House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

House v Defence Force Retirement & Death Benefits Authority

[2002] FCA 65

DAVID RICHARD HOUSE v DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY

Q 128 of 2001

DRUMMOND J
BRISBANE
6 FEBRUARY 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 128 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

DAVID RICHARD HOUSE
APPLICANT

AND:

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT & DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DRUMMOND J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 FEBRUARY 2002

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 128 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

DAVID RICHARD HOUSE
APPLICANT

AND:

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT & DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DRUMMOND J

DATE:

6 FEBRUARY 2002

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal under s 44 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”) from a decision of the Tribunal that affirmed the respondent Authority’s decision of 11 December 1998 to refuse Mr House’s request for review of his incapacity classification under s 34 the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) (“the DFRDB Act) and also varied the later decision of the Authority of 13 December 1999 to retain Mr House’s classification of incapacity at 40% Class B, but only so as to classify the applicant at 30% Class B.  The Tribunal dealt with both Mr House’s applications for review in a single set of reasons.

  2. On 29 May 1975, Mr House was retired from the army on a ground that denied him any entitlement to benefit under the DFRDB Act. In 1979 the Authority was advised by the Army Office that his mode of discharge had been changed to “medically unfit for further service” because of the impairments “alcoholism and alcoholic liver disease”. He thereupon became entitled to invalidity benefit under s 26 the DFRDB Act.  Section 30(1) of that Act provides:

    “Where a member of the scheme … is, or is about to become, entitled to invalidity benefit, the Authority shall determine his percentage of incapacity in relation to civil employment and shall classify him according to the percentage of incapacity as follows:

    Percentage of Incapacity  Class

    60% or more  A

    30% or more but less than 60%  B

    Less than 30%  C”

  3. The amount of benefit a person receives is governed by whether he or she comes within Class A, B or C, not by the person’s assessed percentage of incapacity:  that only provides the data for making the classification into one of these three categories.

  4. Mr House was initially classified under s 30 as 10% Class C.  By April 1986, the Authority had arrived at the position of classifying him as 30% Class B as from the date of his retirement.  Between then and the requests for review that led…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority involved Mr House, who appeared pro se, contesting a decision by the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority. The core dispute centred on the Authority's determination regarding Mr House's eligibility for certain retirement and death benefits, particularly in relation to the impact of his alcoholism on his employability post-discharge from the military. The matter was heard and determined by the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had made an error of law in considering the 1979 diagnosis of "alcoholism and alcoholic liver disease" and whether this diagnosis played a role in Mr House's employability after his discharge from the army. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal's consideration of the 1979 diagnosis constituted an error of law that affected its ultimate decision. The court examined whether the Tribunal appropriately assessed the role of Mr House's alcohol abuse on his employability and if any irrelevant considerations were taken into account.

In its reasoning, the court found that while the Tribunal did consider the 1979 diagnosis, it did so in the context of assessing Mr House's employability, which was within its purview. The court held that the Tribunal's assessment of the diagnosis did not constitute an error of law, as it was part of the broader evaluation of Mr House's condition and its impact on his employment prospects. The court also rejected Mr House's challenge regarding the Tribunal's failure to alert him to its intention to consider the correctness of the 1979 diagnosis, finding no material impact on the final decision.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the court ordered that Mr House pay the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

DRUMMOND J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DRUMMOND J

Mr House, who represented himself in the present proceedings (as he had in earlier reclassification applications made by him to both the Authority and the Tribunal), was alert throughout to concerns the Tribunal might have about his credibility.GROUND (c)(i) - IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS If the Tribunal had simply found that the 1979 diagnosis of “alcoholism and alcoholic liver disease” was unjustified, then it could properly be said that it had considered matter irrelevant to its decisional task. The Tribunal, however, expressed this view in the context of undertaking what it considered, understandably, to be the difficult task of assessing just what role Mr House’s abuse of alcohol played in affecting his employability after his discharge from the army. But if the Tribunal dealt with its assessment of the 1979 diagnosis in a way which could be said to involve it having regard to a matter irrelevant to its considerations, that is not an error of law that in fact affected its ultimate decision adverse to Mr House. I have explained why this is so in the reasons I have given for rejecting the challenge to the decision that the Tribunal made an error of law constituted by its failure to alert Mr House to the fact that it intended to consider the correctness of the 1979 diagnosis. The appeal is dismissed with costs.