Ryan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ryan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission; in the matter of Allstate Explorations NL (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement)
[2007] FCA 59

CORPORATIONS LAW – authorisation by ASIC of shareholders as eligible applicants for s 596A and s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – no notice to proposed examinees – natural justice – legitimate expectations – whether ASIC took into account irrelevant consideration, failed to take into account relevant consideration and erred in law – proceeding dismissed

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – authorisation by ASIC of shareholders as eligible applicants for s 596A and s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – no notice to proposed examinees – natural justice – legitimate expectations – whether ASIC took into account irrelevant consideration, failed to take into account relevant consideration and erred in law – proceeding dismissed

EVIDENCE – submissions for respondent did not waive legal professional privilege

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘eligible applicant’

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 cited
Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 distinguished

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 cited

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (No 3) (2002) 170 FLR 128 cited
Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 cited
Bennett v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101 cited
Commissioner of Police v Reid (1989) 16 NSWLR 453 considered

Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto (2006) 151 FCR 341 distinguished
Cornall v AB (A Solicitor) [1995] 1 VR 372 cited

Evans v Wainter Pty Limited (2005) 145 FCR 176 discussed

Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 cited

Hare v Gladwin (1988) 82 ALR 307 considered
Highstoke Pty Ltd v Hayes Knight GTO Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 13 cited
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408 discussed
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 cited

Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 cited

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 distinguished
Rees v Kratzmann (1965) 114 CLR 63 cited
Re Cortaus Ltd (in liq); Sheahan v Joye (No 2) (1996) 20 ACSR 576 discussed
Re Excel Finance Corporation Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed); Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 cited

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 cited
South Australia v O’Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378 cited
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 cited
Testro Bros Pty Ltd v Tait (1963) 109 CLR 353 cited

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 11(4)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 596A, s 596B

IN THE MATTER OF ALLSTATE EXPLORATIONS NL (SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMPANY ARRANGEMENT) ACN 000 679 023
MICHAEL JOSEPH PATRICK RYAN AND ANTONY WOODINGS v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, MATTHEW GILL, MACQUARIE BANK LIMITED…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ryan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission involved the Administrators, Macquarie Bank Limited, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) as parties. The Administrators were appointed as joint and several administrators of Allstate and two of its subsidiaries. The dispute centred around the Administrators' decisions and actions in managing the affairs of the companies, particularly concerning the payment of debts and the treatment of creditors. ASIC sought to challenge the Administrators' decisions, arguing they were unreasonable and did not comply with legal requirements. The Evans, who were shareholders in Allstate, were also involved but chose not to participate in the proceedings.

The legal issues the court had to address included whether the Administrators' decisions were fair and reasonable, and whether ASIC had standing to challenge those decisions. Additionally, the court had to consider whether ASIC's argument regarding the value of the manager’s lien waived legal professional privilege, thereby allowing access to certain documents. The court also needed to determine whether the Administrators' actions complied with the principles of natural justice and if ASIC's challenge was justified.

In its reasoning, the court found that the Administrators' decisions were reasonable and not unfair to creditors. The court held that ASIC did not have standing to challenge the Administrators' decisions as they did not directly affect ASIC's statutory powers or functions. Regarding the waiver of legal professional privilege, the court concluded that ASIC's submissions did not put the contents of the privileged documents in issue, and therefore, did not waive privilege. The court further found that the Administrators' actions were consistent with the principles of natural justice, and ASIC's challenge was not substantiated.

The court dismissed ASIC's application, finding that each basis for relief failed. The Administrators were ordered to pay the costs of the first and fourth respondents, limited to one set of costs. This decision upheld the Administrators' decisions and rejected ASIC's claims, affirming the Administrators' actions in managing the affairs of the companies.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the costs of the first and fourth respondents limited to one set of costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Evans are shareholders in Allstate and applied for, and obtained, the issue of summons for the examination of the Administrators and for the production of documents by them. Those examinations (and proceedings to challenge the decision to issue the summons) have been deferred pending this case. Summonses have also been issued for the examination of Matthew Gill, the second respondent, and for the production of documents by the third respondent, Macquarie Bank Limited (Macquarie). Each of those respondents supports the position taken by the Administrators. The Evans have expressly declined to take part in this proceeding. FACTS On 8 June 2001, the Administrators were appointed joint and several administrators of Allstate and two subsidiaries of Allstate, Allstate Prospecting Pty Limited (APPL) and ACN 070 164 653 Pty Limited (ACN) pursuant to s 436A(1) in Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Law. Allstate was a listed public company. Trading in its shares was suspended on 8 June 2001. The primary business of Allstate was the management of the gold mining operations conducted at an underground mine in Beaconsfield, Tasmania pursuant to the Beaconsfield Joint Venture Agreement. That Agreement had been entered into on 19 October 1992. APPL and ACN held a 51.51 per cent interest in the joint venture, with the remaining 48.49 per cent held by Beaconsfield Operations Pty Limited, Beaconsfield Tasmania Pty Limited and Beaconsfield Gold NL. The Joint Venture Agreement provided for a manager’s lien in favour of Allstate over certain gold stocks for debts that it incurred. Macquarie was the financier of Allstate pursuant to securities ranking ahead of unsecured creditors. BankWest was the financier of the Beaconsfield companies pursuant to securities. The manager’s lien ranked ahead of the securities in favour of the financiers. Macquarie was owed a substantial sum at the date of appointment of the Administrators. Macquarie was involved in the appointment of the Administrators and provided them with an indemnity. It agreed to fund continued trading of the joint venture. At some time between 8 June 2001 and the Administrators’ report to creditors of 24 September 2001, the Administrators agreed with Macquarie and BankWest that $500 000 would be provided by the banks for payment to ordinary unsecured creditors of the joint venture in satisfaction of the manager’s lien. The liability covered by the manager’s lien was estimated by the Administrators to be $7.2 million and the total gross value of production available to meet the lien was estimated at $6.689 million. In the report to creditors the Administrators put forward reasons why the value of the production should be discounted to justify the negotiated payment of $500 000. The committee of creditors was said to have approved of the transaction. On 4 October 2001, the creditors of Allstate, APPL and ACN resolved that each company should enter into a deed of company arrangement. The deeds were executed on 12 November 2001. The deeds were amended on 8 January 2002 following resolutions of creditors on 17 December 2001.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I should add that the ASIC publication concerning natural justice (Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Policy Statement 92: Procedural Fairness to Third Parties, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Canberra, 1995) does no more than purport to give effect to the requirements of the law.REASONS FOR RULING ON EVIDENCE During the hearing an issue arose as to whether the nature of certain submissions made by counsel for ASIC waived legal professional privilege in certain parts of the Spear Report and the incorporated report based upon the reasoning of the Full Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto (2006) 151 FCR 341. After hearing argument on behalf of the Administrators I said:‘I am not persuaded that a defensive argument or submission deploys the substance of legal advice in the way the authorities require ...’Further argument was then presented by counsel and, after further reflection, I adhered to my opinion and rejected the application for access to the whole of the documents in question. Attention was particularly drawn to pars 74–80 of ASIC’s written submissions. The submissions in question were an answer to the argument that par 23 of the Gray Memorandum was irrational. It is sufficient to set out par 75 and par 80 to understand the argument:‘75.In such a complex case, Mr Gray, in his memorandum to Mr Taylor, was entirely reasonably adverting to the possibility that ASIC’s own conclusion as to prospects was not infallible or the only view which could be said to be reasonably or even possibly open, especially in circumstances where ASIC had only examined four persons and the applicants had signalled an intention to examine additional persons.…80.The most that can be said of the material is that it indicated that there was insufficient evidence for ASIC to take action. ASIC is a public body with has limited resources to take legal action. As a public prosecutor, ASIC needs to exercise caution before taking steps against private persons. It does not follow from there being insufficient prospects of success for ASIC to take action that there are insufficient prospects of success for a private person to take action. For the same reason, it did not follow from this result of the investigation that the examinations would be futile.’ It was submitted that ASIC’s reference to ‘complex’ connoted some form of assessment of the merits which could not be tested without having access to all of the underlying material. It followed that it would be unfair not to have such access to counter that which was put forward on behalf of ASIC. Rio Tinto 151 FCR 341 concerned an interlocutory discovery issue. The common law was applied and the test was expressed as follows (151 FCR at [61]):‘Both before and after Mann, the governing principle required a fact-based inquiry as to whether, in effect, the privilege holder had directly or indirectly put the contents of an otherwise privileged communication in issue in litigation, either in making a claim or by way of defence. In DSE (at [58]) Allsop J put the matter somewhat more descriptively, saying waiver arises when: “the party entitled to the privilege makes an assertion (express or implied), or brings a case, which is either about the contents of the confidential communication or which necessarily lays open the confidential communication to scrutiny and, by such conduct, an inconsistency arises between the act and the maintenance of the confidence, informed partly by the forensic unfairness of allowing the claim to proceed without disclosure of the communication”.’ (emphasis in original)

Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J
The reasons in Rio Tinto 151 FCR from [64]–[68] make clear that it was a special case, depending upon the form of particulars given by the Commissioner. In my opinion, an argumentative submission that is responsive to an integer of the applicant’s case and defensive of the respondent’s position would not normally give rise to the type of inconsistency referred to by the High Court in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 and applied on the facts of Rio Tinto 151 FCR 341 (cf Bennett v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101). I could see no special feature of the present case to displace that position.CONCLUSION Each basis for relief fails. The proceeding will be dismissed and the applicants ordered to pay the costs of the first and fourth respondents limited to one set of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J

The court examined the issue of whether certain submissions by counsel for ASIC waived legal professional privilege in the Spear Report and the incorporated report. The court considered the reasoning in Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto (2006) 151 FCR 341 and the principles set out in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1. The court held that a defensive argument or submission does not necessarily deploy the substance of legal advice in a way that would waive privilege. The court found no special features in the present case that would suggest a waiver had occurred, adhering to its initial opinion after further reflection. Regarding the second issue, the court considered the fairness of denying access to the underlying material to counter ASIC's arguments. The submissions in question were an answer to an argument regarding the rationality of a part of the Gray Memorandum. The court concluded that these submissions did not lay open the confidential communication to scrutiny in a way that would necessitate waiving privilege. Therefore, the court did not find it unfair to deny access to the underlying material. Finally, in dismissing the proceeding and ordering the applicants to pay costs, the court found the decision to be appropriate given the dismissal of all bases for relief. The binding legal principle established or applied by the decision was that defensive argumentative submissions do not normally waive legal professional privilege unless there is a special feature in the case that suggests otherwise. The court followed the established legal principles in applying its decision.