FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BJM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 143
Appeal from: BJM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2408 File number(s): NSD 1713 of 2016 Judge(s): FARRELL J Date of judgment: 18 February 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa – whether primary judge’s reasons were adequate or failed to give proper, genuine or realistic consideration to the appellant’s case – whether primary judge erred by failing to conclude that the Tribunal’s finding with respect to the appellant’s capacity to pay bail on return to Sri Lanka was legally unreasonable – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Sch 3 Cases cited: Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 7
AXL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 208
Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430
BJM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2408
BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 450; [2016] FCA 802
Carrascalaov Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352; [2017] FCAFC 107
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175; [2018] FCAFC 2
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164; [2010] HCA 48
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16
Date of hearing: 2 March 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr O Jones Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1713 of 2016 BETWEEN: BJM16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 FEBRAURY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,381.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FARRELL J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia: see BJM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2408. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the reasons provided by the Federal Circuit Court were adequate, particularly in light of the appellant's argument that the AAT's finding at DR[74] was illogical or unreasonable. The court noted that the Federal Circuit Court had found the Tribunal's reasons to be logical, but the appellant argued that this was not sufficient as the question was not whether the reasons were logical, but whether they were illogical or unreasonable. The court observed that the appellant's submissions were not before it, and so it could only rely on the claims made in ground 5 and J[29] to understand how the case was put to the primary judge. The court found that the elements of the claim that the AAT's finding at DR[74] was illogical or unreasonable were: (1) the Tribunal did not specifically explore with the appellant how he would raise moneys to pay bail and there was no finding about that; and (2) there was no logical connection between the country information and the evidence before the Tribunal.
The court held that the reasons provided by the Federal Circuit Court were adequate, and that the court did not err in not concluding that the AAT's finding at DR[74] was legally unreasonable. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's capacity to pay bail and had concluded that he could readily find work and support himself on return to Sri Lanka. The court also found that there was a logical connection between the country information and the evidence before the Tribunal.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $7,381.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,381.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Tribunal accepted several pieces of evidence from BJM16, including that his father was killed by the Sri Lankan army, he was used by the LTTE to transport medicine and petrol, and he was detained and interrogated by members of Karuna, an armed group, for being a suspected LTTE member. Despite these incidents, the Tribunal concluded that BJM16 could find work and support himself in Sri Lanka, and would not face serious harm or significant harm for this reason.
The matter began when BJM16 applied for judicial review of the AAT's decision to the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge dismissed BJM16's application for judicial review. BJM16 then appealed this decision to a higher court. The appeal was heard and considered on its merits, focusing on whether the primary judge's reasons were adequate and whether there were any errors in the primary judge's conclusions regarding the AAT's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Last, the sentence which appears at DR[69] “[t]he Tribunal considers that the applicant can readily find work and support himself on return to Sri Lanka, and will not face serious harm or significant harm for this reason” indicates that BJM16 was being supported by his own labours, not by his landholding, so that it does not support the Tribunal’s reasoning at DR[74] which suggests that he can pay his bail from income derived as a landowner, not a land worker.CONSIDERATION As discussed by Flick J in BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 450; [2016] FCA 802 at [8]-[10], the judicial obligation to provide reasons for decisions derives from the judicial function and the “defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies” (see Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 7 at [67] per French CJ), and it serves the function of enabling a matter to be properly considered on appeal. The provision of clear reasons for decisions also serves many other functions discussed in Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at 441-2 per Meagher JA, which include assisting a party and the broader public to understand why the decision was made thus maintaining public acceptance of the judicial system and (hopefully) avoiding the feeling of grievance and injustice which a losing party might reasonably feel when they do not understand why a decision is made. Sufficient reasons guard against unconsidered and impulsive decisions. It will “ordinarily be sufficient if … by his [or her] reasons the judge apprises the parties of the broad outline and constituent facts of the reasoning on which he [or she] has acted”: see DAO16 v MIBP at [47] quoting Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 273 per Mahoney JA. In AXL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 208 (AXL16 v MIBP), (at [21]) Perram J found reasons given by the same trial judge to be inadequate in circumstances where the Court could not discern why the primary judge rejected the central argument put by the appellant. The central argument was that the Tribunal’s reasons were illogical because they involved a non-sequitur. Justice Perram found that it was not enough to deal with this central argument for the primary judge to find that the Tribunal’s reasons were logical – that was the question not the answer. Unlike AXL16 v MIBP, the written submissions made by BJM16’s counsel to the primary judge are not before the Court. Accordingly, this Court can only rely on the claims made in ground 5 and J[29] to understand how the case was put to the primary judge. On that basis, the elements of the claim that the Tribunal’s finding at DR[74] was illogical or unreasonable were:(1)The transcript of the Tribunal proceedings demonstrates that the Tribunal did not specifically explore with BJM16 how he would raise moneys to pay bail and there was no finding about that; and(2)There was no logical connection between the country information and the evidence before the Tribunal.