Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

Matter No B36/2015

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY
INSPECTORATE & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Matter No B45/2015

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND
ENERGY UNION & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY
INSPECTORATE & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate

[2015] HCA 46

9 December 2015

B36/2015 & B45/2015

ORDER

1.In each matter, appeal allowed.

2.Set aside paragraph 1 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 1 May 2015.

3.Remit the proceedings to the Federal Court for determination according to law.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

J T Gleeson SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with T M Begbie and R C A Higgins for the appellant in B36/2015 and the second respondent in B45/2015 (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

J K Kirk SC with E P White for the appellants in B45/2015 and the second and third respondents in B36/2015 (instructed by Hall Payne Lawyers)

C J Murdoch for the first respondent in both matters (instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright)

C A Moore SC with D M Tucker appearing as amici curiae in B36/2015 (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Practice and procedure – Civil penalties – Whether submissions as to agreed penalty permissible – Whether Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 applies to civil penalty proceedings.

Words and phrases – "agreed penalty", "appropriate penalty", "civil penalty".

Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth), ss 38, 49.

  1. FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ.   These are appeals from an order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Dowsett, Greenwood and Wigney JJ)[1] adjourning civil penalty proceedings before it under the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) ("the BCII Act") in which the parties had made submissions to the Court seeking the imposition of agreed penalties. The issue is whether the Full Court erred in adjourning the proceedings on the basis that the decision of this Court in Barbaro v The Queen[2] applies to a civil penalty proceeding brought under Pt 1 of Ch 7 of the BCII Act[3] and in particular whether Barbaro precludes a court from receiving an agreed or other submission as to the amount of a pecuniary penalty to be imposed under s 49 of the BCII Act. For the reasons which follow, the decision in Barbaro does not apply to civil penalty proceedings and a court is not precluded from receiving and, if appropriate, accepting an agreed or other civil penalty submission. 

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Details
Case
[2015] HCA 46
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning the permissibility of submissions regarding agreed penalties in civil penalty proceedings. The appeal was brought by the Commonwealth against the Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, following a decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The central dispute revolved around whether the principles established in *Barbaro v The Queen* (2014) 253 CLR 58, which addressed the role of the prosecution in criminal sentencing, applied to civil penalty proceedings.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether *Barbaro v The Queen* precluded parties in civil penalty proceedings from making submissions as to an agreed penalty, and if so, whether the Full Court of the Federal Court had correctly applied the reasoning of *Barbaro* to the civil penalty context. The High Court was required to determine the extent to which the distinction between the roles of the court and the prosecutor in criminal sentencing, as articulated in *Barbaro*, should inform the conduct of civil penalty proceedings.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court. The Court reasoned that *Barbaro* was concerned with the distinct role of the prosecution in criminal sentencing and the importance of maintaining a clear separation between the roles of the prosecutor and the sentencing judge. While acknowledging the Full Court's concerns about maintaining public perception and the potential for agreed penalties to undermine the court's ultimate decision-making power, the High Court found that the reasoning in *Barbaro* was not intended to apply to civil penalty proceedings. The Court considered that the utility of agreed penalty submissions in civil matters, as identified in cases like *Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Energy Australia Pty Ltd*, was a relevant consideration that distinguished them from criminal sentencing. The proceedings were remitted to the Federal Court for determination according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. In each matter, appeal allowed.

2. Set aside paragraph 1 of the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 1 May 2015.

3. Remit the proceedings to the Federal Court for determination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ GAGELER J KEANE J
Apart from the Federal Court, the issue also received some reasoned attention in the Victorian Court of Appeal, in Matthews v The Queen[58], in which a majority concluded that the reasoning in Barbaro is concerned only with the role of the Crown in the sentencing process and therefore does not apply to civil proceedings. The reasoning in Barbaro was subsequently considered by this Court in CMB v Attorney-General (NSW)[59]. In that case, it was reaffirmed that in criminal proceedings the determination of the appropriate sentence rests solely with the court, but that the prosecutor remains under a duty to assist the court to avoid appealable error where a sentencing judge indicates the form (as opposed to the duration) of a proposed sentencing order and the prosecutor considers it to be manifestly inadequate. [58][2014] VSCA 291 at [29] per Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA.[59](2015) 89 ALJR 407 at 420-421 [63]-[64] per Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ; 317 ALR 308 at 323-324; [2015] HCA 9.The decision below In this matter, the Full Court began their consideration of the issue with what they conceived to be the ratio decidendi of Barbaro. Their Honours identified it correctly, albeit incompletely, as being that "the prosecution's opinion as to sentencing range is irrelevant to the sentencing process"[60]. Despite so recognising that Barbaro was confined to criminal proceedings, however, the Full Court also referred to Weinberg JA's criticisms in Ingleby of the approach taken to civil penalty proceedings in NW Frozen Foods and Mobil Oil as having "anticipated at least part of the reasoning of the High Court in Barbaro"[61].[60]FWBII v CFMEU (2015) 229 FCR 331 at 369 [106].[61]FWBII v CFMEU (2015) 229 FCR 331 at 371 [114]. The Full Court specifically rejected Middleton J's analysis in Energy Australia on the basis that the certainty of outcome for regulators and respondents to which Middleton J referred[62]: "could only be achieved if there were a very high level of expectation that the Court would adopt the agreed outcome. Such an expectation would belie the pious assertion, frequently made, that it is for the Court to make the final decision. It is not clear to us that it is possible to maintain the public perception that the Court imposes the penalty and, at the same time, lead the parties to believe that their agreement will probably be adopted. With all respect to Middleton J we conclude that his reasons do not offer a viable basis for limiting the applicability of the decision in Barbaro to criminal sentencing."[62]FWBII v CFMEU (2015) 229 FCR 331 at 375 [133]-[134]. The Full Court rejected McKerracher J's reasoning in Mandurvit on the basis, they said, that they considered that "[his] Honour seems to have accepted that he was effectively bound by the decision in NW Frozen Foods" and had agreed with the observations of Middleton J[63].[63]FWBII v CFMEU (2015) 229 FCR 331 at 375 [137]. The Full Court acknowledged that there were "various differences" between the role of the prosecution in a criminal proceeding and the role of a regulator in civil penalty proceedings. But their Honours were of opinion that "none offered a principled basis for declining to apply the reasoning in Barbaro to proceedings for the imposition of a pecuniary penalty" and that, although Barbaro "arose in the context of a misguided assertion as to the prosecution's duty", the plurality's rejection of the proposition that the prosecution had a duty to offer a submission as to the available range "was based upon the view that it would, in any event, be inappropriate for the prosecution to do so"[64]. They added that the role of the regulator "would suggest that any view expressed by a regulator is also unlikely to be dispassionate, in the sense in which the High Court used that term", and that a regulator has "neither the history of independence nor detachment from the investigation which are generally characteristics of prosecuting authorities"[65].[64]FWBII v CFMEU (2015) 229 FCR 331 at 376-377 [141].[65]FWBII v CFMEU (2015) 229 FCR 331 at 377 [141].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ, GAGELER J, KEANE J

Thirdly, it was considered that to permit the Crown to state the bounds of the available range could lead to erroneous views about the importance of such a statement in the sentencing process, with consequent blurring of what should be, and be perceived to be, the sharp distinction between the role of the judge and the role of the prosecutor in the criminal trial process[51]. It was also noted that the supposed usefulness to a sentencing judge of a MacNeil-Brown submission wrongly assumed that the prosecution would act dispassionately in determining the available range[52].[51]Barbaro (2014) 253 CLR 58 at 72 [33].[52]Barbaro (2014) 253 CLR 58 at 71 [29].Subsequent consideration of the application of Barbaro Several judges at first instance have expressed diverse views as to whether Barbaro applies to civil proceedings. Up to the time of the decision of the Full Court in this case, however, there were only two cases in which judges of the Federal Court undertook a reasoned analysis of the issue. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Energy Australia Pty Ltd[53] ("Energy Australia"), Middleton J held that Barbaro does not preclude agreed penalty submissions in civil penalty proceedings. His Honour emphasised the utility and desirability of agreed penalty submissions as follows[54]: "The acceptance of agreed penalty amounts (providing always that the Court undertakes its duty to fix the appropriate penalty) increases the certainty of outcome for regulators and wrongdoers. This increases the predictability of outcomes for regulators and respondents and makes it more likely that proceedings will be resolved by agreement in an appropriate way and under the supervision of the Court. This in turn improves deterrence by encouraging the implementation of corrective measures and freeing up the resources of the regulator."[53](2014) ATPR ¶42-469.[54](2014) ATPR ¶42-469 at 44,192 [149]. Similarly, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mandurvit Pty Ltd[55] ("Mandurvit"), McKerracher J concluded that, in the context of the plurality's reasoning as a whole, the holding in Barbaro that the prosecution in a criminal sentencing proceeding should not make a submission as to the bounds of the available range was not intended to apply to civil pecuniary penalty cases[56]. His Honour also endorsed Middleton J's observations as to the utility and propriety of a court receiving and, if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions[57].[55](2014) ATPR ¶42-471.[56](2014) ATPR ¶42-471 at 44,236 [48].[57]Mandurvit (2014) ATPR ¶42-471 at 44,241-44,242 [77]-[79]; see also at 44,238 [59] quoting Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v AGL Sales Pty Ltd (2013) ATPR ¶42-449 at 43,509 [42] per Middleton J. Apart from the Federal Court, the issue also received some reasoned attention in the Victorian Court of Appeal, in Matthews v The Queen[58], in which a majority concluded that the reasoning in Barbaro is concerned only with the role of the Crown in the sentencing process and therefore does not apply to civil proceedings. The reasoning in Barbaro was subsequently considered by this Court in CMB v Attorney-General (NSW)[59]. In that case, it was reaffirmed that in criminal proceedings the determination of the appropriate sentence rests solely with the court, but that the prosecutor remains under a duty to assist the court to avoid appealable error where a sentencing judge indicates the form (as opposed to the duration) of a proposed sentencing order and the prosecutor considers it to be manifestly inadequate. [58][2014] VSCA 291 at [29] per Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA.[59](2015) 89 ALJR 407 at 420-421 [63]-[64] per Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ; 317 ALR 308 at 323-324; [2015] HCA 9.The decision below