AOC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AOC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 973

Appeal from: AOC16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2485
File number: SAD 286 of 2016
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 22 August 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION — protection visa —adverse credibility findings by Tribunal — findings not affected by jurisdictional error
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 91R, 474, 476

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

ADN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 810

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39, (2009) 259 ALR 429

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 25

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

Date of hearing: 8 March 2017
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P d’Assumpcao
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance

ORDERS

SAD 286 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AOC16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $4,000.00.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. The appellant is a Sunni Muslim and a citizen of Pakistan.  On 19 November 2013, he made an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). A delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refused the application. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

  2. The appellant applied for a review of the Tribunal’s decision to Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC).  The application was dismissed: AOC16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2485. This is an appeal from that judgment.

  3. For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed.

    BACKGROUND

  4. The visa could only be granted if the Minister (or his delegate) was satisfied that the appellant satisfied the prescribed criteria: s 65 of the Act. The criteria for the visa include those prescribed in s 36(2) of the Act. It…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 973
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AOC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had rejected the appellant's application for a protection visa. The appellant, a non-citizen, applied for the visa on the grounds that he satisfied the criteria set out in the Migration Act 1958, specifically those relating to protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. The primary issue for the court was whether the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error in its adverse credibility findings against the appellant.

The court considered whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the appellant's credibility by not giving due regard to the Family Incident Report (FIR) or by concluding that the FIR was a forgery. The court acknowledged that while an error in assessing credibility could constitute jurisdictional error, it found no such error in this case. The Tribunal had thoroughly considered the appellant's evidence and the FIR, and had provided adequate reasons for its findings. The court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that the FIR was a forgery was supported by the evidence and thus, the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs in the amount of $4,000.00. The court held that the Tribunal's decision, while adverse to the appellant, was based on a proper consideration of the evidence and did not exhibit any jurisdictional error. The appeal was thus without merit, and the original decision of the AAT was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $4,000.00.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed.BACKGROUND The visa could only be granted if the Minister (or his delegate) was satisfied that the appellant satisfied the prescribed criteria: s 65 of the Act. The criteria for the visa include those prescribed in s 36(2) of the Act. It was necessary for the appellant to satisfy either the criteria in s 36(2)(a) or the criteria in s 36(2)(aa), namely that he is:(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or(aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; The references in s 36(2)(a) of the Act to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol are references respectively to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Protocol relating to the State of Refugees (1967). Australia has protection obligations to a person described in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, being a person who:… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. At the time that the appellant made his application for the visa, the meaning of the word “persecution” in Article 1A(2) was affected by s 91R of the Act. It provided:(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless: (a)that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and (b) the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and (c) the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct. (2)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph: (a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty; (b) significant physical harassment of the person; (c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person; (d)significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist; (e)denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist; (f)denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist. (3)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person:(a)in determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless:(b)the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Counsel for the Minister submitted, in the alternative, that s 91R had been repealed at the time of the Tribunal’s decision in any event and the Tribunal could not therefore commit jurisdictional error by ignoring or misapplying it. I do not accept that aspect of the Minister’s submissions. Section 91R was repealed by Item 12 of Sch 5 to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth). By reason of the transitional provision contained in Item 28 of Sch 5, the relevant repealing provision did not apply to applications for protection visas made before 16 December 2014. The appellant applied for his visa before that date.CONCLUSION The appeal should be dismissed with costs fixed in the amount of $4,000.00.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 2 of the present appeal should be rejected for the same reasons. I now turn to consider the merits of Ground 1.CONSIDERATIONCredibility The appellant’s submissions did not identify, or permit the Court to identify, a recognised species of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision-making process. Rather, the complaint is to be understood as “outcome focused” in the sense that the Tribunal’s findings, particularly as to the appellant’s credibility were not open on the evidence before it. In light of the appellant’s submissions, I will proceed on the basis that the appellant also complains that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by:(1)making adverse credit findings without first having regard to the FIR;(2)failing to find that the FIR corroborated his claims; and (3)concluding that the FIR was a forged document. An error in the assessment of credibility may constitute a jurisdictional error. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99, Robertson J said at [78]:It is not, in my opinion, the case that a finding in relation to credit may never found a conclusion of jurisdictional error, particularly where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact is the basis for a tribunal’s rejection of the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and the entirety of the applicant’s claim. To similar effect, in SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253, Flick J held that a Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings “do not shield its decision-making process from scrutiny” (at [31]). His Honour went on to observe that:… an ultimate conclusion founded in part upon adverse findings as to credit may be set aside if the decision-maker has proceeded in a manner which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. There may be instances in which the failure by a Tribunal to give corroborative evidence any weight when assessing the credibility of a person will constitute jurisdictional error. As Finkelstein J said in SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 25 (at [23] — [24]):23 … I take it to be a trite proposition that a decision-maker required to find facts, whether the decision-maker be a judge or an administrative official, must consider the totality of the evidence that bears upon the facts to be found. That requires the decision-maker to consider any direct evidence of the existence of the fact in issue together with any corroborative evidence that bears on that issue. This is nothing more than common sense. There may be circumstances where it is not necessary to pay due regard to corroborative evidence. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at [49] McHugh and Gummow JJ said ‘it is not unknown for a party’s credibility to have been so weakened in cross-examination that the tribunal of fact may well treat what is proffered as corroborative evidence as of no weight because the well has been poisoned beyond redemption’. That proposition is no doubt true. But the circumstances for its application will be rare indeed. Even experienced advocates can only point to a handful of cases where a witness’ credit has been so badly destroyed in cross-examination that it is possible to make findings of fact based on that evidence alone and simply disregard any corroborative evidence.24 For example in WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 568 the appellant complained that the tribunal failed to have regard to certain documents because the tribunal was not convinced that the documents could overcome the difficulties that it had with the appellant’s evidence. Lee and Moore JJ said at [27]:Such a circumstance may arise where an applicant’s claims have been discredited by comprehensive findings of dishonesty or untruthfulness. Necessarily, such findings are likely to negate allegedly corroborative material: see S20/2002 at [49] per McHugh and Gummow JJ. Obviously to come within that exception there will need to be cogent material to support a conclusion that the appellant has lied … it will not be open to the Tribunal to state that it is unnecessary for it to consider material corroborative of an applicant’s claims merely because it considers it unlikely that the events described by an applicant occurred. In such a circumstance the Tribunal would be bound to have regard to the corroborative material before attempting to reach a conclusion on the applicant’s credibility. Failure to do so would provide a determination not carried out according to law and the decision would be affected by jurisdictional error: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 180 ALR 1; 62 ALD 225 at [82]-[85] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.