Smith v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Smith v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCAFC 78

Appeal from: Smith v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 652
File number(s): NSD 1480 of 2024
Judgment of: COLVIN, ANDERSON AND OWENS JJ
Date of judgment: 11 June 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision not to revoke cancellation of visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 – Tribunal required to determine two key issues – primary judge found the appellant was denied procedural fairness in relation to one issue – primary judge further found the Tribunal’s error was not material – where not in dispute that the denial of procedural fairness could have made no difference to the determination of the issue in relation to which it occurred – where appellant contended that there was a realistic possibility that the determination of the other issue could have been different had he been afforded procedural fairness – error held to be material – appeal allowed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501(3A), (6), (7), 501CA(4)
Cases cited:

Bachelard v Australian Federal Police [2025] FCAFC 5

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 264 CLR 123; [2018] HCA 34

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12

Minister for Home Affairs v BRO18 (2024) 302 FCR 259; [2024] FCAFC 27

MZAPCv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506;  [2021] HCA 17

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80; [2022] HCA 26

Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 295 FCR 177

PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1540

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 38
Date of hearing: 12 March 2025
Counsel for the Appellant:  Mr D Godwin
Solicitor for the Appellant:  Nikjoo Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent:  Mr B Kaplan and Mr R Harvey
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1480 of 2024

BETWEEN:

RANGI LEE JOSEPH SMITH

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

COLVIN, ANDERSON AND OWENS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside Orders 1 and 2 made by Shariff J on 20 June 2024 and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Second Respondent dated 3 November 2023.

(b)A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal that it determine the Applicant’s Application for Review of Decision dated 16 August 2023 according to law.

(c)The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceeding.

3.The First Respondent pay the…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 78
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Smith v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had affirmed the cancellation of the appellant's visa under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had denied the appellant procedural fairness and, if so, whether this error was material to the outcome of the decision.

The court found that the AAT had indeed denied the appellant procedural fairness by failing to provide notice that it might find him to have failed the character test on specified grounds. However, the primary judge had determined that this error was not material, meaning it did not affect the outcome of the decision. The court's reasoning focused on the materiality of the procedural error. The primary judge had concluded that the error was not material because the Tribunal's findings on the character test were independent of its decision on whether there was another reason for visa cancellation. Despite this, the appellant argued that there was a realistic possibility the outcome could have been different had procedural fairness been observed, particularly because the Tribunal had indicated its decision was finely balanced.

The Federal Court, however, found that the primary judge's assessment of materiality was flawed. The court held that the materiality inquiry must consider whether there is a realistic possibility that the outcome could have been different had the error not occurred. This requires a forward-looking approach, assessing the potential impact of additional evidence or submissions that could have been made by the appellant had he been afforded procedural fairness. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision on whether there was another reason for visa cancellation could have been influenced by the character test findings, thereby making the error material. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the AAT was quashed. The court ordered that the AAT redetermine the application for review of the decision and directed the Minister to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside Orders 1 and 2 made by Shariff J on 20 June 2024 and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Second Respondent dated 3 November 2023.

(b) A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal that it determine the Applicant’s Application for Review of Decision dated 16 August 2023 according to law.

(c) The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceeding.

3. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It may also be noted that the Tribunal stated explicitly that the decision was finely balanced. The reasons record that weighing the countervailing considerations had “not been an easy task” (at [82]), and that overall it was “not … an easy decision to make” (at [86]). It may be inferred that some additional material on the “another reason” issue that was favourable to the appellant may have persuaded the Tribunal to a different outcome.THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge held that the Tribunal denied the appellant procedural fairness (at [72], [83]). It did so by finding that the appellant failed the character test on the grounds in ss 501(6)(c), (d)(i) and (d)(ii) of the Migration Act, without giving him any notice that it might do so. The Minister does not challenge that conclusion on this appeal. The primary judge also held, however, that the denial of procedural fairness was not material, because the ultimate outcome would inevitably have been the same (at [91], [99]). That was because, his Honour found:(a)In relation to the determination of the “character test” issue, the Tribunal also found that the appellant failed the character test on the basis of the ground in s 501(6)(a), namely that he had a “substantial criminal record” within the meaning of s 501(7). That was an independent and sufficient basis for finding that the appellant failed the character test (see at [92]-[94]).(b)In relation to the determination of the “another reason” issue, the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the appellant failing the character test on the grounds in ss 501(6)(c), (d)(i) and (d)(ii) did not have any impact on its decision making in relation to that issue (see at [95]-[98]). More precisely, the critical aspects of his Honour’s reasoning were as follows:(i)The focus of the materiality inquiry is the “outcome of the decision” (at [88]). That is to say, by reference to LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12 at [16], per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ, his Honour identified the relevant question as being whether “there exists a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision could have been different had [the] error not been made” (or, approached from the other direction, whether “there is a basis on which it can be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made”).(ii)In assessing whether a realistic possibility of a different outcome existed, “the inquiry that is posited is ‘backward-looking’ by reference to ‘the decision that was made and, depending on the nature of the error, how that decision was made’” (at [90], quoting from LPDT at [10]).(iii)When his Honour examined “how the Tribunal in fact made its decision” he did “not see any indication that the Tribunal’s conclusions about the applicant having failed the character test, or having failed the character test on particular grounds, were brought to bear in the Tribunal’s decision making in relation to” the “another reason” issue (at [95]). As his Honour said (at [97]):This analysis of the actual reasons of the decision made by the Tribunal does not disclose that it brought to bear upon its determination of the various issues arising under Direction 99 any of its findings as to the applicant having failed to pass the character test, or the grounds upon which he had failed the character test. The latter findings were independent of the former. As is evident from the above, the Tribunal turned its attention to each of the considerations arising from Direction 99 in a way that was independent to its findings about the applicant having failed the character test.(iv)The independence of the Tribunal’s consideration of the two issues was not undermined by the footnote quoted above at [16], and the cross-reference it supplied. The primary judge held that this footnote merely indicated that “the Tribunal’s conclusions about the primary and other considerations subsequently led it to find that there were additional reasons why the applicant failed the character test” (at [98]).(v)In light of that analysis of the way in which the Tribunal actually reasoned to its decision, the primary judge said that he was “affirmatively satisfied that, although the Tribunal erred in denying the applicant procedural fairness … the ultimate outcome would inevitably have been the same” in that “the Tribunal’s consideration of whether there was ‘any other reason’ why the applicant’s visa should not have been cancelled would have been unchanged” (at [99], original emphasis). That was because his Honour’s “examination of the reasons of the Tribunal” disclosed that “the considerations arising from Direction 99 were independently found to have not given rise to another reason why” the original decision should be revoked (at [100]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There was no challenge on appeal to the first of those reasons. That is to say, it was accepted that the appellant had a “substantial criminal record”, and that it was thus inevitable that he would have been found to fail the character test, regardless of what other evidence he might have adduced, or submissions he might have made, in relation to the alternative bases upon which he was found to have failed the character test. The appellant’s submissions on appeal focussed on the second aspect of the primary judge’s reasoning.CONSIDERATION The outcome of the primary judge’s analysis of the materiality question in this case was significantly influenced by his Honour’s understanding of the requirement that the inquiry be “backward looking” (and the related need that it be answered by reference to the decision that was made and, depending on the nature of the error, how it was made). In particular, the primary judge appears to have regarded himself as constrained to consider whether there was a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision might have been different on the assumption that a key feature of the Tribunal’s actual reasons (the independence of the consideration of the two issues) would have remained unchanged in the face of additional evidence or submissions in relation to one of those issues. To say that the inquiry is backward-looking is to contrast it with the prospective inquiry required in connection with the exercise of the Court’s residual discretion to deny prerogative relief: see, e.g., Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 264 CLR 123; [2018] HCA 34 at [74], per Edelman J. Fundamentally, the difference between the two approaches is that the former is directed to ascertaining whether the error could have made any difference to the result, whereas the latter asks whether there would be utility in another hearing: see PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1540 at [65], per Colvin J. Thus, while “a court called upon to determine whether jurisdictional error has occurred must be careful not to assume the function of the decision-maker”, nevertheless “the court is … charged with the responsibility of determining for itself whether the result in fact arrived at by the decision-maker in the decision-making process could realistically have been different had that procedural irregularity not occurred”: MZAPCv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506; [2021] HCA 17 at [51], per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ. The inherent nature of that inquiry reveals why it would be inappropriate to treat any aspect of the Tribunal’s actual reasons, or reasoning process, as necessarily fixed for the purpose of the counterfactual analysis. To be open to the possibility that some feature of the decision might have changed does not involve any impermissible “reconstruction” of the decision-making process, or “rewriting” of the reasons for decision: see LDPT at [29], per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ. Nor does it deny that the question of materiality is to be “answered by reference to the decision that was made and, depending on the nature of the error, how it was made”: LPDT at [10], per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ. The actual decision (including how it was made, and the reasons given) remain indispensable to defining the subject matter and scope of the counterfactual inquiry (see, e.g., Minister for Home Affairs v BRO18 (2024) 302 FCR 259; [2024] FCAFC 27 at [33], per Bromwich, Derrington and Snaden JJ). As was observed in MZAPC at [38], per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ:… whether the decision that was in fact made could have been different had the condition been complied with falls to be determined as a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined on the balance of probabilities.