ACA18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ACA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 241

Appeal from: ACA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2038
File number: NSD 1494 of 2018
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 28 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review – where the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed the decision of a delegate not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether primary judge failed to engage with appellant’s argument – whether primary judge erred in finding that IAA had considered all relevant claims and integers thereof – whether primary judge erred in finding that IAA had correctly understood claimed sequence of events – appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

BJM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 143

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Date of hearing: 19 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Presence Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1494 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ACA18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. This is an appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Authority): ACA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2038 (ACA18).  The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister), to refuse to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity. He arrived in Australia by boat on 29 September 2012. He did not hold a visa that was in effect and was thus an unauthorised maritime arrival within the meaning of s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

  3. In the record of the appellant’s Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview the following is recorded in response to the question “[w]hy did you leave your country of nationality (country of residence)?”:

    6B: During 2010 I tried to go to UK, a person helped…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a resident in Australia, sought judicial review of the Immigration Assessment Authority's (IAA) decision to affirm the Minister for Home Affairs' refusal of a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The IAA's decision was upheld by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, leading to the appellant's appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant's claims centered on the alleged harm he would face upon returning to Sri Lanka due to his perceived links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and his litigation against a migration agent.

The primary legal issues in this appeal were whether the primary judge had properly engaged with the appellant's argument that the IAA failed to consider a component of his claim, specifically that his father was both a nurse and a farmer at the time of his disappearance, and whether the primary judge erred in affirming the IAA's findings regarding the appellant's claims. The appellant argued that the IAA did not consider the possibility that his father could have held both occupations, which could have led to different conclusions about the reasons for his father's disappearance and the appellant's own safety.

The court considered the principles set out in Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which held that a tribunal must address and deal with the claims made by the applicant. However, the court found that the IAA had indeed considered the appellant's claims about his father's occupation and found them to be unsubstantiated. The IAA concluded that the appellant's father was not a nurse and did not have any involvement with the LTTE, which led to the dismissal of the appellant's claim that he would be in danger due to perceived links to the LTTE. The court upheld the primary judge's findings that the IAA had correctly understood the claimed sequence of events and had considered all relevant claims.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or taxed. This outcome confirms the importance of tribunals thoroughly considering all claims and their components when making decisions under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, ACA18, applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV) which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs. Following this, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed the delegate's decision. ACA18 sought judicial review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was dismissed. ACA18 then appealed to the court against the dismissal of his application for judicial review. ACA18's claims centred on his perceived links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) due to his father's disappearance and his litigation against his migration agent. The IAA did not accept ACA18's claims that his father was a nurse who had treated injured LTTE members or that his father's disappearance was due to any involvement with the LTTE or the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP).

The matter originated from a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs refusing ACA18 a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. This decision was affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority. ACA18 sought judicial review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was dismissed. ACA18 then appealed to the court against the Federal Circuit Court's decision dismissing his application for judicial review. The appeal focuses on whether the primary judge failed to engage with ACA18's argument and whether the primary judge erred in finding that the IAA had considered all relevant claims and correctly understood the claimed sequence of events.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 30 March 2017 the appellant was informed that the Minister’s decision refusing him a SHEV had been referred to the Authority. After that referral the appellant’s solicitor and migration agent provided a letter to the Authority from a Sri Lankan lawyer about the appellant’s claim that he had sued the agent and the commencement of that proceeding in the Magistrates Court of Vavuniya District. They also provided a statutory declaration made by a solicitor admitted in New South Wales and in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka who was also an accredited translator in Sinhalese to English (and vice versa) and who provided an opinion that the Sri Lankan court documents appeared to be genuine. AUTHORITY’S DECISION The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in his amended notice of appeal (see [22] below) are focused on two claims made by the appellant, namely his claim to fear harm because of his perceived links to the LTTE which are said to arise because of his father’s disappearance and his claim to fear harm because of his litigation against the agent. The Authority’s findings in relation to those claims are set out below. I note that despite the appellant disclaiming any prior statements made to the Department in his SHEV Statement, the Authority had regard to some of that material, as it was entitled to do. No complaint is made about that. The Authority addressed the appellant’s claims about his father at [24]-[36] of its decision record. At [24] the Authority said:The [appellant] claimed that his father worked as a nurse in Mulankavil Government Hospital and during the course of his employment he attended to many LTTE cadres who had been injured during the civil conflict. His father also owned several plots of land which he farmed and rented some of the land to others. The Authority did not accept that the appellant’s father was a nurse and employed in a government hospital and that during his employment he looked after injured members of the LTTE or that he had any involvement with the LTTE, including in secret. That was for two reasons. First, the Authority observed that the appellant’s claims about his father’s involvement with the LTTE were not made at the entry interview. Secondly, the Authority found that the appellant’s evidence that his father was a nurse when he was born was contradicted by his birth certificate which listed his father’s “rank or profession” as “cultivation”. Having considered the appellant’s explanation for the discrepancies, the Authority was not persuaded that he had been a truthful witness about this aspect of his claims and was not satisfied that the claims were true. The Authority accepted that the appellant’s father disappeared in November 2007. However, it did not accept that the appellant’s father disappeared because of any involvement with the LTTE or the TMVP. The Authority noted that the appellant’s own evidence was that his claim that his father was involved with the TMVP was not true. The Authority continued at [35]-[36] of its decision record:35.… it follows that I do not accept that the [appellant] was perceived to be involved or that his whereabouts were being sought on this basis also. No do not accept that there is sufficient evidence before me to establish that his father’s disappearance arose because his father was a Tamil.36.I also do not accept that as a consequence of the [appellant’s] father’s disappearance, the [appellant] will be viewed with suspicion on return. …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant submitted that nothing in the Authority’s reasoning provided any cogent reason for rejecting the claim that his father was a nurse as well as a farmer at the time of his disappearance. He contended that the Authority approached the question of the appellant’s father’s occupation or profession on the basis that he was either a farmer or a nurse and could not be both. The appellant submitted that accordingly the Authority failed to consider the claim. The appellant further submitted that, had the Authority considered that the appellant’s father could have been both a nurse and a farmer, it may have accepted the argument set out at [24] above, namely that his father was a nurse who treated wounded LTTE cadres, disappeared for that reason and that his father heaving been suspected of having LTTE sympathies could have led to suspicion that the appellant held the same opinion, which would in turn lead to the appellant being in continuing danger. Consideration There is a degree of overlap between grounds one and two. Given the appellant’s focus on ground two, I will consider that ground first. By that ground the appellant in effect contends that the Authority failed to consider a claim or a component integer of a claim made by him, namely that his father was a nurse and a farmer at the time of his disappearance. The appellant said that the Authority considered whether he was a nurse or a farmer but failed to consider whether he may have been both. The applicable principles were not in dispute. In Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136 a Full Court of this Court considered whether the Refugee Review Tribunal had failed to consider an aspect of the appellant’s claims. At [41]-[42], Allsop J (as his Honour then was) (with whom Spender J agreed) relevantly said:41The Tribunal, on a fair and straight-forward reading of its reasons, did not deal with the claim made by the appellant in his application for review by the Tribunal and supported by objective evidence that: Due to my participation with Karen community and political groups I have made a number of friends, some of whom are members of the Karen National Liberation Army.42The “participation in the Karen community and the political groups” could be said to have been dealt with by the Tribunal dealing with the appellant’s activities in Australia. The friendships (of the appellant, as a Karen) with people in organisations such as the KNLA were not. This is not merely one aspect of evidence not being touched. It is not a failure to find a “relevant” fact. The Tribunal failed to address and deal with how the claim was put to it, at least in part. The requirement to review the decision under s 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) requires the Tribunal to consider the claims of the applicant. To make a decision without having considered all the claims is to fail to complete the exercise of jurisdiction embarked on. The claim or claims and its or their component integers are considerations made mandatorily relevant by the Act for consideration in the sense discussed in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323. See also Sellamuthu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 90 FCR 287 at [18], [19], [21] and [50]….