Stead v State Government Insurance Commission

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.

STEAD v. STATE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION

(1986) 161 CLR 141

23 September 1986

Courts

Courts—Practice—New trial—Denial of natural justice—Trial—Submission that evidence of witness should not be accepted stopped by judge—Evidence accepted—Whether new trial should be granted.

Decision

MASON, WILSON, BRENNAN, DEANE AND DAWSON JJ.: In an action in negligence arising out of a motor accident on 9 June 1981, in which liability was admitted, judgment was given for the appellant in the sum of $11,300, consisting of $10,000 for pain and suffering and loss of amenity of life, $1,000 for out of pocket expenses and $300 for interest. The amount of $10,000 was awarded in respect of a physical injury sustained by the appellant to his neck or cervical spine.

2. The appellant had sought additional damages in respect of a neurotic condition from which the primary judge found that he was suffering. The additional damages sought were substantial because the condition led to a complete breakdown and rendered the appellant totally incapacitated for work. The primary judge found that the respondent's negligence did not cause or materially contribute to the condition.

3. Whether the accident which resulted from the respondent's negligence was the cause or a material factor contributing to the condition was a major issue at the trial. Before the accident the appellant had always been a regular and industrious worker. Some time shortly after the accident he began to experience pain and discomfort in the region of his neck and cramping pains all over his body during sexual intercourse. This lead to his consulting his doctor about the accident for the first time thirteen months after the accident and to a deterioration in what had been a loving relationship with his third wife whom he had married one month before the accident. He came to believe that he was suffering from muscular dystrophy and, later, heart disease. He virtually ceased to work from the time when he first consulted his doctor, Dr Hardy, in July 1982.

4. The respondent's case on the issue of causation was that the cause of the condition was not the accident, but the stresses and strains arising from the appellant's third marriage. A substantial amount of evidence was tendered on the issue. The appellant gave evidence, as did his wife and father. He called a fellow worker, his doctor, a psychiatrist, a dentist, and a physiotherapist. He tendered reports by a surgeon, a neurosurgeon, a physician and rheumatologist and another psychiatrist. The respondent called two psychiatrists, one of whom was Dr Scanlon, and tendered the reports of a neurosurgeon and two orthopaedic surgeons.

5. After the close of the evidence the respondent's counsel, Miss Mack, addressed. She relied strongly on Dr Scanlon who had given cogent evidence against the existence of a causal connexion between the accident and the appellant's neurotic condition. Following some discussion between Miss Mack and the primary judge concerning Dr Scanlon's evidence, particularly with respect to the…