FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCA 29
Appeal from: Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114 File number: NSD 446 of 2016 Judge: BEACH J Date of judgment: 27 January 2017 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to vary a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to make a banning order under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to cancel an Australian credit licence under s 55(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) – whether credit licensee was a fit and proper person – whether person likely to contravene credit legislation in the future – whether there was a denial of procedural fairness – apprehended bias – appeal dismissed Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 2C, 13
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 5, 13, 37, 47, 53, 55, 80, 225, 327
Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] AATA 567
Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] AATA 726
Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114
Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315
House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2011) 193 FCR 112
Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2014) 226 FCR 55
Date of hearing: 1 December 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 103 Counsel for the Applicants: The Applicants appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission ORDERS
NSD 446 of 2016 BETWEEN: MEENAKSHI CALLYCHURN
First Applicant
UNIQUE MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LTD
Second Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGE:
BEACH J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 JANUARY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants’ appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to their appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BEACH J:
The applicants have appealed pursuant to s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) delivered on 29 February 2016 (Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114).
In that decision, the Tribunal set aside a decision of a delegate of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to make, pursuant to s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act), a banning order against the first applicant (Ms Callychurn) which prohibited her from engaging in any credit activities for five years. The Tribunal substituted the delegate’s…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 29
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court addressed the applicants' arguments that there was procedural unfairness due to a failure to consider relevant information. The Court found that the AAT's consideration of the annual compliance certificate and the VCAT proceeding was thorough and fair, dismissing the applicants' claims of procedural unfairness and bias. The Court also found that the applicants' submissions amounted to a merits challenge, which was beyond the scope of the Court's review.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no legal error was made by the AAT. The Court noted that even if there had been an error, it would not have affected the AAT's decision, as the findings and conclusions were balanced and fair. The Court ordered that the applicants pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to their appeal.
The Court's decision underscores the importance of providing accurate information in compliance certificates and the high threshold for overturning AAT decisions. The outcome also reaffirms the principle that procedural fairness must be rigorously applied in administrative law, but that the Court's role is limited to reviewing the process, not the merits of the decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants’ appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to their appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The second question of law is expressed as follows:Whether the Tribunal erred in the inferences it did draw from the facts as found from 2011 Annual Compliance Certificate being a restriction or right to carry on business as lay associate, or as a lawyer, that the Appeal to the Court of Appeal were disciplinary proceedings which were current or pending that may result in disciplinary action being taken by confirmation of VCAT’s order and the failure of the Tribunal to consider the special rules in respect of who can sign the annual compliance certificate given that UMS was the body corporate having no CEO it was Mr Frugtniet as the responsible Manager and not Ms Callychurn. Tribunal Consideration at [14-27] and Decision at [28-29] The applicants referred to a document published by ASIC entitled “About the Australian credit licence annual compliance certificate” which set out the questions asked by ASIC when an Australian credit licensee completes the annual compliance certificate. The compliance certificate required Ms Callychurn on behalf of UMS to certify various matters about its “fit and proper” people. The Tribunal found that Ms Callychurn had made misleading statements in relation to these matters. The Tribunal found that Ms Callychurn had failed to disclose that Mr Frugtniet, who was named as UMS’ fit and proper person, had been subject to the VCAT proceeding. Further, the Tribunal found that Ms Callychurn failed to disclose that Mr Frugtniet had been subject to a disqualification order which prohibited him from practising as a “lay associate” in legal practice. The compliance certificate required the credit licensee to certify that it had no reason to believe that any of its fit and proper people had been:(a)“refused the right or been restricted in the right to carry on any trade, business or profession for which an authorisation (licence, certificate, registration or other authority) is required by law”;(b)“subject to disciplinary action in relation to any such authorisation”;(c)“subject of any … proceedings that are current or pending and which may result in disciplinary action being taken in relation to any such authorisation”. The applicants asserted that it was not necessary for Ms Callychurn to disclose that Mr Frugtniet was subject to the VCAT proceeding. The applicants further submitted that the disqualification order against Mr Frugtniet did not constitute a refusal of the right or a restriction of a right to carry on any trade, business or profession for which an authorisation was required by law. The applicants contended that practising as a “lay associate” did not require any “authorisation” at law. As such, so the applicants contended, there was no relevant restriction on Mr Frugniet’s right to practice as a lay associate. The applicants submitted that Mr Frugtinet was not subject to any “disciplinary action” which needed to be disclosed in the compliance certificate. It was said that such disciplinary action had to be “in relation to” the relevant authorisation. The applicants asserted that Mr Frugtniet was not subject to any authorisation to practise as a lay associate, and the VCAT proceeding was not a “disciplinary action” that had to be disclosed as that proceeding was not in relation to any relevant authorisation.