Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 233

Appeal from: Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1328
File number: VID 1328 of 2017
Judges: LOGAN, CHARLESWORTH AND STEWARD JJ
Date of judgment: 21 December 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – visa cancelled on character grounds – Minister refusing to revoke cancellation – Minister having regard to impacts of any future offending – whether appellant denied procedural fairness in relation to the impacts – whether impacts material to Minister’s decision – whether consideration of the impacts obviously arose on the known materials as an aspect of the risk posed by the appellant to the Australian community
Legislation:

Constitution s 75(b)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 144

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 476A, 499, 501, 501(3A), 501(6)(e), 501A, 501CA, 501CA(4)

Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth)

Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld)

Armed Forces Act 2006 (UK) s 359

Cases cited:

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596

Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513

AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 451

Brown v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 235 FCR 88

Bukvic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 110 FCR 554

Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 489

Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1328

Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 142 ALD 195

Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 314 ALR 130

Hicks v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 757

House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2011) 193 FCR 112

Howells v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 580

Hurpurshad v Sheo Dyal (1876) LR 3 Ind App 286

Jarratt v Commissioner of Police for New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 44

Jione v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 232 FCR 120

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 367

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1

Palmer v Crone [1927] 1 KB 804

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389

R v War Pensions Entitlement…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dunn v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, Mr Dunn, appealing against the Minister's decision to refuse to revoke a visa cancellation on character grounds. Mr Dunn argued that he had been denied procedural fairness because the Minister had not expressly invited his comments on the social costs associated with his potential reoffending. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered whether the Minister's failure to expressly invite comments on these considerations constituted procedural unfairness and whether such considerations were material to the decision.

The legal issues centred on whether the social cost considerations were so obvious that they did not require explicit invitation of comments from Mr Dunn and whether the Minister's failure to do so constituted procedural unfairness. The court had to determine whether the social cost considerations were incontrovertible and whether the Minister's evaluation of these factors, alongside other relevant matters, was legally sound.

The Full Court rejected Mr Dunn's argument, holding that the social cost considerations were incontrovertible based on the known facts about his past conduct. The court found that the Minister was entitled to draw inferences about possible future harm from Mr Dunn's previous offending. However, while the factual basis for the social cost considerations was clear, the decision to revoke the visa cancellation involved evaluating multiple countervailing factors, including the best interests of Mr Dunn's biological and step-grandchildren, the community's expectations, and Mr Dunn's significant family ties and contributions to the community. The court concluded that the Minister's failure to expressly invite comments on the social cost considerations did not amount to procedural unfairness.

ORDERS:
The appeal was dismissed with costs as agreed or as assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed with costs as agreed or as assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Counsel for Mr Dunn avoided the terminology of a legitimate expectation as the source of the Minister’s obligation to give advance notice of the social cost considerations. To my mind, however, Mr Dunn’s complaint that he had been given “false comfort” by the Minister’s prior decision is no different from a complaint that the prior decision gave rise to a legitimate expectation that the Minister would reason in a particular way upon the re-exercise of the power. Whether expressed in the language of false comfort or a legitimate expectation, the argument cannot succeed on the facts. The primary judge was correct to reject it.The decisions in Durani and Jione The Full Court in Durani rejected a submission that an allegation of procedural unfairness must be resolved by reference to earlier decided cases (at [70]):… In each case, in our opinion, the court must evaluate the circumstances in order to decide whether or not there has been procedural unfairness. It is impermissible to reason that because there are a number of factual similarities or factual overlap between an earlier case and the facts presently under consideration that one result or the other should thereby follow. Somewhat ironically, the third ground of appeal relied on by Mr Dunn contends that the primary judge erred in concluding that the social cost considerations were obvious because his Honour wrongly distinguished Durani and the judgment of Buchanan J in Jione. The two judgments may be summarised as follows. In Durani the Full Court (Besanko, Barker and Robertson JJ) allowed an appeal from a decision made personally by the Minister not to revoke a decision to cancel Mr Durani’s visa. Mr Durani was a medical practitioner. He had resided in Australia on a skilled independent visa. He was convicted of sexual offences involving a patient in his care. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal decided not to exercise a power under s 501(2) of the Act to cancel Mr Durani’s visa. The Minister set the Tribunal’s decision aside and cancelled Mr Durani’s visa under s 501A(2) of the Act. The valid exercise of that power required the Minister to be satisfied that cancellation of the visa was in the national interest: s 501A(2)(e). If so satisfied, the Minister retained a residual discretion as to whether or not the visa should be cancelled. The Minister concluded that it was in the national interest to cancel Mr Durani’s visa because, relevantly, Mr Durani’s offending had reduced confidence in the nation’s health care system. Further, the Minister held that the offending had brought the reputation of Australia’s skilled migration program into disrepute and had undermined public confidence in that program. On judicial review, Mr Durani argued that he had been denied procedural fairness in respect of each of these matters. The primary judge concluded that the matters were obvious such that it was unnecessary for the Minister to expressly invite Mr Durani’s comments in respect of them. On appeal, the Full Court said (at [63]):As to reducing public confidence in the nation’s health care system, in our opinion, this aspect of the appellant’s criminal offences had been expressly adverted to both in the sentencing remarks ... and in the decision of the tribunal and was self-evidently a matter that might be taken into account by the minister in deciding whether he was satisfied that the cancellation of the appellant’s visa was in the national interest. …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Mr Dunn’s case, the primary judge dealt with the question of incontrovertibility as one informing the question of whether the Minster had committed jurisdictional error. Whilst I would respectfully disagree with that conceptual approach, for the reasons that follow I do not consider the outcome of the appeal turns upon it.CONSIDERATIONS NOT INCONTROVERTIBLE The learned judge did not err in his conclusion that the social cost considerations were factually incontrovertible in the sense that there was no submission Mr Dunn could make to dissuade a reasonable decision-maker about the apprehended harm should Mr Dunn reoffend. I respectfully agree with his Honour’s conclusion that should Mr Dunn again become involved with the police and the criminal justice system, there would incontrovertibly be a consequent economic imposition on the Australian community. Further, the possibility that persons involved in administering the criminal justice system might suffer psychological harm if exposed to images of the kind possessed by Mr Dunn was expressed by the Minister at no higher likelihood than that: a possibility. The intelligible basis for the existence of that possibility is to be found in the nature and severity of Mr Dunn’s previous offending as detailed in the sentencing remarks. The remarks give a plain description of the content of the material forming the subject matter of Mr Dunn’s prior criminal charges. Whilst it is true that the identification of a possibility involves some speculation, the Minister’s task of considering the harm that might be caused should Mr Dunn reoffend was itself a speculative one. The Minister was entitled to draw inferences about possible future harm founded in the known facts about Mr Dunn’s past conduct. Incontrovertibly, Mr Dunn had possessed and made available images of the most extreme depravity and had been dealt with by the police and the criminal justice system in respect of them. In my view, the factual existence of a possibility of psychological harm to those involved in policing and in the administration of the criminal justice system was a logical inference that Mr Dunn could not successfully rebut. However, it does not follow that a failure to comply with an obligation (if any) to expressly invite Mr Dunn to make submissions about the social cost considerations could make no difference to the exercise of the Minister’s power. That is because the issues to be decided by the Minister in respect of the considerations were not solely factual. The proper exercise of the power conferred by s 501(3A) of the Act required the Minister to arrive at a state of satisfaction (or non-satisfaction as the case may be) as to whether there was “another reason” to revoke the original decision. The task involved the evaluation of multiple countervailing factors and, importantly, the ascription of relative weight to the array of matters the Minister considered relevant. In the case of Mr Dunn, the Minister evaluated and ascribed weight to at least the following matters:(1)it was in the best interests of Mr Dunn’s biological and step-grandchildren for the original decision to be revoked;(2)the Australian community would expect that Mr Dunn would not hold a visa, given the nature and seriousness of his offending;(3)Mr Dunn had significant family ties to Australia and had made positive contributions to the community;(4)Mr Dunn would face substantial hardship if he were returned to New Zealand, particularly in light of serious medical conditions from which he suffered, his age and lack of social and familial networks;(5)the nature of the child pornography material accessed, possessed and made available by Mr Dunn, including nearly 800 items in the highest classification of depravity;(6)the prospect that Mr Dunn may face prolonged detention because of doubts as to his fitness to travel; and(7)the social cost factors.