Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
COMMISSIONER  APPELLANT

AND

KEVIN PATTINSON & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson

[2022] HCA 13

Date of Hearing: 7 December 2021
Date of Judgment: 13 April 2022

M34/2021

ORDER

1. Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 16 October 2020 and, in their place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

S P Donaghue QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, and T M Begbie QC with J D Watson for the appellant (instructed by MinterEllison)

R M Doyle SC with P A Boncardo and B Bromberg for the respondents (instructed by Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ. This appeal concerns the scope of the power conferred on the Federal Court of Australia by s 546 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act") to impose civil pecuniary penalties in respect of contraventions of the civil remedy provisions of the Act.

  2. The contraventions in question occurred in September 2018 at a building site in Frankston, Victoria. The site was occupied by Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd, the principal contractor. The first respondent ("Mr Pattinson") was an employee of Multiplex. He was also an officer of the second respondent union ("the CFMMEU") and was the union delegate on site[1].

  3. A subcontractor was engaged to install solar panels at the site. Two employees of the subcontractor arrived at the site to carry out that work and attended an induction conducted by Mr Pattinson. During the induction, Mr Pattinson enquired whether the two employees were "union" and whether they had a "ticket". This enquiry alluded to the CFMMEU's longstanding "no ticket, no start" policy, pursuant to which all workers are required to hold union membership in order to work on construction sites where the CFMMEU has a presence. Since at least the advent of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), the implementation of such a policy has been unlawful[2].

    [2]Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson (2019) 291 IR 286 at 291‑292 [3]‑[9] ("ABCC v Pattinson"); Pattinson v ABCC (2020) 282 FCR 580 at 587 [11].

  4. Neither employee was a member of the CFMMEU and they told Mr Pattinson as much. In response, Mr Pattinson represented to the two employees that, in order to perform the work they had attended the site to perform, they were required to become a member of an industrial association ("the misrepresentations"). As a result of the misrepresentations, the two employees were prevented from performing any work on the site that…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCA 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner against the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the determination of pecuniary penalties for contraventions of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth). The dispute arose from findings that a union officer and the union itself had contravened section 349(1) of the Act, which prohibits knowingly or recklessly making false or misleading representations about another person's obligation to engage in industrial activity. The union had a history of contravening the Act.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the discretion to impose a pecuniary penalty under section 546 of the Act was constrained by a notion of proportionality drawn from criminal law, and whether the statutory maximum penalty for a civil remedy provision could only be imposed for the most serious category of contravening conduct.

The High Court held that the discretion to impose an "appropriate" penalty under section 546 of the Act is informed by well-settled principles aimed at deterrence and does not require the imposition of a penalty proportionate to criminal offending. The Court reasoned that the object of civil penalties is deterrence, and where a contravention is part of an industrial strategy pursued without regard for the law, a court may reasonably conclude that no penalty short of the maximum would be appropriate to deter future non-compliance. The Full Court's interference with the penalties imposed by the primary judge was found to be based on an erroneous application of a "notion of proportionality" derived from criminal law, which distracted from the core question of whether the penalties were reasonably necessary to deter further contraventions, particularly in light of the union's history of non-compliance.

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Full Court, and reinstated the penalties originally ordered by the primary judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 16 October 2020 and, in their place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ EDELMAN J
The reasons of the Full Court identify no reason for reducing the penalty fixed by the primary judge in relation to Mr Pattinson. It is noteworthy that the primary judge did not impose on Mr Pattinson anything like the maximum penalty that might have been imposed upon him. If the Full Court's interference with the primary judge's exercise of discretion in relation to Mr Pattinson is explicable on the same basis as that which led to the Full Court's interference with the penalty imposed on the CFMMEU, then, for the reasons set out above, there was no basis for that course. The penalty imposed by the primary judge in relation to Mr Pattinson should be restored.Conclusion The theory of s 546 of the Act is that the financial disincentive involved in the imposition of a pecuniary penalty will encourage compliance with the law by ensuring that contraventions are viewed by the contravenor and others as an economically irrational choice. Whether or not experience vindicates the theory of the Act is a matter for Parliament. The court's function is to give effect to the intention of the Act. In this regard, the court must do what it can to deter non‑compliance with the Act. Where it is evident that a contravention has occurred as a matter of industrial strategy pursued without regard for the law, it is open to a court acting under s 546 reasonably to conclude that no penalty short of the maximum would be appropriate. The circumstance that the imposition of the maximum penalty might not prove in fact to be effective to deter further contraventions is not a reason to impose a lesser penalty or no penalty at all. The judicial task of setting an "appropriate" penalty under s 546 of the Act is informed by well‑settled principles that have been applied without difficulty, and which require no supplementation by the Full Court's "notion of proportionality", drawn from the criminal law context of Veen [No 2]. The Full Court expressly acknowledged that "we are not in the domain of crime" and that "[t]he imposition of civil penalties is free from notions of retribution and denunciation, its object is deterrence"[84]. But it is impossible to square these acknowledgements with their Honours' conclusions, from which it is apparent that their Honours were distracted by their "notion of proportionality" from coming to grips with the central question: whether, in light of the CFMMEU's strategy of non‑compliance with the law, the penalties imposed by the primary judge were reasonably necessary to deter further contraventions. [84]Pattinson v ABCC (2020) 282 FCR 580 at 646 [191]. To say, as the Full Court did, that on the approach taken by the primary judge "[t]he penalty becomes imposed not for the instant contravention but, to some degree, for the past, again"[85] is to fail to appreciate that the significance of the CFMMEU's past offending is that it demonstrates a fixed "intention of promoting a no‑ticket no‑start policy"[86]. It is to fail to appreciate that the CFMMEU's tenacity in adhering to that policy reflects a calculation on its part that the industrial benefits from that adherence are such that the lesser penalties previously imposed are a price worth paying so that it can continue to have its way.[85]Pattinson v ABCC (2020) 282 FCR 580 at 647 [195]. See also 657 [231].[86]Pattinson v ABCC (2020) 282 FCR 580 at 647 [195].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ, EDELMAN J

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