Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 140

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – migration – cancellation of visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – visa holder failed to pass character test because he had a substantial criminal record by reason of having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or more – Minister’s delegate cancelled visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision – primary judge dismissed application to set aside Tribunal’s decision – written direction given by Minister under s 499 of Act about exercise of power of cancellation under s 501 – requirement that decision-maker take into account general deterrence when deciding whether discretion to cancel visa should be exercised – whether AAT had genuinely considered factor of general deterrence or had merely referred to it in a formulaic manner – same Tribunal member having set out general principles relating to factor of general deterrence in identical terms in earlier decision.

MIGRATION – cancellation of visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – visa holder failed to pass character test because he had a substantial criminal record by reason of having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or more – Minister’s delegate cancelled visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision – primary judge dismissed application to set aside Tribunal’s decision – written direction given by Minister under s 499 of Act about exercise of power of cancellation under s 501 – requirement that decision-maker take into account general deterrence when deciding whether discretion to cancel visa should be exercised – whether AAT had genuinely considered factor of general deterrence or had merely referred to it in a formulaic manner – same Tribunal member having set out general principles relating to factor of general deterrence in identical terms in earlier decision.

Held:  Tribunal had not given genuine consideration to factor of general deterrence.  Appeal allowed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 distinguished

Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 171 FCR 345 cited
Filipo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] AATA 1144 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 distinguished

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153 cited

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2009) 175 FCR 201 cited

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 followed

TAUMAFAI AIMAHALA LAFU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

NSD 765 of 2009

LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ
9 OCTOBER 2009
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION NSD 765 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

TAUMAFAI AIMAHALA LAFU
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ

DATE…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Lafu, a New Zealand citizen, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the cancellation of his visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The basis of the visa cancellation was Mr Lafu's criminal conviction for grievous bodily harm, which resulted in a substantial criminal record. Mr Lafu argued that the AAT failed to adequately consider the factor of general deterrence in the context of cancelling his visa. The primary judge dismissed Mr Lafu's appeal, a decision which Mr Lafu now sought to appeal to the Full Court.

The primary issue for the Full Court was whether the AAT erred in not adequately considering the factor of general deterrence when deciding to cancel Mr Lafu's visa. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the AAT genuinely took into account the relevance of general deterrence in the context of cancelling Mr Lafu's visa. This involved examining whether the AAT's reasons for decision demonstrated an active intellectual engagement with the issue of general deterrence, as required by legal principles and relevant authorities.

In allowing the appeal, the Full Court held that the AAT did not genuinely consider the issue of general deterrence in relation to Mr Lafu's visa cancellation. The court found that the AAT's reasons did not reveal whether the tribunal was influenced by the factor of general deterrence, nor did they show a clear process of reasoning regarding its relevance. The Full Court considered that the AAT's failure to expressly deal with the issue of general deterrence in its reasons indicated an oversight. Consequently, the AAT's decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration in accordance with law.

In conclusion, the Full Court allowed Mr Lafu's appeal and set aside the AAT's decision. It issued a writ of certiorari to quash the AAT's decision and a writ of mandamus to require the AAT to rehear and determine Mr Lafu's application in accordance with law. Additionally, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship was ordered to pay Mr Lafu's costs of the appeal and the hearing at first instance. The Full Court's decision emphasised the necessity for administrative tribunals to adequately consider all relevant factors in their decision-making processes, particularly when such factors could significantly influence the outcome of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made on 9 July 2009 in proceeding NSD 332/2009 in this Court be set aside.

3. In lieu of the orders referred to in order 2 above:

(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 2 April 2009 in proceeding No 2009/0215 in the second respondent be set aside;

(b) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision referred to in (a);

(c) a writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to hear and determine the application before it according to law; and

(d) the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of proceeding NSD 332/2009.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

In our respectful opinion, her Honour did err in the respect mentioned and the appeal should be allowed.FACTS Mr Lafu was born in New Zealand on 27 December 1970. On 19 May 2007 he moved to Australia. Upon entering Australia he was the holder of a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. The visa permitted Mr Lafu to live in Australia permanently while he remained a citizen of New Zealand. On 9 October 2008 Mr Lafu was convicted of “Grievous Bodily Harm” in the District Court of Queensland and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 months. Briefly recounted, the facts of the offence were that, on or about 4 August 2007, less than three months after he had arrived in Australia, Mr Lafu involved himself in a fight between a person who was in his group and another man (the complainant). The complainant was knocked to the ground by the other man. A security officer came over to help him. The complainant appeared to be unconscious. Mr Lafu walked up to the complainant and stomped on his face, probably once. A cracking sound was heard. The complainant suffered head injuries with permanent effects. On 7 November 2008, Mr Lafu was given a notice of intention to consider cancellation of his visa. At that time he was due to be released at the end of the non-parole period on 2 January 2009. After communications between the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and Mr Lafu, the detail of which does not matter, on 24 December 2008 the Delegate cancelled Mr Lafu’s visa under s 501(2) of the Act. Accordingly, after the completion of the service of his sentence on 2 January 2009, by which time he had served 16 months in prison, Mr Lafu was detained by the Department. He has since remained in detention at the Immigration Detention Centre at Villawood. On 16 January 2009 Mr Lafu applied to the AAT for review of the Delegate’s decision. On 2 April 2009 the AAT affirmed that decision. On 20 April 2009 Mr Lafu filed in this Court what was treated as an application under s 39B(1)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 476A of the Act in relation to the AAT’s decision. On the hearing before the primary Judge Mr Lafu relied upon an amended application filed on 22 June 2009.LEGISLATION Under s 501(2)(b) of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if the Minister reasonably suspects that the visa holder does not pass “the character test”, and the visa holder does not satisfy the Minister that he or she passes the character test. Under s 501(6) the holder of a visa does not pass the character test if one of the grounds in that subsection is met. In the present case the relevant ground is that set out in para (a) of subs (6) read with subs (7) of s 501. This is, relevantly (see para (c) of subs (7)), that the person has a substantial criminal record, which the person has if the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. Mr Lafu was sentenced to such a term of imprisonment. Therefore the Minister (and the AAT on review) was entitled to reasonably suspect that Mr Lafu did not pass the character test, and to conclude that Mr Lafu had not satisfied him (or the AAT) that Mr Lafu passed the character test.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ
Notwithstanding her Honour’s careful analysis, our own careful analysis of the AAT’s reasons convinces us that so far as those reasons reveal, the AAT did not reach a conclusion in relation to whether and to what extent general deterrence was relevant to the circumstances of Mr Lafu’s case. Apart from reciting the requirement that that factor be taken into account, the AAT’s reasons do not indicate whether the AAT was influenced, and if so by what process of reasoning, by the factor of general deterrence, in deciding that Mr Lafu’s visa was to be cancelled. We conclude that the AAT did not give real consideration to the factor of general deterrence as it related to the individual circumstances of Mr Lafu’s case.CONCLUSION For the above reasons the appeal should be allowed and the decision of the AAT set aside. There should be an order for a writ of certiorari quashing the AAT’s decision and a writ of mandamus requiring it to hear and determine the application before it according to law. The first respondent should pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the hearing at first instance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ

Her Honour quoted (at [28]) an observation of the Full Court of this Court in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 (WAEE) at [47] as follows:The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where, however, there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the tribunal's review of the delegate's decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.CONSIDERATION The Delegate’s decision was a privative clause decision: see s 474(2) of the Act. This Court had jurisdiction in relation to the decision: see s 476A(1)(b) of the Act. That jurisdiction was the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution: see s 476A(2) of the Act. Section 483 of the Act had the effect of excluding the Court’s jurisdiction to hear an “appeal” from the AAT in relation to its decision in this case. In order to succeed before her Honour, Mr Lafu had to establish jurisdictional error by the AAT: see Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 171 FCR 345 at [4]. The Minister accepted that jurisdictional error would be established if the AAT did not genuinely take into account the question of general deterrence as required by Direction 21: see the primary Judge’s decision at [21]; and the discussion by Rares J in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153 at 181–182 [105]-[107], and by the Full Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2009) 175 FCR 201 at 242 [267]. With respect, we consider that her Honour misapplied the statement made by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 in inferring from other parts of the AAT’s reasons that [124]-[127] were to be read as an engagement by the AAT in an “active intellectual process” (Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462). The High Court said at the passage referred to (and quoted by her Honour at [22]):… reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and [are] not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. When the allowances called for by this passage are made, we remain of the view that the AAT’s reasons for decision fall on the wrong side of the line: they do not show an active intellectual engagement with the question how the factor or consideration of general deterrence was taken into account, and therefore whether it was taken into account at all, in the exercise of a discretion to cancel. Mr Lafu would be left to guess what role, if any, the issue of general deterrence had played. Yet it will be recalled (see [32] above) that Mr Lafu had expressly submitted that “[g]iven the lack of publicity about the matter, and the lack of any gang involvement, cancelling the applicant’s visa would have no deterrent value”.