J and ADN15 at [30] per Charlesworth J. In Tinkler v Elliott [2012] EWCA Civ 1289; [2012] NLJR 1323; [2012] All ER (D) 94; [2013] CP Rep 4 (“Tinkler”) at [32] per Kay LJ (Munby and Lewison LJJ agreeing) the Court of Appeal of England and Wales made the following comment (which has often been referred to with approval by the Federal Court) in respect of self-represented litigants seeking an extension of time:
I accept that there may be facts and circumstances in relation to a litigant in person which may go to an assessment of promptness but, in my judgment, they will only operate close to the margins. An opponent of a litigant in person is entitled to assume finality without expecting excessive indulgence to be extended to the litigant in person …
In this case the applicants were afforded the opportunity by way of the Registrar’s Orders, and by way of an indulgence, to file an amended Proposed Judicial Review Application, and supporting affidavit: see [7(r)] above, so that they could put before the Court any material that they had that might explain the period of delay. The applicants did not take advantage of the opportunity afforded to them.
In this case the delay is minimal, the Proposed Judicial Review Application being filed two days out of time and, of itself, does not weigh to any significant degree against time being extended.
The written explanation submitted by the Applicant in the Applicant’s July 2015 Affidavit says that the Applicant tried to submit the documents, seemingly in person by coming from the southern city of Mandurah “for many and many times”, and that he tried to lodge the Proposed Judicial Review Application electronically, but was only able to finally lodge the Proposed Judicial Review Application when assisted by Court staff in the Court’s Perth Registry (“Registry”). The Applicant further says that the Christmas holiday period also intervened. At hearing, the Applicant’s explanation was to the above effect, and in particular, he said there were “technical difficulties” and he came to the Registry every two to three days but was unable to have the Proposed Judicial Review Application processed: Transcript, pp.4-6. The Court has also considered that English is not the Applicant’s first language, and has placed some weight on that, albeit minimal in circumstances where the Applicant:
a)has been engaged in writing film scripts, seemingly in English;
b)submitted Court documents, some quite lengthy, written in English; and
c)made some, but not all, of his submissions at hearing orally in English: Transcript, pp.3-5 and 6.
The Applicant has endeavoured to explain the delay but the detail is imprecise, and nothing is specifically said as to the actual reason that the Applicant did not have the Proposed Judicial Review Application processed, or was actually unable to submit the Proposed Judicial Review Application. It is not possible for the Court to discern from the materials before it what it was that the Applicant was:
a)being told or not told by Registry staff; or
b)doing or not doing as a consequence,
which resulted in the Proposed Judicial Review Application not being filed prior to 9 January 2015. In those circumstances, it is simply not possible for the Court to determine whether there is an adequate explanation for the delay, and in those circumstances the Applicant has not established that there is an adequate explanation for the delay, and this factor must weigh against an extension of time.
Prejudice
Although the Minister does not contend that he would be prejudiced by reason of the delay, the mere absence of prejudice to the Minister cannot of itself justify the exercise of the discretion to extend time: Hunter Valley FCR at 349 per Wilcox J. This factor does not weigh, to any significant degree, against time being extended.
Merits
Jurisdictional error required
The Tribunal Decision is reviewable by this Court if it is affected by jurisdictional error: Migration Act, ss.474 and 476; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 at [76] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ in such a way that the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given to the Tribunal under the Migration Act: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf& Anor [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
The Court has no jurisdiction to engage in merits review, and fact-finding is a matter for the Tribunal, and is not reviewable by this Court if the findings of fact were open to the Tribunal, and otherwise made in accordance with the law: NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9] per Heerey, RD Nicholson and Selway JJ; Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1, CLR at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ , CLR at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (“Wu Shan Liang”). The weight to be given to an applicant's claims and evidence is a matter for the Tribunal to assess as part of its fact-finding function: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
Determining reasonable prospects of success on an application for an extension of time
In determining whether, for the purposes of the Extension of Time Application, the merits of the Proposed Judicial Review Application are arguable or have reasonable prospects of success, it is not necessary for the applicants to positively establish that the Proposed Judicial Review Application will succeed at final hearing: SZTES v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 (“SZTES”) at [48] and [102] per Wigney J (from which an appeal was dismissed: SZTES v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158), but it will rarely be in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time to file an application which has little or no prospect of success: MZZIV at [6] per Mortimer J. In determining whether the grounds of review are arguable, reasonably arguable, or have reasonable prospects of success only requires the Court to deal with the grounds of review, and to examine them, in a reasonably impressionistic manner, and without the full consideration of all of the arguments which would be necessary upon a consideration of the merit of each of the grounds of review. The issue is not whether the applicants would be successful in the ultimate outcome, but whether an extension of time ought to be granted because an impressionistic, and necessarily preliminary examination of the grounds of review, reveals that the grounds of review, or any of them, might be arguable, reasonably arguable, or have a reasonable prospect of success, if fully examined as to their or its merit: SZTES at [48] per Wigney J; Mladenov v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 12 at [25] per Mortimer J.
Grounds
The Proposed Judicial Review Application sets out the following two grounds (which the Court will subsequently refer to as grounds 1 and 2 respectively):
“The member neglect some important evidence and the evidence obviously will cause serious harm”; and
“Some of the conclusion (sic) which the member made are contradicted with member’s accepted evidence”
(Transcribed without amendment from the Proposed Judicial Review Application).
In Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 (“Applicant WAEE”) at [45] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ the Full Court of the Federal Court observed that:
If the Tribunal fails to consider a contention that the applicant fears persecution for a particular reason which, if accepted, would justify concluding that the applicant has satisfied the relevant criterion, and if that contention is supported by probative material, the Tribunal will have failed in the discharge of its duty, imposed by s 414, to conduct a review of the decision. This is a matter of substance, not a matter of the form of the Tribunal’s published reasons for decision.
Another Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431; (2013) 136 ALD 547 (“MZYTS”) at [34] per Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ said that:
[L]awful formation of that state of satisfaction [under s 65 of the Act] (one way or the other) involves, first, a correct understanding of the basis (or bases) on which the visa applicant says she or he has a fear of persecution in her or his country of nationality …
and further at [62] per Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ said that:
A failure to consider the claim advanced by a visa applicant is plainly and uncontroversially a failure to perform the statutory task imposed on the Tribunal.
The immediately preceding quote from MZYTS is reflective of the fact that the Tribunal must consider all of the claims made by an applicant and all of the integers of those claims as articulated by an applicant or which arise clearly from the material before the Tribunal: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 77 ALJR 1088; (2003) 197 ALR 389; (2003) 73 ALD 321 at [24]-[25] per Gummow and Callinan JJ; Htun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136; (2001) 194 ALR 244 at [42] per Allsop J.
In Applicant WAEE the Full Court of the Federal Court further observed at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ that:
Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.
It has also been said that the Tribunal does not commit jurisdictional error by failing to take account of or refer to every document or piece of evidence upon which an Applicant relies in preparing the written statement for its decision pursuant to s.430(1) of the Migration Act, or by failing to set out a line-by-line refutation of an applicant’s evidence: Li Shi Ping v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1994) 35 ALD 225 at 236-237 per Carr J (with whom Sheppard and Gummow JJ agreed); Re The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405; (2000) 168 ALR 407; (2000) 58 ALD 609 at [65] per McHugh J; Applicant WAEE at [46] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ.
The Tribunal Decision is a reasonably lengthy, but also comprehensive, consideration of the applicants’ case. The Tribunal Decision:
a)sets out the relevant law;
b)sets out the applicants’ claims in not inconsiderable detail: see [9] above, and more importantly, accurately on the basis of the relevant materials;
c)sets out the evidence of the Applicant given to the Tribunal;
d)considers the Applicant’s evidence, and the materials before the Tribunal, including, particularly, country information; and
e)draws its factual conclusions as to whether or not the applicants have met the relevant Refugee Convention criteria and complementary protection criteria from its consideration of the evidence and materials (including the country information) before the Tribunal.
It is well accepted that the Tribunal may get any information it considers relevant, and that the weight it affords that material (and in particular country information) is a matter for it: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10]-[11] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ, provided that the Tribunal gives proper consideration to the claims and evidence before it: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZJSS & Ors [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164; (2010) 85 ALJR 306; (2010) 273 ALR 122; (2010) 119 ALD 446 at [26] and [30] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
The Court has carefully read the applicants’ materials filed in these proceedings, notably the Applicant’s March 2015 and July 2015 Affidavits, together with the Applicant’s May 2013 Statement provided to the Department. The assertions and submissions made by the Applicant, particularly in the Applicant’s March 2015 and July 2015 Affidavits do not establish the grounds now relied upon by him in these proceedings. It is not apparent to the Court that the Tribunal neglected any evidence or any materials relied upon by the applicants, let alone any that was “important”, nor did the Tribunal, importantly, neglect any claim actually made by the applicants. The assertions now made by the applicants constitute either new material which was not before the Tribunal: see for example the Annexures to the Applicant’s July 2015 Affidavit, or commentary upon the Tribunal Decision, as in the Applicant’s March 2015 Affidavit. The latter takes the form of setting out large parts of the Tribunal Decision, and then asserting some form of jurisdictional error, such as disregarding relevant considerations or misapprehending relevant considerations, or asserting that the Tribunal Decision lacks basic and reliable evidence. The Applicant’s commentary is however no more than a line by line rearguing of factual matters which were determined by the Tribunal having regard to the evidence and materials that were before it. It is unnecessary to go through each of the many examples: it suffices to say that the Applicant is simply reagitating arguments made before the Tribunal in relation to claims and evidence considered by the Tribunal. In those circumstances, ground 1 is not reasonably arguable because it constitutes no more than an impermissible application for merits review of the Tribunal Decision: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
In relation to ground 2 it is apparent that the concern of the Applicant was that the Tribunal had accepted almost all of his evidence with respect to his fear of persecution (save for one exception in relation to events immediately prior to his departure from China), but found that those fears were subjectively held, and were not objectively well-founded: CB 337 at [42]. In order to have a well-founded fear of persecution the fears must be objectively well-founded: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559; (1997) 71 ALJR 743; (1997) 144 ALR 567; (1997) 48 ALD 481, CLR at 572 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Cummow JJ. It is apparent that the Applicant has not appreciated the distinction between his own subjective fear of persecution and the requirement for the Tribunal to assess whether any fear of persecution held by the applicants was an objective fear of persecution. It follows that ground 2 is not reasonably arguable.
It follows that the grounds of the Proposed Judicial Review Application are not reasonably arguable, and have no reasonable prospects of success, and the Court should not therefore extend time to file the Proposed Judicial Review Application: MZZIV at [5] per Mortimer J. In weighing the factors relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to extend time this factor and this conclusion must prevail.
Conclusion and orders
The Court has concluded that the applicants’ Extension of Time Application must be dismissed. There will be an order accordingly. In the circumstances, it is therefore unnecessary to make an order dismissing the Proposed Judicial Review Application: BZABK v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor [2012] FCA 774; (2012) 205 FCR 83 at [43] per Foster J.
The Court will also order that:
a)the name of the Minister be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs”; and
b)the name of the Tribunal be changed to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”,
and there will be orders accordingly.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Antoni Lucev
Associate:
Date: 20 August 2019
0
40
4