FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 54
Citation: Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 54 Appeal from: Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1084 Parties: ANTHONY MOANA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION File number: VID 643 of 2014 Judges: NORTH, JESSUP AND RANGIAH JJ Date of judgment: 22 April 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – cancellation of visa on character grounds – whether Minister properly exercised discretion under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether risk of harm to Australian community is a mandatory relevant consideration – whether Minister bound to evaluate the likelihood of future harm Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(2), (6) and (7)
Migration (Offences and Undesirable Persons) Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth)Cases cited: Djalic v Minster for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 292 cited
Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 417 applied
Godley v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 83 ALD 411 cited
Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326 cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Haneef (2007) 163 FCR 414 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566 distinguished
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 139 FCR 505 applied
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1 cited
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 cited
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 cited
Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673 considered
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 citedDate of hearing: 6 March 2015 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 79 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Niall QC with Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Dr SP Donaghue QC with Mr CJ Horan Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 643 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ANTHONY MOANA
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
NORTH, JESSUP AND RANGIAH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 APRIL 2015
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 643 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ANTHONY MOANA
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR…
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- Case
- [2015] FCAFC 54
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the statutory provisions and existing case law to determine whether the risk of harm to the Australian community is a mandatory relevant consideration in the exercise of the Minister's discretion. The court found that the Act does not expressly state any factors that the Minister must consider in exercising this discretion. The court also noted that the decision in Tanielu, where the Federal Court held that the Minister must evaluate the risk of future harm, was not binding authority. The court concluded that the Minister had considered the risk of harm in the present case, and had evaluated the likelihood of such harm. Therefore, no jurisdictional error was demonstrated, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.
The court's reasoning was based on a careful construction of the statutory provisions and an analysis of the relevant case law. The court found that the Minister had properly exercised his discretion, and that there was no requirement for him to evaluate the likelihood of future harm in determining the risk to the Australian community. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, her Honour held that no jurisdictional error had been demonstrated and that the application for judicial review should be dismissed.CONSIDERATIONWhether risk to the community is a mandatory relevant consideration The first issue in the appeal is whether the Minister is bound to consider any risk of harm to the Australian community posed by the continued presence of the visa holder in Australia when exercising the discretion under s 501(2) of the Act. It is apparent that s 501(2) confers a broad discretion on the Minister to cancel a visa. The discretion is enlivened if the Minister reasonably suspects a visa holder does not pass the character test and the visa holder fails to satisfy the Minister that he or she passes the character test. The circumstances in which a person does not pass the character test are set out in s 501(6). Section 501(2) does not expressly state any factors which must be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion. The question of what, if any, factors the decision-maker is bound to take into account is a question of construction of the statute. A court will not find that a decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that the decision-maker is bound to do so is found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 505 per Dixon J, Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375 per Deane J, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40 per Mason J. As the appellant’s submission that the Minister is bound to consider risk of harm to the Australian community focuses heavily upon the reasons for judgment in Tanielu, it is convenient to begin by considering those reasons. In Tanielu, Mortimer J concluded that risk of harm to the Australian community must be taken into account by the Minister in exercise of the discretion under s 501(2). Her Honour also concluded that consideration of the risk of harm can only be undertaken by evaluating the seriousness of any future harm which might be caused and the likelihood of that harm occurring. Her Honour held that as the Minister had failed to conduct such an evaluation in that case, his decision to cancel the applicant’s visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Mortimer J considered that the content of the character test gives the best contextual indication of the considerations which the statute makes relevant to the exercise of the power. Her Honour’s view was that each of the criteria set out in s 501(6) which may cause a person to fail the character test involves protection of the Australian community; using “protection” in a broad sense of some kind of harm, disadvantage or unacceptable or undesirable consequence. Her Honour thought that without assessment of risk to the Australian community being an integral aspect of the exercise of the power in s 501(2), it is difficult to see how the power would otherwise stay within constitutional limits and advance the purposes and objects of the Act in general and the cancellation provisions in particular.