Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Publications Pty Limited (Reopening Application)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Publications Pty Limited (Reopening Application) [2025] FCAFC 66

Appeal from: Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 41) [2023] FCA 555
File numbers: NSD 689 of 2023
NSD 690 of 2023
NSD 691 of 2023
Judgment of: PERRAM, KATZMANN AND KENNETT JJ
Date of judgment: 16 May 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application to reopen appeal after hearing of appeal and months after judgment had been reserved, to amend notice of appeal and to adduce further evidence to support additional grounds – where appellant alleged that new evidence showed that the trial miscarried by reason of wilful misconduct of one respondent and new trial should be ordered – where misconduct said to have consisted of improperly and unlawfully obtaining and retaining information concerning appellant’s legal strategy relating to trial that was confidential and protected by legal professional privilege – where allegation based on incomplete clandestine audio recording of comments made in a conversation with a then prospective witness whose evidence did not have any direct bearing on any findings challenged on appeal – where recording emerged nearly four years after conversation – where alleged misconduct founded on similar suspicions already ventilated in separate proceedings in 2021  about unauthorised access to appellant’s personal email account – where appellant alleged one respondent had accessed that account directly or indirectly and thereby obtained correspondence with his lawyers which was protected by legal professional privilege – where there were alternative sources of information conveyed – where no evidence adduced about purpose of communications in the correspondence alleged to have been accessed, whether correspondence to which respondents allegedly had accessed was privileged – whether evidence sufficient to make out allegation of miscarriage of justice – whether interests of justice favour grant of relief sought
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 27, 28(1)(f), 30, 37M(1)

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v NSW Ports Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1232

Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Clifton (Liquidator) v Kerry J Investment Pty Ltd trading as Clenergy [2020] FCAFC 5; 379 ALR 612; 143 ACSR 1

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134

Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits International B.V. [2021] FCAFC 77; 389 ALR 612; 159 IPR 58

Glencore International AG v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] HCA 26; 265 CLR 646

GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32

Hassan (formerly AFX21) v Minister for Home Affairs[2025] FCAFC 57

Kaye v Woods (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 87; 309 FLR 200

McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529

Northern Land Council v Quall (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 2

Roberts-Smith v Roberts [2022] FCA 18

Roberts-Smith v Roberts [2022] FCA 524

Stead…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 66
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The interlocutory application in Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Publications Pty Limited (Reopening Application) involved an attempt by the appellant, Mr Ben Roberts-Smith, to reopen an appeal against a defamation judgment that had already been reserved. The respondents, Fairfax Publications, opposed the application on the basis that it was an attempt to introduce new evidence and grounds for appeal long after the trial had concluded and the appeal had been heard. The key issue before the court was whether the appellant's application to amend the notice of appeal and adduce further evidence was permissible under the circumstances and whether it had prospects of success. The court held that the application was not in the interests of justice, primarily because the alleged misconduct by one of the respondents, Mr McKenzie, was not substantiated by the evidence provided. The court found that the audio recording, which was the basis for the new evidence, did not significantly alter the evidentiary landscape and did not demonstrate the necessary culpability on the part of Mr McKenzie to warrant reopening the appeal. Consequently, the application was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the appellant on 27 March 2025 be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before addressing the substance of the interlocutory application and the contents of the audio recording, some context is necessary.BackgroundPerson 17 In October 2017 the appellant commenced an extra-marital affair with Person 17. The relationship ended in April 2018. In articles published by the respondents in August 2018 (referred to as “the Group 3 articles”), it was suggested that the appellant had acted violently towards Person 17 after a function in Canberra which they both attended. The primary judge found that the Group 3 articles carried the defamatory imputations that:(a)the applicant committed an act of domestic violence against a woman in the Hotel Realm in Canberra (Imputation 7); and(b)the applicant is a hypocrite who publicly supported Rosie Batty, a domestic violence campaigner, when in private he abused a woman (Imputation 8). The respondents raised defences of substantial truth and contextual truth in relation to these imputations. There was thus a factual context as to whether the appellant had in fact committed an act of violence against Person 17 on a particular night at the Hotel Realm in Canberra. The primary judge considered the evidence and submissions in relation to this issue (both of which were extensive) between J[1968] and J[2227]. The evidence covered a number of events before and after the night of the alleged assault. His Honour accepted the evidence of Person 17 in a number of respects and rejected the evidence of the appellant on all controversial aspects. On the aspects of Person 17’s evidence that were accepted, his Honour expressly found the appellant’s denials to be false (J[2213]). His Honour went on to reject certain explanations given by the appellant before observing at J[2220] that he had difficulty accepting the appellant’s evidence on any disputed issue. Among other things, he was found to have lied about being separated from his then wife, Ms Emma Roberts (who formerly went by the name of Emma Roberts-Smith) while carrying on his relationship with Person 17. However, the primary judge had significant reservations about aspects of Person 17’s evidence which he set out at J[2221]-[2225]. He concluded at J[2226]:In conclusion, I do not accept the applicant’s evidence. Nevertheless, I must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities having regard to the criminal conduct alleged, that Person 17’s evidence is reliable and should be accepted. For the reasons I have given, I am not satisfied that Person 17’s evidence is sufficiently reliable to form the basis of a finding that the assault occurred and Imputations 7 and 8 are substantially true. His Honour found the defence of contextual truth to have been established, for reasons explained later at J[2601]-[2607]: essentially, that imputations 7 and 8 did not materially damage the appellant’s reputation because, in light of the imputations that were found to be substantially true, he had no reputation capable of being further harmed. The conclusion as to contextual truth is challenged by ground 16 of the notice of appeal, merely as a corollary of the attacks that are made on his Honour’s conclusions that other imputations were true. There was no notice of contention in relation to the conclusions concerning imputations 7 and 8 and substantial truth. These imputations, and the events concerning Person 17, therefore featured in the submissions on the appeal only in so far as some of his Honour’s findings relating to them contributed to his overall view as to the appellant’s credibility. None of the findings that his Honour made in connection with Person 17 is challenged.Ms Roberts and Ms Scott

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Had we been persuaded that the allegation in proposed ground 17 had significant merit, it would be necessary to consider the factor discussed above in conjunction with a conclusion about the degree of culpability of Mr McKenzie in order to come to a view about what the interests of justice required. As things stand, that exercise does not need to be undertaken. Our conclusions as to the scope of what is alleged in proposed ground 17 and the evidence presented in support of it dictate the conclusion that, if allowed to be added to the grounds of appeal, it would fail. If further support for that conclusion were needed, it would be found in the fact that the appellant was aware of the access to his email account during the trial and had opportunities to pursue the issue then.Exercise of the discretion to grant leave to amend and to adduce further evidence The conclusion in the previous paragraph also points the way to the correct disposition of the interlocutory application. Having heard full argument on the proposed new ground, we would reject it. A grant of leave to amend, and to adduce the evidence, would therefore be futile. It follows that the interlocutory application will be dismissed with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Secondly, the allegation now sought to be pursued against Mr McKenzie (and collaterally against Ms Scott and Ms Roberts) overlaps very substantially with one pursued in proceedings against Ms Roberts that commenced nearly four years ago and in cross-examination in the trial. Having become concerned about the issue, it was obviously open to the appellant to take further steps in the proceedings below, such as seeking leave to issue further subpoenas to Ms Scott or issuing a focused notice to produce to the respondents. To set the entire trial at nought on a ground so closely related to issues that have already been raised, investigated and debated, and which could have been further pursued during the trial, cannot in our view be in the interests of justice unless the evidentiary landscape has changed very significantly. An example of such a circumstance might be the disclosure of cogent evidence, relevant to the issue, that was previously concealed by the defaulting party. That is not the case here. While we are prepared to assume that the recording was not capable of being obtained by the appellant until it was sent anonymously to Mr Svilans (the respondents not having taken any point about this), there is no evidence that its concealment was brought about by the respondents. Nor, for reasons outlined above, does the recording substantially strengthen the claim that Mr McKenzie engaged in the misconduct alleged. To the extent that there is a proper evidentiary basis for the allegation in proposed ground 17, it was available during the trial.Conclusion as to prospects of success Had we been persuaded that the allegation in proposed ground 17 had significant merit, it would be necessary to consider the factor discussed above in conjunction with a conclusion about the degree of culpability of Mr McKenzie in order to come to a view about what the interests of justice required. As things stand, that exercise does not need to be undertaken. Our conclusions as to the scope of what is alleged in proposed ground 17 and the evidence presented in support of it dictate the conclusion that, if allowed to be added to the grounds of appeal, it would fail. If further support for that conclusion were needed, it would be found in the fact that the appellant was aware of the access to his email account during the trial and had opportunities to pursue the issue then.Exercise of the discretion to grant leave to amend and to adduce further evidence The conclusion in the previous paragraph also points the way to the correct disposition of the interlocutory application. Having heard full argument on the proposed new ground, we would reject it. A grant of leave to amend, and to adduce the evidence, would therefore be futile. It follows that the interlocutory application will be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.