FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCAFC 137
Appeal from: Callychurn v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCA 29 File number: VID 122 of 2017 Judges: RARES, COLLIER AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ Date of judgment: 1 September 2017 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from primary judge’s dismissal of an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to vary a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) to make a banning order under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (“Credit Act”) – whether first appellant contravened s 225 of the Credit Act in lodging compliance certificates with ASIC – whether ASIC had reason to believe that the first appellant was likely to contravene the Credit Act in the future – whether ASIC had reason to believe that the first appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities Legislation: Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) (reprint no. 35, consolidated to 30 March 2011), ss 1.2.4(2)(b), 2.2.6, 2.2.7
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), ss 53, 80(1)(d), (e), (f), 216, 225(1), (2), (5)
Cases cited: Frugtniet v Law Institute of Victoria Ltd [2012] VSCA 178
John McGrath Motors (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Applebee (1964) 110 CLR 656
Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563
Date of hearing: 22 August 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 56 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M H O’Bryan QC and Mr J P Wheelahan Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission ORDERS
VID 122 of 2017 BETWEEN: MEENAKSHI CALLYCHURN
First Appellant
UNIQUE MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LTD
Second AppellantAND: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, COLLIER AND O’CALLAGHAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
1 September 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for hearing according to law.
3.The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
4.There be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from the decision of the primary judge, dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), which banned the first appellant, Meenakshi Callychurn (Ms Callychurn), from providing or engaging in credit activities and cancelled the credit licence of the second appellant (UMS). The Tribunal’s order affirmed earlier decisions of a delegate of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), save that the Tribunal reduced the period of Ms Callychurn’s ban from five to four years: Callychurn and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 114
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 137
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had erred in law in its interpretation of the Credit Act. The Tribunal had held that the appellant had given a false or misleading answer in contravention of s 225 of the Credit Act because Mr Frugtniet was restricted in his right to carry on business for which an authorisation was required by law. However, the court held that the Tribunal’s interpretation of the Credit Act was incorrect, as Mr Frugtniet was never a lawyer or an Australian legal practitioner, and therefore was not restricted in his right to carry on business as a lay associate. The court further held that the Tribunal had erred in finding that ASIC had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities.
The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the AAT for hearing according to law. The court held that ASIC must pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal. There should be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.
The ratio of the decision was that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the Credit Act and in finding that ASIC had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities. The court held that the Tribunal’s interpretation of the Credit Act was incorrect and that there was no evidence to support ASIC’s belief that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for hearing according to law.
3. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
4. There be no order for costs of the proceeding before the primary judge.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first question which Ms Callychurn, on behalf of UMS, answered in the affirmative was: “does the licensee certify that it has no reason to believe that any of its fit and proper people have been refused the right or been restricted in the right to carry on any trade, business or profession for which an authorisation (licence, certificate, registration or other authority) is required by law?” (emphasis added). The Tribunal held that in answering “yes” to that question, Ms Callychurn gave a false or misleading answer in contravention of s 225 of the Credit Act because: [w]hile there was no specific authorisation previously required for him to do so, the effect of the order was to impose a requirement that [Mr Frugtniet] obtain authorisation from the Legal Services Board to carry on a business as a lay associate. In other words he was quite clearly restricted in the right to carry on business for which an authorisation was required by law … Clearly while ordinarily there is no authorisation required to carry on a business as a lay associate, there is such a restriction in circumstances where by order of a Tribunal authorisation is now specifically required from the Legal Services Board ... In addition Mr Frugtniet was restricted in his right to carry on practice as a lawyer by virtue of the order made by the VCAT on 8 April 2011. The last point made by the Tribunal is clearly incorrect. Mr Frugtniet was not and never had been a lawyer, within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act, having previously been denied admission to practise. Nor, for that reason, was he at any relevant time an Australian legal practitioner, within the meaning of that Act (being, relevantly, a lawyer who holds a current practising certificate). At the time of the VCAT order, the Legal Profession Act defined “lay associate” in these terms, “a lay associate of a law practice is an associate of the practice who is not an Australian legal practitioner”: Legal Profession Act (reprint no. 35, consolidated to 30 March 2011), s 1.2.4(2)(b). That Act was repealed on 1 July 2015 by s 157 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic). Prior to its repeal, s 2.2.6 of the Legal Profession Act relevantly provided:Order disqualifying persons (1)The Board may apply to the Tribunal for an order that a person (other than an Australian legal practitioner) is a disqualified person for the purposes of this Division if the person— (a)has been convicted of a relevant offence; or (b)in the opinion of the Board has been a party to an act or omission that, if the person had been an Australian legal practitioner, may have resulted in a charge being brought in the Tribunal. (2)The Tribunal may order that the person is a disqualified person for the purposes of this Division, for a specified period or indefinitely. …(Emphasis added.) Section 2.2.7 of the Legal Profession Act relevantly provided:Prohibition on certain associates (1)Unless the Board gives its approval, a local legal practitioner, or a law practice in this jurisdiction, must not have a lay associate who the practitioner or practice knows to be— (a)a disqualified person; or (b)a person who has been found guilty of a relevant offence. …(3)A disqualified person, or a person found guilty of a relevant offence, must not become or seek to become a lay associate of a local legal practitioner or law practice, unless the person first informs the practitioner or practice of the disqualification or finding of guilt. Penalty: 60 penalty units. ….