FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Saraceni v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] FCAFC 42
Citation: Saraceni v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] FCAFC 42 Appeal from: Saraceni v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] FCA 688 Parties: LUKE SARACENI v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, MARTIN BRUCE JONES AND JOHN ROSS LINDHOLM AS RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS OF SEAPORT PTY LTD ACN 085 027 176 (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED), MARTIN BRUCE JONES, DARREN GORDON WEAVER AND ANDREW JOHN SAKER AS RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS OF NEWPORT SECURITIES PTY LTD ACN 059 217 439 (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (CONTROLLERS APPOINTED) and MARTIN BRUCE JONES, DARREN GORDON WEAVER AND ANDREW JOHN SAKER AS RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS OF MAYPORT NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 070 052 603 (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) File number: WAD 151 of 2012 Judges: NORTH, JACOBSON & GILMOUR JJ Date of judgment: 16 May 2013 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – summary judgment – whether any reasonable prospect of success
CORPORATIONS – examinations – operation and effect of Div 1 of Part 5.9 Corporations Act 2001 – authorisation as eligible applicant – whether there is an implied obligation of procedural fairness at authorisation stage – whether potential “target” of examination entitled to notice
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – natural justice – procedural fairness – improper exercise of power – whether failure to take into account relevant considerations – whether irrelevant considerations taken into account
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 11
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Div 1 Part 5.9, ss 9, 596A, 596B
Corporations Law (Cth), s 597
Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31ACases cited: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Limited (1993) 177 CLR 485
Australian Securities Commission v Somerville (1994) 51 FCR 38
Byrne v Marles (2008) 19 VR 612
Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B (N.S.); 143 ER 414
Cornall v AB (A Solicitor) [1995] 1 VR 372
Decor Corp Pty Limited v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Evans v Wainter Pty Ltd (2005) 145 FCR 176
Flanders v Beatty (1995) 16 ACSR 324
Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486
Hare v Gladwin (1988) 82 ALR 307
Highstoke Pty Ltd v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 501
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
May v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 92 FCR 152
Minosea Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 14 ACSR 642
Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 290 ALR 616
Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed); Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69
Ryan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 158 FCR 301
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252
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- Case
- [2013] FCAFC 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the operation and effect of Division 1 of Part 5.9 of the Corporations Act 2001, focusing on the authorisation of eligible applicants and the procedural fairness requirements. It was argued that ASIC's failure to provide notice to Mr. Saraceni before authorising the Receivers constituted an improper exercise of power. However, the court concluded that ASIC's authorisation of the Receivers did not require the application of procedural fairness as it did not carry the capacity to destroy or prejudice Mr. Saraceni's rights or interests. The court further held that the authorisation stage and the application stage for an examination order were distinct, with the latter stage providing an appropriate opportunity for Mr. Saraceni to challenge the purpose and fairness of the examination.
Ultimately, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal. The reasoning was that Mr. Saraceni did not demonstrate a reasonable prospect of success on appeal. Consequently, Mr. Saraceni was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal be granted.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The applicant/appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The third, and most fundamental proposition, is that the overriding question will always be whether the exercise of the investigative power carries with it the capacity to destroy or prejudice the rights or interests of the person affected by the exercise of the power. That was why the exercise of the power by the Commission in Ainsworth and by the delegate in Johns were each attended by an obligation of procedural fairness. In those cases there was inevitable public attention drawn to matters that were otherwise protected by statutory obligations of confidence.The operation and effect of Division 1 of Part 5.9 The operation and effect of Division 1 of Part 5.9 of the Corporations Act have been considered in some detail by two Full Courts of the Federal Court. The first was Re Excel. The second was Evans v Wainter Pty Ltd (2005) 145 FCR 176 (often referred to as New Tel). In Re Excel at 79ff, the Full Court (Gummow, Hill and Cooper JJ) addressed the historical background to the examination regime which was then contained in s 597 of the Corporations Law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth). Their Honours observed at 81 that the power conferred on the Commission as an administrative matter to authorise a person to make application for the issue of an examination summons reflected a legislative decision to move to the Commission power to grant standing, but without derogating from the discretion which was retained by the Court to grant or refuse an order. The two-stage process, to which I referred above, was explained by their Honours at 81-82. In so describing the process, they observed that the issues that arise for decision at the first stage, that is to say, authorisation, are different from those that arise at the second stage which is concerned with the application to the Court by an “authorised person”. At the first stage, the question at issue is whether the applicant for authorisation is an appropriate person for the Commission to authorise to make an application to the Court. That question requires consideration of the relationship which the person has to the corporation but it may also encompass matters personal to the applicant, such as his or her relationship to the persons who may be examined. Their Honours went on to say at 82 that at the second stage, the Court in deciding whether to grant the order may take into account different matters, specifically matters concerning the relationship between the proposed examinee and the corporation and the proposed examinee and the applicant. Also the Court may take into account the purpose of the applicant in seeking the examination order. Significantly, their Honours said, at 83, that ordinarily a challenge to the issue of an examination order on the ground of an improper purpose on the part of the applicant will not arise at the first stage. Rather, the challenge on the ground of purpose will take place at the second stage in relation to the order of the Court.