ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 810

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3488
File number(s): SAD 458 of 2015
Judge(s): CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 14 July 2016
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 91R, 474, 476, 477

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 11

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Marsden v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 229

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 12, (1994) 48 FCR 83

SQMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 165

SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319, (2012) 135 ALD 17

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Date of hearing: 27 May 2016
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P d’Assumpcao
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SAD 458 of 2015
BETWEEN:

ADN15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JULY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $1,756.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.  He seeks an extension of time in which to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court published as ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3488. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Second Respondent (Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (Delegate) to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. An appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court is to be commenced within 21 days after the pronouncement of the judgment appealed…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 810
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ADN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection concerned an application by the applicant, ADN15, for an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant had arrived in Australia by boat and applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, claiming fear of persecution in Sri Lanka due to his brother's alleged involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and his Tamil ethnicity. The court was required to decide whether the applicant's delay in lodging his appeal was justifiable, considering factors such as the length of the delay, the adequacy of the explanation for the delay, any prejudice that might be suffered by the respondents, and the prospects of success of the appeal.

The court considered the principles outlined in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen and found that the applicant's ignorance of the timeframe for lodging an appeal was not, in itself, an adequate explanation to warrant an extension of time. The court also noted that the applicant was a self-represented litigant who was not proficient in written or spoken English, which informed the weight to be given to the length of the delay in exercising the discretion to grant an extension of time. The court held that the Tribunal's findings were open to it on the country information to which it had regard and that the conclusions reached were not such that no reasonable Tribunal would have reached them. The court ultimately dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $1,756.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $1,756.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the application for an extension of time should be dismissed.BACKGROUND The applicant arrived in Australia by boat on 1 August 2012. He applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa (Visa) four months later. In support of his application, he claimed to fear persecution in Sri Lanka by reason of his brother’s alleged involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam (LTTE) and by reason of his Tamil ethnicity. He also claimed that he feared persecution should he be returned to Sri Lanka by reason of his would-be status as a returned failed asylum seeker. The applicant claimed that between 2005 and 2008 his brother was forced to work for a naval wing of the LTTE known as the Sea Tigers. He alleged that his brother escaped the LTTE, but was subsequently questioned for four hours by local police. He alleged that in January 2009, his brother and was arrested and detained for three months on suspicion of being an LTTE member. The applicant further claimed that after his brother’s release, they went into business together buying and selling dried fish, that his brother went missing in February 2010, and that his uncle had reported that the Sri Lankan Navy had learned about his role in the LTTE. He alleged that the Criminal Intelligence Division of the Sri Lankan police (CID) started visiting his family and had taken him in and interrogated him about his brother’s whereabouts about 15 or 16 times. He claimed that a pistol was put to his temple during the interrogations and that he was punched in the face. He further claimed that after each interrogation he was driven away in a white van and thrown out, and that on the last occasion he was interrogated his passport had been confiscated. He further claimed that on 28 November 2012 two men from the CID had attended his family’s home asking after him and that his mother had told them that he had left Sri Lanka. The Visa could only be granted if the decision-maker was satisfied that the applicant met the prescribed criteria: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), s 65. The criteria for the Visa are relevantly prescribed in s 36(2) of the Act. It was necessary for the applicant to satisfy either the criteria in s 36(2)(a) or the criteria in s 36(2)(aa), namely that he is:(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or(aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or… The references in s 36(2)(a) of the Act to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol are references respectively to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (Convention) and the Protocol relating to the State of Refugees (1967) (Protocol). Australia has protection obligations to a person described in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, being:a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the relevant time, meaning to be given to the concept of “persecution” in Article 1A(2) was affected by s 91R of the Act, to which I will later refer.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION In a written submission to the Tribunal, the applicant’s representatives claimed that the applicant feared harm in Sri Lanka by reason of:(a)his Tamil ethnicity;(b)his membership of a particular social group, namely failed asylum seekers returning to Sri Lanka; and(c)a political opinion imputed to him by reason of his brother’s links with the LTTE. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s brother had been detained in January 2010 for a three month period due to “some suspicion” of involvement with the LTTE. It found that the applicant’s brother had been released in April 2010 and that records stated that “there is no necessity for any further inquiry about him”. The Tribunal held (at [39] of its reasons) that the chance that the applicant would be imputed with a pro-LTTE opinion or targeted by the authorities or anyone else was “remote”. The Tribunal identified inconsistencies in the applicant’s accounts of events concerning his brother’s activities and movements, it found that the applicant was not a credible witness and that some of the details of his claims were implausible. It determined that although the applicant’s brother had been detained on suspicion of involvement with the LTTE, he had not in fact been forced to work for that organisation. The Tribunal then turned to consider the applicant’s claim that he feared persecution by virtue of his Tamil ethnicity. It referred to country information issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) which indicated that the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka had improved since the ending of the war in 2009. That information stated:3.11 A number of those intending to leave Sri Lanka and travel to Australia, irregularly surveyed by the Australian National University’s Development Policy Centre, cited persecution and torture as reasons for leaving. This included 37 per cent who said they wanted to leave Sri Lanka because of ‘persecution in Sri Lanka’ and 36 per cent who cited ‘torture in Sri Lanka’. DFAT assesses that these fears are significant ‘push factors’ for external migration. 3.12 However, the cessation of the forced registration of Tamils suggests the trend of monitoring and harassment of Tamils in day-to-day life has generally eased since the end of the conflict. According to the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) eligibility guidelines released in July 2010, due to the improved human rights and security situation there was ‘no longer a need for group based protection mechanisms or for the presumption of eligibility for Sri Lankans of Tamil ethnicity originating from the north of the country’. The Tribunal noted that it preferred that country information over alternative material that had been provided by the applicant’s representatives.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the second ground of review, the Federal Circuit Court Judge held that the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the country information to which it had regard. It could not, therefore, be said that the Tribunal’s conclusions were such that no reasonable decision maker could have reached them. The Judge said:[14] As the Minister observed in his written submissions, the Tribunal’s decision was based on the individual and cumulative claims made by the applicant, such evidence as it accepted and relevant country information. The relevant country information to which the Tribunal had regard provided probative evidence to support its findings. In Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 the High Court made it clear that if probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning, and if reasonable minds can draw different conclusions from that evidence, a decision cannot be said to be unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred over another. The conclusions which the Tribunal reached were open to it on the evidence before it and not such that it could be said that no reasonable Tribunal would have reached them. Consequently, the second ground of the application is not made out.CONSIDERATION In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 (at 348-349) (Hunter Valley), Wilcox J considered the principles applicable upon an application made under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) for an extension of time to commence proceedings under that Act. The principles there stated have been repeatedly accepted as guiding the Court’s discretion on an application made pursuant to r 36.05 of the Rules for an extension of time in which to commence an appeal: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; Marsden v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 229 at [19]. The discretion is to be exercised having regard to:(1)the length of the delay;(2)the adequacy of any explanation for the delay;(3)any prejudice that might be suffered by the respondents or any other person if an extension of time were to be granted;(4)the prospects of success of the appeal sought to be commenced. As Wilcox J observed in Hunter Valley, s 11 of the ADJR Act does not expressly prescribe the factors to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion. The same may be observed of the discretion conferred by r 36.05 of the Rules. As the discretion is not expressly unfettered, it has been said that the principles stated in Hunter Valley are not to be taken as exhaustive: Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [33]-[36] (Griffiths and Edmonds JJ agreeing), citing with approval French J in Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 12; (1994) 48 FCR 83 at 97. The applicant appeared in this Court as a self-represented litigant. In an affidavit sworn in support of his application, he stated that he was ignorant of the timeframe in which an appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court should be commenced. This Court has held that ignorance of the time in which to commence an appeal is ordinarily not, of itself, an adequate explanation sufficient to justify the grant of an extension of time: SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; (2012) 135 ALD 17. In my view, the effect of the authorities is not to relegate ignorance of timeframes imposed by the rules to the status of an irrelevant consideration. It is relevant that the applicant is a person who is not legally represented and who is not proficient in written or spoken English. At the very least, those issues inform the weight to be accorded the length of the delay in the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to whether to extend the time to commence the appeal.