Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey

[2014] FCA 640

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640
Appeal from: Pandey & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 453
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v MENUKA PANDEY, BILAL CHEEMA and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 292 of 2014
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 19 June 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for a student visa – applicant was not enrolled in a course and accordingly did not have a certificate of enrolment – applicant sought an adjournment to allow her to obtain a certificate of enrolment so as to satisfy clause 572.222 of the Migration Regulations 1994 – whether the Tribunal’s refusal to grant an adjournment was legally unreasonable – principles of legal unreasonableness

MIGRATION – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal had failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether the Tribunal was bound to consider whether the applicant would genuinely undertake study in refusing to grant an adjournment

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2001) 211 CLR 476
Date of hearing: 30 May 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Hughes
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz
First and Second Respondents: The first and second respondents appeared in person.
Third Respondent: The third respondent did not appear.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 292 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

MENUKA PANDEY
First Respondent

BILAL CHEEMA
Second Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.Orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

2.1The application to that Court be dismissed; and

2.2The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceedings in that Court.

3.The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 292 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

MENUKA PANDEY
First Respondent

BILAL CHEEMA
Second Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE:

19 JUNE 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In May 2013, Ms Menuka Pandey and her husband appeared…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 640
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Ms Pandey, a citizen of Nepal, sought a student visa to study in Australia. The Tribunal had previously refused her visa application, and she challenged that decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge upheld the challenge on the basis that the Tribunal had failed to take into account a relevant consideration when it refused the adjournment application. The main issues in this appeal were whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the Tribunal had failed to take into account a relevant consideration, and if the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was legally unreasonable.

The court found that the Tribunal did not fail to take into account a relevant consideration when it refused the adjournment application. The court held that the Tribunal was bound to consider whether the applicant had been given a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence and present arguments concerning the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In this case, the Tribunal had provided the applicants with a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence and present arguments, as it had invited them to do so in its letter dated 27 March 2013. The court also held that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was not legally unreasonable. The Tribunal had considered the matters placed before it by the applicants to explain why they required more time to provide evidence, and it was satisfied that the applicants had had ample opportunity to provide a current certificate of enrolment.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court. The court ordered that the application to that Court be dismissed, and that the applicants pay the first respondent's costs of the proceedings in that Court. The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 3 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

2.1 The application to that Court be dismissed; and

2.2 The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceedings in that Court.

3. The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Pandey challenged the Tribunal’s decision in administrative review proceedings commenced in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge upheld the challenge on the basis that in refusing the adjournment application the Tribunal had failed to take into account a relevant consideration. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the primary judge erred in so concluding. A further, and equally important, issue is whether the Tribunal’s refusal to allow the adjournment was nonetheless legally unreasonable. Background facts Ms Pandey is a citizen of Nepal. Mr Cheema is a citizen of Pakistan. On 2 December 2010, Ms Pandey applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for a student visa. Mr Cheema was named in the application as Ms Pandey’s husband. Mr Cheema did not separately apply for a student visa. In her application, Ms Pandey nominated three courses she wanted to undertake: first, an English course which was to run from 15 November to 10 December 2010; second, a Diploma of Management course which was to run from 15 January to 15 July 2011; and third, an Advanced Diploma of Management course which was to run from 16 July 2011 to 13 January 2012. It would appear from the application form that Ms Pandey had engaged in earlier study in Australia; from October 2008 to September 2009 in a course in food processing and from October 2009 to September 2010 in a Diploma of Business Management. On 13 January 2011, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister), refused Ms Pandey’s visa application. The delegate found, relevantly, that Ms Pandey had failed to satisfy clause 572.223(2)(a)(iii) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). That clause required that the Minister be satisfied that Ms Pandey would have access to funds demonstrated or disclosed in accordance with the requirements in Schedule 5A relating to her financial capacity. The delegate also refused Mr Cheema’s application as part of Ms Pandey’s family unit. On 31 January 2011, Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. In their application they nominated a migration agent to act on their behalf and nominated that agent to be the authorised recipient to receive correspondence on their behalf. Both Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema were granted bridging visas pending the determination of their review application. On 27 March 2013, the Tribunal wrote to Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema’s nominated migration agent as authorised recipient of correspondence on their behalf. The letter enclosed a letter to Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema inviting them to appear before the Tribunal at a hearing on 14 May 2013. The letter also invited Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema to provide, amongst other things, a certificate of enrolment as required by clause 572.222. A copy of clause 572.222 was attached to the letter. Clause 572.222(1) relevantly provides that, except in certain circumstances not presently relevant, one of the criteria to be satisfied at the time of the decision in respect of a student visa was whether the applicant had given to the Minister a certificate of enrolment relating to the applicant undertaking a course of study the provider of which is not a suspended education provider.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It would appear that Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema accepted the invitation to appear at the hearing but did not respond or provide any documents in answer to the invitation to provide a certificate of enrolment and other documents.The Tribunal hearing and decision The Tribunal’s reasons reveal that at the hearing on 14 May 2013 the Tribunal referred to its letter of 27 March 2013 and noted that it had not received any documents. Ms Pandey confirmed that she did not have a current certificate of enrolment. She said that she had been studying and had completed a course in January 2013. The Tribunal then indicated that without a certificate of enrolment the applicant would not be able to satisfy the essential criteria for her student visa, and that her current enrolment was also the crucial starting point in relation to her meeting other criteria. The reasons (at [20]) then record the following course of events at the hearing: Both applicants indicated to the Tribunal that after the first named applicant finished her studies in January 2013, the second named applicant had found a sponsor for a subclass 457 visa, and they had applied for such a visa. They had understood from their agent that because of this, the first named applicant ‘no longer needed to have a CoE’. The Tribunal explained that it was considering the criteria for a student visa, and their evidence seemed to suggest that the first named applicant was not proposing to continue with her studies because she and her husband were pursuing an option relating to subclass 457 visas. The Tribunal indicated this might raise the issue of whether the first named applicant was a genuine applicant for stay as a student, but in any event, a crucial issue was that she did not have a current certificate of enrolment. The applicants indicated that they may have misunderstood or been misguided by their agent, and that the first named applicant had been studying in the past and would have continued to study if she knew it was a requirement. They indicated that they would need more time to arrange relevant evidence relating to the student visa requirements. The first named applicant also indicated that she had only recently received a copy of the Tribunal’s hearing invitation letter inviting her to provide additional evidence. It would appear that the Tribunal then made a decision to refuse the adjournment application and to affirm the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal gave reasons orally and then provided written reasons two days later. The critical paragraph (at [24]) of the Tribunal’s written reasons should be set out in full: At the hearing, the applicants requested additional time to provide further evidence, including a current certificate of enrolment, along the lines of the Tribunal’s invitation in its letter of 27 March 2013. The Tribunal considers the applicants have had ample opportunity to provide a current certificate of enrolment relating to the primary applicant, and other evidence relating to relevant criteria for a student visa. As discussed with the applicants at the hearing, the Tribunal had invited the applicants to provide additional evidence in its letter of 27 March 2013. The first named applicant claimed at the hearing that she only received a copy of the Tribunal’s letter a few days before the hearing. In the circumstances that the applicants had appointed a registered migration agent as their representative and authorised recipient for the review, the Tribunal is satisfied that its letter of 27 March 2013 which included the invitation to provide additional evidence, is taken to have been given to the applicants on that date, which is when it was sent by fax to the last fax number of the authorised recipient provided in relation to the review. In addition, the Tribunal considers that the applicants’ evidence strongly indicates that after the first named applicant finished a course of study in January 2013, their focus was no longer on the first named applicant continuing her studies, but on pursuing subclass 457 visa options based on the second named applicant’s employment. The Tribunal has decided in the circumstances not to grant additional time for the applicants to provide evidence in relation to meeting the criteria for a student visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms Pandey and Mr Cheema are not legally represented. They did not furnish any written submissions. Perhaps not surprisingly the submissions made by Ms Pandey at the hearing did not address the legal arguments advanced by the Minister. Rather, her submissions were directed to the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account a relevant consideration? It is well accepted that a failure by an administrative decision-maker to take a particular matter into account will only constitute a jurisdictional error if the decision-maker was bound to take that matter into account: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39. What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider is determined by the construction of the statute conferring the discretion. Where the relevant statute does not expressly refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In short terms, Part 5 of the Act provides for review of certain migration decisions by the Tribunal. Division 3 imposes a duty on the Tribunal to review decisions. Division 4 contains provisions concerning the Tribunal’s exercise of power, including (in s 353) an obligation to provide a mechanism of review that is “fair, just, economical, informal and quick”, not “bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence”, but rather based on “substantial justice and the merits of the case”. Division 5, which contains provisions relating to the Tribunal’s conduct of reviews, provides, amongst other things, that the Tribunal may invite a person (including an applicant) to give information (s 359) and must invite an applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review (s 360). Section 363(1) provides that for the purposes of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may, amongst other things, “adjourn the review from time to time.” The Tribunal’s discretion in s 363 to adjourn the review (which will include a hearing convened following an invitation under s 360) may appear to be relevantly unconstrained. No mandatory considerations are spelt out. The scope, subject and purpose of Part 5 of the Act, however, would suggest that the Tribunal is bound at least to consider whether the applicant has been given a reasonable opportunity to give evidence and present arguments concerning the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In a case where an applicant is seeking more time in which to provide evidence to the Tribunal, that may in turn require the Tribunal to consider the matters placed before it by the applicant to explain why he or she requires more time. That would generally include matters relating to the further evidence that is to be supplied, the reason that the evidence has not been provided to date and the length of time required.