BZO17 v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 2085
•31 August 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BZO17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2085 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa – whether jurisdictional error in the way in which the Authority dealt with allegedly corroborative evidence – whether jurisdictional error in the way in which the Authority dealt with credibility findings. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Part 7AA, ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CA |
| Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 AOC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 973 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 |
| Applicant: | BZO17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | BRG 333 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 29 August 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 August 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 31 August 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Walker |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | O’Reilly Lillicrap |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr McGlade |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
| The Second Respondent entered a submitting appearance |
ORDERS
The further further amended application filed on 22 August, 2017 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the further further amended application fixed in the sum of $7,206.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 333 of 2017
| BZO17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks an order quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 29 March, 2017 which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent to reject the applicant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa.
The applicant filed an amended application on 21 July, 2017 and a further further amended application on 22 August, 2017. The second amended application contains three grounds of review. However, at the commencement of the hearing counsel for the applicant expressly abandoned all of the grounds of review, save for ground 3. Ground 3 was the only ground pressed before me.
The first respondent opposes the application. The second respondent enters a submitting appearance.
Both parties have filed comprehensive written submissions and have supplemented those written submission with further oral submissions.
Background
A useful summary of the background to this application is contained in the first respondent’s written submissions. The applicant accepted the accuracy of that summary and I have drawn upon it in the following recitation of the necessary background.
The applicant is a 29 year old national of Bangladesh. On 21 February, 2013 the applicant arrived in Australia by boat and consequently is regarded as an unauthorised maritime arrival for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Around April, 2016 the Minister exercised his power to “lift the s.46A(l) bar” to permit the applicant (despite being an unauthorised maritime arrival) to apply for either a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa.
On 17 August, 2016 the applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa. A Safe Haven Enterprise visa is a temporary protection visa that is valid for five years. To obtain that visa, the applicant needed to establish (among other things) that at the time of the decision he met either the refugee or complementary protection criteria in ss.36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act .
On 6 January, 2017 a delegate of the first respondent made a decision to refuse to grant the applicant the visa.
The applicant is a “fast track applicant”. Part 7 AA of the Migration Act applied to the second respondent’s review of the earlier decision. The delegate’s decision was a “fast track decision”. The material consequence of the decision being a fast track decision (as I have mentioned earlier) was that it had to be referred to the second respondent for review. The Minister so referred the delegate’s decision to the second respondent in accordance with s.473CA of the Act.
The second respondent considered the applicant’s claims. As the first respondent points out, those claims evolved over time. In his entry interview (March, 2013), the applicant:
a)said that he came to Australia solely for economic reasons;
b)said that he was not involved with any political group or organisation; and
c)answered “No” in response to the question “Were there any armed groups, political groups or religious groups operating in the area you lived?”
In consequence of the applicant not raising any potential protection visa claims in his entry interview, he was “screened out” of the protection visa process.
In May, 2013 the applicant provided information to a Departmental Officer which led to him being “screened back into the protection visa process”. Relevantly, the applicant advised the first respondent’s department that:
a)he attended meetings and gatherings of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party;
b)he received threats and was attacked by people opposing the Bangladesh Nationalist Party due to his perceived association and influence with the Party; and
c)after a Bangladesh Nationalist Party rally he was charged with the destruction of a vehicle owned by an Awami League member and was summoned to appear in Court. When the applicant received news of a warrant for his arrest he fled Bangladesh.
The applicant was then permitted to lodge an application for either a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa.
The applicant made written claims and was interviewed for the purposes of a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa application. In his written claims and oral evidence during the application interview:
a)the applicant did not raise his Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims in his written claims;
b)when initially asked in the interview whether he had any problem with the Awami League, the authorities, the police or the Courts, the applicant made no mention of the attack on the Awami League member or the issue of the warrant; and
c)the applicant asserted an entirely new claim – namely that:
i)while he did not support any political party he was attacked and harassed by Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party members because he refused to join them;
ii)because the applicant knew what harm would come to him for not joining the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party, the applicant did not leave the house for a two week period - except on one occasion to buy a bus ticket to leave the area where he resided. However, because the PBSP were so alert/vigilant, they were aware that the applicant had gone to buy a bus ticket and attacked him on his way home; and
iii)after that, the applicant fled to another area in Bangladesh (Tongi). He remained there for a number of months before fleeing to Australia by boat.
For various reasons connected with the changing nature of the applicant’s claims (and the inadequate/inconsistent explanations why his claims kept changing and why they were not raised earlier), the second respondent did not consider the applicant to be a credible witness and rejected all material aspects of his Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party claims and Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims.
The second respondent also considered whether the applicant would be persecuted or harmed in consequence of his financial position (as outlined in his arrival interview) and on account being a failed asylum seeker - but concluded it was not satisfied the applicant would face any real risk of persecution or harm on either such basis. On 29 March, 2017 the second respondent made a decision to affirm the delegate’s decision.
In consequence, the second respondent was not satisfied that the applicant met either the refugee or complementary protection criteria and affirmed the delegate’s decision.
On 12 April, 2017 the applicant applied to this Court for orders quashing the second respondent’s decision and for the issue of a writ of mandamus, directed to the second respondent, requiring it to re-make its decision according to law.
The grounds of review
Ground 3 of the further further amended application is in the following terms:
3. The second respondent made a jurisdictional error at:
(a) paragraph [18] of its reasons in finding that the “claims in the 2013 statement [were] not credible”; and
(b) paragraph [21] of its reasons in finding that the applicant had not “come to the adverse attention of the authorities or other persons in the past”, in circumstances where the documents provided with the 2013 statement showed these findings to be incorrect and therefore each of those findings were so unreasonable, irrational and/or illogical that no reasonable person would have made them.
The gravamen of this ground seems to be that the second respondent fell into jurisdictional error because:
a)it made a determination about the applicant’s credit before it made a determination about, or any determination at all about, the veracity and weight to be given to certain documents relied upon by the applicant and said to corroborate his claims, or some of them; and
b)it used findings of credit relating to the timing of the raising of claims, as a basis to disregard in their entirety the claims made in the 2013 statement, which were supported by those documents.
It is summarised by the applicant’s counsel in his written submissions as:
24. Here, the second respondent has used findings of credit relating to the timing of the raising of claims, as a basis to disregard in their entirety the claims made in the 2013 statement, which were supported by the court documents. The second respondent did not find that the documents were not authentic. No reasonable decision maker could have come to the decision in [18] and [20] that all of the claims in the 2013 statement should be rejected, on the probative material available
The starting point is to understand how the second respondent went about its task. As I have set out above, the applicant made claims that arose out of his alleged involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Relevantly, the second respondent recorded:
4. The applicant’s claims are contained in the information referred to the second respondent. The claims made in the applicant’s protection visa application and at his protection visa interview (SHEV interview) in December 2016 can be summarised as follows:
· The applicant was not a member or supporter of any political party but would sometimes attend processions or rallies organised by the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The Awami League also wanted him to join their party.
· In September 2012 the applicant was approached by a member of the communist Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (PBSP), which the applicant knew to work underground, engage in acts of violence, and have an association with the Awami League government. The PBSP member asked the applicant to work with them as an informer and promised him lots of money. He asked the applicant to go to a bridge the following night, and said he did not need to fear anything, the party members just wanted to talk to him. The person told the applicant that if he told anyone about the proposal he would be killed. He did not attend at the bridge and did not leave his house.
· The applicant decided to leave his area. He was returning home from purchasing a bus ticket with his uncle when 4-5 people attacked him with rods and knives. The applicant ran away and saw that the attackers had also left, as a motorbike was coming. The applicant stayed at home for another two weeks before going to Tongi and remaining there until his departure from Bangladesh in January 2013.
· One of the applicant’s good friends was killed and found under a bridge. The party may have also approached him to join them, or may have thought the applicant had discussed their proposal with him…
5. The applicant also made the following written claims to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) in May 2013:
· The applicant was involved in politics, with the BNP opposition party and would take part in meetings and processions.
· He and his friends stopped a car and ‘they’ burnt it and ran away. The owner reported this to the local chairman. One night when returning home from a meeting with the leader of the party, some ‘cadres’ attacked them, but a motorbike came and the cadres ran away.
· The applicant’s friend was killed by the cadres and his body left under a bridge.
· The applicant fled in fear. The cadres inquired about him and beat his parents when they did not give information.
· The owner of the car complained to the court and a warrant was issued against the applicant. The applicant then left the country.
Of the applicant’s claim to fear harm from the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party and its members, the second respondent said:
9. I do not consider the applicant a credible witness in relation to his claims that the PBSP attacked him or killed one of his friends. This claim, which the applicant described at the SHEV interview as his ‘main problem’, was raised for the first time in the 2016 protection visa application. At an arrival interview in March 2013, the applicant was asked why he left Bangladesh. He referred to his family’s poverty and said that when the government held strikes work would cease, creating hardship for the poor. He also mentioned political issues. He said there were two major parties which asked him to join them, but that if he joined one the other would be against him, so he did not become involved with either. He was asked whether there were any armed or political groups operating in his area, and said no. The applicant made no mention of having been attacked, his friend being killed, or of fearing harm from the PBSP Party.
10. When this omission was raised with the applicant at the SHEV interview, he provided a number of explanations, referring to interpretation issues, his fear, feeling unwell, the impact of the boat journey, advice from other detainees, fear of being put in jail, and not knowing what answer to give. He also said that he had a number of problems but provided a simplified answer and was not allowed to explain all the problems in detail.
11. I do not accept these explanations…
As to the applicant’s claims that he feared harm from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the second respondent said:
Involvement with the BNP
16. The applicant’s 2013 statement indicates he was involved with politics, with the BNP and would take part in meetings and processions. He claimed that he and his parents had been attacked, that his friend has been killed, and that he was the subject of a warrant as a result of an incident involving a car being burnt. The applicant submitted a number of what purport to be legal documents which refer to the car being burnt and name the applicant as a ‘victim’ (although in context it appears ‘accused’ would be a more accurate description).
17. The statement does not specify who carried out the attacks, referring only to ‘cadres’. One of the documents describes the car owner as ‘Awamilig’, which I accept could be a reference to the Awami League. During the SHEV interview the delegate repeatedly referred to the attack having been made by the Awami League, and neither the applicant nor his representative took issue with this or suggested it was a different group.
18. The delegate appears to have accepted implicitly accepted (sic) elements of this claim. However, I do not. The applicant did not mention these matters in either his arrival interview or statement submitted with the SHEV application. The applicant was expressly asked in the SHEV interview whether he had any problems with the Awami League, the authorities, the police or the courts, and made no mention of the attack or the past warrant. When the delegate raised the May 2013 claims later in the interview, the applicant claimed they were resolved, that the accusation that he had burnt the car was not correct, and that this had been ‘proved’. Even if this explains why he did not raise the claim in the SHEV application, it does not explain why he did not mention the past warrant or attack when asked about the Awami League, courts or authorities. Nor does it account for the omission of any reference to these matters in the arrival interview, which was prior to his making the 2013 statement. I do not accept that if the applicant had been attacked, his friend killed and a warrant issued, all apparently relating to his involvement with the BNP, that he would have failed to raise these matters when asked why he had left Bangladesh, or what he feared on return. For the reasons above, I do not accept any of the applicant’s explanations regarding the limitations of the arrival interview. The existence of the documents do not outweigh my concerns and I find the claims in the 2013 statement not credible. I am not satisfied there is a real chance of the applicant being harmed in connection with any of these claimed events.
19. I am, however, prepared to accept that the applicant may have been requested to join political parties. He mentioned this at the arrival interview, where I consider he gave more accurate evidence regarding his circumstances and reasons for leaving Bangladesh than that presented subsequently, and again at the SHEV interview said that both the BNP and Awami League had organised meetings or rallies and asked him to attend or join their party. I am willing to accept that he may have attended some BNP rallies, as he mentioned this spontaneously at the SHEV interview. However, the applicant stated at the arrival interview that he had not joined any party and did not want to, confirmed at the SHEV interview that he was not a member of any party or associated with any political activity, and also said in the statement submitted with the SHEV application that he is not a supporter of any political party. I have found the applicant’s claims to have been harmed in relation to alleged BNP involvement or failure to join the PBSP not credible. While he said the Awami League did not like it if he did not attend their rallies, other than the claims I have rejected he has not claimed to have been harmed for refusing to become involved with political parties, or attending BNP rallies. I am not satisfied there is a real chance of the applicant being harmed in the reasonably foreseeable future because of any political opinion, activity or refusal to become involved with a party.
(my emphasis)
I have set these passages out in full because the second respondent’s reasons at [18] and [19] were the focus of the parties’ submissions. It is important to view those paragraphs in context.
The documents referred to by the second respondent were provided by the applicant in 2013. Those documents included what the applicant claimed were “court documents” that he alleged contained accusations brought by a member of the Awami League that he was a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and was responsible for burning a car. The documents were provided in the Bengali language with English translations. The second respondent referred to them as “legal documents”.
The second respondent made no findings about these documents. It did not make a finding about whether they were in fact “court documents”. It made no findings about the nature of the documents at all, or the claim by the applicant that it contained accusations brought by a member of the Awami League that he was a member of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and was responsible for burning a car. The second respondent made no findings about the authenticity of the documents, although, by implication, did not reject them as non-genuine or fraudulent.
The refusal by the second respondent to accept the applicant’s claim relating to his Bangladesh Nationalist Party involvement because of its view of the veracity of those claims was, I accept, integral to the second respondent’s ultimate determination that there was no real chance of the applicant suffering harm in the future should he return to Bangladesh. The applicant argues that the second respondent has used findings of credit relating to the timing of the raising of claims, as a basis to disregard in their entirety the claims made in the 2013 statement, which were supported by the “legal documents”. The applicant argues that no reasonable decision maker could have come to the decision in [18] and [21] that all of the claims in the 2013 statement should be rejected, on the probative material available.
The first respondent argues that the second respondent’s reasons reveal that when determining whether it was satisfied of the veracity of the applicant’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims (including the part of those claims where he asserted that a warrant had been issued for his arrest in connection with a car being burnt):
a)the second respondent noted the numerous concerns with the applicant’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims, including:
i)the vagueness of the claim (such as the applicant’s 2013 statement, which raised the Bangladesh Nationalist Party claim, not identifying who carried out the attacks);
ii)the fact that, during the visa application interview, the delegate repeatedly referred to the attack having been made by Awami League members – which neither the applicant nor his representative purported to correct;
iii)the fact that the applicant did not mention his Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims in his entry interview (for which the second respondent did not accept an adequate explanation had been provided);
iv)the fact that the applicant did not mention his Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims in the written statement he submitted in connection with his visa application; and
v)the fact that when, earlier on in his visa application interview, the applicant was asked whether he had any issue with the Awami League, authorities, police or the courts, the applicant made no mention of the car incident or any warrant being issued for his arrest;
b)the second respondent referred to the documents the applicant had submitted in support of his claims. One was a document which, on its face, appeared to be a notarised complaint lodged by an Awami League member against a number of Bangladesh Nationalist Party members, including the applicant in connection with a car being burnt; and
c)the second respondent noted some of the curious aspects of the that document, before concluding that the existence of the “legal documents” did not outweigh its many concerns with the applicant’s claims since his arrival in Australia and found that the applicant’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party claims were not credible.
The first respondent argues that the second respondent was confronted with two bodies of evidence “which pulled at one another”, namely the applicant’s own statements and conduct since arriving in Australia, which raised a number of concerns about the veracity of such claims and the “legal documents”. Faced with those two bodies of evidence, the second respondent had to determine if it was satisfied of the truth of the applicant’s claims. This required the second respondent to attribute whatever weight it thought appropriate to each body of evidence and make a determination about its state of satisfaction. The applicant argues that the second respondent did that, did not accept the claims and was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicant being harmed in connection with any of those claimed events.
The first respondent argues that making a finding on the authenticity of the “court documents” or “legal documents” was unnecessary. He argues that it is entirely logical and rational for a decision-maker, faced with “a singular document purporting to outline one set of facts (the truth of which has had considerable doubt cast on it by other evidence)”, to have such concerns about that document that it is unwilling to place much weight on it without needing to go an extra step of making a finding of non-authenticity. That is particularly so, it is said, where there was no direct evidence authenticating that document but rather only the applicant’s own evidence which was marred by credibility concerns.
Consideration
In AOC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 973 Charlesworth J observed:
24. An error in the assessment of credibility may constitute a jurisdictional error. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99, Robertson J said at [78]:
It is not, in my opinion, the case that a finding in relation to credit may never found a conclusion of jurisdictional error, particularly where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact is the basis for a tribunal’s rejection of the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and the entirety of the applicant’s claim.
25. To similar effect, in SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253, Flick J held that a Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings “do not shield its decision-making process from scrutiny” (at [31]). His Honour went on to observe that:
… an ultimate conclusion founded in part upon adverse findings as to credit may be set aside if the decision-maker has proceeded in a manner which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
26. There may be instances in which the failure by a Tribunal to give corroborative evidence any weight when assessing the credibility of a person will constitute jurisdictional error. As Finkelstein J said in SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 Awami LeagueD 25 (at [23] — [24]):
23 … I take it to be a trite proposition that a decision-maker required to find facts, whether the decision-maker be a judge or an administrative official, must consider the totality of the evidence that bears upon the facts to be found. That requires the decision-maker to consider any direct evidence of the existence of the fact in issue together with any corroborative evidence that bears on that issue. This is nothing more than common sense. There may be circumstances where it is not necessary to pay due regard to corroborative evidence. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 Awami LeagueR 59 at [49] McHugh and Gummow JJ said ‘it is not unknown for a party’s credibility to have been so weakened in cross-examination that the tribunal of fact may well treat what is proffered as corroborative evidence as of no weight because the well has been poisoned beyond redemption’. That proposition is no doubt true. But the circumstances for its application will be rare indeed. Even experienced advocates can only point to a handful of cases where a witness’ credit has been so badly destroyed in cross-examination that it is possible to make findings of fact based on that evidence alone and simply disregard any corroborative evidence.
24 For example in WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 Awami LeagueD 568 the appellant complained that the tribunal failed to have regard to certain documents because the tribunal was not convinced that the documents could overcome the difficulties that it had with the appellant’s evidence. Lee and Moore JJ said at [27]:
Such a circumstance may arise where an applicant’s claims have been discredited by comprehensive findings of dishonesty or untruthfulness. Necessarily, such findings are likely to negate allegedly corroborative material: see S20/2002 at [49] per McHugh and Gummow JJ. Obviously to come within that exception there will need to be cogent material to support a conclusion that the appellant has lied … it will not be open to the Tribunal to state that it is unnecessary for it to consider material corroborative of an applicant’s claims merely because it considers it unlikely that the events described by an applicant occurred. In such a circumstance the Tribunal would be bound to have regard to the corroborative material before attempting to reach a conclusion on the applicant’s credibility. Failure to do so would provide a determination not carried out according to law and the decision would be affected by jurisdictional error: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 180 Awami LeagueR 1; 62 Awami LeagueD 225 at [82]-[85] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
The applicant argues that:
The IAA had concerns about credibility which it elucidated in paragraph [18], to the effect that the failure to raise the claim in the arrival interview and earlier in the SHEV interview counted against the Applicant, and then said that “the existence of the documents do not outweigh my concerns and I find the claims in the 2013 statement not credible”. The “concerns” in that sentence were the findings of credit, which had already been drawn. No regard was had to the Notarised Complaint, apart from identifying what those documents said, before the conclusion was reached about credibility.
However, in my view, the second respondent’s reference to “concerns” in the sentence to which attention is drawn by the applicant were not some pre-formed findings of credit as the applicant contends, but rather were the concerns that the second respondent had identified with the applicant’s claims and his own evidence concerning them. The second respondent identified and particularised those concerns in its reasons for decision at [18].
Moreover, the second respondent considered the documents that were relied upon by the applicant to support his claims. I accept the first respondent’s submission that it was not necessary for the second respondent to come to a conclusion about the authenticity of those documents before it gave them little or insignificant weight. The second respondent approached the applicant’s claims in the way described by the first respondent – namely it considered all of the evidence before it and carried out a weighing exercise and fixed upon a conclusion. Taken at their highest, the applicant’s submissions must lead to the proposition that in the absence of a finding that corroborative documents are not genuine, an administrative decision maker must accept those documents and the evidence purportedly within them, despite the decision maker having other evidence about which it harbours doubts or concerns and which impact upon the overall weighing exercise to be undertaken by the decision maker. No authority was cited fir that proposition. The weighing of various pieces of evidence is a matter for the administrative decision maker: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 580; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 at [33].
The applicant argues that the “court documents” produced by the applicant ought to have been considered in determining credibility, rather than a conclusion being formed about credibility and that finding being used to reject the entirety of the 2013 statements, including the parts supported by the documents. However, I do not consider that on a fair reading of the second respondent’s decision that is what it did. The second respondent clearly had regard to the “court documents” in [16] and [17] of its decision record and its reference to the documents in those paragraphs demonstrates that some analysis of those documents was undertaken. The statement by the second respondent in [18] of the decision record that “The existence of the documents do not outweigh my concerns and I find the claims in the 2013 statement not credible.” demonstrates that the second respondent had embarked upon an evaluative exercise where it weighed the evidence before it to reach its conclusion.
Conclusion
In my view, the second respondent’s decision is not attended by jurisdictional error. The further further amended application must be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Jarrett
Associate:
Date: 31 August 2017
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