Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCAFC 137

Appeal from: Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCA 29
File number: VID 122 of 2017
Judges: RARES, COLLIER AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 1 September 2017
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from primary judge’s dismissal of an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to vary a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) to make a banning order under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (“Credit Act”) – whether first appellant contravened s 225 of the Credit Act in lodging compliance certificates with ASIC – whether ASIC had reason to believe that the first appellant was likely to contravene the Credit Act in the future – whether ASIC had reason to believe that the first appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities
Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) (reprint no. 35, consolidated to 30 March 2011), ss 1.2.4(2)(b), 2.2.6, 2.2.7

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), ss 53, 80(1)(d), (e), (f), 216, 225(1), (2), (5)

Cases cited:

Frugtniet v Law Institute of Victoria Ltd [2012] VSCA 178

John McGrath Motors (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Applebee (1964) 110 CLR 656

Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563

Melbourne Steamship Co Ltd v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333

R v Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442

Date of hearing: 22 August 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M H O’Bryan QC and Mr J P Wheelahan
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission

ORDERS

VID 122 of 2017
BETWEEN: MEENAKSHI CALLYCHURN
First Appellant


UNIQUE MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LTD
Second Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, COLLIER AND O’CALLAGHAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

1 September 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for hearing according to law.

3.The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

4.There be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the primary judge, dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), which banned the first appellant, Meenakshi Callychurn (Ms Callychurn), from providing or engaging in credit activities and cancelled the credit licence of the second appellant (UMS).  The Tribunal’s order affirmed earlier decisions of a delegate of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), save that the Tribunal reduced the period of Ms Callychurn’s ban from five to four years: Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 137
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Federal Court of Australia heard an appeal from the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to dismiss an appeal from a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to make a banning order under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (Credit Act). The primary issue before the court was whether the first appellant contravened s 225 of the Credit Act in lodging compliance certificates with ASIC, and whether ASIC had reason to believe that the first appellant was likely to contravene the Credit Act in the future, and whether ASIC had reason to believe that the first appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities. The court had to determine whether the appellant had made false or misleading statements in the compliance certificates, and whether ASIC had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities.

The court found that the Tribunal had erred in law in its interpretation of the Credit Act. The Tribunal had held that the appellant had given a false or misleading answer in contravention of s 225 of the Credit Act because Mr Frugtniet was restricted in his right to carry on business for which an authorisation was required by law. However, the court held that the Tribunal’s interpretation of the Credit Act was incorrect, as Mr Frugtniet was never a lawyer or an Australian legal practitioner, and therefore was not restricted in his right to carry on business as a lay associate. The court further held that the Tribunal had erred in finding that ASIC had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities.

The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the AAT for hearing according to law. The court held that ASIC must pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal. There should be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.

The ratio of the decision was that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the Credit Act and in finding that ASIC had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities. The court held that the Tribunal’s interpretation of the Credit Act was incorrect and that there was no evidence to support ASIC’s belief that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for hearing according to law.

3. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

4. There be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons that we will return to below, it is necessary to record ASIC’s concession after the hearing before the Tribunal, and after Ms Callychurn had been cross-examined, about the difficulty that she had in endeavouring to: (a) notify ASIC that Mr Frugtniet had ceased to be a fit and proper person as at 12 January 2013; and (b) at the same time, list him as a person who, as at the annual compliance date, namely 24 December 2012, was a fit and proper person. The concession made by ASIC was as follows:ASIC accepts that once Ms Callychurn completed the section “Notification of ceasing to be a fit and proper person”, stating that Mr Frugtniet ceased to be a fit and proper person on 12 January 2013, the form automatically operated to remove Mr Frugtniet’s name from the “List of fit and proper people as at the licensee’s annual compliance date” even though the date Ms Callychurn had entered for Mr Frugtniet’s ceasing (12 January 2013) was after the annual compliance date. ASIC accepts that the form did not permit Ms Callychurn manually to add Mr Frugtniet’s name under the heading “List of fit and proper people as at the licensee’s annual compliance date”.Accordingly, ASIC disclaims any submission that Ms Callychurn herself removed Mr Frugtniet’s name from the “List of fit and proper people as at the licensee’s annual compliance date” in the 2012 Annual Compliance Certificate. To the extent that any cross-examination suggested that Ms Callychurn’s evidence on this point was incorrect, that suggestion should not have been made and is withdrawn.Other facts upon which the Tribunal relied in imposing the banning order The Tribunal found that, although Ms Callychurn notified ASIC that Mr Frugtniet had ceased to be a fit and proper person as at 12 January 2013 (and was therefore not permitted to engage in credit activities under the terms of UMS’s credit licence), Mr Frugtniet continued to be the only person involved in writing loans for UMS up until late September 2013 and that Ms Callychurn had “improperly and inappropriately delegated her responsibilities as a director of UMS to Mr Frugtniet”. The Tribunal also found that, at various times, long after Ms Callychurn had told ASIC that Mr Frugtniet was no longer a fit and proper person, Mr Frugtniet continued to be the sole signatory to a bank account in the name of UMS into which commission monies were paid and that Mr Frugtniet’s name and contact details appeared on the UMS website as the only “relevant contact” and the “complaint contact” for UMS. In March 2014, ASIC issued two notices under ss 266 and 267 of the Credit Act calling for production of certain documents – one to UMS and the other to a company called Ozwide Financial Services Pty Ltd, of which Ms Callychurn was a director. The Tribunal found that, although the documents sought to be produced were in the possession of the companies, they never were produced. On 28 April 2015, Ms Madeleine Yasmin Seyfarth (Ms Seyfarth) was appointed as an additional director of UMS. Belatedly, it seems, it was revealed that the new director’s former surname was Frugtniet; that she was Mr Frugtniet’s niece; and that, between March 2004 and March 2007, she had been a bankrupt and thus disqualified from managing corporations. Ms Seyfarth resigned in June 2015 and a Mr David Fu was appointed in her place, although there was no evidence adduced by Ms Callychurn before the Tribunal about his “background, position and relationship … to any of the relevant parties”.RELEVANT LEGISLATION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

We set out at [10] above another question which Ms Callychurn answered in the affirmative in both the 2011 and 2012 compliance certificates. That question relevantly was as follows: “Does the licensee certify that it has no reason to believe that any of its fit and proper people have … been the subject of administrative … proceedings … which were determined adversely to them …?”. On the material before us the affirmative answer to that question was, in all the circumstances, self-evidently untrue, to Ms Callychurn’s knowledge, since she knew of the VCAT order. However, ASIC did not rely on that answer before the Tribunal, the primary judge or on the hearing of this appeal (by way of notice of contention or otherwise).CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the appeal must be allowed and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for hearing according to law. ASIC must pay Ms Callychurn’s costs of the appeal. There should be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first question which Ms Callychurn, on behalf of UMS, answered in the affirmative was: “does the licensee certify that it has no reason to believe that any of its fit and proper people have been refused the right or been restricted in the right to carry on any trade, business or profession for which an authorisation (licence, certificate, registration or other authority) is required by law?” (emphasis added). The Tribunal held that in answering “yes” to that question, Ms Callychurn gave a false or misleading answer in contravention of s 225 of the Credit Act because: [w]hile there was no specific authorisation previously required for him to do so, the effect of the order was to impose a requirement that [Mr Frugtniet] obtain authorisation from the Legal Services Board to carry on a business as a lay associate. In other words he was quite clearly restricted in the right to carry on business for which an authorisation was required by law … Clearly while ordinarily there is no authorisation required to carry on a business as a lay associate, there is such a restriction in circumstances where by order of a Tribunal authorisation is now specifically required from the Legal Services Board ... In addition Mr Frugtniet was restricted in his right to carry on practice as a lawyer by virtue of the order made by the VCAT on 8 April 2011. The last point made by the Tribunal is clearly incorrect. Mr Frugtniet was not and never had been a lawyer, within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act, having previously been denied admission to practise. Nor, for that reason, was he at any relevant time an Australian legal practitioner, within the meaning of that Act (being, relevantly, a lawyer who holds a current practising certificate). At the time of the VCAT order, the Legal Profession Act defined “lay associate” in these terms, “a lay associate of a law practice is an associate of the practice who is not an Australian legal practitioner”: Legal Profession Act (reprint no. 35, consolidated to 30 March 2011), s 1.2.4(2)(b). That Act was repealed on 1 July 2015 by s 157 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic). Prior to its repeal, s 2.2.6 of the Legal Profession Act relevantly provided:Order disqualifying persons (1)The Board may apply to the Tribunal for an order that a person (other than an Australian legal practitioner) is a disqualified person for the purposes of this Division if the person— (a)has been convicted of a relevant offence; or (b)in the opinion of the Board has been a party to an act or omission that, if the person had been an Australian legal practitioner, may have resulted in a charge being brought in the Tribunal. (2)The Tribunal may order that the person is a disqualified person for the purposes of this Division, for a specified period or indefinitely. …(Emphasis added.) Section 2.2.7 of the Legal Profession Act relevantly provided:Prohibition on certain associates (1)Unless the Board gives its approval, a local legal practitioner, or a law practice in this jurisdiction, must not have a lay associate who the practitioner or practice knows to be— (a)a disqualified person; or (b)a person who has been found guilty of a relevant offence. …(3)A disqualified person, or a person found guilty of a relevant offence, must not become or seek to become a lay associate of a local legal practitioner or law practice, unless the person first informs the practitioner or practice of the disqualification or finding of guilt. Penalty: 60 penalty units. ….