Details
- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 293
- Decision Date
-
CaseChat Overview and Summary
CUS18, a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia by boat in 2013, sought judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Authority affirming the refusal of a Protection Visa. The core issues before the Court were whether the significant delay in lodging the application for judicial review could be justified and whether the proposed grounds of review were reasonably arguable. The Court had to consider the statutory limitation period under the Migration Act and the principles established in Marks and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority that underscore the importance of these periods in the administration of justice.
The Court found that the delay of 390 days was substantial, exceeding eleven times the statutory limitation period of 35 days. Despite this, CUS18 argued that the delay could be justified due to his mental health issues and the complexity of his case. The Court examined the explanation for the delay, considering CUS18's claims of deteriorating mental health and the absence of legal representation until shortly before the application was lodged. The Court also assessed whether CUS18's grounds for judicial review were reasonably arguable, focusing on the credibility findings made by the Authority and whether these findings were open to challenge.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the delay was not sufficiently justified by CUS18's circumstances, nor were the proposed grounds of review reasonably arguable. The Court determined that the delay was not exceptional and that the statutory limitation period should be rigidly applied. The Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that there was no basis to extend the time for CUS18 to lodge his application.
Background
Background to the litigation
At hearing: (a)the Court Book (“CB”) was marked as Exhibit 1; and(b)three affidavits were read on behalf of CUS18 (without objection from the Minister), namely:(i)CUS18’s affidavit affirmed 8 July 2021 comprising 15 paragraphs and relied upon in relation to the proposed grounds of review in the Proposed Judicial Review Application (“CUS18’s Review Affidavit”); (ii)another CUS18 affidavit affirmed 8 July 2021 comprising 23 paragraphs and relied upon in relation to the Extension of Time Application (“CUS18’s Extension of Time Affidavit”); and (iii)the affidavit of Ms Carolyn Graydon, the Principal Solicitor at the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, the solicitors for CUS18, filed 26 October 2020 annexing a transcript of a 30 November 2016 interview between CUS18 and an officer of the Minister’s Department (“Graydon Affidavit” and “Protection Visa Interview Transcript” respectively).BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The background to this matter is as follows:(a)CUS18 is a citizen of Bangladesh who entered Australia at Christmas Island on 16 June 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival: CB 58, 65 and 132;(b)on 22 April 2016 CUS18 was advised that the Minister had lifted the statutory bar under s 46A of the Migration Act to allow CUS18 to make an application for a Protection Visa: CB 28-29;(c)on 25 August 2016 CUS18 lodged a Protection Visa application: CB 44-92;(d)on 30 November 2016 CUS18 attended an interview to discuss his Protection Visa application and claims for protection: CB 106-108;(e)on 7 December 2016 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant CUS18 a Protection Visa: CB 132-146; (f)following the Delegate’s Decision the matter was referred to the Authority in accordance with s 473CA of the Migration Act;(g)on 12 December 2016 the Authority sent to CUS18 an acknowledgement of the referral in accordance with s 473CA of the Migration Act, and a copy of the Authority’s Practice Direction: CB 149-161;(h)CUS18 provided to the Authority on 16 March 2017 a letter of support from the Centre for Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Detainees Inc (“CARAD”) and a letter in Bengali: CB 163-164, and subsequently on 30 March 2017 provided to the Authority a translation of that letter: CB 180-183; and(i)on 30 March 2017 the Authority Decision affirmed the Delegate’s Decision: CB 188-199.AUTHORITY DECISION In the Authority Decision the Authority:(a)was satisfied that Bangladesh was CUS18’s receiving country for the purposes of its review: CB 190 at [7];(b)made adverse credibility findings against CUS18 as a result of various inconsistencies in CUS18’s evidence, including the evidence provided at his entry interview, his subsequent interview in September 2013 with his immigration detention case manager, his written claims in August 2016 and his claims in a November 2016 interview;(c)noted the information that CUS18 provided at his entry interview that he then retracted at his interview with the case manager, including information about whether he had been charged with murder in Bangladesh and his travel to Malaysia: CB 191 at [11]. The Authority considered CUS18’s reasons for the “contradictory claims”: CB 192 at [12] including that:(i)when he travelled to Australia by boat, he did not eat or drink anything and his mental condition was very poor, and someone told him to say things he said at his entry interview: CB 192 at [12]. The Authority observed that CUS18’s entry interview commenced when he had been in Australia for some 17 days, and he did not claim to be unwell at that time until now: CB 192 at [13]; and(ii)his time in immigration detention had affected his mental health: CB 192 at [12]. The Authority found that CUS18 had not provided medical evidence to substantiate his mental health problems (or physical health problems): CB 192 at [13], and that CUS18’s alleged health and state of mind could not explain the extent of the inconsistencies in CUS18’s claims: CB 192 at [14];(d)ultimately accepted that CUS18 provided false claims at his entry interview regarding his entry into Malaysia and the alleged murder charges: CB 192 at [13]; (e)concluded that CUS18 departed Bangladesh lawfully in 2006 and then entered Malaysia on a tourist visa and remained in Malaysia until he travelled to Australia (in 2013): CB 193 at [16];(f)noted inconsistencies between CUS18’s evidence in relation to his family, including in relation to whether he was married, how many children he had, and whether his family members had been killed: CB 192 at [11] and [14], and did not accept that CUS18’s wife, children and mother were killed or that the whereabouts of his other family members was unknown to him: CB 193 at [16];(g)did not accept that CUS18 was the child of refugees from Burma (or Myanmar as it is now generally known), or that he was subjected to harassment or mistreatment on this basis, and observed that CUS18 stated that his ethnicity was Bangladeshi and did not refer to a distinct ethnic dimension which could explain why his family suffered from mistreatment, nor did he provide an explanation as to how his parents acquired citizenship in Bangladesh if they were stateless persons born in Burma: CB 192-193 at [15];(h)did not accept that CUS18 or his family were ever subjected to mistreatment by the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) or Jamaat e-Islami (“JI”), and whilst it considered country information in relation to political violence in Bangladesh and acknowledged that violence does occur between supporters of various political parties, found that CUS18 did not provide any specific reasons why his support for local political groups was so sought after, and why his refusal resulted in frequent attacks upon himself, the burning of his father’s shop, and the death of his wife and two children in 2015: CB 192-193 at [15]-[16];(i)did not accept that CUS18 would face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm by reason of being perceived as a stateless person and the child of refugees from Burma, from the BNP or JI for refusing to join their parties, or for any other reason: CB 193 at [16];(j)was not satisfied that CUS18 would face harm as the result of having sought asylum in Australia or as a consequence of a Departmental data breach in 2014: CB 193 at [16]; and(k)considered the complementary protection criterion and was not satisfied that CUS18 would face a real risk of significant harm upon return to Bangladesh: CB 194 at [20].EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATIONRequirements
Decision
Reasons for decision
The background to this matter is as follows:(a)CUS18 is a citizen of Bangladesh who entered Australia at Christmas Island on 16 June 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival: CB 58, 65 and 132;(b)on 22 April 2016 CUS18 was advised that the Minister had lifted the statutory bar under s 46A of the Migration Act to allow CUS18 to make an application for a Protection Visa: CB 28-29;(c)on 25 August 2016 CUS18 lodged a Protection Visa application: CB 44-92;(d)on 30 November 2016 CUS18 attended an interview to discuss his Protection Visa application and claims for protection: CB 106-108;(e)on 7 December 2016 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant CUS18 a Protection Visa: CB 132-146; (f)following the Delegate’s Decision the matter was referred to the Authority in accordance with s 473CA of the Migration Act;(g)on 12 December 2016 the Authority sent to CUS18 an acknowledgement of the referral in accordance with s 473CA of the Migration Act, and a copy of the Authority’s Practice Direction: CB 149-161;(h)CUS18 provided to the Authority on 16 March 2017 a letter of support from the Centre for Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Detainees Inc (“CARAD”) and a letter in Bengali: CB 163-164, and subsequently on 30 March 2017 provided to the Authority a translation of that letter: CB 180-183; and(i)on 30 March 2017 the Authority Decision affirmed the Delegate’s Decision: CB 188-199.AUTHORITY DECISION In the Authority Decision the Authority:(a)was satisfied that Bangladesh was CUS18’s receiving country for the purposes of its review: CB 190 at [7];(b)made adverse credibility findings against CUS18 as a result of various inconsistencies in CUS18’s evidence, including the evidence provided at his entry interview, his subsequent interview in September 2013 with his immigration detention case manager, his written claims in August 2016 and his claims in a November 2016 interview;(c)noted the information that CUS18 provided at his entry interview that he then retracted at his interview with the case manager, including information about whether he had been charged with murder in Bangladesh and his travel to Malaysia: CB 191 at [11]. The Authority considered CUS18’s reasons for the “contradictory claims”: CB 192 at [12] including that:(i)when he travelled to Australia by boat, he did not eat or drink anything and his mental condition was very poor, and someone told him to say things he said at his entry interview: CB 192 at [12]. The Authority observed that CUS18’s entry interview commenced when he had been in Australia for some 17 days, and he did not claim to be unwell at that time until now: CB 192 at [13]; and(ii)his time in immigration detention had affected his mental health: CB 192 at [12]. The Authority found that CUS18 had not provided medical evidence to substantiate his mental health problems (or physical health problems): CB 192 at [13], and that CUS18’s alleged health and state of mind could not explain the extent of the inconsistencies in CUS18’s claims: CB 192 at [14];(d)ultimately accepted that CUS18 provided false claims at his entry interview regarding his entry into Malaysia and the alleged murder charges: CB 192 at [13]; (e)concluded that CUS18 departed Bangladesh lawfully in 2006 and then entered Malaysia on a tourist visa and remained in Malaysia until he travelled to Australia (in 2013): CB 193 at [16];(f)noted inconsistencies between CUS18’s evidence in relation to his family, including in relation to whether he was married, how many children he had, and whether his family members had been killed: CB 192 at [11] and [14], and did not accept that CUS18’s wife, children and mother were killed or that the whereabouts of his other family members was unknown to him: CB 193 at [16];(g)did not accept that CUS18 was the child of refugees from Burma (or Myanmar as it is now generally known), or that he was subjected to harassment or mistreatment on this basis, and observed that CUS18 stated that his ethnicity was Bangladeshi and did not refer to a distinct ethnic dimension which could explain why his family suffered from mistreatment, nor did he provide an explanation as to how his parents acquired citizenship in Bangladesh if they were stateless persons born in Burma: CB 192-193 at [15];(h)did not accept that CUS18 or his family were ever subjected to mistreatment by the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) or Jamaat e-Islami (“JI”), and whilst it considered country information in relation to political violence in Bangladesh and acknowledged that violence does occur between supporters of various political parties, found that CUS18 did not provide any specific reasons why his support for local political groups was so sought after, and why his refusal resulted in frequent attacks upon himself, the burning of his father’s shop, and the death of his wife and two children in 2015: CB 192-193 at [15]-[16];(i)did not accept that CUS18 would face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm by reason of being perceived as a stateless person and the child of refugees from Burma, from the BNP or JI for refusing to join their parties, or for any other reason: CB 193 at [16];(j)was not satisfied that CUS18 would face harm as the result of having sought asylum in Australia or as a consequence of a Departmental data breach in 2014: CB 193 at [16]; and(k)considered the complementary protection criterion and was not satisfied that CUS18 would face a real risk of significant harm upon return to Bangladesh: CB 194 at [20].EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATIONRequirements
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the above circumstances it was not in dispute at hearing that s 477(2)(a) of the Migration Act had been satisfied. Whether in the interests of the administration of justiceLaw In considering the law with respect to whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time in which to make an application for judicial review under the Migration Act regard must be had to the High Court judgments in Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470; (2000) 177 ALR 491 (“Marks”) and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 70 ALJR 866; (1996) 139 ALR 1 (“Brisbane South Regional Health Authority”), which, in summary, provide as follows:(a)a limitation period is the general rule, and an extension provision is the exception to it: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J; (b)the limitation period represents Parliament’s judgment as to how the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within a limitation period: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J; (c)where a significant period of time has elapsed, and in all but very exceptional cases, the limitation period should be “rigidly applied”: Marks at [16] per McHugh J; and (d)the effect of the limitation period is such that it “may often result in a good cause of action being defeated”: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J. With the above statements of principle in mind, the factors the Court generally takes into account when determining whether to grant an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act are well-established, but not closed, and can be summarised as follows:(a)the extent of the delay;(b)the explanation for the delay;(c)any prejudice that may be suffered; and(d)whether the grounds of the Proposed Judicial Review Application are reasonably arguable,see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; (1984) 58 ALR 305; (1984) 7 ALD 315 (“Hunter Valley Developments”), and SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] per Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ.Delay In this case there is a very substantial delay of 390 days. The delay itself is more than eleven times the existing limitation period, and an extension of time, if granted, would extend the period granted to CUS18 in which to file to 425 days, whereas the limitation period under s 477(1) of the Migration Act is 35 days. As was stated in Marks at [16] per McHugh J where a significant period of time has elapsed, and “[i]n all but very exceptional cases”, the limitation period should be “rigidly applied”: see too BJM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 786 (“BJM15”) at [41] per Colvin J; WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 (“WQRJ”) at [30] per Derrington J. In the Court’s view, for reasons set out below in relation to both the explanation for the delay (at [14]-[42] below) and the merits of the Proposed Judicial Review Application (at [46]-[79]) there is nothing “exceptional”, or obviously exceptional, in the circumstances of CUS18’s case.