BLM24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BLM24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 509

File number: PEG 102 of 2024
Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS
Date of judgment: 11 April 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa – whether the Tribunal failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s circumstances – whether the Tribunal engaged in a process of reasoning that was illogical or irrational – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 423A, 476, 477

Cases cited:

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352; [2017] FCAFC 107

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175; [2018] FCAFC 2

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3

Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] HCA 12

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582; [2022] HCA 17

Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 44
Date of hearing: 7 April 2025
Place: Perth
Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Mayne
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

PEG 102 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BLM24

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE LADHAMS

DATE OF ORDER:

11 APRIL 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE LADHAMS:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant is a citizen of China who applied for a protection visa in Australia. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 509
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BLM24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant seeking judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that affirmed the Minister's decision to deny her a protection visa. The applicant argued that the AAT failed to sufficiently weigh her circumstances and engaged in illogical or irrational reasoning, which led to the denial of her visa application. The central legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's decision contained jurisdictional errors by failing to appropriately weigh the applicant’s evidence or by engaging in illogical or irrational reasoning.

The court examined the AAT's decision and the principles outlined in DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which detailed the criteria for establishing illogicality, irrationality, and unreasonableness in fact-finding. The court noted that while findings on credibility are generally within the administrative decision-maker's purview, they are not beyond scrutiny if they involve jurisdictional error. The court held that to establish such an error, the adverse credibility findings must be "extreme" in their illogicality, more than just a disagreement with the decision-maker's reasoning. The applicant needed to demonstrate that the AAT's findings were not supported by the evidence or that they lacked a logical or rational basis.

Upon reviewing the AAT's findings, the court found that the AAT had considered the applicant's evidence in detail, accepted some parts as credible, and dismissed minor inconsistencies. The AAT also rejected certain aspects of the applicant's claims, concluding that she had exaggerated her claims. The AAT's reasoning was grounded in the evidence provided, and it made specific findings that the applicant did not have a real chance of serious harm amounting to persecution upon return to China. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error, as the findings and reasoning were logical and rational, based on the evidence presented. The applicant's disagreement with the AAT's findings did not amount to a demonstration of illogicality or irrationality.

As a result, the court dismissed the application for judicial review. The AAT's decision affirming the Minister's decision to deny the applicant a protection visa was upheld as lawful.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175; [2018] FCAFC 2, the Full Court summarised principles relating to illogicality, irrationality and unreasonableness in fact-finding, including adverse credibility findings at [30], where the Court said:(1)While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision-maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496 (CQG15) at [37]-[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J).(2)Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) that:135.… A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. (Emphasis added.)(3)By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), “[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 676 at [54].” Equally jurisdictional error may be established by “a process of reasoning which damns a man’s credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document”: SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 181 FCR 113 at [37].(4)Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that: 56An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny … (Citations omitted.)(5)A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]-[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61]. Consideration of the Tribunal’s reasoning in the present case

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 5 March 2024 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL DECISION In assessing the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal accepted parts of the applicant’s claims as credible and dismissed minor or explained inconsistencies. However, the Tribunal also rejected aspects of the applicant’s claims and found that the applicant had exaggerated some of her claims. Claims relating to the applicant’s fear of persecution from her ex-boyfriend The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s relationship with her ex-boyfriend was characterised by abuse and exploitation and accepted that she suffered mental and physical mistreatment. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant remained in the abusive relationship and did not have access to effective help to extricate herself from the relationship until travelling to Japan and ultimately Australia. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant sought assistance from her friends to avoid her ex-boyfriend. Considering the evidence and circumstances as a whole, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not have a real chance of serious harm amounting to persecution, despite having experienced mistreatment in the past. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal particularly noted the following circumstances and findings:(a)The Tribunal did not accept the ex-boyfriend was able to exert the level of control over the applicant as she appeared to suggest, noting that the applicant was able to leave the relationship when she travelled to Japan and was not forced back into it when she returned to China. The Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence was that she was able to leave the ex-boyfriend and return to China after travelling to Malaysia with him, despite her claims that her ex-boyfriend was influential and had an influential family in his village/city.(b)The applicant did not seek protection when she was in Japan and the Tribunal was not persuaded by the applicant’s explanation that Japan was ‘too close’ to China. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s failure to seek protection in Japan seriously undermined her claim to face a real chance of future serious harm if she returns to China.(c)The applicant provided no credible evidence to suggest her ex-boyfriend had made any attempt to contact her since 2017, or that he had a continuing adverse interest in her.(d)There was nothing in the evidence to support the applicant’s assertion that her ex-boyfriend’s relatives may force her to resume her relationship, or how they could do so now that the applicant is married and with a child.(e)The Tribunal was not persuaded on the evidence before it of the applicant’s claim that she knows her ex-boyfriend’s ‘secrets’ and that he will harm her to silence her reporting to the authorities. The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s claim that she reported the ex-boyfriend’s corruption to the police in China, who did not act upon it, to be vague, lacking in detail and not credible.(f)The applicant’s personal circumstances are very different to what they were when she departed China in 2017 and she would be returning to China with her husband and child. The Tribunal found no evidence to suggest the applicant’s husband and child would not be entitled to a visa or right to enter and reside in China if they were to accompany the applicant to China. The Tribunal also found that the presence of a husband and child would be a factor in reducing the risk of harm at the hands of the applicant’s ex-boyfriend.(g)The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s assertion that she faced a real chance of becoming a ‘chained woman’ was exaggerated and that there was not a real chance of her facing such harm. The Tribunal acknowledged reports of abuse and trafficking in China and, in particular, acknowledged the reports relating to a ‘chained woman’ in Feng County. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of similar mistreatment from her ex-boyfriend or anyone else. The Tribunal considered the government response to the reporting relating to the ‘chained woman’ was not one of acquiescence and referred to country information regarding measures by the Chinese authorities to combat people trafficking and human slavery.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The evidence before the Court comprises:(a)an affidavit filed by the applicant with the judicial review application, annexing a copy of the Tribunal decision;(b)the court book filed on behalf of the Minister on 29 May 2024; and(c)an affidavit of service of Aatika Ismailjee made on 2 April 2025 and filed on behalf of the Minister.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPLICATIONThe role of the Court in judicial review proceedings The role of the Court in this judicial review proceeding is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the Tribunal decision by reference to the applicant’s complaints about that decision: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3 (Djokovic) at [17]. The Court does not consider the merits of the Tribunal decision: Djokovic at [17]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6 at [31]. The Court can only grant relief to the applicant if she establishes that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error. Jurisdictional error was explained by the High Court in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] HCA 12, where the Court said at [2]-[3] (footnotes omitted): 2.Jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority which results in a decision made in the purported exercise of that authority lacking the legal force attributed to exercise of that authority by statute. …3.Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. … Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness. Disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].The applicant’s submissions at the hearing When invited to make oral submissions at the hearing, the applicant submitted that she feels the Minister does not understand her situation in China and she hopes that the Court will try to understand why she cannot return to China. The applicant submitted that she has lived here for a long time and it would be very hard if they had to leave Australia now. The applicant was specifically referred to each of her two grounds and invited to make submissions addressing those grounds. However, the applicant indicated that she had nothing to add to her two grounds. The applicant was also invited to make any other submissions about why she believes there is a jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision and did not have anything further that she wished to say.