Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Pulini
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Pulini [2024] FCA 541
Appeal from:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2023
File number:
QUD 61 of 2023
Judgment of:
RANGIAH J
Date of judgment:
24 May 2024
Catchwords:
CITIZENSHIP – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – where Tribunal set aside Minister’s decisions to revoke respondents’ citizenship under s 34(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act2007 (Cth) – where Tribunal satisfied under s 34(2)(c) it would be contrary to the public interest for the respondents to remain Australian citizens – whether Tribunal failed to take into account its satisfaction under s 34(2)(c) as a relevant consideration in the exercise of its discretion – whether Tribunal’s finding as to the benefit of revocation to the Australian community was illogical, irrational or unreasonable – whether Tribunal’s exercise of discretion was reasonably open to it – appeal allowed
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs:
87
Date of hearing:
31 October 2023
Counsel for the Applicant:
Mr PD Herzfeld SC with Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the Applicant:
Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr M Black
Solicitor for the Respondents:
Fisher Dore
ORDERS
QUD 61 of 2023
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Applicant
AND:
MALAVINE PULINI
First Respondent
ISIKELI FELEATUOA PULINI
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 MAY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The decision of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs brought this appeal against the respondents, Mr and Mrs Pulini, who had their applications for Australian citizenship revoked by the Minister. The respondents had been convicted of serious criminal offences, including trafficking in persons and harbouring an unlawful non-citizen, and had been sentenced to imprisonment. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) set aside the Minister's decision to revoke the respondents' citizenship, finding that it would be contrary to the public interest for them to remain Australian citizens. The Minister appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the AAT erred in law by failing to take into account its findings as a starting point in exercising its discretion under s 34(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth). The central legal issue in this case was whether the AAT erred in law by not having regard to its satisfaction of the matters in paras (a), (b) and (c) of s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act as a starting point in exercising its discretion. The Minister argued that the AAT was bound to take into account its findings that the respondents had been convicted of offences for which they were sentenced to a "serious prison sentence" and that it would be contrary to the public interest for them to remain Australian citizens. The respondents argued that the AAT did take into account its findings when exercising its discretion, and that its reasons demonstrated an understanding of the link between its findings and the exercise of the discretion. The Federal Court held that the appeal should be allowed, and that the AAT's decision was set aside. The Court found that the AAT erred in law by not having regard to its satisfaction of the matters in paras (a), (b) and (c) of s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act as a starting point in exercising its discretion. The Court held that the AAT's failure to take into account its findings was a jurisdictional error, as the AAT was bound to consider those findings when exercising its discretion. The Court also held that the AAT's finding as to the benefit of revocation to the Australian community was illogical, irrational or unreasonable, and that the AAT's exercise of discretion was not reasonably open to it. The Court remitted the matter to the AAT for hearing and determination, and ordered that the respondents pay the applicant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 19 January 2023 be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for hearing and determination.
4. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
It is necessary to describe the factual background, the relevant legislative provisions and the Tribunal’s reasons in order to give context to the grounds of appeal and the parties’ submissions.Factual background The respondents were born in Tonga. For about five years, they employed a Fijian woman (Ms MBN) as a domestic worker in Tonga. The respondents immigrated to Australia in 2006, and Ms MBN then worked for the respondents in Australia for three months before her tourist visa expired and she returned to Fiji. In 2007, Mrs Pulini asked Ms MBN to return to Australia, telling her that Mr Pulini had a friend “in Immigration” who could help her with her papers so she could stay in Australia. When Ms MBN returned to Australia, the respondents took possession of her passport, ostensibly to get help from Mr Pulini’s friend, but that turned out to be merely a pretence. Mrs Pulini planned to create a situation where Ms MBN could be exploited. Her conduct amounted to an offence of trafficking in persons. Ms MBN became, in effect, the respondents’ servant, performing labour for very little pay and under onerous and oppressive conditions. While the respondents’ conduct was not an offence known to law at the outset, their conduct became a criminal offence, namely, causing a person to enter into or remain in forced labour, from 8 March 2013. On 11 May 2008, Ms MBN’s tourist visa expired. From that time, the respondents continued to allow Ms MBN to reside with them in her role as a servant. In doing so, the respondents committed the offence of harbouring an unlawful non-citizen. On 26 May 2008, the respondents applied for Australian citizenship, and on 2 September 2009, acquired Australian citizenship by conferral. In 2016, Ms MBN was able to break free from her situation, which had subsisted for around eight years by then. In 2019, the respondents were convicted of the following criminal offences and were sentenced to the following terms of imprisonment:(a)Mrs Pulini:(i)trafficking in persons contrary to s 271.2(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Criminal Code) — 2 years’ imprisonment;(ii)harbouring an unlawful non-citizen contrary to ss 233(2) and 233E(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) — 3 and 2 years’ imprisonment, respectively; and(iii)causing a person to enter into or remain in forced labour contrary to s 270.6A(1) of the Criminal Code — 6 years’ imprisonment.(b)Mr Pulini:(i)harbouring an unlawful non-citizen contrary to ss 233(2) and 233E(3) of the Migration Act — 3 and 2 years’ imprisonment, respectively; and(ii)causing a person to enter into or remain in forced labour contrary to s 270.6A(1) of the Criminal Code — 5 years’ imprisonment. The respondents pleaded guilty to the Migration Act offences, and were convicted of the Criminal Code offences following a trial. Mr Pulini’s sentence expired on 15 April 2024, while Mrs Pulini’s sentence will expire on 15 April 2025. The sentencing judge described the respondents’ offending in the following way:The Pulinis treated their victim like a servant. She was paid poorly and made to feel of little value. Previously, Ms [MBN] had lived with, and worked for, the Pulinis for five years. They knew her as a good person, someone who was meek and gentle, and also good to their children. She had in fact played a significant role in the raising of those children.Ms [MBN] had trusted the Pulinis. In return the Pulinis treated Ms [MBN] very badly. They used her poverty and desire to be in Australia to exploit her as cheap labour. They had encouraged her to stay on after her visa had expired. They oppressed her with duties, expectations and poor pay.The longer Ms [MBN] stayed without a legal visa, the more difficult it became for her to break free. The Pulinis mistreatment was calculated. And criminal. The impact on Ms [MBN] was substantial. Her presentation in court was compelling. She had carried the weight of hopelessness and increasing despair for almost eight years.…The trafficking conviction means that from the outset, Mrs Pulini planned to create a situation where Ms [MBN] could be exploited. The promise of a contact in immigration was a device. Mrs Pulini never had any intention of helping Ms [MBN] get a long-term visa. Rather, Mrs Pulini intended to make Ms [MBN] more vulnerable by building her hopes for a future in Australia and by concealing the true reason for the confiscation of her passport.On the strength of the promised contact in immigration, Ms [MBN] handed over her passport and she overstayed her visa, making it increasingly difficult for her to leave. …Mr Pulini admitted that the couple had talked in detail about bringing Ms [MBN] out. They decided from the outset that they would get her here on a three-month tourist visa with the intention that she would stay on illegally. He said it was more for the benefit of the Pulinis than Ms [MBN]. Mr Pulini also assisted in the confiscation of the passport. He admitted to putting it in his wardrobe. I accept Ms [MBN]’s evidence that Mr Pulini did not return the passport until it had expired.…At first Ms [MBN] had believed Ms Pulinis’ claim that they could get her a long-term visa. By the time that Ms [MBN] realised that it was not going to happen, she was already stuck. She knew under the terms of her visa that she was not supposed to work, and that she could not stay beyond the three months. She had in that way been made complicit in the breach of the immigration laws, and she was afraid of being charged and imprisoned.…Ms [MBN] was dependent upon the prisoners for her accommodation and for access to any income to send to her family. There was the marked power imbalance. If she had left the Pulini house she would have nowhere to live and no means of support in Australia. Even the bank account that she was given was in the Pulinis name. At any time, they could close it. I accept that Ms [MBN] was frightened of the Pulinis. The Pulinis would get mad at her if she was unable to do what was expected. They were unhappy with Ms [MBN] even visiting friends. …In the eight years with the Pulinis, Ms [MBN] did not have access to a doctor or a dentist. She got sick and she was in pain with toothache, but she was too afraid to ask for treatment. She suffered chronic health conditions, for which over the counter medications did not help. She would eat her meals alone and go to her room unless there were guests.…Ms [MBN]’s impact statement speaks of lost relationships, both actual and potential, and outlines the psychological trauma she has suffered. She was demeaned and intimidated. She felt voiceless and broken and hopeless. She is still depressed. She has not recovered her self-esteem or her capacity to enjoy life as she once did. The eight years have taken a terrible toll.…It is hard to reconcile the Pulinis presentation to their friends in the church and neighbourhood with the way that they treated Ms [MBN] behind closed doors. It seems that they compartmentalised their life. Privately they depersonalised Ms [MBN] as the help while publicly presenting the face of generosity and kindness, even volunteering to help others.The criminal offending was not an aberration. It continued for eight years and it only ended when Ms [MBN] ran away. It was sustained, it was protracted and it was callous. The Prisoners took away a woman’s freedom and seriously compromised her human rights and dignity for eight years. That is time Ms [MBN] will never recover. Damage that has been done cannot be undone.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Section 24 then provides, relevantly:24 Minister’s decision(1)If a person makes an application under section 21, the Minister must, by writing, approve or refuse to approve the person becoming an Australian citizen.…(1A)The Minister must not approve the person becoming an Australian citizen unless the person is eligible to become an Australian citizen under subsection 21(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) or (8). Section 34 provides, relevantly:34 Revocation by Minister—offences or fraud…Citizenship by conferral(2)The Minister may, by writing, revoke a person’s Australian citizenship if:(a)the person is an Australian citizen under Subdivision B of Division 2 (including because of the operation of section 32); and(b)any of the following apply:(i)the person has been convicted of an offence against section 50 of this Act, or section 137.1 or 137.2 of the Criminal Code, in relation to the person’s application to become an Australian citizen;(ii)the person has, at any time after making the application to become an Australian citizen, been convicted of a serious offence within the meaning of subsection (5);(iii)the person obtained the Minister’s approval to become an Australian citizen as a result of migration related fraud within the meaning of subsection (6);(iv)the person obtained the Minister’s approval to become an Australian citizen as a result of third party fraud within the meaning of subsection (8); and(c)the Minister is satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for the person to remain an Australian citizen.…Serious offence(5)For the purposes of this section, a person has been convicted of a serious offence if:(a)the person has been convicted of an offence against an Australian law or a foreign law, for which the person has been sentenced to death or to a serious prison sentence; and(b)the person committed the offence at any time before the person became an Australian citizen. The expression “serious prison sentence” is defined in s 3 to mean, “a sentence of imprisonment for a period of at least 12 months”.Consideration The Minister’s first ground of appeal asserts that the Tribunal erred in law in the exercise of the discretion under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act by failing to have regard to, and/or failing to treat as a starting point, the Tribunal’s satisfaction of the matters in paras (a), (b) and (c) of that subsection. The Minister submits that in exercising its discretion, the Tribunal was bound to take into account its anterior findings that after making their applications for citizenship, the respondents had been convicted of offences for which they were each sentenced to a “serious prison sentence”; and, it would be contrary to the public interest for them to remain Australian citizens. That submission largely coalesces into an argument that the Tribunal erred in failing to take into account the second of those considerations. The Minister also submits that the purpose of citizenship revocation goes beyond merely protecting the Australian community and extends to revoking the citizenship of a person who is not “worthy” or not “deserving” of the conferral of Australian citizenship, and that this was a matter required to be taken into account by the Tribunal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The expression “serious prison sentence” is defined in s 3 to mean, “a sentence of imprisonment for a period of at least 12 months”.Consideration The Minister’s first ground of appeal asserts that the Tribunal erred in law in the exercise of the discretion under s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act by failing to have regard to, and/or failing to treat as a starting point, the Tribunal’s satisfaction of the matters in paras (a), (b) and (c) of that subsection. The Minister submits that in exercising its discretion, the Tribunal was bound to take into account its anterior findings that after making their applications for citizenship, the respondents had been convicted of offences for which they were each sentenced to a “serious prison sentence”; and, it would be contrary to the public interest for them to remain Australian citizens. That submission largely coalesces into an argument that the Tribunal erred in failing to take into account the second of those considerations. The Minister also submits that the purpose of citizenship revocation goes beyond merely protecting the Australian community and extends to revoking the citizenship of a person who is not “worthy” or not “deserving” of the conferral of Australian citizenship, and that this was a matter required to be taken into account by the Tribunal. The respondents submit that the Tribunal did not fail to take into account its finding of satisfaction that it was contrary to the public interest for the respondents to remain Australian citizens. They submit that the Tribunal’s language indicates it was aware of the link between satisfaction of the preconditions and the exercise of the discretion. This is also said to be indicated by the Tribunal’s quotation of passages at [53]–[55] of TRHL, which shows that the Tribunal understood that its public interest findings were not to be cast aside and were a starting point for consideration of the discretion. The respondents also rely upon the Tribunal’s observations at [210] as indicating that the Tribunal was including (not disregarding) the public interest in its consideration of the discretionary power, while also undertaking a “broader enquiry”. The respondents submit that in considering the exercise of the discretion, the Tribunal made multiple references to the respondents’ offending conduct and took into account that the respondents are not of good character. Accordingly, it is said that the Tribunal took into account that the respondents were persons who had committed serious offences and that it was contrary to the public interest for them to remain Australian citizens. The respondents submit that the Tribunal’s reasons must be read as a whole and, as the Tribunal undertook a detailed and lengthy analysis of the public interest, it would be an extraordinary reading of the Tribunal’s reasons to conclude that it disregarded its own findings when considering the exercise of the discretion. An appropriate starting point for consideration of the parties’ submissions is s 21(2)(h) of the Citizenship Act, which provides that a person is eligible to become an Australian citizen if the Minister is satisfied that the person, “is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application”.