Soper v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Soper v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2004] FCA 854

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – failure to take into account relevant consideration – grant by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) of authorisation to make enquiries under s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether a duty to enquire acts as an implied constraint on definition of ‘eligible applicant’ – whether attitude of liquidator to grant of authorisation a mandatory relevant consideration – no duty to enquire – attitude of liquidator not mandatory relevant consideration

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – decision asserted to be manifestly unreasonable by ASIC’s failure to make enquiries – no manifest unreasonableness demonstrated

EVIDENCE – no evidence that delegate did or did not take relevant matters into account – whether an inference can be drawn that the delegate failed to consider relevant matters – not possible to draw inference

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘eligible applicant’

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5, 13, Sch 2
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1), 39B(1A)(c)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9, 596A, 596B
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 11, 11(4)

Cubillo v Commonwealthof Australia (2001) 112 FCR 455 cited
Domino Hire Pty Ltd v Pioneer ParkPty Ltd(in liq) (2003) 21 ACLC 1330 considered
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499 cited
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 cited
Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 applied
Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance v ASC (1993) 40 FCR 409 cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 40 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433 cited
Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 referred to
Queensland Building Services v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 73 FCR 29 referred to
Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 cited

BRIAN SOPER & ORS v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION & ANOR
N 575 OF 2004

HELY J
5 JULY 2004
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 575 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

BRIAN SOPER
FIRST APPLICANT

ARA BASTAJIAN
SECOND APPLICANT

JOHN McFARLANE
THIRD APPLICANT

CHARLES GOODE
FOURTH APPLICANT

NICI AGSTEN
FIFTH APPLICANT

TERESA CASANOVA
SIXTH APPLICANT

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED
(ACN 005 357 522)
SEVENTH APPLICANT

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENT

CLIFFORD JOHN CARPENTER
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JULY 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 575 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

BRIAN SOPER
FIRST APPLICANT

ARA BASTAJIAN
SECOND APPLICANT

JOHN McFARLANE
THIRD APPLICANT

CHARLES GOODE
FOURTH APPLICANT

NICI AGSTEN
FIFTH APPLICANT

TERESA…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 854
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Soper v Australian Securities and Investments Commission involves an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) on 4 February 2004. This decision authorised Mr Carpenter to be an eligible applicant for the purpose of applying to the Court under section 596B of the Corporations Act in respect of several individuals concerning the examinable affairs of Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liquidation). The applicants, who are or were officers or employees of the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, argue that ASIC’s decision was unreasonable. They contend that ASIC should have made inquiries directly with the liquidator of Pioneer Park Pty Ltd to ascertain why he had adopted a certain position.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether ASIC was required to make specific inquiries of the liquidator and if there was any manifest unreasonableness in ASIC’s decision not to do so. The court considered the statutory framework governing ASIC’s powers under the Corporations Act and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act, including the definition of ‘eligible applicant’ and the process for authorising applicants to seek court orders. The court also reviewed the precedent set by the Full Court in Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd v England, which outlined the two-stage process for granting authorisations to eligible applicants.

In its reasoning, the court found that ASIC was not under an obligation to make the inquiries of the liquidator as contended by the applicants, and there was no manifest unreasonableness in ASIC’s failure to pursue that line of enquiry. The court determined that ASIC had appropriately considered the relationship Mr Carpenter had to the relevant corporation and found no grounds for interference with the administrative decision. The court concluded that the application for judicial review should be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have before me a Second Further Amended Application for an order of review under s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘the ADJR Act’) and s 39B(1) and 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to review a decision (‘the decision’) by the first respondent on or about 4 February 2004 made under s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Corporations Act’) and/or s 11 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the ASIC Act’). The decision authorised the second respondent (‘Mr Carpenter’) to be an eligible applicant for the purpose of an application to the Court under s 596B of the Corporations Act in respect of:(a) Ara Bastajian; (b) Brian Soper; (c) Teresa Casanova; (d) Nici Agsten; (e) Geoffrey Neilson; (f) Charles Goode; and (g) John McFarlane,concerning the examinable affairs at Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (ACN 002 706 881) (‘Pioneer’). The decision was made by Nick Horspool (‘the Delegate’), acting under delegation from the first respondent (‘ASIC’).Background The individual applicants are or were officers or employees of the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (‘the Bank’). In the period 1996 – 1999 Pioneer was a customer of the Bank and had entered into facility agreements with the Bank pursuant to which financial accommodation was provided by the Bank to Pioneer. Mr Carpenter guaranteed the repayment of Pioneer’s indebtedness to the Bank. Mr Carpenter was a shareholder in and a director of Pioneer. He also claims to be a creditor of Pioneer. At the end of 1998 or in the first part of 1999 the Bank terminated the credit facilities which it had granted to Pioneer and on 10 June 1999 appointed administrators of Pioneer pursuant to its security documents. On 28 July 1999 the company was placed into liquidation. On and from 14 December 1999 Gavin Thomas has been the liquidator of Pioneer. In very general terms, Mr Carpenter contends that in terminating Pioneer’s facilities and in appointing administrators, the Bank acted in breach of its contract with Pioneer, and is liable to Pioneer for a substantial sum by way of damages. The Bank has instituted proceedings against Mr Carpenter upon his guarantee in which the Bank seeks to recover the amount allegedly still owed by Pioneer to the Bank after realisation of securities given by Pioneer to the Bank. Mr Carpenter is defending those proceedings. Again, in very general terms, his defence is that the Bank’s conduct in terminating the facilities and in appointing administrators was a breach of contract which discharged his liability as guarantor. The liquidator of Pioneer has instituted proceedings against Mr Carpenter and entities associated with him for alleged preferences or insolvent trading. Those actions have been funded by the Bank. The details of the liquidator’s claims against Mr Carpenter do not matter for present purposes. On 10 June 2003 Austin J dismissed an application made by Mr Carpenter and an associated entity for the removal of Mr Thomas as a liquidator: Domino Hire Pty Ltd v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 21 ACLC 1330.The application to the Australian Securities & Investments Commission

Decision

Reasons for decision

HELY J
If I am right in my conclusion that the liquidator’s attitude was not a matter which was mandatorily relevant, then there is no manifest unreasonableness in ASIC not making enquiries of the liquidator directly to ascertain why he had adopted the position disclosed in his letter of 13 November 2003. In any event, ASIC did make enquiries on that question from the solicitor for Mr Carpenter and received a response which was consistent with the liquidator’s letter. There was no obligation upon ASIC to make the enquiries of the liquidator for which the applicants contend, or manifest unreasonableness in failing to pursue that line of enquiry.Conclusion The application should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HELY J

I agree that the memo of 21 January 2004 does not mention those matters. Whilst a full copy of the judgment was included in the working file, there is no evidence as to whether or not the Delegate read it. Parts of that copy of the judgment have been highlighted, and it is common ground that this occurred before submission of the working file to the Delegate.Consideration The effect of s 569B of the Corporations Act and the definition of ‘eligible applicant’, when taken in conjunction with s 11(4) of the ASIC Act (see Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance v ASC (1993) 40 FCR 409), is to enable ASIC to make an administrative decision by virtue of which a person is granted standing to apply to the Court to summons a person for examination about a corporation’s examinable affairs. The term ‘examinable affairs’ is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act. It follows from the definition, also in s 9, of ‘eligible applicant’ that the appointment of a liquidator of a corporation does not preclude ASIC from granting an authorisation to some other person which will result in that person falling within the definition of ‘eligible applicant’: ‘eligible applicant … means: … (e) a person authorised in writing by ASIC …’ (Corporations Act s 9) The operation of the precursor to these provisions was considered by the Full Court in Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 (Excel). The Full Court in Excel drew attention to the fact that the legislation provides for a two stage process and that different matters will arise for consideration at each stage of that process. The first stage in that procedure, where the prospective applicant for a court order is not ASIC or a person referred to in par (b), (c) or (d) of the definition of ‘eligible applicant’, is the authorisation by ASIC of the person to make an application under Part 5.9. The second stage is when the applicant, thus authorised, makes an application to the Court. The question at issue in the first stage is whether the prospective applicant seeking authorisation is an appropriate person for ASIC to authorise to make the application to the Court. That question will require consideration of the relationship which that person has to the relevant corporation, although it may also encompass matters personal to that applicant, such as the applicants’ relationship to the persons to be examined: Excel at 82. At 86 the Full Court said:‘As we have already noted, the grant of authorisation under subs (1) does no more than confer standing upon the person authorised to make an application. That being the case, reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of subsection (1) leads to the conclusion that the decision-maker, in determining whether to authorise a particular person to make applications in relation to a particular corporation, will be required only to consider the relationship which that person has to the external administration and in the particular case the appropriateness of that person being given standing to apply to the Court under subs (2).’