FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZVVR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1364
Appeal from: SZVVR & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1137 File number: NSD 855 of 2016 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 17 November 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – first appellant teacher in China – first appellant claimed to fear persecution in China – alleged membership of educational society (the Society) opposing ideological indoctrination of children in China – first appellant “detested” enforced teaching of Communist ideologies to primary school children – Tribunal not satisfied Society existed – Tribunal found first appellant not credible witness – whether Tribunal failed to consider “integer” of appellants’ claim – whether first appellant’s political opinion an integer of the appellants’ claim – nothing to indicate Tribunal formed view about first appellant’s political opinion – jurisdictional error – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65 Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593
Htun v Minister for Immigration (2001) 233 FCR 136
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZTQP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 121
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451
V v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 355
Vrachnas J, Bagaric M, Dimopoulos P, Pathinayake A, Migration and Refugee Law – Principles and Practice in Australia (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2012) Date of hearing: 7 November 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 Counsel for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Appellants: Mr L Karp Solicitor for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Appellants: Christopher Levingston & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 855 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZVVR
First Appellant
SZVVS
Second Appellant
SZVVT
Third Appellant
SZVVU
Fourth Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the primary Judge on 12 May 2016 be set aside.
3.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of 11 November 2014 be set aside.
4.There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to determine the appellants’ application for review according to law.
5.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and their application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1364
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the Tribunal did not sufficiently address the first appellant's political opinion and its potential impact on her claim. The Tribunal's decision appeared to reject the credibility of the first appellant's claims, but did not explicitly address her political views, which were integral to her application. The Court emphasised the importance of the Tribunal engaging in an active intellectual process to consider the applicants' claims and their components. Given the Tribunal's failure to properly consider the first appellant's political opinion, the Court concluded that the Tribunal did not exercise its jurisdiction correctly. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal was mandated to reconsider the family's application for a protection visa according to law.
The Court set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court and the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. It mandated the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review the family's application in accordance with the law. Additionally, the Court ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs for the appeal and their application to the Federal Circuit Court, with costs to be taxed if not agreed upon otherwise.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the primary Judge on 12 May 2016 be set aside.
3. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of 11 November 2014 be set aside.
4. There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to determine the appellants’ application for review according to law.
5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and their application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted, in summary:·It is clear that the Tribunal understood that the first appellant claimed to hold the relevant political opinion, that the Tribunal recorded her evidence to that effect and her claim that it was this opinion which motivated her alleged establishment of the Society.·The Tribunal found that the first appellant and her claims were not credible.·The Tribunal’s findings and the generality of the Tribunal’s reasons could be taken to include a rejection of the first appellant’s claim to possess the opinion concerned. This appears to have been the primary Judge’s reading of the Tribunal’s decision.·Even if the Tribunal made no finding as to the first appellant’s political views there was no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, in circumstances where all of the first appellant’s claimed fears concerned her alleged activities in the Society (which were rejected by the Tribunal).Consideration As Counsel for the appellants correctly submitted, in discharging its statutory review function the Tribunal is required to consider the appellants’ claims and their integers (see, for example, SZTQP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 121 at [51]). As the Full Court of this Court further explained in NABE 144 FCR 1 at [55]:Where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on “... a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction – Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 at 394 [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at 408 [95]. The verb “consider” was discussed by the Full Court in Tickner 57 FCR 451. Black CJ observed at 462:The meaning of “consider” used as a transitive verb referring to the consideration of some thing is given in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed) as “to contemplate mentally, fix the mind upon; to think over, meditate or reflect on, bestow attentive thought upon, give heed to, take note of”. Consideration of a document such as a representation or a submission … involves an active intellectual process directed at that representation or submission. At 495-496 Kiefel J said:To “consider” is a word having a definite meaning in the judicial context … It requires that the Minister have regard to what is said in the representations, to bring his mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward and to appreciate who is making them. From that point the Minister might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. However, the Minister is required to know what they say. A mere summary of them cannot suffice for this purpose, for the Minister would not be considering the representations, but someone else’s view of them, and the legislation has required him to form his own view upon them.