Li v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Li v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural [2022] FCA 1594  

File number(s): VID 112 of 2021
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 23 December 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm a decision to not revoke the cancellation of the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal failed to consider, misconstrued or misapplied the primary and other considerations under Ministerial Direction No. 79 – whether the Tribunal failed to consider relevant considerations, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to engage in an active intellectual process in relation to the evidence and submissions, and/or acted illogically or irrationally in deciding that there was not ‘another reason’ why the visa cancellation decision should be revoked – application dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 499(1), 501(3A), 501(6), 501(7), 501CA(3) and 501CA(4)
Cases cited:

Applicant in WAD 230/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 705; 148 ALD 117

Bettencourt v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 172; 287 FCR 294

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; 289 FCR 21

FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185; 272 FCR 454

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123

HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202; 273 FCR 121

Mayes v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1036

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1: 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v “SRT” [1999] FCA 1197; (1999) 92 FCR 560

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385; 106 FCR 313

Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81

Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2013] VSCA 213; 304 ALR 535

QDQY v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1394

R v Li, R v McKenzie; R v Pisasale [2020] QCA 39

Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155

Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673; 225 FCR 424

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 179
Date of hearing: 9 March 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Cole
Solicitor for the Applicant: Stephen Byrne
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms F Gordon
Solicitor for…
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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1594
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a Chinese national, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming the decision of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (the Minister) not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant's visa under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal failed to consider, misconstrued, or misapplied the primary and other considerations under Ministerial Direction No. 79 in deciding that there was not another reason why the visa cancellation decision should be revoked.

The Federal Court found that the Tribunal had carefully considered the primary and other considerations under Ministerial Direction No. 79. The court held that the Tribunal was not required to find that there was another reason for revoking the visa cancellation decision. The Tribunal had found that two of the three primary considerations weighed slightly against revocation, and that all three of the relevant other considerations weighed neutrally. The court concluded that the Tribunal had not failed to consider, misconstrued, or misapplied any of the considerations, and that the decision of the Tribunal was not irrational or illogical.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review, and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister's costs. The court found that the Tribunal had given proper consideration to all of the relevant factors in making its decision, and that the decision was not flawed in any way. The applicant's application for judicial review was therefore unsuccessful, and the decision of the Tribunal was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs in an amount to be agreed between the parties, and if not agreed to be the subject of a lump-sum determination by a Registrar.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

A non-exhaustive list of ‘other considerations’ that must be taken into account by the Tribunal are set out in paragraph 14, relevantly including:(a)the strength, nature and duration of the non-citizen’s ties to Australia. Paragraph 14.2 provides as follows in relation to this consideration:(1)The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia. Reflecting the principles at 6.3, decision-makers must have regard to:a)How long the non-citizen has resided in Australia, including whether the non-citizen arrived as a young child, noting that:i.less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia; andii.More weight should be given to time the non-citizen has spent contributing positively to the Australian community.b)The strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia, including the effect of non-revocation on the non-citizen’s immediate family in Australia (where those family members are Australian citizens, permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely).(b)the impact on Australian business interests of the non-citizen’s removal from Australia. Paragraph 14.3 provides as follows in relation to this:(1)Impact on Australian business interests if the non-citizen’s visa cancellation is not revoked, noting that an employment link would generally only be given weight where non-revocation would significantly compromise the delivery of a major project, or delivery of an important service in Australia.(c)the extent of any impediments for the non-citizen if removed from Australia. Paragraph 14.5 provides as follows in relation to this:(1)The extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account: a)The non-citizen’s age and health;b)Whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; andc)Any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country.THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDThe conviction On 25 July 2019 the applicant was convicted in the District Court of Queensland of one count of ‘extortion with intent to gain a benefit with threat of detriment’, and one count of ‘extortion with intent to cause detriment with threat of detriment’, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 months, suspended after seven months. In sentencing the applicant Judge Farr SC described the circumstances of the applicant’s offending conduct as follows:Yutian Li, you have been convicted by a jury of two counts of extortion. You were 37 years of age at the time. You are a Chinese national….You are presently in the country on a bridging visa. I note that you have no prior convictions. You have been convicted on the basis that you were a party to each offence. It is not suggested that you were a principal offender. You met your co-offender, Mr Pisasale, when working as an escort.I accept that you told him some things about a relationship that you had previously had with the complainant, [Mr X]. It is clear that the effect of what you told him is that you felt you had been treated badly by that man. Whether or not that was correct information, I do not know, nor is it of relevance to this proceeding. One of the conversations between you and Pisasale that was covertly recorded was telling, in that you spoke of Pisasale having to punish [Mr X] for what he had done.I do not have any doubt that you understood the correct meaning of that word, and that this notion of punishment, whenever it was first formulated - and it is obvious that there was some discussion about it sometime before that recorded phone call on the 13th of January - was the catalyst for this offending conduct. You, quite obviously, had not expended any money on hiring a private investigator to investigate [Mr X], and you were well aware that you were not entitled to any compensation from him. You wanted him punished for the way he treated you, either financially or, alternatively, by causing his wife to find out about his relationship with you.… You knowingly aided or assisted in the commission of each offence by providing Pisasale with your name, [Mr X]’s phone number and address… You provided Pisasale with information regarding your relationship with [Mr X], and you provided to him certain paperwork. You were also present with Pisasale during, at least, some of his phone conversations with [Mr X].Of course, you encouraged Pisasale to punish [Mr X], and I am satisfied that you and he formed a common intention to unlawfully obtain money from [Mr X]. I note, also, that whatever it was that you told Pisasale regarding your previous relationship, you did not initially tell him that you were, in fact, married yourself. So, even though you were not the principal offender for these offences, you played an integral role in their commission. You knew of the methods that were being adopted and you knew that were not entitled to any compensation. Of course, you were the intended beneficiary of those offences. It has been submitted that the amounts sought, that is $10,000 and $8,400, were reasonably small amounts. But that depends upon the financial circumstances of [Mr X]. Evidence is before the Court that he gave you some money during the course of the relationship, so you may well have thought that he was a man of some means.Whether he was or not, I do not know, but I do know that the amounts demanded were considered by you and Pisasale to be at such a level that success in getting the money was realistic, and that paying it would constitute punishment for [Mr X]. In my view, it is a large sum of money for an ordinary person. Furthermore, this was not a single instance of offending conduct. The activity of [sic] the subject of count 2 occurred about two weeks after the events that are subject of count 1.You had plenty of time to realise the error of ways and disassociate yourself before the events that are the subject of count 2 occurred. It is partially to your credit that you did eventually tell Pisasale that you did not want him to continue to chase [Mr X], and that you just wanted to forget about him, but that did not happen until well after the count 2 offence occurred. It seems that you did tell [Mr X], during a phone call, probably on the 16th of January 2017, that you did not want money, but subsequent to that, you supplied Pisasale with documents including, what you said, was a false ID that [Mr X] had used to get into the country. Extortion is a serious offence. You involved yourself in its commission on two separate occasions over a two week period of time. You have demonstrated no remorse. You have exercised your right to trial by jury and you are not to be sentenced more heavily because you have done that, but it means, of course, that you have not co-operated with the administration of justice. That is relevant to the degree of leniency that might be afforded to you. It seems that you have a reasonable employment history and have obtained some tertiary qualifications. You recently have been working as a masseuse and I note that you help financially to maintain your mother in China.The threat of harm in this matter was not trivial. [Mr X] was threatened with litigation that could cost him up to $200,000, plus $20,000 to $30,000 in costs, plus adverse publicity about his extra-marital affair and the risk of a criminal prosecution. I note, though, that the threat did not involve a threat of violence or physical harm to the person, nor of damage to property, nor were you in a position of power. I further note that no money was actually handed over.The mandatory cancellation of the applicant’s visa

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 29 July 2020, the applicant voluntarily returned to China.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Before the Tribunal it was common ground that having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a period of more than 12 months the applicant did not pass the character test. The applicant’s evidence and submissions were directed to establishing that there was another reason (or perhaps more accurately, other reasons) why the Tribunal should exercise the power under s 501CA(4) to revoke the visa cancellation decision. It was also common ground that in deciding whether to revoke the visa cancellation decision the Tribunal was required to be guided by the considerations mandated in Direction 79.Protection of the Australian community In relation to this ‘primary consideration’, the Tribunal reasoned that having regard to the findings and the outcome in the criminal proceeding “the impact of any future offending could also be serious”; finding that “[a]dverse financial consequences and other serious inconvenience is a foreseeable outcome for victims from this form offending” (at [89]). Drawing from the “limited formal evidence” to hand and from the Tribunal’s assessment of the significance of the particular findings in the criminal proceeding and the applicant’s response to that proceeding (at [90]), the Tribunal found that there was only a low risk of the applicant reoffending “but a risk nonetheless”. In the Tribunal’s view there was a “troubling ambiguity” at the core of the application in that, while the applicant expressed remorse, and the Tribunal accepted that she became involved in an extortion attempt “not entirely of her making”, the “particular findings” in the criminal proceeding ran contrary to core arguments she made in which she contended that she had limited culpability for the offending conduct (at [90]). The Tribunal was not comfortably persuaded that there was adequate evidence to outweigh the significance that it was required to place on the ongoing risk of the applicant reoffending, albeit that the risk may be quite low (at [91]).The best interests of minor children in Australia In relation to this ‘primary consideration’, the applicant did not contend that any minor children were affected by the visa cancellation decision. The Tribunal found this consideration weighed neutrally (at [93]).The expectations of the Australian community In relation to this ‘primary consideration’, the Tribunal took into account the principles expressed at paragraphs 6.3(5), (6) and (7) of Direction 79, including that:(a)“Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by people who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time”; (b)“Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by…those holding a limited stay visa, reflecting that there should be no expectation that such people should be allowed to come to, or remain permanently in, Australia”; and(c)“[t]he length of time a non-citizen has been making a positive contribution to the Australian community… are considerations in the context of determining whether that non-citizen’s visa should be cancelled or their visa application refused”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal reasoned that the applicant had made “a somewhat marginal contribution to the Australian community”; that her offending conduct occurred within a very short period of time after she arrived in Australia, and that she had spent only three and a half years in Australia, 12 months of which had been in prison or detention (at [97]). It found that the fact that the applicant had breached Australian law was sufficient to make an adverse finding under this consideration which weighed slightly against revocation of the visa cancellation decision (at [99]-[100]). The ‘other considerations’ under paragraph 14 of Direction 79 In relation to:(1)“strength, nature and duration of ties”, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s personal connections and contributions to Australia were not substantial, and concluded that the strength, nature and duration of her ties to Australia were “minimal”. The Tribunal considered that that this consideration weighed neutrally (at [111]-[113]); (2)“impact on Australian business interests”, the Tribunal noted that the applicant’s employment history in Australia appeared to be restricted to engaging in massage and escort services (the latter, on her evidence, for a brief period only) (at [104]). The applicant’s evidence centred on her intention to continue her studies, and the Tribunal concluded that this “very indirect prospective contribution to the conduct of business by an unspecified education provider [was] too remote to engage this consideration”, and concluded that it therefore weighed neutrally (at [105]); and(3)“extent of impediments if removed”, the Tribunal considered the applicant’s arguments as to gender discrimination against women and older employees in China (at [115]), and her work history in China and the likelihood of her being able to obtain employment upon return to China (at [117]). The Tribunal concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the applicant faced “particularly significant challenges” upon return to China. It noted that the applicant had voluntarily returned to China from immigration detention, had given evidence that she had been effectively engaging in daily life since her return and had already obtained short-term employment in her area of childcare. The Tribunal concluded that this consideration weighed neutrally at [120]). In respect to the primary considerations “protection of the Australian community” and “expectations of the Australian community”, the Tribunal noted that they each weighed slightly against revocation, whereas “best interests of minor children in Australia” weighed neutrally (at [121]). In respect to the three relevant ‘other considerations’, the Tribunal said that each weighed neutrally (at [122]). The Tribunal concluded (at [123]) that there was nothing arising from the evidence or the Tribunal’s consideration and findings that weighed positively in the applicant’s favour, and that there was nothing to cause the Tribunal to identify any other relevant factor that that might amount to ‘another reason’ to revoke the cancellation decision. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had been convicted of a “not insubstantial offence” (at [124]) and that the delegate’s decision not to revoke the cancellation decision should be affirmed as the Tribunal had found that two of the three ‘primary considerations’ weighed slightly against revocation (at [125]).THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW