FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ADN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 810
ORDERS
SAD 458 of 2015 BETWEEN: ADN15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 JULY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $1,756.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He seeks an extension of time in which to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court published as ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3488. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Second Respondent (Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (Delegate) to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.
An appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court is to be commenced within 21 days after the pronouncement of the judgment appealed…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 810
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles outlined in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen and found that the applicant's ignorance of the timeframe for lodging an appeal was not, in itself, an adequate explanation to warrant an extension of time. The court also noted that the applicant was a self-represented litigant who was not proficient in written or spoken English, which informed the weight to be given to the length of the delay in exercising the discretion to grant an extension of time. The court held that the Tribunal's findings were open to it on the country information to which it had regard and that the conclusions reached were not such that no reasonable Tribunal would have reached them. The court ultimately dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $1,756.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $1,756.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the second ground of review, the Federal Circuit Court Judge held that the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the country information to which it had regard. It could not, therefore, be said that the Tribunal’s conclusions were such that no reasonable decision maker could have reached them. The Judge said:[14] As the Minister observed in his written submissions, the Tribunal’s decision was based on the individual and cumulative claims made by the applicant, such evidence as it accepted and relevant country information. The relevant country information to which the Tribunal had regard provided probative evidence to support its findings. In Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 the High Court made it clear that if probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning, and if reasonable minds can draw different conclusions from that evidence, a decision cannot be said to be unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred over another. The conclusions which the Tribunal reached were open to it on the evidence before it and not such that it could be said that no reasonable Tribunal would have reached them. Consequently, the second ground of the application is not made out.CONSIDERATION In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 (at 348-349) (Hunter Valley), Wilcox J considered the principles applicable upon an application made under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) for an extension of time to commence proceedings under that Act. The principles there stated have been repeatedly accepted as guiding the Court’s discretion on an application made pursuant to r 36.05 of the Rules for an extension of time in which to commence an appeal: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; Marsden v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 229 at [19]. The discretion is to be exercised having regard to:(1)the length of the delay;(2)the adequacy of any explanation for the delay;(3)any prejudice that might be suffered by the respondents or any other person if an extension of time were to be granted;(4)the prospects of success of the appeal sought to be commenced. As Wilcox J observed in Hunter Valley, s 11 of the ADJR Act does not expressly prescribe the factors to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion. The same may be observed of the discretion conferred by r 36.05 of the Rules. As the discretion is not expressly unfettered, it has been said that the principles stated in Hunter Valley are not to be taken as exhaustive: Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [33]-[36] (Griffiths and Edmonds JJ agreeing), citing with approval French J in Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 12; (1994) 48 FCR 83 at 97. The applicant appeared in this Court as a self-represented litigant. In an affidavit sworn in support of his application, he stated that he was ignorant of the timeframe in which an appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court should be commenced. This Court has held that ignorance of the time in which to commence an appeal is ordinarily not, of itself, an adequate explanation sufficient to justify the grant of an extension of time: SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; (2012) 135 ALD 17. In my view, the effect of the authorities is not to relegate ignorance of timeframes imposed by the rules to the status of an irrelevant consideration. It is relevant that the applicant is a person who is not legally represented and who is not proficient in written or spoken English. At the very least, those issues inform the weight to be accorded the length of the delay in the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to whether to extend the time to commence the appeal.