FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 1991 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time to file application – no written application to extend time – whether specification of why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time – whether affidavit in support of extension of time evidences prescribed matters – factors for consideration in extending time. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.1.06, 44.05, 44.12 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2, cl.886.222 |
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Singh v Minister for Immigration and Anor and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] FCCA 1991
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Circuit Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, whether the applicant's judicial review application was filed within the prescribed 35-day time limit under section 477(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Secondly, if the application was out of time, whether the Court had the power to grant an extension of time under section 477(2) of the *Migration Act*, and if so, whether the applicant had met the necessary conditions for such an extension.
The Court found that the applicant's judicial review application was lodged one day outside the 35-day time limit, as the date of the migration decision was correctly identified as 1 October 2014, the date of the Tribunal's written statement. Consequently, the Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter was contingent on granting an extension of time. However, the Court held that section 477(2) of the *Migration Act* mandates that an application for an extension of time must be made in writing and must specify why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. The Court noted that the applicant had not made a written application for an extension of time, nor had he provided an affidavit explaining the delay and demonstrating why an extension was necessary in the interests of justice, as required by Rule 44.05(2)(c) of the *Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001* (Cth). Applying the principles from *WZASQ* and *Sandan*, the Court concluded that these requirements were mandatory and not severable.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the applicant's application under section 477(2) of the *Migration Act* for an extension of time to lodge his application for judicial review. The Court also ordered that the name of the second respondent be amended to read "Administrative Appeals Tribunal".
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That the name of the second respondent be amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2.
That the applicant’s application under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for an extension of time in which to lodge an application under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) be dismissed.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH
PEG 350 of 2014
BALVINDER SINGH
Applicant
And
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judicial review application – introduction
1.
By application filed on 6 November 2014 the applicant seeks judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) of a decision of the second respondent, the Migration Review Tribunal (“Tribunal” and “Tribunal Decision” respectively. The Tribunal Decision is at Court Book (“CB”) 115-120). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (“Delegate” and “Delegate’s Decision” respectively) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (“Minister”), to refuse to grant a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) visa (“Skilled Residence Visa”) to the applicant. The Delegate’s Decision is at CB 43-46.
Grounds of the Judicial Review Application
2.
The Judicial Review Application raises the following grounds of review:
1. File was mishandled due to heavy work load.
2. State migration never sent no email to confirm that it was declined.
3.
The Judicial Review Application also attached an extract of submissions provided by the applicant to the Tribunal which noted that:
a) “State Migration Western Australia was mishandling the applications which was resulting in extended delays and re-lodgement requests”;
b) the applicant re-lodged his application with “State Migration of Western Australia” in 2011 however was unable to be assessed at that time; and
c) the applicant “would have met cl.886.222(2) [of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Migration Regulations”)] or 886.222(3) and accordingly cl.886.222 in its entirety had the State Migration of Western Australia provided the Form 1100 to the Department in time.”
It would appear that the references to “State Migration Western Australia” and similar expressions are in fact a reference to the State Migration Centre in the Small Business Development Corporation: see, for example, Court Book (“CB”) 92-93.
4.
Annexure 4 of an Affidavit filed by the applicant on of 12 December 2014 (“Applicant’s Affidavit”) appears to raise further grounds of review, stating:
1. I lodged an application for the grant of a Skilled (Residence) (class VB) subclass Skilled- Sponsored (886) on 19 March 2010 that was refused by the delegate of the Minister on 25 June 2013.
2. To seek justice from the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT), I lodged application for appeal 5 July 2013.
3. I was invited for a physical hearing on 30 September 2014. The Tribunal overlooked the facts of my case under law.
4. Tribunal refused my appeal on 2 October 2014 without due consideration of my evidence and my hearing.
Minister’s Response
5.
The Minister filed a Response (“Response”) on 20 November 2014 stating:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the Migration Review Tribunal decision dated 1 October 2014. Subsection 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) applies and the application in this Court was not filed within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision.
2. The application for judicial review does not establish any jurisdictional error in the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 1 October 2014.
3. The application for judicial review does not raise an arguable case for the relief claimed and should accordingly be dismissed pursuant to Rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.
6.
The Minister seeks orders that:
a) the grant of an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act be refused;
b) the matter be dismissed pursuant to r.44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth); and
c) the applicant pay the Minister’s costs of the proceedings fixed in the sum of $3,416.
The Judicial Review Application: in or out of time?
7.
The Tribunal Decision was dated 1 October 2014 and the Judicial Review Application was filed on 6 November 2014. In order for the Judicial Review Application to have been filed within 35 days, it was required to be filed by 5 November 2014.
8.
The applicant argued that the Judicial Review Application was filed within time because the 35 day time period ran from the date the applicant received the Tribunal Decision, which he says was 2 October 2014.
9.
The date of the migration decision is prescribed by s.477(3)(b) of the Migration Act as being, for present purposes “the date of the written statement under sub-section 368(1) [of the Migration Act]”.
10.
The written statement under s.368(1) of the Migration Act is the Tribunal Decision. As indicated above, the Tribunal Decision is dated 1 October 2014. The “date of the migration decision” for the purposes of s.477(1) of the Migration Act is therefore 1 October 2014.
11.
The Judicial Review Application was therefore lodged one day outside the time period set by s.477(1) of the Migration Act. The applicant’s argument that the date of the migration decision was 2 October 2014 must therefore fail. Accordingly, the Judicial Review Application is incompetent by virtue of s.477(1) of the Migration Act unless the Court grants an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act.
Extension of time – whether application to extend time to be made in writing a mandatory requirement
Legislation
12.
Section 477(1), (2) and (3)(b) of the Migration Act provides that:
(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:
(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and
(b) the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.
(3) In this section:
“date of the migration decision” means:
…
(b) in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal--the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1) or 430(1) …
No written application for an extension of time to file the Judicial Review Application
13.
The Minister argued that an extension of time was not in the interests of justice because the applicant had not made application in writing to the Court to extend time for the filing of the Judicial Review Application: Minister’s Written Submissions at [15(a)].
14.
In WZASQ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1726 (“WZASQ”) this Court observed as follows:
10 Section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 requires that before the Court can make an order extending time:
a)there has to be an application for an order to extend time;
b)the application for an order to extend time must be in writing; and
c)the application must specify why it is that the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make that order. In context, this last requirement makes it clear that the application must be one made by the applicant, for it is for the applicant to specify why it is that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time.
11 … It is not open to the Court, whether by a Registrar or a Judge, even by consent, to make an order either waiving or avoiding the requirements of s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958. There are no provisions of the Migration Act which allow a Registrar or Judge to do so. As the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia observed in SZRBN & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor: … [[2012] FMCA 384 (“SZRBN”)].
“[28] In my view the language of s 477(2) is plain. The relationship between its constituent parts, s 477(2)(a) and s 477(2)(b), is one of dependence for its engagement and operation of the latter on the former. I do not see that there is discretion for the court to consider the matter in s 477(2)(b) without an application pursuant to s 477(2)(a). This is not a matter as elsewhere in the Act where the court may act on its own motion (see for example s 486F(3)(a)).
[29] The application to the court is out of time. Notwithstanding that this is only by a matter of a mere three days, the only discretion available to the court to extend time is contained in s 477(2)(b) of the Act. The engagement of that consideration is dependent, or contingent, on the matter set out in s 477(2)(a). The applicants, despite ample opportunity, have not acted to comply with s 477(2)(a) of the Act.
[30] The application is not competent and the applicants have not taken the necessary and mandatory step to open the door to the only possible avenue to enable the application, as amended, to be made competent. Accordingly I will make an order dismissing the application as not competent … [SZRBN at [28]-[30] per Nicholls FM]”.
12 In the absence of an application meeting the requirements of s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 an application for an extension of time under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 is incompetent.
WZASQ at [10]-[12] per Judge Lucev. An application for leave to appeal against SZRBN was dismissed by the Federal Court: SZRBN v Minister for immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 984.
15.
In Sandan v Minister for immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1166; (2015) 296 FLR 48 (“Sandan”), delivered subsequent to this matter being argued, further rationale for the mandatory nature of the requirement that an application for an extension of time to file an application for judicial review under s.476 of the Migration Act was set out as follows:
12. It has long been recognised that the use of the word “must” in migration legislation, such as s.477(1) of the Migration Act, limiting time for the filing of applications imposes a mandatory obligation to comply with the time limit. In Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 386; (1997) 151 ALR 717; (1997) 45 ALD 104 (“Wang”) the Federal Court said:
In my view the use of the word “must” in s 478(1)(b) and (2), in relation to the 28 day time limit, is not merely directory but “is a word of absolute obligation”: see Posner v Collector for Inter-state Destitute Persons (Vic) (1946) 74 CLR 461 at 490 per Williams J and Kosovich v Mancini (1982) 31 SASR 272 at 275-276 per Millhouse J. Such an interpretation also accords with the principle that enactments requiring that a specified procedure be followed in courts are usually mandatory and not merely directory: see D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (4th ed, 1996), p 278 and Public Prosecutor v Oie Hee Koi [1968] AC 829 at 852.
Wang, FCR at 391 per Merkel J.
13. Section 477(2) of the Migration Act is a provision under which the Court is given the discretion to make an order extending the otherwise mandatory time limitation in s.477(1) of the Migration Act if, and only if, the conditions in s.477(2) are met. In s.477(2) of the Migration Act the word “and” is used between paragraphs (a) and (b). Although not an invariable rule, where “and” appears joining two or more requirements in a statute it will usually indicate that those requirements are cumulative, unless the particular context requires otherwise: Re The Licensing Ordinance (1968) 13 FLR 143 at 146-147 per Blackburn J; Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs v Gray [1999] FCA 1150; (1999) 91 FCR 254 at [23] per Hill J; Whitfield v One Key Resources Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 553; (2014) 285 FLR 416; (2014) 241 IR 472 at [13] per Judge Lucev. The use of the conjunctive “and” in s.477(2) of the Migration Act therefore means that the obligations imposed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.477(2) of the Migration Act are not severable: SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 139 ALD 252 at [45] per Foster J (“SZRIQ”), the context not requiring otherwise. Thus, the requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.447(2) of the Migration Act must all be met before time can be extended. As indicated in WZASQ this requires:
a) an application for an order to extend time made in writing specifying why the applicant considers it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time; and
b) satisfaction on the part of the Court that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time.
14. The Court cannot simply jump to the second step, and satisfy itself that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time, without an application being made which complies with the terms of s.477(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Sandan at [12]-[14] per Judge Lucev.
16.
By neither making an application for an extension of time in writing nor specifying why he considered it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time, the applicant has wholly failed to satisfy s.477(2) of the Migration Act. Therefore, an extension of time cannot be granted by the Court.
Extension of time – whether affidavit complying with r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules is mandatory requirement
Legislation
17.
Rule 44.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) provides as follows:
(1) An application for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under section 476 of the Migration Act in relation to a migration decision must be made in accordance with the approved form.
(2) An application must be supported by an affidavit including:
(a) a copy of the decision in relation to which the remedy is sought and any statement of reasons for the decision; and
(b) any document or other evidence the applicant seeks to rely on; and
(c) if an extension of time is sought--the evidence explaining the delay and showing why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension.
18.
Rule 44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules provides that where an application for judicial review seeks an extension of time, it must be supported by an affidavit containing evidence:
a) explaining the delay; and
b) showing why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension, as required by r.44.05(2) of the FCC Rules.
19.
In Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 (“A’Hearn”) the Full Court of the Federal Court stated that although it was to be expected an explanation for the delay would normally be given, “there was no rule that such an explanation is an essential pre-condition”: A’Hearn at 444 per Black CJ, Gray and Burchett JJ, but, as the Federal Court has otherwise observed, the failure to provide any adequate explanation for the delay may, of itself, provide sufficient reason to refuse the extension of time sought: SZMWH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 879 at [7] per Stone J (“SZMWH”).
20.
In this case there is, however, a rule, and unless compliance with the rule is dispensed with in the interests of justice: FCC Rules, r.1.06(1): “The Court may in the interests of justice dispense with compliance, or full compliance, with any of these Rules, at any time”, the requirements of r.44.05(2) of the FCC Rules are mandatory because of the use of the word “must”: Broad Spectrum Training Pty Ltd & Ors v Bidding Buzz Ltd & Ors [2010] FMCA 932; (2010) 244 FLR 335 at [35]-[40] per Lucev FM (“Broad Spectrum”), and cases there cited, applied in WZASC v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1452 at [9] per Judge Lucev (“WZASC”). Therefore, absent such dispensation, the FCC Rules prescribe that there must be an explanation provided in an affidavit supporting the Judicial Review Application as to the delay and as to why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time.
21.
In Sandan the provisions of r.44.05 of the FCC Rules were explained as follows:
17.Rule 44.05 of the FCC Rules was inserted into the then
Background
Background to the litigation
Singh submitted that the application for judicial review was out of time because the 35-day period ran from the date he received the Tribunal Decision. However, the Federal Circuit Court found that the applicant had not made an application for an extension of time in writing as required by s.477(2) of the Migration Act. The Court further noted that the absence of a written application specifying why it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time meant that the application for an extension of time was incompetent. Singh also failed to provide an affidavit explaining the delay and showing why it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension, as required by r.44.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) ("FCC Rules").
Balvinder Singh initiated a judicial review application under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) against a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, affirmed by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration & Border Protection, to refuse his application for a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) visa. The application, filed on 6 November 2014, sought to challenge the Tribunal’s decision dated 1 October 2014. The applicant argued that the Tribunal’s decision was flawed due to mishandling of the file and delays caused by State Migration Western Australia. The Minister for Immigration & Border Protection responded by arguing that the application was out of time, as it was filed one day after the 35-day period prescribed by section 477(1) of the Migration Act. Furthermore, the Minister contended that the applicant had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for seeking an extension of time, specifically the need for a written application specifying why an extension was necessary in the interests of justice, and the requirement for an affidavit explaining the delay and justifying the extension.
The Federal Circuit Court examined whether the application was within time and whether the mandatory procedural requirements for an extension of time had been met. It was established that the application was lodged one day after the statutory deadline, making it incompetent unless an extension of time was granted. However, the applicant had not filed a written application for an extension of time as required by section 477(2) of the Migration Act, nor had he provided the requisite affidavit explaining the delay and justifying the extension of time as mandated by rule 44.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Consequently, the Court found that the applicant’s failure to comply with these mandatory requirements precluded the grant of an extension of time, rendering the application incompetent.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the Court required to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act when the applicant has not made a written application specifying why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time?
2. Are the requirements of r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules mandatory when seeking an extension of time, and must an affidavit be provided that explains the delay and shows why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension?
3. What factors should the Court consider when determining whether to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act?
Held
1. Is the Court required to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act when the applicant has not made a written application specifying why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time?
The Court concluded that the applicant's failure to make a written application specifying why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time meant the application for an extension of time was incompetent. Therefore, the Court was not required to grant an extension of time, and the application was dismissed.
2. Are the requirements of r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules mandatory when seeking an extension of time, and must an affidavit be provided that explains the delay and shows why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension?
The Court concluded that the requirements of r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules are mandatory and that an affidavit must be provided explaining the delay and showing why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension. However, the Court did not consider this issue further because the applicant had not made a written application as required by s.477(2) of the Migration Act.
3. What factors should the Court consider when determining whether to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act?
The Court did not reach this issue as it found the application for an extension of time was incompetent due to the applicant’s failure to make a written application as required by s.477(2) of the Migration Act. Therefore, the Court did not consider the factors for determining whether to grant an extension of time.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Federal Court Rules in 1992, following the decision in Comcare v A'Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441. The rule was designed to provide a framework for the filing of applications for judicial review in migration matters. In particular, it was intended to ensure that the Court had all necessary information before it when considering whether to grant an extension of time. The requirement for an affidavit to be provided that explains the delay and shows why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension is therefore a mandatory requirement under r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules.
22.
In this case, the applicant did not provide any explanation for the delay in filing the Judicial Review Application, nor did he provide any reasons why it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time. The applicant's failure to provide any explanation for the delay or any reasons why an extension should be granted therefore renders the application non-compliant with the mandatory requirements of r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules. The Court is therefore not required to consider the merits of the application for an extension of time because the application is not compliant with the mandatory requirements of the FCC Rules.
Factors for consideration in extending time
23.
Even if the Court were to consider the merits of the application for an extension of time, the Court would be required to consider the factors set out in s.477(2) of the Migration Act and r.44.05 of the FCC Rules. These factors include the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the other party, and the merits of the case. In this case, the delay in filing the Judicial Review Application was one day, and the reason for the delay was not explained by the applicant. The Minister would therefore be prejudiced if the Court were to grant an extension of time. In addition, the merits of the case are not such that they would warrant an extension of time.
24.
In conclusion, the Court is not required to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act when the applicant has not made a written application specifying why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time. The requirements of r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules are mandatory when seeking an extension of time, and an affidavit must be provided that explains the delay and shows why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension. When determining whether to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act, the Court must consider the factors set out in s.477(2) of the Migration Act and r.44.05 of the FCC Rules. In this case, the applicant failed to provide any explanation for the delay or any reasons why an extension should be granted, and the delay was only one day. The Court is therefore not required to grant an extension of time.
Ratio decidendi
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court is not required to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act when the applicant has not made a written application specifying why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time. The requirements of r.44.05(2)(c) of the FCC Rules are mandatory when seeking an extension of time, and an affidavit must be provided that explains the delay and shows why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension. When determining whether to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act, the Court must consider the factors set out in s.477(2) of the Migration Act and r.44.05 of the FCC Rules.