House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority
[2011] FCAFC 72

Citation: House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [2011] FCAFC 72
Appeal from: House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [2010] AATA 147
Parties: DAVID HOUSE v DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
File number(s): QUD 103 of 2010
Judges: GREENWOOD, GILMOUR AND LOGAN JJ
Date of judgment: 1 June 2011
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – consideration of an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) on the ground that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct legal test of “prescribed physical or mental impairment” for the purposes of s 34(1B), s 34(1A)(c) and Part V of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) – consideration of whether the citizen is to be deprived of a remedy under s 44(4) or s 44(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) notwithstanding that an error of law is made out and conceded by the respondent – consideration of the general principles to be applied in determining whether a remedy should go – consideration of the principle that when the question involves the exercise of the discretion and the error of law determines the framework within which the facts are to be determined and upon which the statutory discretion is exercised, the Court ought to exercise great caution before deciding that the error of law could make no difference to the result already reached – consideration of the authorities on that question

MENTAL HEALTH – consideration of the notion of “prescribed physical or mental impairment” for the purposes of Part V of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of the general principles to be applied in determining whether the citizen is to be deprived of a remedy in circumstances where an error of law is made out and conceded by the respondent – consideration of the authorities on the question of whether the error of law could make no difference to the result already reached

DEFENCE AND WAR – consideration of the notion of “prescribed physical or mental impairment” for the purposes of Part V of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) – consideration of s 34(1A) and s 34(1B) in the context of a reclassification application under s 34 of Part V of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth)

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(1), (3), (4), (5) and (7)
Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth), ss 34(l), 34(1A), 34(1B), 34(2), 37
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 - applied
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 - considered
Lu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 340; (2004) 141 FCR 346 - applied
R v Ross‑Jones; Ex parte Green (1984) 156…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority, the court was called to review an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning the classification of Mr House’s incapacity for certain civil employment under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the AAT had correctly applied the legal standard of “prescribed physical or mental impairment” as stipulated in sections 34(1A) and 34(1B) of the Act, particularly in relation to Mr House’s personality disorder. The court also had to determine if Mr House should be deprived of a remedy under sections 44(4) or 44(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), despite the AAT’s concession of an error of law.

The court found that the AAT had erred in its assessment by not recognising Mr House’s personality disorder as a prescribed impairment. This error was deemed significant because it directly influenced the framework within which the statutory discretion was exercised. The court emphasized the importance of applying the correct legal test when determining such impairments, as outlined in the Act. Furthermore, the court highlighted that when an error of law pertains to the exercise of discretion, the court should exercise caution before concluding that the error could make no difference to the result reached by the AAT. The authorities cited by the court underscored that the error of law must be considered in light of the potential impact on the outcome, especially when it affects the statutory discretion exercised by the AAT.

Given the court’s findings, it concluded that the personality disorder described in the AAT’s decision was, as a matter of law, a “prescribed physical or mental impairment” under the relevant sections of the Act. This determination necessitated a reevaluation of Mr House’s incapacity classification, ensuring that all relevant impairments were accurately considered. The court’s decision underscores the necessity for precise application of legal standards in administrative law, particularly when such applications have significant implications for the affected individual’s benefits and classification.

Orders

Orders of the court

7. The personality disorder described in the Tribunal’s decision under the heading “The Prescribed Impairments” and described, more particularly, at paragraphs 25 to 29 of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision is, as a matter of law, a “prescribed physical or mental impairment” for the purposes of Part V of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) and in particular, for the purposes of, ss 34(1A) and 34(1B) of that Act.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The question to be determined then is whether or not, without descending into merits review, the Tribunal’s treatment of the evidence concerning the kinds of civilian employment a person with Mr House’s skills, qualifications and experience might reasonably undertake (s 34(1A)), on the footing that Mr House’s personality disorder was not a prescribed impairment, leaves no possibility of a successful outcome in the review of the exercise of the s 34(1) discretion, had the error of law not occurred. Background to the Tribunal’s decision Mr House joined the Defence Force on 1 October 1968 and was retired from the Force effective from 29 May 1975. His Interim Discharge Certificate describes the ground of discharge as medical unfitness for service in the Military Forces (AB, Part B, 220). That description of the ground of discharge seems to have emerged as a result of a decision taken under s 44(2) of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) to amend an earlier description of the ground of discharge. On 6 August 1979, the Authority determined that Mr House was entitled to invalidity benefit under s 26 of the Act having regard to a retirement impairment of “alcoholism and alcoholic liver disease”. On 30 August 1985, the Authority determined under s 37 of the Act that Mr House ought to have been retired from the Defence Force on the ground of “invalidity or of physical or mental incapacity to perform his duties” and that Mr House would be treated as having retired on that ground. Since 1985 Mr House’s percentage of incapacity for particular classes of civil employment and his classification under s 30 have been the subject of many applications for reclassification and proceedings before the Tribunal and Courts. The various classifications seem to have been these: from 30 May 1975, Class B, 30 per cent; from 16 January 1977, Class B, 35 per cent; from 4 May 1990, Class B, 40 per cent; from 22 June 1999, Class B, 30 per cent; from 10 August 2001, Class C, 20 per cent; and, from 15 February 2002, Class C, 20 per cent. On 19 November 2004, the applicant requested the Authority to review his incapacity classification within s 30 of the Act. Mr House requested the incapacity classification take into account impairment by reason of a personality disorder and injuries suffered in a car accident which had the effect, he contended, of diminishing his capacity for relevant civil employment. On 14 March 2005, the Authority’s Delegate rejected the request for review under s 34 of the Act on the footing that the additional impairments were not causally connected to Mr House’s alcoholism impairment. Mr House requested the Authority to reconsider the Delegate’s decision and it did so. The Authority observed that on 8 May 2001 the Tribunal had reduced the applicant’s classification from 40 per cent to 30 per cent (Class B) and on 3 July 2001 the Authority’s Delegate reclassified Mr House’s level of incapacity as 20 per cent (Class C). The Authority noted that the Delegate’s decision had been confirmed by the Authority upon reconsideration on 15 February 2002. The Authority also observed that Mr House’s request for a review on 19 November 2004 was made two years and nine months after the last re-consideration on 15 February 2002 resulting in the prevailing Class C classification at 20 per cent and that Mr House had not provided evidence that his capacity to undertake the relevant classes of civil employment had significantly diminished in the interim period.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal’s decision of 26 February 2010, constituted by Deputy President Hack SC, is the decision now under appeal arising out of the remission order made by Collier J.The Tribunal’s Decision The Tribunal notes at [14] that all earlier determinations of the applicant’s incapacity had been made on the footing that the applicant’s sole prescribed impairment was alcoholism. In the proceedings before the Tribunal the applicant contended that his personality disorder; upper left limb injuries as a result of motor vehicle accidents in 1975 and 1976; and a condition of chronic dysthymia (described as “a chronically low mood”) ought to be accepted as impairments causally connected with his accepted prescribed impairment of alcoholism. At [34]-[[38] the Tribunal finds that the upper limb injuries are not causally connected to alcohol consumption on the evidence and thus s 34(1B)(b) is not made out. At [39] - [41], the Tribunal finds that it is not satisfied that Mr House suffers from the condition chronic dysthmyia. There is no challenge to those findings. The Tribunal’s findings at [28] and [29] concerning the relationship between Mr House’s alcoholism and his personality disorder have already been noted. The Tribunal however begins that discussion at [26] by observing at the outset that whether Mr House’s personality disorder ought to be regarded as a “prescribed condition [impairment]” is “controversial”. The Tribunal notes at [26] that there is no issue, on the evidence, that Mr House has a personality disorder. The Tribunal refers to the evidence of Dr Barbara McGuire, a consulting psychiatrist, and notes that in her report of 19 April 2006 (AB, Part B, 402) Dr McGuire refers to reports of other psychiatrists as early as 1983 describing Mr House’s personality disorder. The Tribunal notes the oral evidence of Dr McGuire that Mr House suffers from a personality disorder and that the disorder caused him to drink. The Tribunal also notes at [26] the opinion of Dr McGuire that the two conditions of alcoholism and personality disorder “are so intertwined as to make attempts at teasing them apart at best only an academic exercise”. At [27] the Tribunal notes the evidence of Dr Jill Reddan a consulting psychiatrist who provided three reports in evidence dated 22 June 1997 (AB, Part B, 287), 8 May 2000 (AB, Part B, 334) and 15 January 2003 (AB, Part B, 567). The Tribunal notes the opinion set out at pages 10, 11 and 12 (AB, Part B, 296, 297 and 298) of Dr Reddan’s report of 22 June 1997 that Mr House has a personality disorder and particularly notes Dr Reddan’s observation about primacy and the difficulty of sequential isolation of the affects of the two conditions, at p 12 of the report (AB, Part B, 298), in these terms:(ii)The relationship between Mr House’s personality disorder and his alcohol consumption is complicated and it is impossible to state which is the primary problem and which is the secondary. The remaining part of the quote at point (ii) on page 12 of Dr Reddan’s report is this:It is likely however, that Mr House sought to deal with any uncomfortable affects or anxieties by alcohol abuse but, because of his need to project blame onto others and refusal to see any problems within himself, he has consistently refused to address his alcohol problem. It is likely, however, that is ongoing alcohol consumption did narrow his ability to think through the consequences of his actions and assisted in maintaining the rigidity and self-absorption of his personality.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established