FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey
[2014] FCA 640
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640 Appeal from: Pandey & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 453 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v MENUKA PANDEY, BILAL CHEEMA and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 292 of 2014 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 19 June 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a student visa – applicant was not enrolled in a course and accordingly did not have a certificate of enrolment – applicant sought an adjournment to allow her to obtain a certificate of enrolment so as to satisfy clause 572.222 of the Migration Regulations 1994 – whether the Tribunal’s refusal to grant an adjournment was legally unreasonable – principles of legal unreasonableness
MIGRATION – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal had failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether the Tribunal was bound to consider whether the applicant would genuinely undertake study in refusing to grant an adjournment
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)Cases cited: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2001) 211 CLR 476Date of hearing: 30 May 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 57 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Hughes Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz First and Second Respondents: The first and second respondents appeared in person. Third Respondent: The third respondent did not appear.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 292 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
AppellantAND: MENUKA PANDEY
First RespondentBILAL CHEEMA
Second RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 JUNE 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:
2.1The application to that Court be dismissed; and
2.2The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceedings in that Court.
3.The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 292 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
AppellantAND: MENUKA PANDEY
First RespondentBILAL CHEEMA
Second RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE:
19 JUNE 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In May 2013, Ms Menuka Pandey and her husband appeared…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 640
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal did not fail to take into account a relevant consideration when it refused the adjournment application. The court held that the Tribunal was bound to consider whether the applicant had been given a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence and present arguments concerning the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In this case, the Tribunal had provided the applicants with a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence and present arguments, as it had invited them to do so in its letter dated 27 March 2013. The court also held that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was not legally unreasonable. The Tribunal had considered the matters placed before it by the applicants to explain why they required more time to provide evidence, and it was satisfied that the applicants had had ample opportunity to provide a current certificate of enrolment.
The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court. The court ordered that the application to that Court be dismissed, and that the applicants pay the first respondent's costs of the proceedings in that Court. The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:
2.1 The application to that Court be dismissed; and
2.2 The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceedings in that Court.
3. The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema are not legally represented. They did not furnish any written submissions. Perhaps not surprisingly the submissions made by Ms Pandey at the hearing did not address the legal arguments advanced by the Minister. Rather, her submissions were directed to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account a relevant consideration? It is well accepted that a failure by an administrative decision-maker to take a particular matter into account will only constitute a jurisdictional error if the decision-maker was bound to take that matter into account: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39. What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider is determined by the construction of the statute conferring the discretion. Where the relevant statute does not expressly refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In short terms, Part 5 of the Act provides for review of certain migration decisions by the Tribunal. Division 3 imposes a duty on the Tribunal to review decisions. Division 4 contains provisions concerning the Tribunal’s exercise of power, including (in s 353) an obligation to provide a mechanism of review that is “fair, just, economical, informal and quick”, not “bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence”, but rather based on “substantial justice and the merits of the case”. Division 5, which contains provisions relating to the Tribunal’s conduct of reviews, provides, amongst other things, that the Tribunal may invite a person (including an applicant) to give information (s 359) and must invite an applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review (s 360). Section 363(1) provides that for the purposes of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may, amongst other things, “adjourn the review from time to time.” The Tribunal’s discretion in s 363 to adjourn the review (which will include a hearing convened following an invitation under s 360) may appear to be relevantly unconstrained. No mandatory considerations are spelt out. The scope, subject and purpose of Part 5 of the Act, however, would suggest that the Tribunal is bound at least to consider whether the applicant has been given a reasonable opportunity to give evidence and present arguments concerning the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In a case where an applicant is seeking more time in which to provide evidence to the Tribunal, that may in turn require the Tribunal to consider the matters placed before it by the applicant to explain why he or she requires more time. That would generally include matters relating to the further evidence that is to be supplied, the reason that the evidence has not been provided to date and the length of time required.