FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174
Appeal from: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1086 File number: VID 575 of 2016 Judges: GRIFFITHS, PERRY AND BROMWICH JJ Date of judgment: 9 December 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review of refusal of grant of protection visas – whether failure to consider country information amounts to jurisdictional error - where adverse credibility finding - expression that credibility is a matter par excellence for the Tribunal – whether logical and probative basis for the Tribunal’s determination that the first appellant sought to mislead the Tribunal – review of other findings of fact by Tribunal.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to raise new grounds not advanced below.
Held: - appeal is allowed.
Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 65(1)(b), 424(1) Cases cited: BKE v Office of Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523
CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1, 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; 74 ALJR 405
NABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 249
NABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 384
NABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2005] HCA 29; 79 ALJR 1142
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; 202 FCR 1
SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253
VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 31 October 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 101 Counsel for the Appellants: Ms G Costello with Ms F Batten Solicitor for the Appellants: King & Wood Mallesons Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs.
Table of Corrections 19 December 2016 In paragraph 35, “her Honour” has been changed to “his Honour”. ORDERS
VID 575 of 2016 BETWEEN: ARG15
First Appellant
ARI15
Second Appellant
ARJ15
Third AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
GRIFFITHS, PERRY AND BROMWICH JJ
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 174
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Tribunal's failure to consider country information provided by the appellants' solicitor amounted to a jurisdictional error. Additionally, the appellants argued that the Tribunal had made several findings that were not supported by probative evidence and were legally unreasonable. They also contended that the Tribunal had misapprehended certain evidence and made adverse credibility findings based on those errors.
The Federal Court of Australia found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding concerning the appellant mother's evidence regarding the dowry was a jurisdictional error. The Court concluded that the error was serious and significant enough to affect the Tribunal's overall rejection of the appellants' claims. The Court held that the error could not be isolated or confined, and it necessarily impacted other parts of the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the claims. Consequently, the Court found that the Tribunal's decision was affected by a jurisdictional error, and the appeal was allowed. The Court set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, as well as their filing fees and court fees in relation to the proceeding below.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 16 May 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 17 April 2015 be set aside; and
(b) the appellants’ application for review be remitted to the second respondent for redetermination according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ legal costs and disbursements of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.
4. The first respondent pay the appellants’ filing fees and Court fees in relation to the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that there were three reasons why this ground of appeal should be rejected. First, in circumstances where the Tribunal was required by s 65(1)(b) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) to refuse to grant protection visas if it was not affirmatively satisfied that the criteria for the grant of that visa were met, the Tribunal did not necessarily have to make positive findings of fact in order not to be affirmatively satisfied that the criteria were met. Moreover, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did not make the various positive findings alleged by the appellants; rather it simply concluded that it did “not accept” various claims made by the appellant mother, including the claims relating to the father-in law’s instigation of an honour killing and the alleged role of the jirga. Secondly, the Minister submitted that the “no evidence” ground of review for jurisdictional error cannot be made out unless there was absolutely no evidence capable of supporting a finding of fact, and this had not been demonstrated by the appellants. Thirdly, even if these obstacles were overcome, any error in fact finding by the Tribunal was not material or vitiating because, so submitted the Minister, there were other grounds relied upon by the Tribunal in concluding that it was not satisfied of the appellant mother’s claim to have a well-founded fear of harm. Thus, for example, the Minister submitted that, even if the Tribunal found that jirgas did not operate in the father-in-law’s city and there was no evidence to support that finding, the Tribunal gave other reasons for rejecting the appellant mother’s claim. It is convenient to commence the consideration of ground 1 by reference to the reasons of the majority in SZMDS. Significantly, that case related to a judicial review challenge to a decision of the Tribunal which dismissed a review application in respect of an unsuccessful application for a protection visa (which is also the case here). The state of satisfaction as expressed in ss 36 and 65 of the Migration Act was held to involve a jurisdictional fact. Justices Crennan and Bell held at [130] that illogicality or irrationality may constitute a basis for judicial review in respect of the Tribunal’s decision concerning the state of satisfaction required under s 65, but their Honours emphasised that not every lapse in logic would give rise to jurisdictional error and the Court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case. They added at [131] that it was insufficient that different minds might reach different conclusions on the jurisdictional fact and that the test for illogicality or irrationality:… must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.