Anderson v Morgan Crest Pty Ltd trading as Ray White Benalla

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Anderson v Morgan Crest Pty Ltd trading as Ray White Benalla [2025] FCA 817  

Appeal from: Anderson v Morgan Crest Pty Ltd trading as Ray White Benalla [2024] FedCFamC2G 1145
File number: VID 1305 of 2024
Judgment of: ROFE J
Date of judgment: 16 July 2025
Catchwords: APPEAL − appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – whether the primary judge took into account the appellant’s submissions – whether case law cited by the appellant was appropriately considered– where the primary judge refused the appellant’s adjournment request – whether refusal of adjournment amounted to the denial of procedural fairness – whether appellant’s personal circumstances were adequately assessed – where refusal of adjournment was delivered ex tempore and not otherwise made available to appellant − appeal allowed
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Australian Consumer Law andFair Trading Act 2012 (Vic)

Real Estate Agents Act 1980 (Vic)

Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic)

Cases cited:

Anderson v Morgan Crest Pty Ltd trading as Ray White Benalla [2024] FedCFamC2G 1145

Anderson v Sharpe (No 2) [2024] VSC 279

Anderson v Sharpe (Residential Tenancies) [2025] VCAT 415

Anderson v Sharpe [2023] VSC 559

Anderson v Sharpe [2024] VSCA 166

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mazda Australia Pty Limited [2023] FCAFC 45

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (2021) 285 FCR 133

Boensch v Somerville Legal (2021) 286 FCR 293

Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478

Jones v. National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80

Nobarani v Mariconte (2018) 265 CLR 236

Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429

Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2015) 236 FCR 199

Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 258 CLR 525

Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625

Sharpe v Anderson (Residential Tenancies) [2024] VCAT 375

Sharpe v Anderson (Residential Tenancies) [2024] VCAT 381

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141

Tran v Singh [2019] FCA 70

Wilson v Alexander [2003] FCA 183

Wyman v Queensland (2015) 235 FCR 464

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 99
Date of last submissions: 3 June 2025
Date of hearing: 3 June 2025
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: S Hibble
Solicitor for the Respondent: Gilchrist Connell

ORDERS

VID 1305 of 2024
BETWEEN:

LENA ANNIKA ANDERSON

Appellant

AND:

MORGAN CREST PTY LTD T/AS RAY WHITE BENALLA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ROFE J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The proceedings be…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 817
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Anderson v Morgan Crest Pty Ltd trading as Ray White Benalla, the appellant, Ms Anderson, sought to appeal a decision made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. Ms Anderson's claim against Ray White Benalla, the respondent, involved allegations of unconscionable conduct, breaches of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic), Estate Agents Act 1980 (Vic), and Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic), as well as breaches of the Australian Consumer Law. Ms Anderson claimed that Ray White Benalla, as the real estate agent for her landlord, failed to carry out necessary repairs, issued invalid and retaliatory notices to vacate, and made false representations to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The primary judge dismissed Ms Anderson’s claim and denied her request for an adjournment, leading to this appeal.

The primary legal issues in this case involved whether the primary judge appropriately considered the appellant’s submissions and relevant case law, and whether the refusal of the adjournment request amounted to the denial of procedural fairness. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the primary judge failed to take into account the appellant’s submissions and whether the case law cited by Ms Anderson was appropriately considered. Additionally, the court assessed whether the primary judge adequately evaluated Ms Anderson's personal circumstances and if the refusal of the adjournment was delivered ex tempore and not made available to Ms Anderson in a timely manner.

The court found that the primary judge did consider the relevant case law and precedents, despite not explicitly citing certain authorities in her written reasons. The court noted that the primary judge provided extensive oral reasons for denying the adjournment request, which were not published or made available to the appellant prior to the appeal. The court held that the refusal of the adjournment request did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness, as the primary judge gave adequate consideration to the request and provided detailed reasons. However, the court concluded that the refusal was delivered ex tempore and not made available to Ms Anderson in a timely manner, which constituted a procedural irregularity.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for a re-trial. The orders of the primary judge were set aside, and each party was directed to bear their own costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of timely and transparent communication in judicial proceedings, particularly in ensuring that all parties have access to the reasons for decisions affecting their rights.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The proceedings be remitted to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for a re-trial.

3. Orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the orders made by the primary judge on 6 November 2024 be set aside.

4. Each party bear their own costs of this appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I will allow the appeal and order that the matter be remitted back to the FCFCoA for re-trial.2. Background I note from the outset that much ink has already been spilled to describe the background facts giving rise to this matter: see Sharpe v Anderson (Residential Tenancies) [2024] VCAT 375; Sharpe v Anderson (Residential Tenancies) [2024] VCAT 381; Anderson v Sharpe (No 2) [2024] VSC 279; Anderson v Sharpe [2024] VSCA 166; and Anderson v Sharpe (Residential Tenancies) [2025] VCAT 415. While Ms Anderson’s matter in this appeal relates to the conduct of her real estate agent, rather than her landlord (Mr Sharpe), her claim arises out of her residential tenancy at 26 Benson Street, Benalla in Victoria (the Property). The circumstances surrounding Ms Anderson’s tenancy are discussed in those decisions at length. The facts relevant to this appeal are briefly explained below. Mr Sharpe was the owner and landlord of the Property for which Ms Anderson entered into a tenancy agreement. Ray White Benalla was Mr Sharpe’s real estate agent for the Property. At first instance, Ms Anderson claimed that Ray White Benalla engaged in unconscionable conduct. As set out at PJ [4], Ms Anderson pleaded that Ray White Benalla was bound by obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic) (RT Act), the Estate Agents Act 1980 (Vic) (EA Act) and Australian Consumer Law andFair Trading Act 2012 (Vic) (ACLFT Act) and had breached the same and acted unconscionably by:(a)failing to have urgent and non-urgent repairs done at the rental property as requested by her on 31 August 2022;(b)issuing an invalid and retaliatory notice to vacate on 22 November 2021;(c)issuing a second invalid and retaliatory notice to vacate on 26 October 2022;(d)issuing a third invalid and retaliatory notice to vacate on 3 March 2023; and(e)making false representations to a Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) hearing and committing offence under s 504 of the RT Act with the object of having her evicted. The primary judge at PJ [5] noted that although the alleged particulars relied upon to make out the claim for unconscionable conduct all related to alleged breaches of provisions of the RT Act, and although the ACLFT Act was mentioned in the Statement of Claim dated 3 October 2023, no coherent pleading was made regarding it. Ms Anderson also alleged that certain conduct constituted unconscionable conduct in connection with the provision of goods and services in breach of the provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), as contained in Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). Ms Anderson sought $43,426.00 in compensation pursuant to s 236 of the ACL, alleging that she had suffered loss and damage pursuant to the Ray White Benalla’s unconscionable conduct. Ray White Benalla denied each allegation of unconscionable conduct and the alleged breaches of the RT Act, EA Act and ACLFT Act.2.1 Events leading to proceeding On 26 June 2020, Ms Anderson entered into a lease for the Property with Mr Sharpe for a fixed 12-month period, being 26 June 2020 to 25 June 2021, for $330 per week.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge then continued the hearing on the basis of the affidavit material before her and the submissions made on behalf of Ray White Benalla. The primary judge gave leave for Ms Anderson to file written submissions in closing in response to the Ray White Benalla’s written submissions within 14 days of the hearing on 8 August 2024. Ms Anderson filed her submissions in accordance with this direction on 21 August 2024. 4. Primary Judgment At the outset, her Honour noted at PJ [8] that the matter was listed for final hearing and that Ms Anderson sought an adjournment, which was opposed by Ray White Benalla. When the hearing was resumed, after it was stood down to allow her Honour to consider the adjournment application, Ms Anderson did not remain for the balance of the hearing: PJ [9]. The primary judge noted that she gave “extensive oral reasons for not being satisfied that the adjournment should be granted”: PJ [10]. I pause here to observe that the primary judge’s oral ex tempore reasons for refusing the adjournment had not been published prior to the hearing of this appeal, nor was the transcript of those reasons available. I directed my chambers to obtain a copy of these reasons from the Court’s transcript provider, VIQ Solutions. Although the request was made prior to the hearing of the appeal, the transcript was not made available to my chambers until the day after the hearing of the appeal had concluded. At PJ [16]–[21], the primary judge rejected Ray White Benalla’s submission that the FCFCoA did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter, as the FCFCoA does have jurisdiction to hear and determine claims arising under the ACL. The primary judge then considered the proceeding “likely ought to be dismissed” because of estoppel principles or because the proceeding is an abuse of process: at PJ [25]. However, “out of an abundance of caution”, the primary judge considered Ms Anderson’s pleaded claims. The primary judge considered the provisions relating to statutory unconscionability under ss 20, 21 and 22 of the ACL at PJ [27]–[30]. At PJ [31]–[32], the primary judge summarised the relevant principles relating to statutory unconscionability espoused by the Full Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mazda Australia Pty Limited [2023] FCAFC 45 (Mazda FC). At PJ [33]–[51], the primary judge made relevant factual findings based on the evidence before her. Due to Ms Anderson’s lack of participation in the hearing, she did not cross-examine or adduce further admissible evidence to contradict evidence which was filed in the proceeding. For example, in relation to Ms Anderson’s case as to whether the First Notice was issued on a bona fide basis, the primary judge noted at PJ [42] that:… the applicant invites the Court to accept her subjective perception, opinion or speculation about the reason for the issuing of the notice to vacate. The applicant’s perception, opinion and speculation constitute inadmissible evidence. On the balance of probabilities, the Court is not persuaded that the reason given by the landlord was false. Nor has the applicant persuaded me that the respondent had knowledge that the contents of the statutory declaration was untrue.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As such, Ray White Benalla submits that no error arises by reason of Grounds 1 or 2.6.2 Consideration In her written closing submissions, Ms Anderson cited the decisions of Quantum FC and Paciocco HC in the following manner:(a)“Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 40 [2021]: 87 – 95”; and(b)“Paciocco v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 90 AL.JR 835; [2016] HCA 28”. The primary judge at PJ [32] quoted the majority of the Full Court in Mazda FC at [487]−[488] (per Mortimer and Halley JJ) as follows:Finally, it is to be noted that whilst exploitation of “some form of pre-existing disability, vulnerability or disadvantage” is often a feature of unconscionable conduct, it is not a necessary feature for the impugned conduct to fall within the meaning of s 21 of the ACL: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (2021) 285 FCR 133; [2021] FCAFC 40 at [78] (Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ).All of these authorities emphasise that the task is an evaluative one. The conclusions reached may be “contestable” in the sense that reasonable judicial minds may differ, as Allsop CJ observed in Paciocco [v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2015] FCAFC 50] at [304]. Whilst the reference to “Paciocco” is a reference to the Full Court’s reasons, and not those of the High Court, it is evident from PJ [26]–[32] that the primary judge takes into consideration the relevant law for statutory unconscionability and unconscionable conduct. The legal principles summarised at PJ [31] evidence the primary judge’s consideration of the binding legal principles expressed in Quantum FC at [76], [87], [91]−[92]. Although the primary judge did not expressly cite Paciocco HC in her reasons, this does not indicate that the relevant principles from case law were not considered. When reviewing the Primary Judgment, it becomes clear that the primary judge did consult the relevant case law and precedent. I acknowledge that Ms Anderson is a litigant-in-person and, without discounting the effort and preparation she invested in formulating her written submissions, it may be that the differences in citation between her submissions and those in the Primary Judgment contributed to any confusion underlying this ground of appeal. Notwithstanding, having found that the primary did appropriately consider the relevant case law, Ground 1 of the appeal must be dismissed. With respect to Ground 2, the primary judge at PJ [53] indicates that no evidence was filed by Ms Anderson to explain how Ray White Benalla’s conduct departed from any standard or code. In her written closing submissions at first instance, Ms Anderson explained the following at [6]−[7]:For the Respondent, acceptable commercial behaviour is set out in its Professional Conduct Regulations (industry code), the objective of which is to prescribe rules of professional conduct for estate agents and agent’s representatives, with the authorising provision being section 99 of the Estate Agents Act 1980.The Applicant relied on the following specific provisions of the Respondent’s industry code to protect her interests when leasing the property through the Respondent:a.Provision 6 - Knowledge of the lawb.Provision 10 - Fairness and honesty; c.Provision 13 - Estate agent or agent’s representatives not to induce breach of contract;d.Provision 14 - Estate agent or agent’s representatives not to induce breach of contract;e.Provision 15 - Estate agent or agent's representative to ascertain information;f.Provision 18 - Maintenance and repairs of residential rental property;g.Provision 20 - Dispute resolution procedures;h.Provision 21 - Estate agent or agent’s representative to advise of dispute resolution procedures. (Footnotes omitted.)