Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,

KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

Matter No S75/2016

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

SZSSJ & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Matter No S76/2016

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ORS  APPELLANTS

AND

SZTZI  RESPONDENT

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZI

[2016] HCA 29

27 July 2016

S75/2016 & S76/2016

ORDER

Matter No S75/2016

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders 1 and 2 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a)order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 28 April 2015 be set aside and in its place order that the first respondent pay the applicant's costs; and

(b)the appeal from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 April 2015 be otherwise dismissed.

Matter No S76/2016

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a)order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 12 May 2015 be set aside; and

(b)the appeal from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 12 May 2015 be otherwise dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

S B Lloyd SC with J E Davidson for the appellants in each matter (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

N L Sharp and A M Hochroth with D P Hume for the first respondent in S75/2016 (instructed by N L Sharp)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent in S75/2016

M J Finnane QC with S E J Prince and P W Bodisco for the respondent in S76/2016 (instructed by Michaela Byers, Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Migration – Refugees – Protection visas – Procedural fairness – Where SZSSJ and SZTZI ("respondents") applied for protection visas – Where respondents' personal information published on Department of Immigration and Border Protection website and accessed from 104 unique IP addresses – Where IP addresses known to Department – Where Department conducted International Treaties Obligations Assessments ("ITOAs") to determine impact of publication on non-refoulement obligations – Where ITOAs conducted in accordance with publicly available "Procedures Advice Manual" – Where Department notified respondents of ITOAs and instructed officers conducting ITOAs to assume personal information may have been accessed by authorities in countries where respondents feared persecution or other relevant harm – Where Department neither disclosed IP addresses nor provided unabridged report relating to disclosure of personal information – Whether obligation to afford procedural fairness applied to ITOA processes – Whether ITOA processes procedurally fair.

Courts and judges – Jurisdiction – Federal Circuit Court of Australia – Whether respondents' claims to relief engaged jurisdiction of Court – Whether jurisdiction excluded…

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Details
Case
[2016] HCA 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection appealed to the High Court of Australia against decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which had overturned decisions of the Federal Circuit Court. The dispute concerned the procedural fairness afforded to SZSSJ and SZTZI (the respondents) in relation to their applications for protection visas. The respondents' personal information had been published on the Department of Immigration and Border Protection website, and the Department conducted International Treaties Obligations Assessments (ITOAs) to determine the impact of this publication on its non-refoulement obligations. The respondents argued that the ITOA processes were not procedurally fair, as they were not provided with all relevant information, including the IP addresses that accessed their data.

The High Court was required to determine whether the obligation to afford procedural fairness applied to the ITOA processes and, if so, whether those processes were procedurally fair. A further issue was whether the respondents' claims for relief engaged the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court under section 476(1) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), and whether that jurisdiction was excluded by section 476(2)(d).

The Court reasoned that the conduct of an ITOA by a Department officer constituted "conduct preparatory to the making of a decision" within the extended definition of "decision" in section 474(3)(h) of the *Migration Act*. This conduct was preparatory to a substantive decision by the Minister regarding the grant of a visa or lifting of a bar under specific provisions of the Act. Therefore, the ITOA process was a "privative clause decision" as defined in section 474(2). The Court found that the claims for relief engaged the Federal Circuit Court's jurisdiction under section 476(1), and this jurisdiction was not excluded by section 476(2)(d). The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and remitting the matters for further consideration, with specific directions regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No S75/2016

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders 1 and 2 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a) order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 28 April 2015 be set aside and in its place order that the first respondent pay the applicant's costs; and

(b) the appeal from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 April 2015 be otherwise dismissed.

Matter No S76/2016

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders 1, 2 and 3 made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 25 September 2015, and in their place order that:

(a) order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 12 May 2015 be set aside; and

(b) the appeal from the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 12 May 2015 be otherwise dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ
The expression "privative clause decision" is defined in s 474(2) to mean "a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act". Section 474 goes on relevantly to provide:"(3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:(a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination;(b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa);(c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument;(d)imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction;(e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement;(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article;(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing;(h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation;(i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act;(j)a failure or refusal to make a decision....(7)To avoid doubt, the following decisions are privative clause decisions within the meaning of subsection 474(2):(a)a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider the exercise, of the Minister's power under ... section 48B ... section ... 195A ... or [s] 417 ...;…" Subject to s 476(2)(d), the claims to declaratory and injunctive relief made by SZSSJ and SZTZI engaged the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court under s 476(1). That was because, the Minister having made a procedural decision to consider whether to grant a visa or to lift the bar in the exercise of one or other of the powers conferred by ss 48B, 195A and 417 of the Act, the conduct of an ITOA by an officer of the Department met the definition of a "privative clause decision" in s 474(2). The conduct of the officer met that definition by reason of the extended definition of "decision" in s 474(3)(h). The conduct of an ITOA by an officer of the Department is conduct under the Act preparatory to the making of a substantive decision by the Minister – specifically, it is the holding of an inquiry or investigation. To conclude that the jurisdiction so engaged is excluded by s 476(2)(d), it would be necessary to read the same extended definition of "decision" in s 474(3)(h) into the reference in s 474(7) to "a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider the exercise, of the Minister's power", relevantly under s 48B, s 195A or s 417. The structure of s 474 is against that reading. The section is more naturally read sequentially: s 474(3) serving to spell out an extended meaning of the generic term "decision" for the purpose of the operative expression "privative clause decision", and s 474(7) serving the distinct and specific function of clarifying that operative expression to include specified statutory decisions of the Minister. None of the other paragraphs of s 474(3) can sensibly be read into s 474(7), and s 474(3)(h) should be treated no differently. Section 474(3)(h) for that textual reason should not be read into s 474(7). But even if it could, s 474(3)(h) as read into s 474(7) could not sensibly be read as encompassing conduct other than that of the Minister.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ