Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCA 29

Appeal from: Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114
File number: NSD 446 of 2016
Judge: BEACH J
Date of judgment: 27 January 2017
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to vary a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to make a banning order under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to cancel an Australian credit licence under s 55(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) – whether credit licensee was a fit and proper person – whether person likely to contravene credit legislation in the future – whether there was a denial of procedural fairness – apprehended bias – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 2C, 13

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 5, 13, 37, 47, 53, 55, 80, 225, 327

Cases cited:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] AATA 567

Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] AATA 726

Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114

Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315

House v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2011) 193 FCR 112

Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2014) 226 FCR 55

Date of hearing: 1 December 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 103
Counsel for the Applicants: The Applicants appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent:  Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission

ORDERS

NSD 446 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MEENAKSHI CALLYCHURN

First Applicant

UNIQUE MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LTD

Second Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

Respondent

JUDGE:

BEACH J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JANUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants’ appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to their appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEACH J:

  1. The applicants have appealed pursuant to s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) delivered on 29 February 2016 (Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114).

  2. In that decision, the Tribunal set aside a decision of a delegate of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to make, pursuant to s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act), a banning order against the first applicant (Ms Callychurn) which prohibited her from engaging in any credit activities for five years. The Tribunal substituted the delegate’s…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was asked to review a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming a decision by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to cancel an Australian credit licence and to make a banning order against the applicant, Ms Callychurn, and her former de facto partner, Mr Frugtniet. The AAT had found that Ms Callychurn was not a fit and proper person to hold a credit licence and that there was a likelihood she would contravene credit legislation in the future. The appeal brought forth several issues including whether there was procedural unfairness, and whether there was bias in the decision-making process.

The Court addressed the applicants' arguments that there was procedural unfairness due to a failure to consider relevant information. The Court found that the AAT's consideration of the annual compliance certificate and the VCAT proceeding was thorough and fair, dismissing the applicants' claims of procedural unfairness and bias. The Court also found that the applicants' submissions amounted to a merits challenge, which was beyond the scope of the Court's review.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no legal error was made by the AAT. The Court noted that even if there had been an error, it would not have affected the AAT's decision, as the findings and conclusions were balanced and fair. The Court ordered that the applicants pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to their appeal.

The Court's decision underscores the importance of providing accurate information in compliance certificates and the high threshold for overturning AAT decisions. The outcome also reaffirms the principle that procedural fairness must be rigorously applied in administrative law, but that the Court's role is limited to reviewing the process, not the merits of the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants’ appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to their appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the applicants have not made out any of their grounds of appeal. As such, the appeal will be dismissed.BACKGROUND On or around 24 December 2010, ASIC granted UMS an Australian credit licence, effective from that date. Ms Callychurn’s now former de facto partner, Mr Rudy Frugtniet, was the sole director, secretary and shareholder of UMS at the time the credit licence was granted. Mr Frugtniet was named as the key person and one of the fit and proper persons in UMS’ credit licence. On 16 June 2011, Ms Callychurn was appointed a director of UMS. On 14 October 2011, Mr Frugtniet ceased to be a director of UMS. During the period from 14 October 2011 to 28 April 2015, Ms Callychurn was the sole director and shareholder of UMS. Before proceeding further with the chronology, the following should be noted. The Victorian Legal Services Board brought proceedings against Mr Frugtniet in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) seeking an order, pursuant to Division 3 of Part 2.2 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic), for the disqualification of Mr Frugtniet from practising as a lay associate of a legal practice in Victoria for a period of three years without the approval of the Legal Services Board (the VCAT proceeding). On 8 April 2011, VCAT made the order sought. The order was made on the basis that Mr Frugtniet had intentionally misrepresented himself to a barrister and a magistrate as a lawyer who was entitled to appear before the Victorian Magistrates Court. Mr Frugtniet appealed VCAT’s order to the Supreme Court of Victoria, which appeal was subsequently dismissed on 13 August 2012. On 24 November 2011, Ms Callychurn commenced as one of UMS’ fit and proper persons for the purposes of UMS’ credit licence. On 5 February 2012, Ms Callychurn lodged with ASIC an annual compliance certificate on behalf of UMS for the compliance period ending 24 December 2011. On 12 January 2013, Mr Frugtniet ceased to be one of UMS’ fit and proper persons. On 6 February 2013, Ms Callychurn lodged with ASIC an annual compliance certificate on behalf of UMS for the compliance period ending 24 December 2012. On 6 March 2013, Mr Frugtniet ceased to be the key person on UMS’ credit licence, at which time Ms Callychurn became the key person. On 27 March 2014, ASIC issued a notice to UMS pursuant to s 266 of the Act, requiring production of certain books of the company. On that same day, ASIC also issued a notice to Ozwide Financial Services Pty Ltd (Ozwide) pursuant to s 267 of the Act, requiring production of certain books of the company. Ms Callychurn was the sole director and sole shareholder of Ozwide. On 26 June 2014, a delegate of ASIC made a banning order against Mr Frugtniet which prohibited him from engaging in credit activities. On 6 March 2015, the Tribunal affirmed that decision. Mr Frugtniet appealed to the Federal Court from the Tribunal’s decision. On 22 August 2016, the Court ordered that his appeal be dismissed (Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCA 995).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Second, Ms Callychurn in relation to her personal position has taken issue with the Tribunal’s statements and conclusions at [72] to [82]. I must say that in my view I thought the Tribunal’s analysis to be balanced and fair. No error of law is disclosed. Her submissions in substance amounted to a merits challenge.CONCLUSION No error of law as attempted to be articulated by the applicants has been made out. And in any event, even if such an error had been established I see no realistic possibility that the Tribunal’s determination and orders would have been any different. To set aside the Tribunal’s determination and orders and remit would be an exercise in futility even if an error of law had been established. The applicants’ appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The second question of law is expressed as follows:Whether the Tribunal erred in the inferences it did draw from the facts as found from 2011 Annual Compliance Certificate being a restriction or right to carry on business as lay associate, or as a lawyer, that the Appeal to the Court of Appeal were disciplinary proceedings which were current or pending that may result in disciplinary action being taken by confirmation of VCAT’s order and the failure of the Tribunal to consider the special rules in respect of who can sign the annual compliance certificate given that UMS was the body corporate having no CEO it was Mr Frugtniet as the responsible Manager and not Ms Callychurn. Tribunal Consideration at [14-27] and Decision at [28-29] The applicants referred to a document published by ASIC entitled “About the Australian credit licence annual compliance certificate” which set out the questions asked by ASIC when an Australian credit licensee completes the annual compliance certificate. The compliance certificate required Ms Callychurn on behalf of UMS to certify various matters about its “fit and proper” people. The Tribunal found that Ms Callychurn had made misleading statements in relation to these matters. The Tribunal found that Ms Callychurn had failed to disclose that Mr Frugtniet, who was named as UMS’ fit and proper person, had been subject to the VCAT proceeding. Further, the Tribunal found that Ms Callychurn failed to disclose that Mr Frugtniet had been subject to a disqualification order which prohibited him from practising as a “lay associate” in legal practice. The compliance certificate required the credit licensee to certify that it had no reason to believe that any of its fit and proper people had been:(a)“refused the right or been restricted in the right to carry on any trade, business or profession for which an authorisation (licence, certificate, registration or other authority) is required by law”;(b)“subject to disciplinary action in relation to any such authorisation”;(c)“subject of any … proceedings that are current or pending and which may result in disciplinary action being taken in relation to any such authorisation”. The applicants asserted that it was not necessary for Ms Callychurn to disclose that Mr Frugtniet was subject to the VCAT proceeding. The applicants further submitted that the disqualification order against Mr Frugtniet did not constitute a refusal of the right or a restriction of a right to carry on any trade, business or profession for which an authorisation was required by law. The applicants contended that practising as a “lay associate” did not require any “authorisation” at law. As such, so the applicants contended, there was no relevant restriction on Mr Frugniet’s right to practice as a lay associate. The applicants submitted that Mr Frugtinet was not subject to any “disciplinary action” which needed to be disclosed in the compliance certificate. It was said that such disciplinary action had to be “in relation to” the relevant authorisation. The applicants asserted that Mr Frugtniet was not subject to any authorisation to practise as a lay associate, and the VCAT proceeding was not a “disciplinary action” that had to be disclosed as that proceeding was not in relation to any relevant authorisation.