FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200
ORDERS
NSD 1198 of 2017 BETWEEN: STEPHEN PAUL MUGGERIDGE
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
FLICK, PERRY AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 DECEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The Appellant is to be released from immigration detention forthwith.
3.The Respondent is to pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the Court below.
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal raises two primary grounds: firstly, that the primary judge erred by not finding that the decision to cancel the visa was legally unreasonable because it lacked evident and intelligible justification for a critical step in the reasoning process. Secondly, it is argued that the primary judge should have found that the decision was affected by legal unreasonableness due to the Minister's failure to properly consider the risk of Mr Muggeridge re-offending. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's decision-making process met the requisite standard of evident and intelligible justification.
The court found that the primary judge's decision should be overturned. The reasoning process adopted by the Minister in assessing the risk of Mr Muggeridge re-offending was indeed legally unreasonable. The court held that the Minister failed to provide an intelligible justification for a critical step in the reasoning process, leading to a decision that was not lawfully made. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the cancellation of Mr Muggeridge's visa was quashed. The court ordered that Mr Muggeridge be released from immigration detention forthwith and that the Minister pay Mr Muggeridge's costs of the appeal and the court below.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The Appellant is to be released from immigration detention forthwith.
3. The Respondent is to pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the Court below.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Grounds 1 and 2 of the amended notice of appeal are to the effect that the learned primary judge should have found grounds 1 and 4 on the application for judicial review to have been established. The reasons given by the primary judge for rejecting those grounds will be considered in the course of determining the merits of the appeal.MANDATORY CONSIDERATIONS This ground of appeal may be briefly disposed of. The Minister made express findings to the effect that the possibility of Mr Muggeridge re-offending was low (reasons [22]) and that the possibility could not be ruled out (reasons [55]). The Minister evaluated the risk to the Australian community in a way that involved not only an assessment (or purported assessment) of the likelihood of re-offending, but also the nature and extent of the harm that might ensue should the risk, however low, materialise. As can be seen, these two discrete aspects of risk featured as critical considerations in the Minister’s decision such as to outweigh compelling countervailing considerations in Mr Muggeridge’s case (reasons [57] – [59]). The risk of harm to the Australian community was in fact considered by the Minister in the sense that the Minister had consciously engaged with the question. It was for that reason that the primary judge rejected the first ground of review: Muggeridge at [39] — [40]. Mr Muggeridge complains not so much of an outright failure by the Minister to have regard to the likelihood of him re-offending. Rather, he complains of the process of reasoning adopted by the Minister in the course of making his assessment of that likelihood. It is submitted that the process of reasoning was affected by legal unreasonableness with the result that the Minister failed to “properly” or “lawfully” consider what was said to be a “mandatory consideration”. That is, with respect, an unnecessarily circular route by which jurisdictional error may be established in the present case. If the Minister’s decision be affected by jurisdictional error for the independent reason advanced in the second ground of appeal, it would not be necessary to cloak the same error in the language of an alternative recognised species of jurisdictional error, such as a constructive failure to have regard to a mandatory consideration. The outcome of the appeal must turn on the contentions raised in the second ground. Before proceeding further, it should be observed that the submissions of the parties on the hearing of the appeal, as in the proceedings before the primary judge, focussed upon an apparent tension in the authorities of this Court concerning the matters mandated for consideration in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 501(2) of the Act: compare Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 367 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505. Relevantly, two contentions were considered by the Full Court in Moana. The first contention (accepted by the majority) was that the Minister was bound to consider any risk of harm to the Australian community posed by the continued presence of the particular visa holder in Australia when exercising the discretion under s 501(2) of the Act (Rangiah J at [39] – [66], North J agreeing at [1]). The apparent tension between that aspect of the decision in Moana and the earlier decision of the Full Court in Huynh has been the subject of comment, but remains unresolved: see Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513 at [33]; Roesner v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 132 at [22] (Allsop CJ, Flick and Griffiths JJ); NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1 at [27]; see also SZSLM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 164 at [18]; Brown v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 235 FCR 88 at [37] — [38]; Roach v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 750 at [64] and AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 451 at [49] — [54].