ATL19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

ATL19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 840  

File number(s): BRG 159 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN
Date of judgment: 4 June 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION LAW – whether the Authority ought to have conducted an interview with the first applicant to clarify aspects of his claims – whether the decision of the Authority not to conduct an interview was legally unreasonable – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 36(2)(a), s. 36(2)(aa), s. 473DC(a)
Cases cited:

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175

DCP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91

DMO18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 61

EIL18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 736

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2018) 264 CLR 2017

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 31
Date of last submission/s: 15 May 2025
Date of hearing: 9 May 2025
Place: Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M. Steele of King’s Counsel and Mr W. Hall of Counsel
Solicitor for the Applicants: Holding Redlich
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M. Maynard of Counsel
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

BRG 159 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ATL19

First Applicant

BIE21
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE EGAN

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JUNE 2025

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The Further Amended Application for Review filed on 15 May 2025 be dismissed.

3.The First Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the Application for Review fixed in the amount of $8,371.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE EGAN

Introduction

  1. The first applicant is the father of the second applicant who was born on 28 June 2007. [1]

    [1]           See Ex. 1 – Court Book (CB) p. 103.

  2. The first applicant claimed that he and his son were Vietnamese Catholics of Kinh ethnicity from Hoa Phong Village in Dac Nong Province, Vietnam. The…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 840
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ATL19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involves the first applicant, a national of Iran, who sought protection in Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the Authority ought to have conducted an interview with the first applicant to clarify aspects of his claims. The court was required to determine if the decision of the Authority not to conduct an interview was legally unreasonable, and whether the decision-making process met the standards of legal reasonableness.

The court considered the principles of legal unreasonableness and jurisdictional error, drawing on various authorities. It emphasised that findings of fact, including credibility findings, are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, but are not beyond scrutiny on judicial review. However, a high degree of caution must be exercised before concluding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error. The court highlighted that extreme illogicality must be demonstrated to establish such error. The court also noted that legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached without necessarily identifying another jurisdictional error and can be inferred where the decision appears to be arbitrary, capricious, without common sense, or plainly unjust.

In applying these principles, the court found that the Authority's decision not to conduct an interview did not establish a jurisdictional error. The reasons provided by the Authority were evident and intelligible, and the decision did not fall outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of fact and law. The court concluded that the decision was not legally unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed, and the decision of the Authority not to conduct an interview with the first applicant was affirmed. The court's decision underscored the stringent test for unreasonableness and the importance of ensuring that the exercise of discretionary powers is conducted within the bounds of legal reasonableness.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The judgment in DCP16 accords with the following earlier authorities: (a)Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [66] and [76] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ where it was said:66. This approach does not deny that there is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. That area resides within the bounds of legal reasonableness. The courts are conscious of not exceeding their supervisory role by undertaking a review of the merits of an exercise of discretionary power. Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a court’s view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker. Accepting that the standard of reasonableness is not applied in this way does not, however, explain how it is to be applied and how it is to be tested.…76As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v R that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion “if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust”. The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.(b)DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175 at [30] per Kenny, Kerr and Perry JJ where it was said:30. The relevant principles can be summarised as follows.(1)While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [37]–[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109; 154 ALD 221; [2016] FCAFC 174 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; 302 ALR 572; 136 ALD 41; [2013] FCA 317 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J).(2)Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; 266 ALR 367; 115 ALD 248; [2010] HCA 16 (SZMDS) that:135.… A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.(Emphasis added)(3)By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451; [2015] FCA 1089 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), “[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant(2018) 353 ALR 641 at 650to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(2002) 194 ALR 676; [2002] FCAFC 437 at [54].” Equally jurisdictional error may be established by “a process of reasoning which damns a man’s credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document”: SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 181 FCR 113; 112 ALD 501; [2009] FCA 1470 at [37].(4)Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN[2016] FCA 516 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that:56.An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny …(citations omitted)(5)A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]–[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61].(c)Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640 at [41] and [42] per Wigney J where it was said:41. The relevant principles relating to legal unreasonableness in the context of decisions by the Tribunal to refuse adjournment applications have been the subject of recent extensive analysis by the High Court in Li and this court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh[2014] FCAFC 1 (Singh). The relevant principles may be summarised as follows:(a)The requirement of reasonableness flows from or is connected with an implied legislative intention that a discretionary power that is statutorily conferred must be exercised reasonably: Li at [29], [63], [88]; Singh at [43].(b)Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising Court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process. Or it can be a conclusion reached without necessarily identifying another jurisdictional error: Li at [27]–[28], [72]; Singh at [44]. In the latter case unreasonableness may be taken to be unreasonableness from which an undisclosed error may be inferred: Li at [27], [68]; Singh at [44].(c)Unreasonableness can be inferred where the decision appears to be arbitrary, capricious, without common sense or “plainly unjust“: Li at [28], [110]; Singh at [44].(d)In those circumstances, where reasons are given, the supervising Court is concerned with seeing if there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification within the decision-making process: Li at [105]; Singh at [44]–[45]. The intelligible justification must lie within the reasons given by the decision-maker: Singh at [47].(e)Regard can also be given to the outcome of the decision: whether the “decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of fact and law“: Li at [105] (Gageler J quoting Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220–221; Singh at [44]–[45].(f)The legal standard of reasonableness and the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case: Li at [67]; Singh at [48]. In the case of discretionary powers vested in the Tribunal, the location of these powers in the statutory scheme, as aids to the performance of a review function, is important: Singh at [49].(g)There is an overlap between the obligation in s 360 of the Act to invite an applicant to a hearing to present evidence and arguments and the exercise of the adjournment discretion in s 363. If, by reason of the refusal of an adjournment application, an applicant is not provided with an opportunity to present his or her evidence, it might be concluded that the hearing contemplated did not take place: Li at [62]; Singh at [51]–[52].(h)The overriding duty of the Tribunal to review a decision may require the Tribunal, acting reasonably, to consider the exercise of the discretion to adjourn in a particular case. A failure to adjourn to allow a visa criterion to be met can, in some circumstances, be so unreasonable as to constitute a failure to review: Li at [100]–[102].(i)It cannot be suggested that the Tribunal is under an obligation to afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case or improve upon the evidence. It may decide in an appropriate case that “enough is enough“: Li at [82]. The Tribunal is also under a duty to review decisions within a reasonable time: Li at [102].(j)Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a Court’s view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker: Li at [30], [66]; Singh at [47]. The test of legal unreasonableness is stringent: Li at [113].42. The question is whether, upon application of these principles, the decision of the Tribunal to refuse the adjournment here was legally unreasonable. Could the Tribunal’s decision be considered to be arbitrary, capricious, without common sense or plainly unjust? Do the Tribunal’s reasons disclose an evident and intelligible justification for refusing the adjournment application?(d)Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [10] – [11] per Kiefel CJ where it was said:10. In the joint judgment in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li it was explained that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power is unreasonable in a legal sense when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification. That may be so where a decision is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at, although an inference of unreasonableness is not to be drawn only where a decision appears to be irrational. None of these descriptions could be applied to the Tribunal’s decision in the present case.11. Statements such as that made in the Wednesbury case, that a decision may be regarded as unreasonable if no reasonable person could have made it, may not provide the means by which a conclusion of unreasonableness may be arrived at in every case. But it serves to highlight the fact that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent. And that is because the courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion. The question is where that area lies.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established