FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Anderson v Morgan Crest Pty Ltd trading as Ray White Benalla [2025] FCA 817
ORDERS
VID 1305 of 2024 BETWEEN: LENA ANNIKA ANDERSON
Appellant
AND: MORGAN CREST PTY LTD T/AS RAY WHITE BENALLA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ROFE J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The proceedings be…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 817
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues in this case involved whether the primary judge appropriately considered the appellant’s submissions and relevant case law, and whether the refusal of the adjournment request amounted to the denial of procedural fairness. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the primary judge failed to take into account the appellant’s submissions and whether the case law cited by Ms Anderson was appropriately considered. Additionally, the court assessed whether the primary judge adequately evaluated Ms Anderson's personal circumstances and if the refusal of the adjournment was delivered ex tempore and not made available to Ms Anderson in a timely manner.
The court found that the primary judge did consider the relevant case law and precedents, despite not explicitly citing certain authorities in her written reasons. The court noted that the primary judge provided extensive oral reasons for denying the adjournment request, which were not published or made available to the appellant prior to the appeal. The court held that the refusal of the adjournment request did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness, as the primary judge gave adequate consideration to the request and provided detailed reasons. However, the court concluded that the refusal was delivered ex tempore and not made available to Ms Anderson in a timely manner, which constituted a procedural irregularity.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for a re-trial. The orders of the primary judge were set aside, and each party was directed to bear their own costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of timely and transparent communication in judicial proceedings, particularly in ensuring that all parties have access to the reasons for decisions affecting their rights.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The proceedings be remitted to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for a re-trial.
3. Orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the orders made by the primary judge on 6 November 2024 be set aside.
4. Each party bear their own costs of this appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As such, Ray White Benalla submits that no error arises by reason of Grounds 1 or 2.6.2 Consideration In her written closing submissions, Ms Anderson cited the decisions of Quantum FC and Paciocco HC in the following manner:(a)“Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 40 [2021]: 87 – 95”; and(b)“Paciocco v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) 90 AL.JR 835; [2016] HCA 28”. The primary judge at PJ [32] quoted the majority of the Full Court in Mazda FC at [487]−[488] (per Mortimer and Halley JJ) as follows:Finally, it is to be noted that whilst exploitation of “some form of pre-existing disability, vulnerability or disadvantage” is often a feature of unconscionable conduct, it is not a necessary feature for the impugned conduct to fall within the meaning of s 21 of the ACL: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Quantum Housing Group Pty Ltd (2021) 285 FCR 133; [2021] FCAFC 40 at [78] (Allsop CJ, Besanko and McKerracher JJ).All of these authorities emphasise that the task is an evaluative one. The conclusions reached may be “contestable” in the sense that reasonable judicial minds may differ, as Allsop CJ observed in Paciocco [v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2015] FCAFC 50] at [304]. Whilst the reference to “Paciocco” is a reference to the Full Court’s reasons, and not those of the High Court, it is evident from PJ [26]–[32] that the primary judge takes into consideration the relevant law for statutory unconscionability and unconscionable conduct. The legal principles summarised at PJ [31] evidence the primary judge’s consideration of the binding legal principles expressed in Quantum FC at [76], [87], [91]−[92]. Although the primary judge did not expressly cite Paciocco HC in her reasons, this does not indicate that the relevant principles from case law were not considered. When reviewing the Primary Judgment, it becomes clear that the primary judge did consult the relevant case law and precedent. I acknowledge that Ms Anderson is a litigant-in-person and, without discounting the effort and preparation she invested in formulating her written submissions, it may be that the differences in citation between her submissions and those in the Primary Judgment contributed to any confusion underlying this ground of appeal. Notwithstanding, having found that the primary did appropriately consider the relevant case law, Ground 1 of the appeal must be dismissed. With respect to Ground 2, the primary judge at PJ [53] indicates that no evidence was filed by Ms Anderson to explain how Ray White Benalla’s conduct departed from any standard or code. In her written closing submissions at first instance, Ms Anderson explained the following at [6]−[7]:For the Respondent, acceptable commercial behaviour is set out in its Professional Conduct Regulations (industry code), the objective of which is to prescribe rules of professional conduct for estate agents and agent’s representatives, with the authorising provision being section 99 of the Estate Agents Act 1980.The Applicant relied on the following specific provisions of the Respondent’s industry code to protect her interests when leasing the property through the Respondent:a.Provision 6 - Knowledge of the lawb.Provision 10 - Fairness and honesty; c.Provision 13 - Estate agent or agent’s representatives not to induce breach of contract;d.Provision 14 - Estate agent or agent’s representatives not to induce breach of contract;e.Provision 15 - Estate agent or agent's representative to ascertain information;f.Provision 18 - Maintenance and repairs of residential rental property;g.Provision 20 - Dispute resolution procedures;h.Provision 21 - Estate agent or agent’s representative to advise of dispute resolution procedures. (Footnotes omitted.)