House and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority

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Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2010] AATA 147

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No Q 200500505  

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re DAVID RICHARD HOUSE

Applicant

And

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Deputy President P E Hack SC

Date26 February 2010  

PlaceBrisbane

Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

.............Signed.................

Deputy President

  1. The Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Act 1973 (Cth) creates a scheme whereby certain members of the Defence Force are entitled, on retirement, to invalidity benefits. The amount of benefit is determined by the respondent, the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority, by reference to the extent of incapacity for civilian employment.

  2. The applicant, Mr David House, was a member of the Defence Force until his retirement in May 1975 and has been a “recipient member”, as that expression is used in the Act, for many years. In these proceedings Mr House contends that the Authority has wrongly determined which of his impairments ought to be taken into account in determining his incapacity and has wrongly determined his percentage of incapacity and classification.

  3. This matter is a re-hearing following an appeal to the Federal Court by the Authority. The parties agreed that the evidence ought to include the transcript of the earlier hearing on 2 & 3 July 2007 and certain of the medical reports produced at that hearing. The only “new” evidence comprised two further short statements by Mr House, a report of Dr Philip Morris, a consultant psychiatrist, and brief evidence from Mr House and Dr Morris.

    The legislation

  4. By virtue of s 26 of the Act, where a “contributing member” is retired on the ground of invalidity or of physical or mental incapacity to perform duties, the member is entitled, on retirement, to invalidity benefits in accordance with Part V of the Act. Where a member is, or is about to become, entitled to invalidity benefit the Authority is required by s 30 of the Act to make an initial determination of,

    “the percentage of incapacity in relation to civil employment and … classify him according to the percentage of incapacity as follows:

Percentage of incapacity Class
60% or more A
30% or more but less than 60% B
Less than 30% C
  1. Once that initial determination has been made the Authority may reclassify in accordance with s 34(1) of the Act. That provides:

    “(1)The Authority may, from time to time, if it is satisfied that the percentage of incapacity in relation to civil employment of a recipient member in receipt of invalidity pay is such that the classification of the member should be altered, reclassify him in the appropriate classification set out in section 30 according to the percentage of his incapacity in relation to civil employment.”

    In determining the percentage of incapacity, the Authority is obliged by s 34(1A) of the Act to,

    “have regard to the following matters only:

    (a)     the vocational, trade and professional skills, qualifications and experience of…

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Details
Case
[2010] AATA 147
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of House and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority, the primary dispute centered around the decision of the respondent to deny the applicant’s request for access to certain documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The applicant, Mr. House, sought various documents related to his health and capacity for civil employment. The matter was brought before the court to challenge the respondent's decision and the underlying reasons for withholding the requested documents. Key legal issues included whether the documents in question existed and could be found, if they were exempt from disclosure due to legal professional privilege or irrelevance, and whether all reasonable steps were taken to locate these documents. Additionally, the court had to consider whether Mr. House was estopped from claiming the documents were exempt and whether the respondent had waived any privilege over the documents.

The court examined the evidence provided by Mr. House, including assessments by clinical neuropsychologists and psychiatrists, which highlighted significant memory impairments and cognitive deficits. Despite these impairments, Mr. House demonstrated a logical grasp of the details of the case, indicating that his cognitive abilities were not as severely impaired as claimed. The respondent argued that Mr. House's capacity for civil employment had not worsened, thereby questioning the necessity to revisit previous decisions. The court also noted the complex nature of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel in relation to decisions of the Tribunal. Ultimately, the court found that the respondent's decision to withhold certain documents was justified based on the principles of administrative law and the flexibility afforded to the Tribunal in handling its proceedings.

The court concluded that the respondent had taken all reasonable steps to locate the requested documents and that the respondent was not estopped from claiming the documents were exempt. The court affirmed the decision of the respondent, upholding the denial of access to the documents in question. This decision was based on the administrative nature of the Tribunal's function and its discretion to avoid re-litigating previously determined matters unless there was a significant change in circumstances. The court found that the respondent's decision to withhold the documents was consistent with the principles of fairness and expedition, and did not require further re-litigation of the issues at hand.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Nevertheless, it is necessary to look at the evidence that touches upon the question.The evidence of impairment As long ago as 1992 Mr House was assessed by Ms Maureen Field, a clinical neuropsychologist. Her report of 21 January 1992 described cognitive impairments in several areas including “significant memory impairment”. A further neurological assessment of Mr House was undertaken by Ms Chris Schumann in March 2007. Her report of 17 April 2007 described Mr House’s memory as being “moderately impaired for immediate recall and learning”. She also noted “a retrieval deficit, which was consistent with his history of chronic alcohol excess”. Her testing indicated the following problems:“1) Moderate depression,2) Mildly slow processing speed on some tasks,3) Mild verbal fluency deficit, 4) Memory problems that included:a. Moderate retrieval deficit, 5) Executive problems that included:a. Mild conceptual shifting problems,b. Mild to severe planning and organising deficit,c. Mild to moderate visuo-perceptual organization deficit.” Importantly, Ms Schumann described the test results as consistent with previous neuropsychological assessment in 1992. In her oral evidence from July 2007 Ms Schumann agreed with the proposition that there had been no change between 1992 and 2007. I should also observe that Dr McGuire commented in her report of 19 April 2006 that there “were no obvious cognitive deficits”. That accords with my observations of him, albeit briefly, in the witness box and in the quality of the written material produced by Mr House. The material demonstrates that Mr House appears quite able to argue his case which he does with a considerable degree of logic and a considerable grasp of the detail of evidence given in hearings going back over 15 years. The extent of Mr House’s memory deficits were the subject of a more recent report by, and evidence from, Dr Philip Morris, a consultant psychiatrist. Dr Morris said this:“On examination on various occasions he has been cooperative and showed no obvious distress. His speech shows difficulty with verbal fluency, and with word finding difficulties. His speech is coherent. His affect showed good range and was appropriate. His mood was euthymic. No psychotic features were noted. He does not have any suicidal or homicidal intent now but has had suicidal thoughts in the past. He has been alert on all assessments. His is of average intelligence. His judgement and insight are preserved. Cognitive examination using the Addenbrooke Cognitive Exam revealed problems with verbal memory recall and impaired phonemic verbal fluency. The remainder of his cognitive functions, including attention and orientation, language and visuospatial capacities were impaired. His mini mental state exam score was 29/30 and his ACE-R score was 96/100. Neither indicates dementia.Computer based neuropsychological testing (Integneuro)(Brain Resource Company) revealed impairments in switching of attention (the trail making test A and B) and verbal interference (the Stroop test), and his verbal memory recall after a short and long delay was well below what would be expected based on his pre-morbid intelligence. These results indicate a mild disturbance of cognition in the areas of attention and concentration, executive function and memory recall that are consistent with his subjective complaints.”In his oral evidence Dr Morris said that these deficits were not recent and were consistent with heavy consumption of alcohol.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For its part, the Authority puts these matters very much in issue. But it raises, as well, the argument that the decision under review ought to be affirmed because, putting the matter broadly, nothing is shown to have altered for the worse in Mr House’s capacity for civil employment and thus the Tribunal ought not allow him to re-litigate the matters heard and determined by the Tribunal’s decision in June 2004. The effect of the previous decision Having regard to the arguments of the parties it seems to me to be logical to consider first the Authority’s argument about the effect of the earlier Tribunal decision in 2004. The starting point of the Authority’s argument is the proposition that issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel do not apply to decisions of the Tribunal. I rather think that that states the matter in too absolute terms. In another matter involving Mr House[13] Cooper J observed that the question whether the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel apply to proceedings in the Tribunal was a complex and controversial question and, so far as I am aware, the controversy continues[14]. Fortunately I need not decide that question. The Authority argument is based upon the cases that establish that the Tribunal “has the discretion not to ‘re-litigate’ matters that it has decided previously”.[13] House v Department of Defence (1996) 65 FCR 94, 100. [14] See e.g. Kowalski v Trustee, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 18 at [12] – [13]. Reference was made to the decision of the Full Court in Morales v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[15] where the Court had occasion to consider earlier decisions of the Tribunal and the Court and said:“…it is important to bear in mind that the function of the AAT is an administrative one. Within the framework of the relevant enactments and the general principles of administrative law, the Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the decision under review ‘was the correct or preferable one on the material before the Tribunal’: see Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 at 419; 24 ALR 577 at 589 per Bowen CJ and Deane J. To enable the Tribunal to perform its functions, the Tribunal has a very wide discretion as to the procedure it should adopt and as to the manner in which it should inform itself about factual matters. In Re Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation (1992) 15 AAR 519, O'Connor J, the President of the Tribunal, and Mr Barbour observed (at 526): ‘s 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act provides the Tribunal the flexibility needed to control its process. It is with regard to the dictates of fairness and expedition, after proper consideration of all the facts, that the Tribunal conducts itself.’ The procedural flexibility that the AAT Act gives to the Tribunal has been seen as a source of power not to allow a matter finally determined before it to be relitigated (see Comcare Australia v Grimes at 67; 592 per Wilcox J and Re Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation at 525-526), and it has been suggested that s 33 provides a series of bases on which the Tribunal can decline to revisit previously determined matters or, as the situation demands, reconsider the totality of the matter or some aspect of it. The point is made by McEvoy (at p 52) by reference to the decision of Senior Member Dwyer and Members McLean and Shanahan in Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation (1995) 21 AAR 9 esp at 20-21 where the Tribunal concluded that although it should not generally allow relitigation of issues already decided, it could use its flexible procedures to allow a second claim in respect of an injury that already had been the subject of a claim. In our view, the essentially administrative nature of the Tribunal's function and the nature of its task in looking to the correct or preferable decision, in circumstances where it is to have regard amongst other things to the dictates of fairness, point to the conclusion that the Tribunal may, in appropriate circumstances, conclude that a previous decision should be applied again as the correct and preferable decision when it is sought to revisit the earlier decision at some later time. Of course, the circumstance that a Court has set aside an entire decision may mean that it is either impermissible, or quite inappropriate, to adopt such a course but that would not necessarily be the case where, as here, a particular determination had not itself been the subject of challenge.” [15] (1998) 82 FCR 374 at 389 – 390.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established