Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200

Appeal from: Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 730
File number: NSD 1198 of 2017
Judges: FLICK, PERRY AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
Date of judgment: 8 December 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – cancellation of visa on character grounds – discretionary power – decision affected by legal unreasonableness lack of evident and intelligible justification for critical step in reasoning process – decision affected by legal unreasonableness
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 474, 476, 501
Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513

Brown v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 235 FCR 88

BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 78

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516, (2016) 69 AAR 210

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32, (2004) 207 ALR 12

Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 367

Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 730

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Roach v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 750

Roesner v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 132

SZSLM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 164

Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492

Date of hearing: 31 October 2017
Date of last submissions: 7 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr NJ Williams SC with Mr LJ Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Legal Aid NSW
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Lenehan with Ms K Phan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1198 of 2017
BETWEEN:

STEPHEN PAUL MUGGERIDGE

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

FLICK, PERRY AND CHARLESWORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The Appellant is to be released from immigration detention forthwith.

3.The Respondent is to pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the Court below.

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 200
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns an appeal against the decision of the primary judge to dismiss Mr Muggeridge's application for judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision to cancel his visa on character grounds. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue in this appeal is whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the decision to cancel Mr Muggeridge's visa was not affected by jurisdictional error, specifically legal unreasonableness.

The appeal raises two primary grounds: firstly, that the primary judge erred by not finding that the decision to cancel the visa was legally unreasonable because it lacked evident and intelligible justification for a critical step in the reasoning process. Secondly, it is argued that the primary judge should have found that the decision was affected by legal unreasonableness due to the Minister's failure to properly consider the risk of Mr Muggeridge re-offending. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's decision-making process met the requisite standard of evident and intelligible justification.

The court found that the primary judge's decision should be overturned. The reasoning process adopted by the Minister in assessing the risk of Mr Muggeridge re-offending was indeed legally unreasonable. The court held that the Minister failed to provide an intelligible justification for a critical step in the reasoning process, leading to a decision that was not lawfully made. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the cancellation of Mr Muggeridge's visa was quashed. The court ordered that Mr Muggeridge be released from immigration detention forthwith and that the Minister pay Mr Muggeridge's costs of the appeal and the court below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The Appellant is to be released from immigration detention forthwith.

3. The Respondent is to pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the Court below.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On this appeal, it is submitted that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the decision to cancel the visa was affected by jurisdictional error in that it was legally unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, that submission is to be accepted and the appeal should, accordingly, be allowed.THE CANCELLATION DECISION Section 501(2) of the Act provides that the Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:(a)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(b)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test. Mr Muggeridge does not pass the character test because he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more for an offence committed more than 25 years ago: s 501(6)(a) and s 501(7)(c). The Minister’s power to cancel the visa was therefore enlivened. So much is uncontested. The Minister provided written reasons for the cancellation decision dated 4 August 2016. The reasons record a number of factual findings concerning Mr Muggeridge’s background and his conduct whilst present in Australia. In the following paragraphs, the Minister’s factual findings are summarised in the form of a chronology of events, commencing with Mr Muggeridge’s birth in New Zealand.Facts Mr Muggeridge was born to Australian citizens. As an infant, he was adopted by a New Zealand couple and he was raised there as a New Zealand citizen. In 1986 Mr Muggeridge was reunited with his birth parents and three siblings, each of whom were born in Australia. He came to Australia aged 22 and resided here lawfully for about eight years. Mr Muggeridge has prior criminal convictions in New Zealand for driving, theft and drug related offences. His criminal offending continued after his arrival in Australia. In 1988 and 1989, he was convicted of driving offences. Also in 1989, he was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and supply of a prohibited drug. For the latter offence he was sentenced to three months imprisonment. In March 1991, Mr Muggeridge was convicted of an offence involving the supply of a prohibited drug (amphetamine). He was sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment. A further term of 18 months imprisonment was imposed because of Mr Muggeridge’s participation in what the sentencing judge described as a “major criminal enterprise” involving the Life and Death Motorcycle Club, of which he was a member. The Minister found (at [14]):Mr MUGGERIDGE performed an important role in the Life and Death motorcycle club’s amphetamine business. He organised the club house, looked after money, balanced the books which were kept in code and accounted for the cash on a periodic basis to the president, one of his co-offenders. Police investigations revealed that bulk supplies of drugs were secured and buried in the premises which the gang occupied and members operated the premises like a shop. The scope of the operation, the length of time over which it operated and the quantity of drugs distributed made it a major criminal enterprise netting many thousands of dollars for some of its participants.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Grounds 1 and 2 of the amended notice of appeal are to the effect that the learned primary judge should have found grounds 1 and 4 on the application for judicial review to have been established. The reasons given by the primary judge for rejecting those grounds will be considered in the course of determining the merits of the appeal.MANDATORY CONSIDERATIONS This ground of appeal may be briefly disposed of. The Minister made express findings to the effect that the possibility of Mr Muggeridge re-offending was low (reasons [22]) and that the possibility could not be ruled out (reasons [55]). The Minister evaluated the risk to the Australian community in a way that involved not only an assessment (or purported assessment) of the likelihood of re-offending, but also the nature and extent of the harm that might ensue should the risk, however low, materialise. As can be seen, these two discrete aspects of risk featured as critical considerations in the Minister’s decision such as to outweigh compelling countervailing considerations in Mr Muggeridge’s case (reasons [57] – [59]). The risk of harm to the Australian community was in fact considered by the Minister in the sense that the Minister had consciously engaged with the question. It was for that reason that the primary judge rejected the first ground of review: Muggeridge at [39] — [40]. Mr Muggeridge complains not so much of an outright failure by the Minister to have regard to the likelihood of him re-offending. Rather, he complains of the process of reasoning adopted by the Minister in the course of making his assessment of that likelihood. It is submitted that the process of reasoning was affected by legal unreasonableness with the result that the Minister failed to “properly” or “lawfully” consider what was said to be a “mandatory consideration”. That is, with respect, an unnecessarily circular route by which jurisdictional error may be established in the present case. If the Minister’s decision be affected by jurisdictional error for the independent reason advanced in the second ground of appeal, it would not be necessary to cloak the same error in the language of an alternative recognised species of jurisdictional error, such as a constructive failure to have regard to a mandatory consideration. The outcome of the appeal must turn on the contentions raised in the second ground. Before proceeding further, it should be observed that the submissions of the parties on the hearing of the appeal, as in the proceedings before the primary judge, focussed upon an apparent tension in the authorities of this Court concerning the matters mandated for consideration in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 501(2) of the Act: compare Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 367 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505. Relevantly, two contentions were considered by the Full Court in Moana. The first contention (accepted by the majority) was that the Minister was bound to consider any risk of harm to the Australian community posed by the continued presence of the particular visa holder in Australia when exercising the discretion under s 501(2) of the Act (Rangiah J at [39] – [66], North J agreeing at [1]). The apparent tension between that aspect of the decision in Moana and the earlier decision of the Full Court in Huynh has been the subject of comment, but remains unresolved: see Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513 at [33]; Roesner v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 132 at [22] (Allsop CJ, Flick and Griffiths JJ); NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1 at [27]; see also SZSLM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 164 at [18]; Brown v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 235 FCR 88 at [37] — [38]; Roach v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 750 at [64] and AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 451 at [49] — [54].