FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 140
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – migration – cancellation of visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – visa holder failed to pass character test because he had a substantial criminal record by reason of having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or more – Minister’s delegate cancelled visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision – primary judge dismissed application to set aside Tribunal’s decision – written direction given by Minister under s 499 of Act about exercise of power of cancellation under s 501 – requirement that decision-maker take into account general deterrence when deciding whether discretion to cancel visa should be exercised – whether AAT had genuinely considered factor of general deterrence or had merely referred to it in a formulaic manner – same Tribunal member having set out general principles relating to factor of general deterrence in identical terms in earlier decision.
MIGRATION – cancellation of visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – visa holder failed to pass character test because he had a substantial criminal record by reason of having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or more – Minister’s delegate cancelled visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision – primary judge dismissed application to set aside Tribunal’s decision – written direction given by Minister under s 499 of Act about exercise of power of cancellation under s 501 – requirement that decision-maker take into account general deterrence when deciding whether discretion to cancel visa should be exercised – whether AAT had genuinely considered factor of general deterrence or had merely referred to it in a formulaic manner – same Tribunal member having set out general principles relating to factor of general deterrence in identical terms in earlier decision.
Held: Tribunal had not given genuine consideration to factor of general deterrence. Appeal allowed.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 distinguished
Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 171 FCR 345 cited
Filipo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] AATA 1144 referred toMinister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 distinguished
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153 cited
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2009) 175 FCR 201 cited
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 followed
TAUMAFAI AIMAHALA LAFU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNALNSD 765 of 2009
LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ
9 OCTOBER 2009
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION NSD 765 of 2009 ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: TAUMAFAI AIMAHALA LAFU
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ
DATE…
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- Case
- [2009] FCAFC 140
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue for the Full Court was whether the AAT erred in not adequately considering the factor of general deterrence when deciding to cancel Mr Lafu's visa. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the AAT genuinely took into account the relevance of general deterrence in the context of cancelling Mr Lafu's visa. This involved examining whether the AAT's reasons for decision demonstrated an active intellectual engagement with the issue of general deterrence, as required by legal principles and relevant authorities.
In allowing the appeal, the Full Court held that the AAT did not genuinely consider the issue of general deterrence in relation to Mr Lafu's visa cancellation. The court found that the AAT's reasons did not reveal whether the tribunal was influenced by the factor of general deterrence, nor did they show a clear process of reasoning regarding its relevance. The Full Court considered that the AAT's failure to expressly deal with the issue of general deterrence in its reasons indicated an oversight. Consequently, the AAT's decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for reconsideration in accordance with law.
In conclusion, the Full Court allowed Mr Lafu's appeal and set aside the AAT's decision. It issued a writ of certiorari to quash the AAT's decision and a writ of mandamus to require the AAT to rehear and determine Mr Lafu's application in accordance with law. Additionally, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship was ordered to pay Mr Lafu's costs of the appeal and the hearing at first instance. The Full Court's decision emphasised the necessity for administrative tribunals to adequately consider all relevant factors in their decision-making processes, particularly when such factors could significantly influence the outcome of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made on 9 July 2009 in proceeding NSD 332/2009 in this Court be set aside.
3. In lieu of the orders referred to in order 2 above:
(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 2 April 2009 in proceeding No 2009/0215 in the second respondent be set aside;
(b) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision referred to in (a);
(c) a writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to hear and determine the application before it according to law; and
(d) the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of proceeding NSD 332/2009.
4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: LINDGREN, RARES AND FOSTER JJ
Her Honour quoted (at [28]) an observation of the Full Court of this Court in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 (WAEE) at [47] as follows:The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where, however, there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the tribunal's review of the delegate's decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.CONSIDERATION The Delegate’s decision was a privative clause decision: see s 474(2) of the Act. This Court had jurisdiction in relation to the decision: see s 476A(1)(b) of the Act. That jurisdiction was the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution: see s 476A(2) of the Act. Section 483 of the Act had the effect of excluding the Court’s jurisdiction to hear an “appeal” from the AAT in relation to its decision in this case. In order to succeed before her Honour, Mr Lafu had to establish jurisdictional error by the AAT: see Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 171 FCR 345 at [4]. The Minister accepted that jurisdictional error would be established if the AAT did not genuinely take into account the question of general deterrence as required by Direction 21: see the primary Judge’s decision at [21]; and the discussion by Rares J in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153 at 181–182 [105]-[107], and by the Full Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2009) 175 FCR 201 at 242 [267]. With respect, we consider that her Honour misapplied the statement made by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 in inferring from other parts of the AAT’s reasons that [124]-[127] were to be read as an engagement by the AAT in an “active intellectual process” (Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462). The High Court said at the passage referred to (and quoted by her Honour at [22]):… reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and [are] not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. When the allowances called for by this passage are made, we remain of the view that the AAT’s reasons for decision fall on the wrong side of the line: they do not show an active intellectual engagement with the question how the factor or consideration of general deterrence was taken into account, and therefore whether it was taken into account at all, in the exercise of a discretion to cancel. Mr Lafu would be left to guess what role, if any, the issue of general deterrence had played. Yet it will be recalled (see [32] above) that Mr Lafu had expressly submitted that “[g]iven the lack of publicity about the matter, and the lack of any gang involvement, cancelling the applicant’s visa would have no deterrent value”.