Collard v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (No. 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Collard v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (No. 3) [2008] FCA 1681

CORPORATIONS – Australian Securities and Investments Commission – examinations – power to exclude examinee’s lawyer from examinations – power exercisable by inspectors rather than Commission – power only enlivened where inspectors believe in good faith and on reasonable grounds that exclusion is necessary – exercise of power attracts obligation of procedural fairness

Held: application granted – direction to exclude not based on reasonable grounds – direction set aside

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 13, sch 2
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 19, 19(2), 20, 22(1), 23(1), 102(6)
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss 22, 23
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) ss 19, 25, 25(4)

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 applied
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88 cited
Australian Securities Commission v Bell (1991) 32 FCR 517 followed
Bell v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 31 FCR 184 referred to
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110 cited
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 cited
Gangemi v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 129 FCR 284 considered
Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241 cited
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 applied
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 applied
Macquarie Advisory Group Pty Ltd (rec apptd) v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (1999) 33 ACSR 106 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 cited
National Crime Authority v A (1988) 18 FCR 439 considered
Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74 referred to
Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 cited
Ryan v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 158 FCR 301 distinguished
Stockbridge v Ogilvie (1993) 43 FCR 244 considered

DAVID JOHN COLLARD, MIN HUA LI and LI MIN ZENG v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, MEREDITH DODDS and YON ASTAR

NSD 1617 of 2008

PERRAM J
12 NOVEMBER 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1617 of 2008

BETWEEN:

DAVID JOHN COLLARD
First Applicant

MIN HUA LI
Second Applicant

LI MIN ZENG
Third Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
First Respondent

MEREDITH DODDS
Second Respondent

YON ASTAR
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 NOVEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The direction made by the Second and Third Respondents on Friday 10 October 2008 is set aside and the application is otherwise dismissed.

2.The First Respondent pay the costs of the Applicants.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1681
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Collard v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (No. 3) involves a dispute between the applicants, who were implicated in an investigation into an alleged illegal managed investment scheme, and ASIC, which conducted the investigation. The applicants sought a declaration that a direction given by ASIC inspectors to exclude their legal representatives from attending the examinations of the applicants was invalid, as well as an injunction restraining ASIC from enforcing the direction. ASIC opposed the application.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were: (a) the identity and authority of the decision-maker, (b) the requirement for reasonable grounds for the inspectors' direction, and (c) whether the inspectors' decision to exclude the applicants' legal representatives was subject to procedural fairness obligations. ASIC argued that it, as the corporate entity, had the authority to issue the direction, while the applicants contended that the power to exclude legal representatives rested with the inspectors conducting the examination. The applicants also argued that the inspectors lacked reasonable grounds to believe that allowing the legal representatives to attend would prejudice the investigation. Additionally, the applicants claimed that the inspectors' decision to exclude their legal representatives breached procedural fairness principles because it did not provide an opportunity for the applicants to argue against the exclusion.

The court found that ASIC, as a corporate entity, did not have the authority to issue the direction to exclude the applicants' legal representatives; this power lay with the inspectors. The court further found that the inspectors' decision was not subject to procedural fairness requirements and did not need to be supported by reasonable grounds because the decision to summon the applicants for examination was not subject to such requirements. However, the court determined that the inspectors' decision to exclude the applicants' legal representatives was unreasonable because it was made without considering the inspectors' reasons and without giving the applicants an opportunity to respond to those reasons.

The court set aside the inspectors' direction to exclude the applicants' legal representatives from attending their examinations and dismissed the application in all other respects. The court also ordered ASIC to pay the applicants' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The direction made by the Second and Third Respondents on Friday 10 October 2008 is set aside and the application is otherwise dismissed.

2. The First Respondent pay the costs of the Applicants.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

It is necessary to say, first, something of the facts.FACTS In August 2008 ASIC commenced an investigation into the affairs of Secured Bond Ltd and a number of other persons and entities. Secured Bond Ltd was involved, so ASIC alleged, in an illegal managed investment scheme called the “Master Fund” or “Secured Bond Ltd Master Fund”. By 2 September 2008, those responsible for the investigation believed that a number of persons, who did not hold financial services licences, had improperly offered investment advice to investors based in New South Wales in relation to the Master Fund. They also believed that the Master Fund had the features of a managed investment scheme but was not, as it should have been, registered. ASIC’s investigators were also aware by that date of a witness, Mr Matthew, who told them that he had met twice with two of the Applicants, Mr Collard and Ms Li, and that they had solicited from him an investment in the Master Fund. That meeting had been organised by the third Applicant, Ms Zeng. Ms Zeng appeared subsequently to have witnessed Mr Matthew’s signature on a document (called by ASIC “the Master Fund Contract”) and to have provided him, on a slip of paper, the details of the bank account into which he should transfer the funds for investment in the Master Fund. The investigators also appeared to suspect that substantial sums had been deposited into various overseas accounts. On 2 September 2008 ASIC commenced proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales against a number of persons and entities in relation to the Secured Bond Master Fund. Amongst the persons joined to the proceedings were the Applicants. ASIC sought a range of interlocutory orders including asset preservation orders in respect of a number of persons and entities including the Applicants, orders that the Defendants, including the Applicants, file an affidavit as to their assets and liabilities, orders requiring the Applicants to surrender their passports to the Court and “repatriation orders” by which the return to Australia of certain funds was to be achieved. ASIC’s originating process also sought final relief which included the winding up of the Master Fund, the appointment of a receiver to the property of all of the defendants and the return of investor funds. The evidence before me does not disclose whether ASIC obtained any of the interlocutory relief ex parte, although it does appear that there was an inter partes hearing of some description on 4 September 2008. What is clear, however, is that on 7 October 2008 the Supreme Court made asset preservation orders, orders requiring the surrender of the Applicants’ passports and fund repatriation orders. These orders were expressed to expire on 12 December 2008. The orders dealing with the issue of fund repatriation were made on 14 October 2008. The Applicants retained the services of Messrs Atanaskovic Hartnell on 3 September 2008, that is, the day after ASIC’s proceedings in the Supreme Court were commenced. A partner of that firm, Mr Anthony Geoffrey Hartnell, went on the record for the Applicants in those proceedings. Atanaskovic Hartnell had not previously been involved with any of the Applicants.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRAM J
There were three issues between the parties.(a)The identity and authority of the decision-maker. ASIC contended that it had given the direction. The Applicants denied that the power to exclude Atanaskovic Hartnell from the examinations was a power which was vested in ASIC. They submitted that the power was vested in the inspectors. The inspectors were joined to the proceedings against this possibility.(b)The reasonable grounds issue. The Applicants submitted that the Full Court’s decision in Australian Securities Commission v Bell (1991) 32 FCR 517 meant that the inspectors’ direction was liable to be set aside unless they – the inspectors – demonstrated during the present proceeding that there were reasonable grounds for a bona fide belief on their part that to allow Atanaskovic Hartnell to represent all three of the Applicants would be likely to prejudice the investigation. ASIC, on the other hand, argued that Bell was concerned with the evidential consequences of the regulator failing to provide any reasons for the making of such a direction. Since ASIC furnished reasons for its direction it followed that the principle was inapplicable. Even if that were not so, ASIC argued that the materials before the Court showed that there were reasonable grounds for a bona fide belief on its or the inspectors’ part that to allow the Atanaskovic Hartnell to represent all three Applicants would be likely to prejudice the investigation.(c)The procedural fairness issue. As an alternative, the Applicants argued that the power to exclude their lawyers from the examinations was a power the exercise of which attracted an obligation of procedural fairness. Since the inspectors did not give the Applicants any opportunity to argue that the direction should not be made, it followed, so the argument ran, that they had denied the Applicants procedural fairness. ASIC, on the other hand, denied that the power to exclude the Applicants’ legal advisers from an examination was a power the exercise of which was conditioned upon adherence to requirements of procedural fairness. It pointed to the fact that the decision to summon the Applicants for examination in the first place was not subject to those requirements and asked, rhetorically, how in the midst of a process in which procedural fairness did not figure largely such an obligation might be found to exist. Against the possibility that it might be found to exist, ASIC submitted that, in the circumstances, the content of the obligation would be diminished to such a low level that it should be found that the obligation had been discharged.First issue: the identity and authority of the decision-maker ASIC contended that it was it, as a corporate entity, that had given the direction to exclude Mr Hartnell and Atanaskovic Hartnell from being present at all the examinations. The Applicants made no express submission about that question but did submit that if ASIC was the decision-maker (as it submitted) then it had no power to give the direction. This was because the power to exclude a person from an examination was conferred by s 22(1) of the ASIC Act and that provision conferred power not on ASIC but on the inspector conducting the examination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRAM J