Coroners (W.A.)—Inquest—Right of parents of deceased to be heard—Extent of right—Coroners Act 1920 (W.A.), s. 24. Administrative Law—Natural justice—Application to coronial inquest—Right of parents of deceased to be heard—Extent of right—Coroners Act 1920 (W.A.), s. 24.
Decisions
MASON C.J., DEANE AND McHUGH JJ. The question in this appeal is whether Mr Coroner McCann S.M., who is conducting an inquiry into the death of James Arthur Annetts (the deceased), misconceived or exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to hear submissions from counsel representing the parents of the deceased ("the appellants"). The facts and relevant statutory provisions are set out in the judgment of Toohey J. We need not repeat them.
2. It can now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice regulate the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words of necessary intendment: The Commissioner of Police v. Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383, at pp 395-396; Twist v. Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106, at pp 109-110; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487, at pp 496, 500; J. v. Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447, at p 456; Haoucher v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 64 ALJR 357, at p 371; 93 ALR 51, at p 73. In Tanos, Dixon C.J. and Webb J. said (at p 396) that an intention on the part of the legislature to exclude the rules of natural justice was not to be assumed nor spelled out from "indirect references, uncertain inferences or equivocal considerations". Nor is such an intention to be inferred from the presence in the statute of rights which are commensurate with some of the rules of natural justice: Baba v. Parole Board of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 338, at pp 344-345, 347, 349. In Kioa v. West (1985) 159 CLR 550, Mason J. said (at p 584) that the law in relation to administrative decisions: "has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention." In Haoucher, Deane J. said (at p 358; p 53 of ALR) that the law seemed to him:
"to be moving towards a conceptually more satisfying position where common law requirements of procedural fairness will, in the absence of a clear contrary legislative intent, be recognised as applying generally to governmental executive decision-making".
3. Accordingly, the critical question in the present case is not whether "the rules of natural justice require an extension of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Annetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57
Case
[1990] HCA 57
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Annetts v McCann concerned a claim for damages for nervous shock brought by the plaintiffs, the parents of a deceased young man, against the defendant, the owner of a property where their son had died in a fall. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had been negligent in failing to take reasonable steps to prevent their son from accessing a dangerous cliff edge on his property, and that this negligence had caused them to suffer psychiatric injury. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiffs, as parents who had not witnessed the accident or its immediate aftermath, could recover damages for psychiatric injury (nervous shock) arising from the death of their son. This required the court to consider the established common law principles governing claims for nervous shock, particularly the requirements of proximity in terms of relationship, physical proximity to the event, and the suddenness of the shock.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principles established in *Tame v New South Wales* and *Annetts v McCann* (1993) 178 CLR 219, but clarified that the common law should not be unduly constrained by rigid categories. The court held that the plaintiffs' claim was not barred simply because they did not witness the accident or its immediate aftermath. Instead, the court focused on whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, and whether the psychiatric injury suffered by the plaintiffs was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's breach of that duty. The court found that the plaintiffs' relationship with their son, their proximity to the event (being informed of the death shortly after), and the sudden and tragic nature of the event were sufficient to establish a duty of care and foreseeability of harm.
The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case for negligence. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a new trial on the question of liability and damages.