ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174

Appeal from: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1086
File number: VID 575 of 2016
Judges: GRIFFITHS, PERRY AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 9 December 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review of refusal of grant of protection visas – whether failure to consider country information amounts to jurisdictional error - where adverse credibility finding - expression that credibility is a matter par excellence for the Tribunal – whether logical and probative basis for the Tribunal’s determination that the first appellant sought to mislead the Tribunal – review of other findings of fact by Tribunal.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to raise new grounds not advanced below.

Held: - appeal is allowed.

Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 65(1)(b), 424(1)
Cases cited:

BKE v Office of Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1, 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; 74 ALJR 405

NABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 249

NABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 384

NABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2005] HCA 29; 79 ALJR 1142

SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; 202 FCR 1

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 31 October 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 101
Counsel for the Appellants: Ms G Costello with Ms F Batten
Solicitor for the Appellants: King & Wood Mallesons
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs.
Table of Corrections
19 December 2016 In paragraph 35, “her Honour” has been changed to “his Honour”.

ORDERS

VID 575 of 2016
BETWEEN:

ARG15

First Appellant

ARI15

Second Appellant

ARJ15
Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

GRIFFITHS, PERRY AND BROMWICH JJ

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 174
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellants, who were seeking judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal concerning their applications for protection visas. The Tribunal had found that the appellants' claims for protection visas were not credible and, therefore, the visas were not granted. The appellants appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed their appeal. They subsequently appealed to the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Tribunal's failure to consider country information provided by the appellants' solicitor amounted to a jurisdictional error. Additionally, the appellants argued that the Tribunal had made several findings that were not supported by probative evidence and were legally unreasonable. They also contended that the Tribunal had misapprehended certain evidence and made adverse credibility findings based on those errors.

The Federal Court of Australia found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding concerning the appellant mother's evidence regarding the dowry was a jurisdictional error. The Court concluded that the error was serious and significant enough to affect the Tribunal's overall rejection of the appellants' claims. The Court held that the error could not be isolated or confined, and it necessarily impacted other parts of the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the claims. Consequently, the Court found that the Tribunal's decision was affected by a jurisdictional error, and the appeal was allowed. The Court set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, as well as their filing fees and court fees in relation to the proceeding below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 16 May 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 17 April 2015 be set aside; and

(b) the appellants’ application for review be remitted to the second respondent for redetermination according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ legal costs and disbursements of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

4. The first respondent pay the appellants’ filing fees and Court fees in relation to the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellants were represented by pro bono counsel (Ms Costello together with Ms Batten). The proposed amended notice of appeal raised the following five grounds of appeal. 1.The Tribunal erred by making findings that were not based on probative evidence; and which were legally unreasonable.Particulars of findings made unreasonably/based on no probative evidencea)Jirgas did not operate in and had no role in the Pakistani city of [X].b)Jirgas did not operate in and had no role in Pakistani cities of 1 million people.c)Jirgas did not operate in and had no role in Pakistani cities that had government representation and administration at the national, provincial and local levels.d)Educated, high status men in Pakistan with powerful relatives would not instigate honour killings.e)Educated, high status men in Pakistan with powerful relatives would not instigate killings by jirgas.f)Educated, high status men in Pakistan with powerful relatives would not kill women.g)If an educated, high status man in Pakistan with powerful relatives killed a women it would be reported to police and investigated.h)Honour killings in Pakistan usually arose from illicit sexual or romantic relationships. 2.The Tribunal erred by failing to consider country information provided by the Appellants’ solicitor.3.In breach of s.424(1) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal ignored evidence that the Tribunal itself obtained. Namely, a statutory declaration from [AM] (the [M] Declaration) which was in the father-in-law’s visit visa application file obtained by the Tribunal. Further and alternatively, the Tribunal erred by failing to have regard to the [M] Declaration.4.The Tribunal erred by failing to have regard to the corroborating psychiatric assessment of the Appellant mother as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. 5.The Tribunal erred by misapprehending the evidence and then use its erroneous findings about the evidence to make negative credibility findings.Particularsa)The Tribunal misapprehended evidence of the Appellant mother in relation to her dowry, and then used its erroneous findings about the dowry to make negative credibility findings against her.b)The Tribunal erred by misapprehending evidence of the Appellant mother and her husband regarding the father-in-law’s knowledge of the wedding and then used those findings to make negative credibility findings against them.c)The Tribunal erred by misapprehending the evidence of [S] regarding attendance at the wedding, and using those findings to make negative credibility findings against him to the extent it placed no weight on his evidence. Grounds 1 to 4 were not advanced below, thus the appellants required leave to raise them on the appeal. The Minister consented to such leave being granted. At the commencement of the hearing, the Court granted leave for the appellants to rely upon the amended notice of appeal, it being expedient in the interests of justice to do so (see VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588 at [46] per Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ).

Decision

Reasons for decision

In these circumstances, the relevant legal deficiencies in the Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding relating to the appellant mother’s evidence concerning the dowry cannot be isolated or confined in the manner suggested by the Minister. In view of the Tribunal’s reliance upon that finding to support other parts of its reasons for rejecting the appellants’ claims, the error necessarily affected those other parts. In the particular circumstances here, it should be concluded that the error was so serious and significant to the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellants’ claims as to amount to a jurisdictional error. Conclusion For these reasons, grounds 2 and 5 have been made out. The amended notice of appeal should be upheld, the orders of the FCCA be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. The Minister should be ordered to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed and also ordered to pay the appellants’ filing fees and court fees in relation to the proceeding below. Orders will be made accordingly. The Court expresses its gratitude to Ms Costello and Ms Batten who, together with King & Wood Mallesons, agreed to represent the appellants on a pro bono basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that there were three reasons why this ground of appeal should be rejected. First, in circumstances where the Tribunal was required by s 65(1)(b) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) to refuse to grant protection visas if it was not affirmatively satisfied that the criteria for the grant of that visa were met, the Tribunal did not necessarily have to make positive findings of fact in order not to be affirmatively satisfied that the criteria were met. Moreover, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did not make the various positive findings alleged by the appellants; rather it simply concluded that it did “not accept” various claims made by the appellant mother, including the claims relating to the father-in law’s instigation of an honour killing and the alleged role of the jirga. Secondly, the Minister submitted that the “no evidence” ground of review for jurisdictional error cannot be made out unless there was absolutely no evidence capable of supporting a finding of fact, and this had not been demonstrated by the appellants. Thirdly, even if these obstacles were overcome, any error in fact finding by the Tribunal was not material or vitiating because, so submitted the Minister, there were other grounds relied upon by the Tribunal in concluding that it was not satisfied of the appellant mother’s claim to have a well-founded fear of harm. Thus, for example, the Minister submitted that, even if the Tribunal found that jirgas did not operate in the father-in-law’s city and there was no evidence to support that finding, the Tribunal gave other reasons for rejecting the appellant mother’s claim. It is convenient to commence the consideration of ground 1 by reference to the reasons of the majority in SZMDS. Significantly, that case related to a judicial review challenge to a decision of the Tribunal which dismissed a review application in respect of an unsuccessful application for a protection visa (which is also the case here). The state of satisfaction as expressed in ss 36 and 65 of the Migration Act was held to involve a jurisdictional fact. Justices Crennan and Bell held at [130] that illogicality or irrationality may constitute a basis for judicial review in respect of the Tribunal’s decision concerning the state of satisfaction required under s 65, but their Honours emphasised that not every lapse in logic would give rise to jurisdictional error and the Court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case. They added at [131] that it was insufficient that different minds might reach different conclusions on the jurisdictional fact and that the test for illogicality or irrationality:… must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.