Papamihail v Legal Profession Complaints Committee

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   PAPAMIHAIL -v- LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2023] WASCA 183

CORAM:   BUSS P

HALL JA

MORRISON AJA

HEARD:   3 MAY 2023

DELIVERED          :   15 DECEMBER 2023

FILE NO/S:   CACV 73 of 2022

BETWEEN:   GEORGE PAPAMIHAIL

Appellant

AND

LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE

First Respondent

LAW COMPLAINTS OFFICER

Second Respondent

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

Third Respondent

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Fourth Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   ALLANSON J

File Number            :   CIV 1530 of 2021


Catchwords:

Legal profession - Legal practitioner - Complaint about practitioner's conduct - Whether complaint against practitioner was investigated on behalf of Legal Profession Complaints Committee by invalidly appointed investigator - Whether the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) permitted the Law Complaints Officer to nominate a person outside the Legal Practice Board's staff as an investigator - Whether Goldsmith v Law Complaints Officer [2021] WASC 69 was wrongly decided

Legal profession - Legal practitioner - Complaint about practitioner's conduct - Whether Legal Profession Complaints Committee denied the practitioner procedural fairness by not inviting submissions on information obtained by an investigator and the report of the investigator before referring the matter of the practitioner's conduct to State Administrative Tribunal

Legal profession - Legal practitioner - Complaint about practitioner's conduct - Whether Legal Profession Complaints Committee denied the practitioner procedural fairness, in circumstances where the Committee had options available to it which were more favourable to the practitioner than referring the matter of the practitioner's conduct to the Tribunal, by failing to give the practitioner an opportunity to make submissions as to what course the Committee should take before the Committee decided to refer the matter to the Tribunal

Legal profession - Legal practitioner - Complaint about practitioner's conduct - Where the matter of the practitioner's conduct referred to State Administrative Tribunal - The meaning of 'matter' within s 428(1) of the Legal Profession Act2008 - Whether referral invalid because the practitioner's conduct the subject of the referral was not a specific item of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct and consequently was not sufficiently precise to constitute a 'matter', within s 428(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2008

Legal profession - Legal practitioner - Complainant about practitioner's conduct - Whether Legal Profession Complaints Committee required to give reasons for a decision under s 428(1) of the Legal Profession Act2008 to refer the matter of the practitioner's conduct to State Administrative Tribunal

Legal profession - Legal practitioner - Complaint about practitioner's conduct - Disciplinary proceedings - Whether State Administrative Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear a matter referred to it by Legal Profession Complaints Committee is enlivened if the Committee has not made a lawful determination that the Tribunal should hear the matter or the Committee has not made a lawful referral of the matter to the Tribunal

Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Leave to amend to raise grounds…

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Details
Case
[2023] WASCA 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Papamihail v Legal Profession Complaints Committee, the matter before the court was whether the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (the Committee) had to provide the legal practitioner, Mr Papamihail, an opportunity to make submissions before deciding to refer his matter to the State Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal). Mr Papamihail was investigated by the Committee for complaints against him, and the Committee decided to refer his matter to the Tribunal. Mr Papamihail argued that the Committee had to provide him with an opportunity to make submissions before deciding to refer his matter to the Tribunal. The court had to decide whether the Committee was required to provide Mr Papamihail with an opportunity to make submissions before deciding to refer his matter to the Tribunal.

The court found that the Committee was not required to provide Mr Papamihail with an opportunity to make submissions before deciding to refer his matter to the Tribunal. The court relied on the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ and the Full Court's decision in Saraceni v Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The court found that the Committee's power to refer a matter to the Tribunal was purely investigative and did not include a power to make findings or recommendations. The court found that the exercise of the Committee's power to refer a matter to the Tribunal did not carry with it the capacity to destroy or prejudice the rights or interests of the practitioner, who would have an opportunity to be heard in the Tribunal. The court found that the Committee had determined that the matter should be heard by the Tribunal and therefore referred, and that it had come to the view, without making any findings against Mr Papamihail, that the Committee should not deal with the matter.

The court dismissed Mr Papamihail's appeal and held that the Committee was not required to provide him with an opportunity to make submissions before deciding to refer his matter to the Tribunal. The court found that the Committee's power to refer a matter to the Tribunal was purely investigative and did not include a power to make findings or recommendations. The court found that the exercise of the Committee's power to refer a matter to the Tribunal did not carry with it the capacity to destroy or prejudice the rights or interests of the practitioner, who would have an opportunity to be heard in the Tribunal. The court found that the Committee had determined that the matter should be heard by the Tribunal and therefore referred, and that it had come to the view, without making any findings against Mr Papamihail, that the Committee should not deal with the matter.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The terms of s 424(1) shed some light on the question of the meaning of 'matter' in s 428:424. Decision of Complaints Committee after investigation(1)After an investigation under section 421 is completed, the Complaints Committee must -(a)in the case of the investigation of a complaint, dismiss the complaint under section 425 or, in the case of an investigation on the initiative of the Complaints Committee, decide to take no further action; or(b)take action under section 426; or(c)refer the matter to the State Administrative Tribunal under section 428. In s 424(1) the phrase used is 'the matter', which equates with 'the matter' in s 428(1). What is investigated under s 421(1) is 'the conduct of an Australian legal practitioner' in respect of each complaint: s 421(1) and s 421(2). Once that investigation is complete, s 424(1) obligates the Committee to do one of three things: (i) dismiss the complaint or decide to take no further action; s 424(l)(a), s 425, s 421(1); (ii) summarily conclude the complaint procedure (for example, by way of imposing a reprimand and a fine, with the practitioner's consent): s 424(l)(b), s 426; or (iii) refer the matter to the Tribunal: s 424(l)(c), s 428. When s 421 and s 424(1) are read together, the word 'matter' seems plainly to be equated with the subject matter of the complaint, that is to say, the conduct of the practitioner about which the complaint is made, whether that conduct is unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, and what orders should be made as a consequence. Having investigated the conduct of a practitioner in respect of a complaint, the Committee has the option of referring 'the matter' to the Tribunal. In our view, that indicates that the legislature intended that the referral would be of the subject matter that was for consideration by the Committee, that is, whether the conduct of the practitioner the subject of a complaint is unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct and whether some form of orders should be made. The power to dismiss a complaint under s 425 arises in this way:425. Dismissal of complaint After an investigation of a complaint against an Australian legal practitioner is completed, the Complaints Committee may dismiss the complaint if satisfied that -(a)there is no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty by the State Administrative Tribunal of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct; or (b)it is in the public interest to do so. Plainly s 425 requires the Committee to form a view as to whether the practitioner would likely be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct by the Tribunal. A similar view as to guilt of unsatisfactory professional conduct must be formed under s 426(1)(a)(ii). It is in that context that one finds s 428 which provides:Referrals to SAT (1)If the Complaints Committee determines that a matter should be heard by the State Administrative Tribunal the Committee may refer the matter to the Tribunal. (2)The Complaints Committee is not limited under subsection (1) by the terms of any complaint it has received or by the subject matter of any investigation it has conducted and is not required to conduct an investigation before referring a matter to the State Administrative Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ[72] the High Court said:Ordinarily, affording a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the exercise of a statutory power to conduct an inquiry requires that a person whose interest is apt to be affected be put on notice of: the nature and purpose of the inquiry; the issues to be considered in conducting the inquiry; and the nature and content of information that the repository of power undertaking the inquiry might take into account as a reason for coming to a conclusion adverse to the person.[72] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180 [83]. At the point of the Committee determining to refer a matter to the Tribunal, there is, in our view, no interest of the practitioner apt to be adversely affected by that step, in the sense used in SZSSJ. Further, in Saraceni v Australian Securities and Investments Commission,[73] the court, having reviewed authority, said:Three propositions may be drawn from a review of these authorities. First, not every power of investigation attracts a duty of procedural fairness. Second, whilst it may be true that no bright lines can be drawn, a statutory power that is purely investigative, such as the power of the Commissioner of Taxation to require production of documents or to attend to give evidence about the person's income, are less likely to be attended by an obligation to accord procedural fairness. This is particularly so where the investigative function does not include a power to make findings or recommendations.The third, and most fundamental proposition, is that the overriding question will always be whether the exercise of the investigative power carries with it the capacity to destroy or prejudice the rights or interests of the person affected by the exercise of the power. That was why the exercise of the power by the Commission in Ainsworth [(1992) 175 CLR 564] and by the delegate in Johns [(1993) 178 CLR 408] were each attended by an obligation of procedural fairness. In those cases there was inevitable public attention drawn to matters that were otherwise protected by statutory obligations of confidence [101] ‑ [102].[73] Saraceni v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] FCAFC 42; (2013) 211 FCR 298. Those statements are applicable here. At the point of the Committee determining that a matter should be heard by the Tribunal and therefore referred, the Committee's powers does not include a power to make findings or recommendations and there is no prejudice to the rights or interests of the practitioner, who will have an opportunity to be heard in the Tribunal. The appellant submits that the Committee was required to give the appellant an opportunity to make submissions in support of a more favourable option to him before it decided to make a referral (dismissal of the complaint, decision to take no further action or summary resolution).[74] That submission cannot be accepted. At that point the Committee had determined that the matter should be heard by the Tribunal, not the Committee. It had come to the view, without making any findings against the appellant, that the Committee should not deal with the matter. It is a romancing rather than realistic view of the state of affairs to suggest that there was any more favourable option available.[74] Appellant's supplementary submissions [54].