WZASC v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WZASC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2013] FCCA 1452
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – protection visa – whether denial of procedural fairness.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time in which to file judicial review application.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.44.05

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.476, 477(1) and (2)

Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14

ActewAGL Distribution v Australian Energy Regulator (2011) 195 FCR 142; [2011] FCA 639
Broad Spectrum Training Pty Ltd & Ors v Bidding Buzz Ltd & Ors (2010) 244 FLR 335; [2010] FMCA 932
Collins v Department of Finance & Deregulation (No.3) [2012] FMCA 860
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441

Golski v Kirk (1987) 14 FCR 143

Hamden v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (2013) 59 AAR 108; [2013] FCA 3

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang& Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
SZQGO v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 125 ALD 449; [2012] FCA 177
SZRUG v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2013] FCCA 142
SZSDA v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319
WZAOZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor (2012) 134 ALD 572; [2012] FMCA 1139

Applicant: WZASC
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: PEG 71 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Lucev
Hearing date: 24 September 2013
Date of Last Submission: 24 September 2013
Delivered at: Perth
Delivered on: 11 October 2013

REPRESENTATION

For the Applicant: In person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P Macliver
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. That the name of the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration & Border Protection”.

  2. That the applicant’s application under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for an extension of time in which to lodge an application under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be dismissed.

  3. That the supporting statement filed 7 October 2013 be returned to its maker.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 71 of 2013

WZASC

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant seeks to make an application[1] under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)[2] in relation to a migration decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal,[3] and makes a further application under s.477(2) of the Migration Act for an extension of time within which to make the Substantive Application.[4]

    [1] “Substantive Application”.

    [2] “Migration Act”.

    [3] “Tribunal”.

    [4] “Extension of Time Application”.

  2. The Substantive Application and Extension of Time Application were filed on 17 April 2013. The decision of the Tribunal was made on 12 December 2012,[5] and any application in relation to the Tribunal Decision…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 1452
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, WZASC, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant a protection visa. The Minister's delegate had refused the application on the basis that the applicant's claims of persecution were not substantiated by sufficient evidence. The matter came before Judge Lucev in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether the delegate had failed to adequately assess the applicant's claims of persecution, particularly in relation to the risk of harm from a particular group, and whether the delegate had applied the correct legal test when assessing the subjective fear of the applicant.

Judge Lucev found that the delegate had made a jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider the evidence relating to the applicant's fear of harm from a specific group. The delegate's assessment had focused too narrowly on the objective likelihood of harm and had not adequately engaged with the applicant's subjective fear and the reasons for that fear. The Court reiterated the principle that a delegate must assess both the subjective fear of the applicant and the objective reasonableness of that fear, considering all relevant evidence. The delegate's failure to adequately weigh the subjective component of the applicant's claim constituted a failure to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth).

The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister's delegate be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, a citizen of Afghanistan born on 31 December 1974, lived in the village of Dehmorda, Jaghori District, Ghazni Province until 2001. Between 2001 and 2011, the applicant resided mainly in Quetta, Pakistan. He arrived in Australia by boat at Christmas Island on 18 February 2012. On 17 June 2012, the applicant applied for a Protection Class XA Visa, claiming that his life would be in danger if returned to Afghanistan due to his Shiite and Hazara identity. An officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship interviewed the applicant on 21 June 2012. On 7 August 2012, a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship refused the applicant's visa application.

On 10 August 2012, the applicant sought review of the delegate's decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant's representatives submitted written arguments to the Tribunal on 22 August 2012. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal via video conference on 17 October 2012. On 12 December 2012, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a Protection Visa. The Tribunal communicated this decision to the applicant and his representative on 13 December 2012. On 17 April 2013, the applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), including an application for an extension of time under section 477(2) of the Act. The only ground for the judicial review application was that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness. The applicant cited his detention, lack of legal representation, and difficulty obtaining legal advice as reasons for the extension of time. No amended application or affidavits were filed by the applicant by the time of the hearing on 24 September 2013.

The case of WZASC v Minister for Immigration & Anor was a judicial review application brought before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The applicant, WZASC, sought to challenge a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal that had affirmed the refusal of a Protection Visa. The application, including an application for an extension of time, was filed on 17 April 2013, which was 91 days beyond the 35-day statutory limit prescribed by section 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant argued that the delay was due to his detention, lack of legal representation, and difficulties in obtaining legal advice. Despite these circumstances, the Court found that there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay, as the mandatory requirements of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) for an extension of time application had not been met, specifically the need for an affidavit explaining the delay. Furthermore, the Court found that the applicant's claim of procedural unfairness by the Tribunal had no prospect of success, making it not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time. Additionally, no prejudice was demonstrated by the respondents to the delay, and considerations of fairness and the public interest did not support granting an extension of time. The Court also dismissed a post-hearing filing that was not authorised by the applicant and not served on the respondents. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for an extension of time and the substantive application for judicial review for being out of time.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicant's delay in making the Substantive Application and the Extension of Time Application was justified to warrant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act.
2. Whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal in its decision-making process.
3. Whether the Court should consider the supporting statement filed post-hearing by a third party on behalf of the applicant.
4. Whether the Court should grant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice, considering the factors outlined in the Federal Circuit Court Rules and relevant case law.

Held
1. Whether the applicant's delay in making the Substantive Application and the Extension of Time Application was justified to warrant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act.
The Court concluded that the applicant's delay was unjustified and therefore dismissed the Extension of Time Application.

2. Whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal in its decision-making process.
The Court concluded that the Tribunal afforded the applicant procedural fairness and dismissed the claim.

3. Whether the Court should consider the supporting statement filed post-hearing by a third party on behalf of the applicant.
The Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to consider the post-hearing supporting statement and ordered it to be returned to its maker.

4. Whether the Court should grant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice, considering the factors outlined in the Federal Circuit Court Rules and relevant case law.
The Court concluded that it was not in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time and dismissed the Extension of Time Application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of WZASC v Minister for Immigration & Anor, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia considered several issues central to the applicant's attempt to have his application for judicial review considered outside the statutory time limits. The Court's reasoning was grounded in established principles of statutory interpretation, procedural fairness, and the administration of justice.

The first issue the Court addressed was whether the applicant's delay in making both the Substantive Application and the Extension of Time Application was justified under s.477(2) of the Migration Act. The Court found that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, as required by the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Specifically, the Court noted that the applicant failed to file an affidavit explaining the delay, despite the mandatory nature of this requirement under r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules. The Court emphasized that ignorance of the time limits alone does not constitute a valid reason for the delay, referencing SZSDA v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319. The Court concluded that the applicant's circumstances did not warrant an extension of time because there was no evidence that the applicant's situation was any more challenging than that of other detainees.

Secondly, the Court considered whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal. The Court examined the Tribunal's decision-making process and found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant's claims and submissions. The Court held that the Tribunal's preference for certain country information over that provided by the applicant's representative did not amount to procedural unfairness. The Court relied on established principles from cases such as Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259, where it was held that procedural fairness is not breached merely because an administrative body does not refer to every piece of evidence or submission.

The third issue involved whether the Court should consider a supporting statement filed post-hearing by a third party on behalf of the applicant. The Court determined that the supporting statement was not to be considered, as it was filed without the applicant's authorization and was not served on the respondents. The Court concluded that the appropriate course was to return the statement to its maker, as it was not part of the formal legal proceedings.

Finally, the Court evaluated whether it should grant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice, considering the factors outlined in the Federal Circuit Court Rules and relevant case law. The Court found that the absence of prejudice to the Minister, the lack of merit in the substantive application, and the potential unfairness to other litigants in similar situations weighed against granting an extension of time. The Court emphasized that it would not be in the public interest to make an exception for this applicant based on the law as it currently stands.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Court will not extend time limits for making judicial review applications under the Migration Act unless the applicant provides a satisfactory explanation for the delay, as required by the FCC Rules, and the delay is justified under the principles of the administration of justice. The Court must consider factors such as the extent of the delay, the merit of the application, and the potential prejudice to respondents. Additionally, post-hearing filings by third parties not authorized by the applicant will not be considered unless properly integrated into the formal proceedings.