BEQ24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 283
•28 February 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BEQ24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 283
File number: PEG 90 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 28 February 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa – decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to assess the applicant’s claimed fear of harm – whether the Tribunal’s use of country information was illogical, irrational or unreasonable – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. Legislation: Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), Item 10 in Schedule 16 and Item 25
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 36, 476 & 499
Cases cited: AVH24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 98
AXP18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3834
BJI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 58
BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
CRG16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 374
CUB23 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 101
CVI17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 688
DAK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 68
DBX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 897
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3
DQA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2418
DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKRT [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24
SZDFO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1192
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 105 Date of hearing: 1 November 2024 Place: Perth Applicant: Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms M Woollett Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
PEG 90 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BEQ24
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
28 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL:
BACKGROUND
Recent amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) was amended on 14 October 2024 following the commencement of the Administrative Review Tribunal (the “ART”) (and by virtue of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth) (the “Consequential Act”)).
This judgment relates to a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). That decision is dated 15 February 2024 and thus predates those amendments. Unless stated otherwise, any reference to the Act in this judgment is a reference to the Act as was in force at the date of the Tribunal’s decision (or as at the date of any relevant matter referenced in this judgment).
At the time that the applicant filed his judicial review application in this Court, the Tribunal was listed as the second respondent in this matter. Item 10 in Schedule 16 of the Consequential Act provides that the ART is (after the transition time) substituted for the Tribunal as a party to any proceedings pending in any Court or Tribunal immediately before the transition time. Item 25 of the Consequential Act relates to any proceeding in a Court that is not finalised before the transition time and that relates to a decision made, or other thing done, by the Tribunal. After the transition time, a proceeding will continue in accordance with the new law. By continuing with a proceeding, anything the Court could have done in relation to the Tribunal before the transition time can now be done in relation to the ART.
In the circumstances, the Court made an order (at the hearing of this matter) substituting the ART as the second respondent in this proceeding and will proceed to review the decision of the Tribunal.
Applicant’s migration history
A summary of the procedural history and background for this matter was provided by the Minister in written submissions (filed in this Court on 16 October 2024). The Court has cross referenced that summary with the materials contained in the Court Book (“CB”). The Minister’s overview is accurate and the Court adopts it as its own (with some minor amendments and additions).
Relevantly, as detailed in the Minister’s summary, the applicant’s migration history is as follows.
The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia (CB 22 & 42). He arrived in Australia in February 2018 as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority (Class UD) (Subclass 601) visa (CB 58).
On 24 April 2018, the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the “visa”) (CB 14-41 & 58).
The applicant’s claims for protection can be summarised as follows (CB 37-39):
(a)the applicant left Malaysia due to “family matters”, “his parents will never accept [him] in the family” if he were to return to Malaysia, and they “chased [him] away”;
(b)the police cannot provide the applicant with assistance as his claims for protection are “family or domestic matters”; and
(c)the applicant is unable to relocate due to “family matters”.
On 8 August 2018, a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”) refused to grant the applicant the visa on the basis that he is not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations (CB 58-65).
On 20 August 2018, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 66-71).
On 15 January 2024, the applicant gave the Tribunal a completed “pre-hearing information form” and provided more information about his claims for protection (CB 77-82). The applicant reiterated his concerns about his family issues and explained further that his wife also has “family problems” and was “almost sold by her biological brother [because] of drugs and owed money to a very dangerous gangster”.
On 25 January 2024, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing before it on 15 February 2024 (CB 83-86).
On 29 January 2024, the applicant provided the Tribunal with a written statement and a completed “response to hearing invitation” form (CB 88-93). He also detailed additional claims for protection. Those claims can be summarised as follows:
(a)in 2016, the applicant was matched with a woman to marry, the woman being “the daughter of my mother’s siblings”. He did not want to marry the woman and did not attend the wedding ceremony. The woman was embarrassed and angry with the applicant and her family found him which led to a “commotion in front of [his] house”. He saw the woman enter a car and he was later hit by a car, hospitalised and suffered a broken leg;
(b)in 2017, the applicant fled to another part of Malaysia as the woman kept bothering him. He was told that the woman’s family made a police report, but the police could not arrest him as he had not committed a crime. The woman’s family were not happy and found him in the part of Malaysia he had fled to, and “beat [him] while he was riding a motorcycle”; and
(c)he was verbally threatened over the telephone and fled to Australia so that the woman’s family could not find him.
On 15 February 2024, the applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal (with the assistance of a Malay interpreter) (CB 97-100).
On the same day, the Tribunal made an oral decision affirming the delegate’s decision refusing to grant the applicant the visa (CB 103).
On 18 February 2024, the applicant requested written reasons for the decision made on 15 February 2024 (CB 104).
On 29 February 2024, the Tribunal reduced its oral decision to a written statement of its decision and reasons (CB 109-119).
On 1 March 2024, the Tribunal provided the applicant with a copy of its written reasons (dated 29 February 2024) (CB 107-108).
On 18 March 2024, the applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision (pursuant to s 476 of the Act) (CB 1-8).
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision.
As this Court has previously explained, it is generally reluctant to extract large portions of the Tribunal’s decision (preferring, instead, to summarise the Tribunal’s “core” findings). At times, however, it is useful to provide substantial portions of the Tribunal’s reasons as this helps draw attention to the Tribunal’s reasoning process: DBX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 897 (per McKerracher J) at [29]-[32]. This approach is particularly useful when (as was the case here) the grounds of review filed by the applicant lack particulars, when the applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation and when the applicant was unable to articulate (in any detail) the concerns that he had with the Tribunal’s decision.
The Tribunal’s written reasons are 11 pages long and span 79 paragraphs (CB 109-119).
The Tribunal began by explaining that the issue before it was whether the applicant met the refugee criterion contained in s 36(2)(a) of the Act or the complementary protection criterion set out in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (at [3]).
The Tribunal noted that it had also considered the Refugee Law Guidelines and the Complementary Protection Guidelines prepared by the Department of Home Affairs and the “DFAT Country Information Report Malaysia” (published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 29 June 2021 (the “DFAT Report”)) in making it decision (at [4]).
The Tribunal then summarised the applicant’s protection claims as articulated in his protection visa application in April 2018 and the claims subsequently made.
The Tribunal explained that the applicant had claimed as follows: “I have family matters” and “my parents will never accept me in the family.” The applicant also claimed that he had been “chased away” by his parents and feared what would occur if he returned (at [6]).
The Tribunal noted that the delegate had refused the protection visa application because the delegate determined that the harm feared by the applicant was “not fear for a [s] 5J(1)(a) reason”. Further, the delegate held that the applicant was not entitled to complementary protection because, whilst there may be instances of corruption in the police force, the Malaysian authorities were nonetheless reasonably effective in relation to combating crime (at [6]).
The Tribunal explained that information had been sought from the applicant in January 2024 about his claims for protection. Specifically, the applicant was asked to fill in a form which asked whether he wanted to provide more information about his protection claims. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had responded as follows (at [10]):
A family problem that is very complicated and hurts my heart, and now I am married here with my choice. My wife also has family problem in Malaysia. My wife was almost sold by her biological brother because of drugs and owed money to a very dangerous gangster.
The Tribunal further explained that, in response to a hearing invitation, the applicant provided further information which claimed that he was “matched with a daughter” of one of his mother’s siblings, he had agreed to marry her but then failed to attend the wedding unexpectedly and without giving notice to anyone. The applicant explained that this angered the bride’s family and, in retaliation, he “was hit with a car” after he fled. The applicant also claimed that the woman’s family made a report to the police but that the police indicated that they would not accept that report as “it was a family matter”. The applicant also claimed that he was threatened by telephone and that the woman and her family beat him when he was riding a motorcycle. He claimed that he had been “slightly injured” (at [11]-[14]).
The Tribunal then summarised the evidence presented at the hearing before it as follows:
15.At the commencement of the hearing, I explored with the applicant his claims for protection as they related to his wife. He clarified that he claimed fear of harm on account of his wife having borrowed money from a loan shark and harm because his wife’s brother had tried to sell her and was a drug addict who would press her for money.
16.At the hearing, the applicant gave evidence which was broadly consistent with the typed statement he provided on 29 July 2024, save for that he clarified that the first motorcycle accident he was involved in, which broke his leg and required his hospitalisation for months, did not involve harm caused by the would-be-bride’s family.
17.That said, there was a level of inconsistency in the applicant’s evidence about the dates of the various motorcycle accidents and when things occurred. However, in the circumstances, I am prepared not to attach any weight to those matters.
18.By way of further explanation, the applicant also gave evidence that, after he was threatened by the bride’s family and became aware that they were involved in the accident, he did not talk to anyone about it. He gave clear evidence that he did not call the police. I accept that to be the case. His evidence was that he continued to work for a period of about six months until he left for Australia. I also accept that to be true.
The Tribunal then detailed its obligations in relation to credibility findings, noting that assessing credibility is a difficult task which should be conducted fairly and reasonably (at [21]).
Overall, the Tribunal determined that, although there were some inconsistencies in the applicant’s account, in all of the circumstances, those inconsistencies “were not significant” (at [22]).
The Tribunal then outlined the criteria in s 36(2) of the Act and s 5H(1) of the Act as relevant for protection (at [25]-[26]).
In relation to the applicant’s concerns about his withdrawal from an agreed marriage, the Tribunal determined as follows:
29.I accept that the applicant was party to an agreement to marry his cousin. I accept that he failed to attend the wedding. I accept that the family of the would-be-bride were angry at that, and I accept that they harmed, or at least attempted to harm, him in [city omitted] in 2017 as claimed by the applicant. I accept that the applicant has a subjective fear of harm if he is to return to Malaysia from those people.
30.In determining whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, I am also prepared to assume, favourably to the applicant, that he has been harmed in the amount suggested by him following his failure to follow through the marriage.
31.As indicated, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the persecution feared must be feared for reasons of one or more of the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The reason, or reasons, must also be the essential and significant reason, or reasons, for the persecution.
32.Put another way, there must be a connection between the persecution feared and one or more of the reasons in section 5J(1)(a).
33.Whether a connection exists has been described as a ‘matter of common sense, not susceptible to a reduction to a satisfactory formula’. Rejection or ostracism by one’s own family would not, of itself, usually constitute persecution. Familial rejection, for any reason, is not the kind of detriment against which the state can be expected to provide protection.
34.However, I do not approach the question from the position that interfamily conflict and violence can never involve a section 5J(1)(a) reason. I recognise that the fact that harm feared amounts to criminal conduct does not, of itself, prevent such harm from being characterised as persecution for the purposes of section 5J(1)(a) of the Act.
35.The applicant conceded that the harm feared by him is not fear for a section 5J(1)(a) reason. However, for completeness, I have considered whether the reason for the harm feared by the applicant from the family of his would-be-bride is because he is a member of a particular social group. I have considered whether a particular social group of ‘men who withdraw from an agreement to marry’ or ‘Muslim men who withdraw from an agreement to marry’ or similar exists.
36.The difficulty, however, is that the harm feared must be feared on account of the applicant’s membership of that particular social group, not merely that it is possible to formulate a group of persons with similar attributes to the applicant which might be described as a particular social group.
37.In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the harm feared by the applicant is for reasons of his membership of those particular social groups or any other particular social group that might be constructed in a similar way.
38.I am satisfied that the harm feared by the applicant is fear because of actions taken by him. The harm that the applicant fears is, essentially, retribution for having wronged, or being perceived to have wronged, the would-be-bride and her close family, and I am not satisfied that their desire for retaliation is linked to a religious or other section 5J(1)(a) reason.
39.On the evidence, I am not satisfied that any aspect of the intention to harm the applicant relates to his membership of any particular social group, but rather because of the slight that he, and he alone, is perceived to have made against the would-be-bride and her close family.
40.I am not satisfied the applicant would be denied state protection for any section 5J(1)(a) reason. Indeed, there was no claim that the applicant would be denied state protection for any section 5J(1)(a) reason.
On the basis of the above, the Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that the essential and significant reason for the applicant’s fear of harm was one or more of the reasons contained in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act (at [41]).
In relation to the applicant’s loan shark claims, the Tribunal reasoned as follows:
42.Whilst the applicant claimed fear of harm because his wife had borrowed money from a loan shark, his evidence was that he did not know how much she borrowed. When asked whether his wife had experienced any particular harm, the applicant’s evidence was that he was not aware of any particular harm.
43.When I asked the applicant why he fears harm from his wife’s loan shark, he claimed that loan sharks are very dangerous people. He confirmed that there was no other particular reason why he feared harm from his wife’s loan shark. The applicant agreed that police take action against loan sharks, but contended that loan sharks will keep harming people nonetheless.
44.Notwithstanding that it may be possible to frame that the applicant did not have a genuinely held subjective fear of harm on the basis of his wife’s claims in relation to the loan shark, I approach these claims on the basis that I assume that he does have such a fear and that his wife has such a fear.
45.Turning to whether the harm feared from the loan shark is one of the reasons contained in section 5J(1)(a) of the Act, I am not satisfied that spouses of persons who borrow money from or are victims of loan sharks form a particular social group for the purposes of the Act. I do not consider that having borrowed money from a loan shark constitutes a characteristic that can be described as ‘innate or immutable’ or that it is a characteristic that is fundamental to an applicant’s identity or conscience as required under section 5L(c).
46.In any event, the applicant did not claim that he would be targeted for any section 5J(1)(a) reason in relation to the wife’s loan shark. For completeness, however, I am not satisfied that he would be targeted on account of his membership of a particular social group. Rather, if the applicant were to be targeted, it would be because he is the spouse of his wife, being the particular person who borrowed money from that particular loan shark. He would not be targeted as a result of his membership of a group of persons expressed to be ‘spouses of persons who had borrowed from loan sharks’.
Overall, on the basis of the above, the Tribunal concluded that it could not be satisfied that any fear of harm that the applicant had in this regard was for the essential and significant reason of one or more of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or a political opinion (at [47]).
The Tribunal continued:
48.In relation to the harm feared from the applicant’s brother, the applicant agreed the harm feared was not feared for a section 5J(1)(a) reason.
49.As the harm feared is feared is from the applicant’s wife’s family, I have had regard to the terms of section 5K of the Act. Where section 5K applies, before determining that an applicant’s fear must be disregarded, I am required to consider whether any other member or former member of the applicant’s family had been persecuted in the past or had a fear of persecution, if so, what the reason for that persecution was, and whether the reasons are one of the five refugee reasons set out in section 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act.
On the basis of the above, the Tribunal determined that, although it was prepared to assume that the applicant’s wife has been exposed to serious harm in the past by her brother, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was any basis to conclude that the reason for the harm experienced by the wife from her brother was for a s 5J(1)(a) reason (at [50]-[51]).
In all of the circumstances, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J of the Act. As such, the applicant did not meet the refugee criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Act on that basis (at [52]).
The Tribunal then considered the applicant’s claims against the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
The Tribunal began by summarising the effect and scope of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and explained that, in relation to the harm feared from the family of his would-be-bride, the applicant claimed that he could not obtain such protection. Further, the applicant claimed that police could not protect him because he overheard a person at work (who had a brother who was a police officer) saying that police will not involve themselves because they consider it to be a family matter (at [54]-[56]).
The Tribunal noted that the applicant later clarified (in his oral evidence) that he did not know “what type of family matter they were actually discussing” (at [56]).
The Tribunal explained that it had told the applicant that it had difficulty accepting that he would not be protected by police when he had never asked them for protection and when the Tribunal asked the applicant if he wanted to comment on that, the applicant claimed that he did not want to make things more difficult for his family (at [57]).
The Tribunal further explained that, in relation to the harm feared from his wife’s loan shark, the applicant claimed that he would be targeted because he is married to his wife. He agreed, however, that he had not borrowed any money. Further, in relation to the harm feared from his wife’s brother, the applicant claimed that he faced a real chance of harm because her brother said, as long as he does not get what he wants, he will keep harassing her. He claimed that there was maybe a risk that her brother would seek to sell his wife in the future (at [58]).
Finally, the Tribunal explained that the applicant did not make any claim to be exposed to any particular harm from the brother. Rather, his claims were related to the harm which his wife might be exposed to from her brother (at [59]).
The Tribunal then summarised the country information before it, as follows:
60.Whilst I accept the country information indicates that, on occasion, women who are victims of domestic violence are commonly returned to the perpetrator because police perceive those issues as private family matters, I am not satisfied that violence stemming from events of seven or eight years ago which has included, on the applicant’s case, quite significant bodily harm would be treated in the same way. I am not aware of any country information that suggests that interfamilial violence between non-spouses is ignored by police or treated by police as a ‘family member’.
61.The harm that is feared is based on events which took place some time ago. The applicant has been absent from Malaysia since February 2018. There was no evidence advanced in the hearing that the putative persecutor has retained any interest in harming the applicant.
62.I observe that country information indicates that, in 2017, Malaysia passed laws to provide better protection for victims of domestic violence. That included the broadening of definitions to include former spouses and family members. The Domestic Violence Act 1994 defines domestic violence in broad terms. It applies to violence by a person against any other member of the family. That definition is, I consider, broad enough to encompass harm feared from the family of the mother’s siblings and the family of the would-be-bride and, indeed, the harm feared from the applicant’s wife’s brother, by either of them.
63.Country information indicates to me that Malaysian police respond to threats and harassment from unlicenced money lenders, and some non-government associations offer assistance to loan shark clients and victims. That information also indicates that unlicenced moneylending activities, including harassment or intimidation of borrowers, are offences under the Moneylenders Act 1951.
64.Individuals prosecuted under the Moneylenders Act face a maximum 1 million ringgit fine or five years’ imprisonment. Country information indicates that police respond to complaints of illegal moneylending activities, including harassment and intimidation, and conduct operations targeting illegal moneylending resulting in the prosecution of persons under the Moneylenders Act and the Penal Code. Additionally, I observe that, on 11 October 2023, The Star reported that nearly 900 suspected loan sharks had been arrested to that point in 2023.
65.The 2021 DFAT report advises that Malaysians perceive police as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. It also advises that Malaysia is taking steps to combat corruption in the police. Moreover, it reports that the Royal Malaysian Police are generally considered a professional and effective police force. DFAT further assesses that, whilst courts have issued contentious verdicts, particularly in instances involving high-profile politicians and human rights defenders, most cases in the Malaysian civil courts comply with the rule of law and legal procedure.
66.I further observe that the provisions of the domestic violence legislation would enable the wife and the applicant to seek protection. Otherwise, I am satisfied that the applicant could obtain protection from any harm directed towards him from either loan sharks, the wife’s brother, or the family of his would-be-bride from police.
On the basis of the above, the Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied the applicant would be refused protection in relation to the harm that he fears because it is considered to be a family or a domestic matter (at [67]). The Tribunal was, however, satisfied that the applicant could and would receive such protection from police (in relation to the harm feared by him):
68.I am satisfied that the police could and would provide protection against loan sharks and their related activity. I am satisfied that the protection could be obtained to prevent the wife’s loan shark from continuing to hound the applicant or his wife.
69.I am also satisfied that the police could and would provide protection to the applicant against the wife’s brother.
70.I note that section 36(2B) applies to situations where protection could, as opposed to would, be obtained by an applicant. The applicant has expressed some reluctance in obtaining protection. However, whether he ultimately chooses to seek protection that’s available to him is a matter for him.
71.Based on the country information which I have considered credible, I am satisfied that the Royal Malaysian Police could provide protection such that, in all the circumstances, there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm for any of the reasons claimed by him that I have considered above.
The Tribunal determined that it was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real risk of serious harm and, as such, did not meet the complementary protection criteria under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (at [72]-[73]).
The Tribunal then assessed the alternative criterion in ss 36(2)(b) and (c) of the Act, as follows:
75.Sections 36(2)(b) and (c) provide as an alternative criterion that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen mentioned in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) who holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that one person is a ‘member of the same family unit’ as another if either is a member of the family unit of the other or each is a member of the family unit of a third person. Section 5(1) also provides that ‘member of the family unit’ of a person has the meaning given by the Regulations for the purposes of the definition. The expression is defined in reg 1.12 of the Regulations to include a spouse.
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant and his wife are members of the same family unit and continued as follows:
77.I put to the applicant in accordance with section 424AA of the Act that, contrary to his claims, his wife did not have a review application pending before the Tribunal, that his wife had applied for a Protection visa but that was still being processed and had yet to be determined by the department. I complied with section 424AA(1)(b)(i), (ii), and (iii). No additional time to respond was sought by the applicant. The applicant responded to say he was unaware of the present position in respect of his wife’s Protection visa application.
78.I do not know what the outcome of his wife's application will be. However, at the time of this decision, there is no evidence that the applicant’s wife has been granted a Protection visa, and therefore section 36(2)(b) and section 36(2)(c) are not applicable to the applicant.
On the basis of all the above, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision refusing to grant the applicant the visa (at [79]).
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application for judicial review (filed by the applicant on 18 March 2024) contains two grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
1.The Tribunal failed to see the harm and fear that I will be going through if I go back to Malaysia and mentioned that the police in Malaysia could protect me. As for 23 November 2023, there was 5413 reports of police being corrupted and 121 police officer was arrested for taking corruption. The DFAT report about the police being corrupted was at 2021. And the information on police officers being arrested and reports of corruption was on November 2023. This shows how weak the protection of the police in Malaysia is and how the service and police protection could be paid and buy by higher money. These information could be seen from the Malaysian main newspaper which is the Utusan Malaysia and Harian Metro. How could the Tribunal be so confident that me and my wife will provided protection by the police and from the shark loan and my wife’s brother.
2.The police had always not wanting to interupt with issues related to family. The statistic shows that as for August 2023, 5216 reports on childs abused was reported, 6740 at 2022 and 6144 at 2021 … [unintelligible] every year. And these facts are only showing those cases that had been reported. There are so many child in Malaysia that had been abused but was not reported. Child had not been exposed on their rights and was threatened from time to time to keep the pain to themselves. That is what happened to my wife. How could we feel confident to go back to Malaysia without feeling fear that we will be harmed by my wife’s brother.
On 27 May 2024, procedural orders were made by Registrar Downing of this Court giving the applicant an opportunity to file an amended application, additional evidence and written submissions. Unfortunately, no additional documents were filed by or on behalf of the applicant.
On 29 July 2024, the applicant contacted the Court and asked to “change the address” of the hearing to Melbourne, noting that the applicant had moved from Perth. The applicant also suggested that it would be difficult for him to have a hearing in Perth as his wife just had a baby two weeks prior and needed assistance. In the circumstances, the Court granted the applicant leave to appear at the hearing via video link.
The applicant appeared before the Court (on 1 November 2024, by video link) without legal representation but with the assistance of a Malay interpreter. The Court explained to the applicant that the application before the Court (and, indeed, the decision of the Tribunal) related only to him and not to his wife and did not relate to any visa application she may have made or might make.
The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received copies of the Court Book and the Minister’s written submissions.
Ms Maggie Woollett from the Australian Government Solicitor appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Minister.
The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 18 March 2024 (the applicant’s affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing of this matter), a Court Book numbering 120 pages (marked as Exhibit 1 at the hearing of this matter) and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 16 October 2024.
Noting that the applicant was not represented (and noting the remarks of the Federal Court in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review)), the Court gave the applicant an opportunity to outline orally what he thought the Tribunal “did wrong” in relation to his matter.
The Court explained it can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Court also noted that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:
(a)where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 (“Craig”) at 198;
(b)where the decision-maker ignores relevant material: Craig at 198;
(c)where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at 198;
(d)where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24 at [207]-[208];
(e)where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant’s claims (or integers of the claims) made: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKRT [2013] FCA 317 at [111];
(f)where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; and
(g)where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [33]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 (“SZMDS”) at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1 at [44].
The Court also explained that it cannot undertake merits review of the Tribunal’s decision: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. Importantly, the Court cannot grant the applicant the visa that he now seeks, even if the Court disagrees with the Tribunal’s ultimate findings. Instead, the Court can only undertake an analysis of whether the Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error of the sort outlined above.
Against this background, the applicant told the Court that the Tribunal had noted that his wife had not been a witness at the hearing before it. The applicant explained to the Court that his wife was not able to attend the Tribunal hearing because “she had an appointment (or a check-up) that coincided with the Tribunal hearing time”. When the Court asked if the applicant had had a conversation with the Tribunal about wanting his wife to appear at the hearing, the applicant said that he had not done so.
The applicant also told the Court that the Tribunal had asked him whether he could survive in Malaysia if he were to return. The applicant explained to the Court that if he were to return to Malaysia on his own, there would not be an issue, but if he returned to Malaysia with his wife and daughter, under Islamic law, they would insist that the child be subject to genital circumcision. He also advised that she would not be able to have the applicant’s name in keeping with the convention in Malaysia.
The applicant’s wife and child are not included in the applicant’s visa application and, as such, are not parties to the application before this Court. Unfortunately, the applicant’s oral submissions do not point to any error on the part of the Tribunal. Instead, at best, they seek assistance for his wife and child and/or seek impermissible merits review.
CONSIDERATION
The applicant’s grounds of review are not particularised, no written submissions were filed by him and his oral submissions before this Court did not address his grounds of review. This is regrettable, but not unusual. It is more often the norm, rather than the exception, that applicants in this Court appear without legal representation and are unable to articulate their concerns in a Court environment that is often intimidating.
In the circumstances, the Court will interpret the applicant’s concerns as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392) and will itself review the Tribunal’s decision for any possible jurisdictional error (as is now the accepted practice in this Court).
Ground one
As outlined above, ground one provides as follows:
1.The Tribunal failed to see the harm and fear that I will be going through if I go back to Malaysia and mentioned that the police in Malaysia could protect me. As for 23 November 2023, there was 5413 reports of police being corrupted and 121 police officer was arrested for taking corruption. The DFAT report about the police being corrupted was at 2021. And the information on police officers being arrested and reports of corruption was on November 2023. This shows how weak the protection of the police in Malaysia is and how the service and police protection could be paid and buy by higher money. These information could be seen from the Malaysian main newspaper which is the Utusan Malaysia and Harian Metro. How could the Tribunal be so confident that me and my wife will provided protection by the police and from the shark loan and my wife’s brother.
As correctly summarised by the Minister (at [28] in written submissions filed in this Court on 16 October 2024), read broadly, ground one suggests that the Tribunal failed to consider the harm and fear the applicant would experience upon his return to Malaysia. The applicant expressed concerns about the Tribunal’s use of the DFAT Report (in relation to assistance available from the Malaysian authorities).
To the extent that the applicant suggests that the Tribunal’s use of the country information was inappropriate or questionable, the Court disagrees.
To the extent that the applicant takes issue with the country information the Tribunal had regard to, as previously emphasised, it is well established that the choice of country information, the weight afforded to that country information and any consideration regarding the accuracy of country information is a matter for the decision-maker: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]-[13]; DAK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 68 at [27] and CRG16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 374 at [56].
This Court would be engaging in an impermissible merits review if it made its own assessment of country information: NAHI. While there might be an argument that the Tribunal cannot rely on information that is “unreliable” (as per the principles in DQA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2418, AXP18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3834 and BJI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 58, it cannot be said here that the country information assessed by the Tribunal was in any way “unreliable”. As highlighted by the Minister before this Court, the DFAT Report cited by, and relied upon, by the Tribunal was the most recent country information report for Malaysia and a mandatory consideration for the Tribunal (as per s 499 of the Act).
Further, although the Tribunal did not limit its analysis to the DFAT Report (citing multiple sources, including from October 2023, in relation to the situation faced by women and others in violent family relationships and police responses to “loan sharks” (at [62]-[63]), there is simply no evidence that any of these materials are “unreliable”.
In this regard, the Court notes that the applicant references a number of statistics and newspapers. These materials were not before the Tribunal and, were the Court to assess these materials now, the Court would engage in a review outside of its core jurisdiction.
Further, if the applicant is suggesting that the Tribunal should have “looked further” for materials of the type he now wants the Court to assess or made further inquiries with the applicant, the Court again disagrees.
As recently discussed by this Court in CUB23 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 101 (“CUB23”), s 5AAA of the Act provides as follows:
5AAA Non‑citizen’s responsibility in relation to protection claims
(1)This section applies in relation to a non‑citizen who claims to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations (however arising).
(2)For the purposes of this Act, it is the responsibility of the non‑citizen to specify all particulars of his or her claim to be such a person and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim.
(3) The purposes of this Act include:
(a)the purposes of a regulation or other instrument under this Act; and
(b)the purposes of any administrative process that occurs in relation to:
(i) this Act; or
(ii) a regulation or instrument under this Act.
(4)To remove doubt, the Minister does not have any responsibility or obligation to:
(a)specify, or assist in specifying, any particulars of the non‑citizen’s claim; or
(b) establish, or assist in establishing, the claim.
As explained in both CUB23 and AVH24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 98, the Tribunal is not required to seek further evidence by itself in relation to what may or not be a protection claim: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 at [43]. That responsibility falls on the applicant.
This does not mean, however, that the Tribunal should not do what it can do to assist an applicant (particularly an applicant who appears without legal assistance, who is not fluent in the English language and who speaks through or with the assistance of an interpreter) better articulate his concerns and the evidence he sought to present and rely on.
That approach was adopted here. Relevantly, as emphasised by the Minister (in written submissions filed in this Court on 16 October 2024):
(a)where the Tribunal required clarification or had concerns with the applicant’s evidence, it invited the applicant to comment or provide evidence and arguments in response; and
(b)the Tribunal took an active role in seeking to elicit further information from the applicant in relation to his claims and gave him the opportunity to fully participate.
In this matter, the applicant was on notice (from the delegate’s decision made on 8 August 2018) that the basis upon which his application might be refused was that the Malaysian police force could provide an adequate level of protection. He was given ample opportunity to provide evidence in support of his claims. He chose not to call witnesses before the Tribunal and, despite the Tribunal’s best efforts, provided evidence that did not support his case. Overall, the Tribunal actively sought to elicit as much information as it could from the applicant in relation to any protection claims raised by him.
Nothing more was required of the Tribunal in this regard.
Finally, if the applicant is suggesting that the Tribunal’s use of the country information before it was “illogical, irrational or unreasonable”, the Court again disagrees.
It is first useful to set out some of the relevant authorities in relation to illogicality, irrationality and legal unreasonableness.
As explained by the High Court of Australia in SZMDS, the threshold for illogicality and irrationality is as follows:
130.In the context of the Tribunal’s decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.
131What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
SZMDS sets a very high threshold for findings of irrationality or illogicality. Ultimately, the fact that reasonable minds might differ as to the decision or finding to be made on the basis of the evidence will not be sufficient to establish error: SZMDS at [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ.
Legal unreasonableness is case specific and the facts of each matter should be examined and determined based on the circumstances and evidence in that particular case: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [10].
As previously set out by this Court in CVI17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 688, the principles in relation to legal unreasonableness were clearly summarised by Wigney J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 640 at [41] as follows:
…The relevant principles may be summarised as follows:
(a)The requirement of reasonableness flows from or is connected with an implied legislative intention that a discretionary power that is statutorily conferred must be exercised reasonably: Li at [29], [63], [88]; Singh at [43].
(b)Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising Court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process. Or it can be a conclusion reached without necessarily identifying another jurisdictional error: Li at [27]-[28], [72]; Singh at [44]. In the latter case unreasonableness may be taken to be unreasonableness from which an undisclosed error may be inferred: Li at [27], [68]; Singh at [44].
(c)Unreasonableness can be inferred where the decision appears to be arbitrary, capricious, without common sense or “plainly unjust”: Li at [28], [110]; Singh at [44].
(d)In those circumstances, where reasons are given, the supervising Court is concerned with seeing if there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification within the decision-making process: Li at [105]; Singh at [44]-[45]. The intelligible justification must lie within the reasons given by the decision-maker: Singh at [47].
(e)Regard can also be given to the outcome of the decision: whether the “decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of fact and law”: Li at [105] (Gageler J quoting Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220-221; Singh at [44]-[45].
(f)The legal standard of reasonableness and the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case: Li at [67]; Singh at [48]. In the case of discretionary powers vested in the Tribunal, the location of these powers in the statutory scheme, as aids to the performance of a review function, is important: Singh at [49].
…
(j)Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a Court’s view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker: Li at [30], [66]; Singh at [47]. The test of legal unreasonableness is stringent: Li at [113].
Here, it cannot be said that the Tribunal’s factual determinations are illogical, irrational or lacking a basis in a finding or inferences supported on logical grounds: SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58 at [52] per McKerracher J.
Instead, the Tribunal:
(a)accurately summarised all relevant legislative provisions as they relate to protection claims (at [31]-[34], [53] & [55]) and demonstrated a solid understanding of those legislative provisions. In this regard, the Court notes the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s claims did not fall within s 5J(1)(a) of the Act, thereby requiring it to consider the applicant’s claims separately (within the context of the complementary protection criterion); and
(b)relied on the country information before it, discussed that information with the applicant and raised any concerns with the applicant’s evidence with the applicant directly so that he might respond. This was accompanied by an analysis of why the country information referenced was relevant to the Tribunal’s core findings.
The Court notes, in particular, the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s claim to fear harm on the basis of his relationship with the family of his would-be-bride. The Tribunal forensically analysed the applicant’s evidence and asked questions as needed. It then assessed the evidence provided by the applicant against the extensive country information before it.
Relevantly, the Tribunal explained as follows (footnotes of extensive country information omitted):
56.In relation to the harm feared from the family of his would-be-bride, the applicant claimed that he could not obtain such protection. He claimed that police could not protect him because he overheard a person at work who had a brother who was a police officer saying that police will not involve themselves because they consider it a family matter. The applicant clarified in his evidence, though, he did not know what type of family matter they were actually discussing.
57.I put to the applicant that I had difficulty accepting that he would not be protected by police when he had never asked them for protection. When I asked the applicant if he wanted to comment on that, he claimed that he did not want to make things more difficult for his family.
58.In relation to the harm feared from his wife’s loan shark, the applicant claimed that he would be targeted because he is married to his wife. He agreed, however, he had not borrowed any money. In relation to the harm feared from his wife’s brother, the applicant claimed that he faced a real chance of harm because her brother said, as long as he does not get what he wants, he will keep harassing her. He claimed that there was maybe a risk that her brother would seek to sell his wife in the future.
59.The applicant did not make any claim to be exposed to any particular harm from the brother. Rather, the applicant’s claims were related to the harm which his wife might be exposed to from her brother.
60.Whilst I accept the country information indicates that, on occasion, women who are victims of domestic violence are commonly returned to the perpetrator because police perceive those issues as private family matters, I am not satisfied that violence stemming from events of seven or eight years ago which has included, on the applicant’s case, quite significant bodily harm would be treated in the same way. I am not aware of any country information that suggests that interfamilial violence between non-spouses is ignored by police or treated by police as a ‘family member’.
61.The harm that is feared is based on events which took place some time ago. The applicant has been absent from Malaysia since February 2018. There was no evidence advanced in the hearing that the putative persecutor has retained any interest in harming the applicant.
62.I observe that country information indicates that, in 2017, Malaysia passed laws to provide better protection for victims of domestic violence. That included the broadening of definitions to include former spouses and family members. The Domestic Violence Act 19949 defines domestic violence in broad terms. It applies to violence by a person against any other member of the family. That definition is, I consider, broad enough to encompass harm feared from the family of the mother’s siblings and the family of the would-be-bride and, indeed, the harm feared from the applicant’s wife’s brother, by either of them.
63.Country information indicates to me that Malaysian police respond to threats and harassment from unlicenced money lenders, and some non-government associations offer assistance to loan shark clients and victims. That information also indicates that unlicenced moneylending activities, including harassment or intimidation of borrowers, are offences under the Moneylenders Act 1951.
64.Individuals prosecuted under the Moneylenders Act face a maximum 1 million ringgit fine or five years’ imprisonment. Country information indicates that police respond to complaints of illegal moneylending activities, including harassment and intimidation, and conduct operations targeting illegal moneylending resulting in the prosecution of persons under the Moneylenders Act and the Penal Code. Additionally, I observe that, on 11 October 2023, The Star reported that nearly 900 suspected loan sharks had been arrested to that point in 2023.
65.The 2021 DFAT report advises that Malaysians perceive police as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. It also advises that Malaysia is taking steps to combat corruption in the police. Moreover, it reports that the Royal Malaysian Police are generally considered a professional and effective police force. DFAT further assesses that, whilst courts have issued contentious verdicts, particularly in instances involving high-profile politicians and human rights defenders, most cases in the Malaysian civil courts comply with the rule of law and legal procedure.
66.I further observe that the provisions of the domestic violence legislation would enable the wife and the applicant to seek protection. Otherwise, I am satisfied that the applicant could obtain protection from any harm directed towards him from either loan sharks, the wife’s brother, or the family of his would-be-bride from police.
It is clear from the passages above that the Tribunal drew conclusions that were open to it on the evidence before it. It cannot be said that the Tribunal acted in a way that was irrational, illogical or unreasonable. The Tribunal’s conclusions were based on the evidence presented by the applicant himself and extensive country information that was directly related to the applicant’s oral evidence.
It cannot be said here that the Tribunal’s decision demonstrates a failure to attend “conscientiously and appropriately to its statutory obligations”: SZDFO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1192 at [10] per Allsop J (as His Honour then was). Nor can it be said that the Tribunal made findings or employed a process of reasoning that no logical or rational decision-maker could have made on the facts of this case.
No jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground one.
Ground two
Ground two states:
2.The police had always not wanting to interupt with issues related to family. The statistic shows that as for August 2023, 5216 reports on childs abused was reported, 6740 at 2022 and 6144 at 2021 … [unintelligible] every year. And these facts are only showing those cases that had been reported. There are so many child in Malaysia that had been abused but was not reported. Child had not been exposed on their rights and was threatened from time to time to keep the pain to themselves. That is what happened to my wife. How could we feel confident to go back to Malaysia without feeling fear that we will be harmed by my wife’s brother.
To the extent that the applicant seeks a review by this Court of country evidence and statistics that were not before the Tribunal, the Court repeats its findings in this regard in relation to ground one above.
To the extent that the applicant is asking the Court to “re-assess” material that was before the Tribunal, the Court again emphasis that to do so would be to ask that the Court engage in an impermissible merits review.
Finally, if (as suggested by the Minister at [36] in written submissions filed in this Court on 16 October 2024) the applicant is claiming that the Tribunal did not consider his claim to fear harm from his wife’s brother, this is factually incorrect.
As correctly outlined by the Minister, the Tribunal did consider that claim and did so in detail (at [48]-[51], [58]-[59], [62], [66] & [69]). The Tribunal’s conclusions were that:
(a)the harm from the brother would not be for one of the reasons specified in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act; and
(b)the police could protect the applicant from any harm from his wife’s brother. In this regard, the Tribunal noted that the applicant made no particular claim that he would be harmed by the brother, the legislation relating to domestic violence was broad enough to encompass harm from the brother and that the police were regarded as effective and professional and could or would provide protection.
As noted above in relation to ground one, the Tribunal’s findings in this regard were open on the evidence before it.
No jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground two.
CONCLUSION
The application for judicial review (filed by the applicant on 18 March 2024) has failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
This Court is otherwise unable to identify any error.
The application is, accordingly, dismissed.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and five (105) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kendall. Associate:
Dated: 28 February 2025
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