AXP18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AXP18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2018] FCCA 3834
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection visa application – judicial review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision – whether the Authority erred in making findings that were unreasonable and not open to it – whether the Authority erred in its assessment of country information – whether country information relied on must be reliable – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.46A(2), 65, 473CA, 476(1)

Cases cited:

Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 84 ALD 545
ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109
BJI17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2405
BYG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2409
CNV17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2408
CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19
CVQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2121
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 1
DQA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2418
DVI17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 241
EAT17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3036
Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30
Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 419
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58

Applicant: AXP18
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent:

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT

AUTHORITY

File Number: PEG 109 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Kendall
Hearing date: 15 November 2018
Date of Last Submission: 15 November 2018
Delivered at: Perth
Delivered on: 21 December 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N. Draper
Solicitors for the Applicant: Granich Partners
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A. Ladhams
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
The Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

  1. The applicant’s originating application filed 26 March 2018 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 109 of 2018  

AXP18

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction 

  1. The applicant in these proceedings is a Hazara Shia citizen of Afghanistan. He arrived in Australia via Christmas Island…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 3834
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review brought by AXP18 against the Minister for Home Affairs. The applicant contended that the Court, in conducting its review, should assess the reliability and accuracy of country information considered by the Authority, relying on the High Court's decision in *CRI026 v Republic of Nauru* [2018] HCA 19 and the Full Federal Court's decision in *Singh*. The Minister argued that this approach was contrary to the established principle that the assessment of country information and the weight to be given to it are matters for the decision-maker, as articulated in *NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs* [2004] FCAFC 10.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether *CRI026* and *Singh* altered the long-standing principle that courts should not substitute their own judgment for that of the administrative decision-maker regarding the assessment of country information. Specifically, the Court had to determine if these cases permitted or required it to scrutinise the reliability and accuracy of the country information relied upon by the Authority, or if the assessment of such information remained solely within the purview of the decision-maker. A further issue was whether the applicant's reliance on *CRI026* was appropriate, given that the facts of the present case did not involve internal relocation, which was a key element in *CRI026*.

Judge Kendall found the Minister's submissions to be sound. The Court affirmed that the principle established in *NAHI*, that the assessment of country information is a matter for the decision-maker, remains valid and was not overruled by *CRI026* or *Singh*. The Court noted that while *CRI026* did require reliable information for assessing internal relocation, the present case did not involve internal relocation. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that while *Singh* and *SZVFW* indicated that legal unreasonableness is fact-dependent and requires scrutiny of factual circumstances, this scrutiny must not involve merits review or the substitution of the Court's own judgment for that of the decision-maker. The mere existence of conflicting or inconsistent evidence does not render all evidence unreliable, nor does it mean that a decision-maker's reliance on particular information is necessarily unreasonable. The Authority had appropriately considered the country information relevant to the applicant's home area and provided clear reasons for its decision, demonstrating no unreasonableness.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister, in turn, contended: 13.The applicant appears to submit that the combined effect of CRI026 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19 (CRI026) and Singh is that in conducting judicial review in this matter, the Court can and should assess the reliability and accuracy of the country information before the Authority, contrary to the long held principle articulated in NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 (NAHI) that the assessment of country information and the weight to be given to country information is a matter for the decision-maker (see applicant's submissions at [15]-[18]). This submission should be rejected.14.To the extent that the applicant relies on CRI026 to invite the Court to form its own assessment of country information, a similar submission was rejected by Judge Smith in BJI17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 2405 (BJI17) at [45]-[51].14.1.Judge Smith rejected a submission that the phrase 'reliable information' as used in CRI026 should be given a meaning similar to that advanced at [11]-[13] of the applicant's submissions in this matter, on the basis that the words of the High Court are not to be examined as though they were part of the Migration Act: BJI17 at [48].14.2.Judge Smith accepted that an administrative decision must be based on 'reliable' information in the sense that the information must provide a logical basis for the decision-maker to be satisfied of the existence of a fact in issue, and suggested that 'it would be surprising' if DFAT and UNHCR reports could not provide a sufficient basis for (in that case) determining the reasonableness of relocation: BJI17 at [49]-[50].14.3.Nothing in CRI026 overruled the principle in NAHI that it is a matter for the Authority, not the Court, to decide what information it accepts, and the existence of information inconsistent with the information relied on by the Authority did not mean that either information was unreliable: BJI17 at [51].15.The Minister contends that the reasoning of Judge Smith is sound and the applicant's submissions based on CRI026 in the present case should be rejected for the same reasons.16.Further, and in any event, the present case is easily distinguishable from CRI026. In addition to the different statutory context in which CRI026 was decided, it is relevant that in CRI026 the High Court was assessing a decision-maker's findings on whether an applicant could reasonably relocate to another place within the applicant's home country. The passage of CRI026 relied on by the applicant in the present case suggests that, before a decision-maker can properly reject an applicant's claim for complementary protection on the basis of the availability of reasonable internal relocation, the decision-maker needs reliable information as to the safety and suitability of the place of relocation: CRI026 at [39]. However, the present case does not involve internal relocation at all. The Authority accepted that the applicant and his family were from Daykundi: [39] and found that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm, or a real risk of significant harm, in Daykundi. Accordingly, the applicant's submission at [14] has no relevance to the present matter.17.The applicant in this matter makes a further submission that CRI026 read with Singh requires the Court to scrutinise the factual circumstances in which the power is exercised and test those circumstances for reliability. The quote from Singh, cited at [17] of the applicant's submission, should be read in the context of the passage in which it appears. At [48] of Singh, the Full Federal Court said:The standard of legal reasonableness will apply across a range of statutory powers, but the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case. As we have said, unlike some other grounds for review of the exercise of power, the reasoning process in review for legal unreasonableness will inevitably be fact dependent. That is not to diminish the importance of the supervising court maintaining an approach which does not involve the substitution of its own judgment for that of the decision-maker. Rather, it is to recognise that any analysis which involves concepts such as "intelligible justification" must involve scrutiny of the factual circumstances in which the power comes to be exercised.[Emphasis added]18.A similar point was recently made by Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZVFW at [84]:Moreover, legal unreasonableness is invariably fact dependent and requires careful evaluation of the evidence. That is, assessment of whether a decision was beyond power because it was legally unreasonable depends on the application of the relevant principles to the particular factual circumstances the case, rather than by way of an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases. Where reasons are provided, they will be a focal point for that assessment…19.For the purposes of the present application, the Minister does not disagree with the principles expressed in the passages from Singh and SZVFW cited in the 2 immediately preceding paragraphs. The Minister does emphasise, however, that in considering the factual circumstances of the case, the Court cannot engage in merits review. This is made clear not only by the emphasised sentence in Singh, but also in a number of other cases, including those cited at [12.1] and [12.2] above. To the extent that the applicant's submission at [18] could be viewed as asking the Court to engage in merits review, it should be rejected.20.As indicated above, the power being exercised by the Authority in the present case required the Authority to consider whether the applicant met the criteria for a protection visa, including the criteria in s 36 of the Migration Act. This involves the Authority having to assess the applicant's claims for protection and can include (as in the present case) an assessment of an applicant's credibility and weighing up sometimes conflicting evidence. There is nothing in Singh or CRI016 (sic) which suggests that the mere existence of conflicting or inconsistent evidence means that all or any evidence is unreliable. Nor is there anything in those cases that suggests that reliance by a decision-maker on any particular country information or evidence to make a finding that is adverse to the applicant, in circumstances where conflicting or inconsistent country information also exists, is necessarily unreasonable. Further, nothing in these cases allows the Court to substitute its own view on which country information is most accurate or reliable or which country information the Authority should have preferred.…27.4.In response to the applicant's submissions at [19]-[22], the Minister reiterates the point made by Judge Smith in BJI17 that the existence of country information that is inconsistent with that relied on by the Authority does not necessarily mean that either country information is unreliable. The Authority is often tasked with assessing conflicting information and, in the case of country information regarding Afghanistan, the Authority's statutory task also often requires it to consider the applicability of country information to different parts of Afghanistan. In this case, the Authority has appropriately considered whether the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm in his home area of Daykundi province and in the course of accessing his home area. In so doing, it has considered country information which, in the Authority's assessment, distinguishes the situation in Daykundi from that in other parts of Afghanistan. The Authority has given clear and cogent reasons for its decision and for placing weight on particular country information and no unreasonableness is evident in those reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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