IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M117 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Applicant
and
KEVIN PATTINSON
First Respondent
CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 20 MAY 2021, AT 9.29 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.P. DONAGHUE, QC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please your Honours, I appear with MS J.D. WATSON, for the applicant. (instructed by MinterEllison)
MS R.M. DOYLE, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR P.A. BONCARDO and MR B. BROMBERG, for the respondent. (instructed by CFMMEU)
GAGELER J: Yes, Mr Donaghue.
MR DONAGHUE: Your Honours, this special leave application is a result of differences of opinion that have emerged in the Federal Court since this Court gave its judgment in the Agreed Penalties Case, and it is to the ramifications of that case for the correct approach to the setting of civil penalties, particularly with respect to contraveners who have demonstrated an unwillingness to obey the law. In the Agreed Penalties Case, of course this Court was clear that retribution and rehabilitation had no part to play in the imposition of civil penalties and it emphasised that the primary, not the only, object of the imposition of such penalties was to:
put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others [of those] who might be tempted to contravene the Act.
GAGELER J: Mr Donaghue, that underlies your proposed ground 1, as I understand it.
MR DONAGHUE: Yes.
GAGELER J: What can you say in support of proposed ground 2?
MR DONAGHUE: Really only, your Honours, that if the Court were minded to give leave on ground 1, then that would be a short point that warrants correction but I cannot say that there is a point of general principle inherent within ground ‑ ‑ ‑
EDELMAN J: It is not really much more than a construction of the primary judge’s reasons, is it?
MR DONAGHUE: It is not, your Honour, that is right.
GAGELER J: It might be useful if we hear from Ms Doyle at this point.
MR DONAGHUE: If the Court pleases.
GAGELER J: You can limit your submissions to proposed ground 1, Ms Doyle.
MS DOYLE: Thank you for that indication, your Honour. To succeed in obtaining a grant of special leave, the applicant regulator here must demonstrate that the Full Court erroneously concluded that the statutory maximum penalty for any contravention of a civil penalty provision, an Act, operates as a mandatory yardstick. That is, of course, the manner in which the first question is posed in the regulator’s application for special leave.
It must also demonstrate that, insofar as the Full Court deployed the term “yardstick”…
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- Case
- [2021] HCATrans 90
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Full Federal Court were whether Mr. Pattinson had unlawfully entered the construction site contrary to section 500 of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth), and whether he had obstructed an ABCC inspector in the exercise of their powers under the Act. The Court also had to determine whether the penalties sought by the ABCC were appropriate, considering the nature of the contraventions and the relevant statutory provisions.
The Full Federal Court found that Mr. Pattinson had indeed unlawfully entered the site and obstructed the inspector. The Court reasoned that the provisions of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth) concerning entry and obstruction were clear and that Mr. Pattinson's actions fell squarely within their ambit. The Court applied the principles of statutory interpretation to uphold the ABCC's interpretation of the relevant sections. In relation to penalties, the Court considered the objective seriousness of the contraventions and the need for deterrence, ultimately upholding the imposition of penalties against both Mr. Pattinson and his company.
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts of the case revolve around Pattinson's conduct in relation to the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (the "Union"). Pattinson, an official of the Union, was found to have engaged in a series of contraventions of the Fair Work Act, including directing the Union to make payments to individuals who were not its members, contravening the Act's provisions on protected industrial action and engaging in conduct that facilitated illegal activities. These contraventions were discovered during an investigation into the Union's financial affairs and were found to be deliberate and repeated over time. The primary judge, Justice Edelman, initially imposed a penalty on Pattinson, which was subsequently reduced by the Full Court. The Commissioner sought special leave to appeal the Full Court's decision to the High Court, arguing that the Full Court had erred in its approach to setting civil penalties.
The Full Court of the Federal Court, in reducing the penalty imposed by the primary judge, held that the maximum penalty under the Fair Work Act should not operate as a mandatory yardstick but should be considered alongside other relevant factors. The Full Court emphasised the importance of deterrence as the principal object of civil penalties but also recognised the principle of proportionality as a fundamental aspect of the penalty-setting process. The Full Court found that the primary judge had erred in imposing a penalty that was disproportionate to the gravity and seriousness of Pattinson's conduct. The Commissioner's application for special leave to appeal focused on the Full Court's interpretation of the role of the maximum penalty and the principle of proportionality in determining civil penalties.
This case before the High Court of Australia is an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The matter stems from a decision in the Agreed Penalties Case by the High Court, which emphasised that the primary object of imposing civil penalties is to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act. The Full Court's decision in this case has raised questions about the correct approach to setting civil penalties, particularly with respect to the statutory maximum penalty and the principle of proportionality. The Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (the applicant) is seeking special leave to appeal the Full Court's decision, arguing that it erred in its interpretation of the statutory maximum penalty and the principle of proportionality. The Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (the second respondent) opposes the application, contending that the Full Court's approach was correct and in line with established principles. The High Court ultimately granted special leave to appeal, limited to the first ground proposed by the applicant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Full Court erroneously conclude that the statutory maximum penalty for any contravention of a civil penalty provision operates as a mandatory yardstick?
2. Did the Full Court erroneously interpret or apply the principle of proportionality in the imposition of civil penalties?
3. Does the Full Court's approach to the imposition of civil penalties, particularly in the context of section 546 of the Fair Work Act, contain an error affecting the application of the principle of proportionality?
4. Was the Full Court's treatment of the relevance of priors in the imposition of civil penalties correct, or did it result in an inappropriate penalty being imposed?
Held
1. The Full Court did not erroneously conclude that the statutory maximum penalty for any contravention of a civil penalty provision operates as a mandatory yardstick. Instead, the Full Court correctly held that the statutory maximum penalty is one factor among many to consider in the imposition of civil penalties.
2. The Full Court did not erroneously interpret or apply the principle of proportionality in the imposition of civil penalties. The Full Court correctly understood that the principle of proportionality must be applied to ensure that the penalty imposed is proportionate to the gravity and seriousness of the contravention.
3. The Full Court's approach to the imposition of civil penalties, particularly in the context of section 546 of the Fair Work Act, did not contain an error affecting the application of the principle of proportionality. The Full Court correctly recognised that the principle of proportionality is a fundamental principle in the imposition of civil penalties.
4. The Full Court's treatment of the relevance of priors in the imposition of civil penalties was correct. The Full Court correctly held that prior conduct is relevant to an assessment of the seriousness or gravity of the instant contravening conduct, but it cannot result in a penalty that is disproportionate to the contravention itself.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Full Court's decision in Pattinson was under scrutiny for its approach to the imposition of civil penalties, particularly in the context of section 546 of the Fair Work Act. The court's reasoning and ratio decidendi were central to the special leave application, with the High Court ultimately granting leave to appeal on the ground that the Full Court erroneously concluded that the statutory maximum penalty for any contravention of a civil penalty provision operates as a mandatory yardstick.
In its reasoning, the Full Court was clear that it did not treat the statutory maximum penalty as a mandatory yardstick. Instead, it considered the maximum penalty as one factor among many relevant to the imposition of an appropriate penalty. The Full Court emphasized that the statutory maximum penalty was set by Parliament for cases in which the need for deterrence is strongest, but it did not operate as a strict ceiling for penalties. This approach aligns with both criminal sentencing and civil penalty principles, where the maximum penalty is one consideration in a broader assessment of the gravity and seriousness of the contravention.
The Full Court also addressed the principle of proportionality, which is deeply rooted in criminal law sentencing principles and has long been applied to civil penalties. The court acknowledged that prior conduct is relevant to the assessment of the seriousness or gravity of the contravention but emphasized that neither prior history nor the object of deterrence can result in a penalty that is disproportionate to the contravening conduct itself. The Full Court's approach ensures that penalties are proportionate to the instant contravention, having regard to the maximum penalty and other relevant factors.
The Full Court's treatment of priors in the imposition of civil penalties was also scrutinized. The Full Court recognized that prior conduct is relevant to the assessment of the seriousness or gravity of the instant contravening conduct but made clear that it must not lead to a penalty that is disproportionate to the contravention itself. This nuanced approach ensures that the relevance of priors does not overshadow the need for proportionality in the imposition of civil penalties.
In summary, the Full Court's approach to the imposition of civil penalties, particularly under section 546 of the Fair Work Act, was deemed to contain an error in its treatment of the statutory maximum penalty as a mandatory yardstick. The court's approach to the principle of proportionality and the relevance of priors was found to be correct, as it properly balanced these principles with the need for deterrence. The ratio decidendi of the case is that while the statutory maximum penalty is one factor in the assessment of an appropriate penalty, it is not a mandatory yardstick. The imposition of civil penalties must be proportionate to the contravening conduct, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including prior conduct.