EOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

EOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1256

File number(s): SYG 3021 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE CLEARY
Date of judgment: 8 August 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal refusing to grant protection visa – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510

AYH19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 585

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97

CZL18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 130

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518

LPDTvMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407

Sharma v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2152

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 267 FCR 200

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 76
Date of hearing: 31 July 2025
Place: Parramatta
Applicant: In person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms R Huang of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SYG 3021 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

EOY19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CLEARY

DATE OF ORDER:

8 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 7.01 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules) the application filed on 19 November 2019 is taken to have been amended so as to seek a writ of certiorari.

2.Pursuant to rr 1.07, 3.03 and 7.02 of the Rules, the Court dispenses with the need for the amended application referred to in Order 1 above to have the amendment physically made, filed or served.

3.The name of the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

4.The application is dismissed.

5.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $5,400.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1256
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of EOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the applicant, EOY19, seeking judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to refuse her application for a protection visa. The AAT's decision was to uphold the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the AAT's decision contained any jurisdictional error that would warrant setting it aside.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the AAT's decision was vitiated by a jurisdictional error, which would necessitate the Court to quash the decision. The applicant argued that the AAT erred in its assessment of her claims regarding her fear of persecution if she were to return to China, particularly concerning her past experiences with domestic violence and her conversion to Christianity. Specifically, the applicant contended that the AAT did not properly assess her credibility and the seriousness of the harm she alleged.

The Court carefully reviewed the AAT's decision, considering whether there was any jurisdictional error. It noted that the AAT had correctly identified the legal issues and provided a summary of the relevant law. The Court found that the AAT had extensively considered the applicant's claims and provided detailed reasons for its findings. The Court held that the AAT's assessment of the applicant's credibility and the seriousness of the harm was within its jurisdictional bounds and did not represent a material error that could have deprived the applicant of a successful outcome. The Court also noted that it was not in a position to review the merits of the AAT's decision.

In light of the above, the Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review. An order was made to amend the application to seek both a quashing order (an order for certiorari) and a writ of mandamus against the respondents. The Court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision and therefore no basis for the Court to interfere with the AAT's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 23 October 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal began its decision by identifying the issue for consideration in the review, namely whether the applicant met the refugee criterion, and if not, whether she was entitled to complementary protection. The Tribunal attached a summary of the relevant law as an attachment to its decision. After setting out, and extensively considering, the claims made by the applicant, the Tribunal then turned to its assessment of those claims. The Tribunal had difficulty identifying a clear chronology of the applicant’s living arrangements, marriages, employment and the incidents linked to her protection claims. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims in relation to her account of converting to Christianity to be vague, unconvincing and untruthful. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant felt that her parents cared less for her than her brothers, and accepted that, after separating and divorcing from her first husband, the applicant returned to the family home as a last resort, and there was dissatisfaction and resentment on both sides of the family, however, found the applicant had not claimed, and there was no real chance of, her family members inflicting serious harm if she returned to China. The Tribunal did not accept that these experiences involved serious harm amounting to persecution, or significant harm. In relation to her claim based on domestic violence suffered in China from her first husband, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant’s belief that her “ex-husband” (first husband) badly abused her extended beyond his infidelity and the psychological impact this had on the applicant. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s first marriage broke down; that she suffered emotionally during that period; and that she and her first have little contact with each other. The Tribunal found that the applicant and her first husband have no further contact with each other. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not suffer any serious harm amounting to persecution, or any significant harm, by her first husband, or that there was a real chance she would suffer serious harm from him in the future. As to her claim of domestic violence relating to her second husband (current, at the time of the Tribunal decision), the Tribunal was not satisfied, on the basis of a single reported comment from her husband conveyed via the applicant’s sister-in-law, that the applicant's husband voiced any real intention to kill or harm her if she sees her again. Rather, it found on the totality of the evidence that neither had any current interest in the relationship with each other. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s second husband was abusive towards her when she returned to the family home in Nanjing after employment in Shanghai. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied, on the basis of a single reported comment from her husband which was conveyed by the applicant’s sister-in-law, that the applicant’s husband voiced any real intent to harm or kill the applicant if he sees her again.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant made brief submissions on each ground, which I summarise below under the consideration of each of her 3 grounds of review. Likewise, Ms Huang made short submissions in response, which I also summarise below, where necessary.CONSIDERATION To obtain the relief sought the applicant must prove that the Tribunal’s decision is vitiated by jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76]. In LPDTvMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [2] – [3] (LPDT) the High Court explained that:Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness. To constitute jurisdictional error, in most cases, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the first applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32]. In reviewing the Tribunal’s decision, the Court does not review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic). Below the Court sets out its consideration of the grounds of judicial review in this matter. For the reasons given below, none of the grounds identify the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.Technical deficiency in the application The application, as filed, contained a technical deficiency. In the application, as filed, the applicant only sought an order for a writ of mandamus and did not seek an order that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed (also referred to as an order for certiorari). As the applicant is unrepresented, it is open to the Court, with the Applicant’s consent, to amend the application at the hearing, so it seeks the appropriate relief: see AYH19 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 585 at [20] and Sharma v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2152 at [13] and more recently, CZL18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1301 at [29]. At the hearing on 31 July 2025, both the applicant and the first respondent consented to the application being amended to correct the deficiency. An order will be made amending the application so that it correctly seeks both a quashing order (an order for certiorari) and mandamus against both respondents.Ground 1 In ground 1 the applicant asserts the “Tribunal doubted my credibility of my claim, such as my debts, without sound evidence”. I interpret this as a challenge made to the Tribunal’s credit finding in paragraphs [48] to [56] regarding her claim that she fears harm from her husband, family and friends from a failure by her to repay loans to them (indebtedness claim).