Waraich v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Waraich v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 155  

Appeal from: Minister for Home Affairs v Waraich [2020] FCA 1513
File number(s): VID 735 of 2020
Judgment of: BROMBERG, KATZMANN AND CHEESEMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 26 August 2021
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - revocation of Australian citizenship under s 34(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) - appeal from decision of primary judge dismissing appeal on a question of law from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – where the primary judge set aside the Tribunal’s reversal of the Minister’s decision to revoke the appellant’s citizenship – whether the Tribunal erred in its application of
s 34(2) – whether residual discretion is enlivened in circumstances where the Tribunal was not satisfied of a jurisdictional fact on which the power is conditioned – whether materiality is such that the Court should refuse relief - Held: appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), s 34(2)

Cases cited:

Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [2001] HCA 58; (2001) 208 CLR 167

BFM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 312

Bushell v Repatriation Commission [1992] HCA 47; (1992) 175 CLR 408

CWY20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1855

Dennis Willcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 123; (1988) 79 ALR 267

Egan v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 85

Fastbet Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 5) [2019] FCA 2073; (2019) 167 ALD 492

Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 288; (2012) 202 FCR 417

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33; (2017) 263 CLR 1

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; (2015) 233 FCR 315

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DRP17 [2018] FCAFC 198; (2018) 267 FCR 492

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16; (2014) 309 ALR 67

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

TRHL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 376; (2016) 69 AAR 192

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 74
Date of hearing: 28 May 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: G Costello
Solicitor for the Appellant: FCG Legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent: N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent:  The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 735 of 2020
BETWEEN:

RANDEEP SINGH WARAICH

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BROMBERG, KATZMANN AND CHEESEMAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 AUGUST 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 155
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Waraich v Minister for Home Affairs involved the revocation of the appellant's Australian citizenship under s 34(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007. The appellant, originally from India, had a complex history of name changes, visa applications, and criminal convictions. The primary dispute centered on the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to reverse the Minister for Home Affairs' decision to revoke the appellant's citizenship. The appellant appealed the primary judge's decision, who dismissed the appeal on a question of law, reinstating the Minister's decision to revoke the appellant's citizenship.

The central legal issues in the case revolved around whether the AAT erred in its interpretation and application of s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act, particularly concerning the public interest condition and the scope of the Tribunal's discretion. The court had to determine if the AAT's failure to consider certain evidence about the appellant's dishonesty constituted a material error that could have affected the outcome. Additionally, the court examined whether the Tribunal correctly understood the public interest condition and if the residual discretion under s 34(2)(c) was properly applied.

The court found that the AAT had indeed erred in its interpretation of the public interest condition, as the Tribunal had conflated the concepts of remaining a citizen being contrary to the public interest and it being in the public interest for the person to cease being a citizen. Despite this error, the court concluded that the error was not material as it did not realistically affect the outcome. The court also held that the AAT's failure to consider evidence of the appellant's broader dishonesty was a legal error, but this did not alter the final decision since the appellant's character and risk of re-offending did not meet the public interest threshold. The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, reaffirming the Minister's decision to revoke the appellant's citizenship.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to the grounds and substance of the appeal, it is convenient to set out the relevant legislation and summarise the background of the matter. Background The appellant was born in India in 1977, arriving in Australia from India on a sub-class 560 student visa on 9 February 1998. At that time, he used the name, Amardeep Singh. That visa was cancelled but later reinstated by the Immigration Review Tribunal, the functions of which are now performed by the Tribunal. On 30 December 1999, the appellant applied for, but was unsuccessful in obtaining, a protection visa. He subsequently departed Australia in June 2002 as an unlawful non-citizen. On 28 February 2004, the appellant married. On 26 June 2004, as a dependent on his wife’s student visa, the appellant returned to Australia using the name, Randeep Singh Waraich. On 8 September 2006, the appellant’s wife applied for a skilled migration visa. The appellant, under the name Randeep Singh Waraich, was included as a dependent on that application. On 14 December 2008, the appellant was granted a permanent visa by reason of his inclusion on his wife’s application. On 14 November 2009, Australian citizenship was conferred on the appellant, in the name Randeep Singh Waraich. The appellant did not declare his change of name or past visa history in either of his visa applications in 2004 and 2006, or in his citizenship application in 2009. In March 2009, using the name Randeep Singh Waraich, the appellant registered with the Victorian Department of Births, Deaths and Marriages. The appellant’s name change was discovered by VicRoads when it was recognised that the photos on the licences of Amardeep Singh and Randeep Singh Waraich appeared to be of the same person. VicRoads referred its discovery to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and the appellant was interviewed by the Department on several occasions in 2012. On 27 November 2013, the appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted of:(a)an offence under s 50(1) of the Citizenship Act for making a statement in relation to an application for Australian citizenship knowing the statement to be false and misleading in a material particular (citizenship conviction); (b)two offences under s 234(1)(c) of the Migration Act for furnishing or causing to be furnished for official purposes a document containing a statement or information that was false or misleading in a material particular (migration convictions). As noted at the outset, it was some considerable time later, on 9 January 2018, that the appellant’s citizenship was revoked. The appellant immediately became the holder of an ex-citizen visa upon revocation of his citizenship. At the time of his application to the Tribunal, the appellant resided in Australia with his wife and two young children and ran his own window tinting business. As the holder of an ex-citizen visa, the appellant is permitted to live, work and study in Australia but cannot return to Australia if he leaves. This would preclude the appellant from, for example, travelling to India and returning to Australia.Relevant legislation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Minister’s appeal below pleaded five errors of law in the Tribunal’s decision. The primary judge allowed the appeal on all five grounds. The first three grounds of appeal and the latter two grounds were interrelated. The primary judge dealt with the grounds in two tranches. The Tribunal’s failure to consider evidence and to respond to a substantial argument advanced by the Minister Grounds 1 to 3 were addressed to the Tribunal’s alleged failure to consider significant and important evidence and to respond to a substantial argument advanced by the Minister. Grounds 1 to 3 correspond to grounds 2 to 4 of the present appeal. The primary judge noted that the assessment of the veracity and weight to be given to evidence before the Tribunal is plainly a matter for the Tribunal and was cognisant that to substitute his own assessment of the evidence for that of the Tribunal would be to impermissibly enter the field of merits review. His Honour concluded however that in this case the Tribunal entirely failed to consider relevant evidence when assessing the merits of the application before it and in doing so failed to discharge its statutory duty. The Minister’s principal contention in relation to grounds 1 to 3, which the primary judge accepted, was that the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant’s oral evidence, in particular his evidence in cross examination of admitted instances of dishonesty that were not directly the subject of the citizenship conviction or the migration convictions. The evidence which the Tribunal failed to consider included concessions by the appellant that he had been dishonest in relation to his protection visa application (including by submitting false newspaper articles), that he had made false statements to VicRoads in relation to his application for a driver’s licence, and that he had made false statements in his witness statement to the Tribunal. The primary judge accepted that the Tribunal’s failure to consider this evidence was a legal error and held that the evidence was material to a rational assessment of the decision before the Tribunal and to an assessment of the appellant’s prospect of re-offending, his character and remorse. Further, his Honour held that it was a legal error for the Tribunal to have construed s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act as limiting, in the exercise of its power, consideration of the appellant’s conduct to only conduct or matters of which he had been convicted and which fell within ss 34(2)(b)(i) to (iv) of the Citizenship Act. His Honour observed that s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act contains no such express distinction and held that there is no reason in principle to apply such a distinction. In concluding that the Tribunal was legally required to consider the broader evidence of dishonesty in deciding whether to revoke the cancellation decision but failed to do so, his Honour relied on the reasoning in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421 at 435‑436 [13] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the purpose of s 34(2)(b)(iii), migration-related fraud extends to a conviction of an offence against s 234 of the Migration Act: Citizenship Act, s 34(6)(a)(i). Section 34(7) provides that s 34(6) “does not apply to a person in respect of an offence if the Minister is satisfied that the act or omission that constituted the offence was not in any way (whether directly or indirectly) material to the person becoming a permanent resident”.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal summarised the background facts and the appellant’s convictions. Under the heading “Consideration”, the Tribunal addressed the appellant’s past behaviour, the lapse of time between his interview and convictions and his contribution to the community before moving to consider the residual discretion and the application of s 34(2)(c). The Tribunal was satisfied that ss 34(2)(a) and (b) were met but was not satisfied that the public interest condition in s 34(2)(c) was met. In the course of considering the application of s 34(2), the Tribunal first concluded that s 34(2)(c) was not satisfied. Next, and notwithstanding that the statutory condition for the exercise of the power had not been fulfilled, the Tribunal purported to go on to determine that the revocation power should not be exercised “as a matter of discretion”. The Tribunal’s reasons for concluding that the appellant’s citizenship should not be revoked as a matter of discretion are set out at [64] – [65] of its reasons:[64]Such factors include the substantial delay in prosecuting him which has unreasonably tormented him and his wife and their family over a long period of time. I take into account his pleas of guilty before the court. Further I accept that his remorse and regret are genuine and deeply felt. Also though, I take into account the fact that he was heavily fined by the court and that he had no prior convictions. I regard this as meaning that the Applicant has otherwise been a law-abiding member of the Australian community, Moreover, I have no reason to expect that the Applicant will re-offend, which the sentencing magistrate was confident about, and it was not argued in any event that there would be any risk of such.[65]I consider I could rest my decision at this point but such factors also include the possible impact upon his family of the Applicant’s citizenship standing as revoked and his good works in the Australian community generally. After setting out its reasons for concluding that the power to revoke would not be exercised “as a matter of discretion”, the Tribunal then returned to its consideration of the public interest condition. The Tribunal used the heading “Contrary to public interest versus in the public interest” (emphasis in original) in this section of its reasons. In relation to the public interest condition, the Tribunal stated that there was a “significant and critical” difference between the requisite assessment of whether it is “contrary to the public interest for a person to remain an Australian citizen” and an assessment of whether it would be “in the public interest for a person no longer to remain an Australian citizen”:[71] I also note, however, that section 34(2)(c) is expressed in terms of it being contrary to the public interest for a person to remain an Australian citizen. It is not expressed in terms of it being in the public interest for a person no longer to remain an Australian citizen. The difference between these two formulations is significant and critical. Some submissions or remarks of Counsel for the Minister I consider blurred this distinction and did not faithfully observe it (emphasis in original).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The grounds of appeal are as follows: 1.The Court below erred in finding that the Tribunal's misconstruction of s 34(2)(c) of the Citizenship Act 2007 (the Act) was material such that it could realistically have made a difference to the outcome in the Tribunal.2.The Court below erred by finding that the Tribunal erred materially by overlooking a critical submission by the First Respondent about the Appellant's risk of re-offending in circumstances where the Minister in fact made no clear submission that the Appellant would reoffend, and where reoffending in respect of gaining citizenship and migration status was moot given that he is now a citizen.3.The Court below erred by finding that the Tribunal erred materially by not considering evidence and claims before it about the Appellant's dishonesty beyond that which formed the basis upon which he had been convicted in the criminal justice system.4.Further and alternatively, the Court below erred in finding that evidence before the Tribunal about the Appellant's dishonesty beyond that which formed the basis upon which he had been convicted in the criminal justice system:a.had to be considered by the Tribunal in order for it to correctly exercise its discretion under s34(2) of the Act; or b.was of such significance to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion that the Tribunal's power under s34(2) of the Act miscarried if it was not considered; or c.could realistically have made a difference to the outcome of the case before the Tribunal. ConsiderationGround 1 – Misconstruction of the public interest condition: s 34(2)(c) Ground 1 concerns the public interest condition in s 34(2)(c) of the Citizenship Act, of which the Minister must be satisfied before the power to revoke a person’s citizenship may be exercised. As noted above, ground 1 corresponds to grounds 4 and 5 of the Minister’s appeal below. Significantly, the appellant conceded, both before the primary judge and in this Court, that the Tribunal had erred in law and that on the proper construction of the public interest condition there is no distinction between whether it is contrary to the public interest for a person to remain an Australian citizen and whether it is in the public interest for a person no longer to remain an Australian citizen. Ground 1 is limited to the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal’s error of law was not material. The appellant’s concession that the Tribunal had erred in law in its approach to the public interest condition was correctly made. In TRHL at [41], Gilmour J held that the two concepts were synonymous:In any event, in my opinion, in this statutory context, the expression of the public interest requirement under s 34(2)(c) as ultimately put on behalf of the Minister before the Tribunal as being "in the public interest that the appellant not continue to be an Australian citizen" is synonymous with the statutory language that "it would be contrary to the public interest for the appellant to remain an Australian citizen."