FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BFM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 467
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 467
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Minister failed to consider a mandatory relevant consideration and if the decision involved illogical or irrational reasoning or legal unreasonableness. The court needed to assess the Minister's engagement with BFM21's representations and whether this engagement was within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. It also needed to consider whether the Minister misunderstood relevant facts or materials, BFM21's arguments, or the applicable law.
The court examined the Minister's reasons for decision and found that while BFM21 had made representations in accordance with the invitation to do so, the Minister's finding that BFM21 did not pass the character test was not controversial. The Minister considered various factors in determining whether there was "another reason" to revoke the cancellation decision, which were generally aligned with the factors outlined in Ministerial Direction 79. The court noted that the decision-maker is not required to treat every statement within representations as a mandatory relevant consideration but must read, identify, understand, and evaluate the representations. The decision-maker must also engage with the representations within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. The court concluded that the Minister's decision was legally sound and dismissed BFM21's application for judicial review.
The court dismissed BFM21's application for judicial review, found that the Minister's decision was legally sound, and ordered that the name of the first respondent be amended to "Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs." BFM21 was also ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.
2. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
3. The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Last, on the question of materiality, BFM21 reiterated that there was a “realistic possibility” that the Minister’s assessment of acceptability of BFM21’s low risk of reoffending may have been different had he considered the argument or evidence relating to the sentencing Judge’s remark having regard to how finely balanced the matter was.Consideration In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 96 ALJR 497 (Plaintiff M1/2021) at [21]-[24], the High Court set out what is required of a decision-maker who must make a decision under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act where representations have been made in response to the invitation required under s 501CA(3) (footnotes omitted):Decision makers’ approach to representations22Section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act confers a wide discretionary power on a decision maker to revoke a decision to cancel a visa held by a non-citizen if satisfied that there is “another reason” why that decision should be revoked. The statutory scheme for determining whether the decision-maker is satisfied that there is “another reason” for revoking a cancellation decision commences with a former visa holder making representations. In determining whether they are satisfied that there is “another reason” for revoking a cancellation decision, the decision-maker undertakes the assessment by reference to the case made by the former visa holder by their representations.23It is, however, improbable that Parliament intended for that broad discretionary power to be restricted or confined by requiring the decision-maker to treat every statement within representations made by a former visa holder as a mandatory relevant consideration. But the decision-maker cannot ignore the representations. The question remains how the representations are to be considered.24Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations. Adopting and adapting what Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said in Tickner v Chapman, the decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision‑maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. The weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker. And the decision-maker is not obliged “to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims” made by a former visa holder. 25It is also well-established that the requisite level of engagement by the decision-maker with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. What is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations. The requisite level of engagement – the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker – will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations. The decision-maker is not required to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the materials before them.26Labels like “active intellectual process” and “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” must be understood in their proper context. These formulas have the danger of creating “a kind of general warrant, invoking language of indefinite and subjective application, in which the procedural and substantive merits of any [decision-maker’s] decision can be scrutinised”. That is not the correct approach. As Mason J stated in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, “[t]he limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind”. The court does not substitute its decision for that of an administrative decision-maker.27None of the preceding analysis detracts from, or is inconsistent with, established principle that, for example, if review of a decision-maker’s reasons discloses that the decision maker ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial and clearly articulated argument; misunderstood the applicable law; or misunderstood the case being made by the former visa holder, that may give rise to jurisdictional error.