Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 76 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2017] FCAFC 107

File numbers: NSD 2174 of 2016
NSD 2194 of 2016
Judges: GRIFFITHS, WHITE AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 24 July 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – cancellation of applicants’ visas under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) – whether respondent gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of each case in making his cancellation decision – whether respondent engaged in an active intellectual process in determining whether or not to exercise powers under s 501(3) of the Act – whether respondent fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider whether it was in the national interest to make a decision without affording natural justice – whether respondent’s satisfaction that removing the applicants was in the national interest was unreasonable in the legal sense – whether respondent erred in construing or applying the concepts of “member… of a group” and “group involved in criminal conduct” in s 501(6)(b) of the Act

Held: respondent’s decisions to cancel applicants’ visas set aside with costs – order that applicants be released forthwith from immigration detention

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 47, 501, 501C, Subdiv AB of Div 3 of Pt 2

Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 3

Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Opened for signature 20 November 1989.  1577 UTS 3 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Cases cited:

Al-Kateb v Goodwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562

Anderson v Director-General of the Department of Environment & Climate Change [2008] NSWCA 337

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; 170 CLR 1

AVU15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 608

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 83; 231 FCR 513

Chester v The Queen [1988] HCA 62; 165 CLR 611

Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 288; 202 FCR 417

Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 713; 14 ALD 291

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 140

Le v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 875

Leiataua v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1427; 208 FCR 448

Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 220; 118 FCR 326

McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; 228 CLR 423

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24

Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Western Australia [1996] FCA 1509; 67 FCR 40

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi [2010] FCAFC 145; 190 FCR 248

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48;

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 107
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicants, Mr Carrascalao and Mr Taulahi, sought judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision to cancel their visas under section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicants challenged the validity of the decision-making process, arguing that the Minister did not properly consider the merits of their cases and failed to provide natural justice. The applicants were both long-term Australian residents with family ties in Australia, and the cancellation of their visas had significant personal and social consequences. The court was tasked with determining whether the Minister gave genuine and realistic consideration to the applicants' cases, engaged in an active intellectual process, and whether his satisfaction that removing the applicants was in the national interest was unreasonable.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Minister had given proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the merits of each case and whether he engaged in an active intellectual process in determining whether to exercise his powers under section 501(3) of the Act. Additionally, the court examined whether the Minister fell into a jurisdictional error by not considering whether it was in the national interest to make a decision without affording natural justice. The court also assessed whether the Minister's satisfaction that removing the applicants was in the national interest was unreasonable in the legal sense and if he erred in interpreting the concepts of "member... of a group" and "group involved in criminal conduct" in section 501(6)(b) of the Act.

The court found that the Minister did not give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the merits of the applicants' cases. It was held that the Minister's reliance on departmental summaries and his previous familiarity with the cases did not excuse him from engaging in an active intellectual process. The court concluded that the Minister's satisfaction that removing the applicants was in the national interest was unreasonable because he failed to consider relevant material and did not engage in a proper decision-making process. Consequently, the court set aside the Minister's decision to cancel the applicants' visas, ordered their immediate release from immigration detention, and directed the Minister to pay the applicants' costs.

The court's decision underscores the importance of a fair and rigorous decision-making process when exercising discretionary powers under the Migration Act. The Minister must give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the merits of each case and engage in an active intellectual process. The court's findings highlight the need for decision-makers to carefully evaluate relevant material and avoid jurisdictional errors that could undermine the integrity of the decision-making process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s decision dated 14 December 2016 to cancel the applicant’s visa is set aside.

2. The applicant be released forthwith from immigration detention.

3. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Power was conferred upon the Minister to revoke a decision made under s 501(3) by s 501C. Section 501C provided (in relevant parts) as follows:Refusal or cancellation of visa—revocation of decision under subsection 501(3) or 501A(3)(1)This section applies if the Minister makes a decision (the original decision) under subsection 501(3) or 501A(3) to:(a) refuse to grant a visa to a person; or(b) cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.(2)For the purposes of this section, relevant information is information (other than non-disclosable information) that the Minister considers:(a)would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for making the original decision; and(b)is specifically about the person or another person and is not just about a class of persons of which the person or other person is a member.(3)As soon as practicable after making the original decision, the Minister must:(a)give the person, in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances:(i) a written notice that sets out the original decision; and(ii) particulars of the relevant information; and(b)except in a case where the person is not entitled to make representations about revocation of the original decision (see subsection (10)) – invite the person to make representations to the Minister, within the period and in the manner ascertained in accordance with the regulations, about revocation of the original decision.(4)The Minister may revoke the original decision if:(a)the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and(b)the person satisfies the Minister that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501).(5)The power under subsection (4) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.(6)If the Minister revokes the original decision, the original decision is taken not to have been made. This subsection has effect subject to subsection (7).… Summary of background facts concerning Mr Taulahi and Mr Carrascalao (a) Mr Taulahi Mr Taulahi is a citizen of Tonga. He first arrived in Australia on 20 December 1988, aged 12. He has been ordinarily resident in Australia for approximately 25 years. He has held a series of Australian visas, most recently a Class BS Subclass 801 Partner (Residence) visa. This was the visa which was cancelled by the Minister on 14 December 2016. Mr Taulahi and his wife have two daughters, who were aged seven and four years old respectively at the time of the Minister’s decision. The younger daughter has special needs requirements. Mrs Taulahi and both the Taulahi children are Australian citizens. Until Mr Taulahi was taken into immigration detention, he and his wife operated successfully a family earthmoving family business called TKL Holdings Australia Pty Ltd, which had approximately 20 employees and provided demolition, excavation and plant hire services. At the time of the cancellation decision, Mr Taulahi was aged 40. Mr Taulahi’s mother and his brother live in Australia and he also has extended familial links to Australia through grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This material was set out in affidavits prepared by various Departmental officers (Ms Grant, Mr Addison, Mr Stoddart and Mr Selles), which were read by the Minister, as well as in documents produced by the Department. Some of this evidence was provided pursuant to orders made by the Chief Justice on 22 December 2016 in the context of the Court seeking an explanation as to the events which gave rise to the delay in complying with the Full Court’s order that Mr Carrascalao and Mr Taulahi be released immediately from detention. The Minister did not provide an affidavit in relation to either decision. Consideration and disposition of the judicial review challenges(a) Ground 1 The Minister did not contest that he was obliged by law to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case in determining whether or not to cancel a visa under s 501(3) of the Act. He denied, however, that this meant that he had to give consideration of some particular or definable quality to each of the items of evidence before him. The Minister submitted that the time he had spent considering whether or not to cancel the visas of Mr Taulahi and Mr Carrascalao could not be determinative because: (a)he was entitled to rely on the Department’s summaries of the underlying material (citing Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 30-31 per Gibbs CJ and Williams v Minister for Justice and Customs [2007] FCAFC 33; 157 FCR 286 (Williams) at [21] per Gyles, Allsop and Buchanan JJ); and(b)he also had some familiarity with both cases, given his previous decisions to cancel their visas and noting also that several of the attachments to the Department’s submission to him in both cases dated back as far as 2009 and related to general matters of policy and national interest with which, it could be reasonably inferred, the Minister was familiar. The Minister also (correctly) emphasised the danger that the use of an expression such as “proper, genuine and realistic consideration”, as relied upon by both judicial review applicants, could draw the Court into an impermissible merits review. The Court is mindful of the necessity to avoid straying into a review of the merits of the Minister’s decisions (see the frequently cited statements of Brennan J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; 170 CLR 1 at 35-37). The Court acknowledges that an expression such as “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” can, if taken out of context, encourage a “slide” into an impermissible merits review (see the observations of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164 (SZJSS) at [30] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, who referred with apparent approval to Basten JA’s comments on this matter in Swift v SAS Trustee Corporation [2010] NSWCA 182 at [45]). The provenance of the expression was identified by the High Court in SZJSS at [26] as Gummow J’s judgment in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 713; 14 ALD 291 at 292. There his Honour was addressing the ground of judicial review relating to the exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy and without regard to the merits of a particular case. In the context of describing what was required of the Minister’s delegate in considering all relevant material placed before him, Gummow J said that the delegate was required to “give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case and be ready in a proper case to depart from any applicable policy”. In SZJSS, the High Court did not indicate that it was inappropriate to use the expression in that particular context. Naturally, when doing so, the limits of the judicial review function still need strictly to be observed.